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A Recipe for Bad Water:
Welfare Economics and
Nuisance Law Mixed Well*
Peter D. lunger**
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
represent the first comprehensive modem attempt to achieve an
effective scheme for water pollution control at the federal level.
Passage of the FWPCA and the increasing interest shown in inter-
disciplinary studies in law and economics suggest that lawyers will
be confronted with the argument that implementation of the FWPCA
will be too costly. In Part I of this article, the author examines the
theoretical bases of welfare economics and concludes that the claim
of excessive cost cannot be ethically or practically supported. In Part
II he examines the ineffectiveness of nuisance law as a means of
reducing water pollution. The author concludes that failure to im-
plement the FWPCA or some similar law will result in excessive
water pollution, even if one accepts the premises of welfare eco-
nomics.
INTRODUCTON
IN THE TWELFTH REGNAL YEAR of King Richard II, Par-
liament declared:
For that so much Dung and Filth of the Garbage and
Intrails as well of beasts killed, as of other Corruptions, be
cast and put in Ditches, Rivers, and other Waters, and
also within many other Places, within, about, and nigh unto
divers Cities, Boroughs, and Towns of the Realm, and the
Suburbs of them, that the Air there is greatly corrupt and
infect, and many Maladies and other intolerable Diseases
0 Copyright@ 1976 by Peter D. Junger.
00 Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University Law School,
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do daily happen .... [And therefore decreed] that all they
which do cast and lay all such Annoyances, Dung, Gar-
bages, Intrails, and'other Ordure in Ditches, Rivers, Waters,
and other Places aforesaid, shall cause utterly to be re-
moved, avoided, and carried away betwixt this and the
Feast of St. Michael next ensuing after the End of this
present Parliament, every one upon Pain to lose and to
forfeit to our Lord the King [20k]. .... 1
To ensure that the waters of England would remain pure, the
statute further provided that no one thereafter should throw or
cast any such annoyances into the waters, and anyone who did
was to be "punished after the Discretion of the Chancellor."2
It was a nice try, but nothing came of it. King Richard got
involved in the War of the Roses and finally, in the reign of Queen
Victoria, the statute was repealed along with a number of others
which had ceased to be in force.3 Despite various legislative at-
tempts 4 and judicial inventions,5 the United States has never
1. 12 Rich. II c. 13 (1388).
2. Id.
3. 19 & 20 Vict. c. 64 (1856).
4. See Water Pollution Control Act, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948); Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1956, 70 Stat. 498 (1956); Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, 75 Stat. 204 (1961); Water
Quality Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 903 (1965); Water Quality Improvement Act
of 1970, 84 Stat. 91 (1970).
5. The "Refuse Act" provision of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations
Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152, nearly became an outright prohibi-
tion of all forms of water pollution. See United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
384 U.S. 244 (1966); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482
(1960). See also Rogers, Industrial Water Pollution and the Refuse Act: A
Second Chance for Water Quality, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 761 (1971); Tripp &
Hall, Federal Enforcement Under the Refuse Act of 1899, 35 ALBANY L. REv.
60 (1970); Note, The Refuse Act of 1899: Its Scope and Role in Control of
Water Pollution, 58 CAIrn. L. REv. 1444 (1970). Understandably, perhaps,
the executive branch of the government declined to enforce this prohibition
against "intentional" polluters. To have done so would have been to seek
injunctions against half the factories in the country. See Puro, Water Pollution
Legislation and the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899: The Environmentalist
Point of View, 16 ST. Louis L.J. 63 (1971). Any hopes of having a licensing
program under the 1899 Act was scuttled by the pyrrhic victory of the en-
vironmentalists in Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971), and perhaps
sunk by the Environmental Protection Agency's support of a House bill H.R.
14103, that would have nullified the Kalur decision for four years. 3
ENviRoN. Rpm. 10 (1972).
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), enshrines the Supreme Court's
discovery of a federal common law of nuisance, a not completely revolu-
tionary concept. Cf. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,
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had, at least until the passage of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972 (FWPCA), any body of federal
law that was more effective in controlling water pollution 7 than
the Statute of Richard II. It is not clear even now that we have
an effective pollution control law, but at least we have the legis-
lative scaffolding upon which such a law can be built.
Some states may, of course, have pollution control laws which
are effective, but it is clear that many do not-especially since
effectiveness is not only a function of the law as it is written, but
also of its enforcement. Ohio's water pollution control laws,8 for
example, appear to be somewhat effective on paper, but what is
one to make of the recent decision 9 of the Ohio Environmental
304 U.S. 92 (1938), decided concurrently with Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), and holding, per Brandeis, J., "[Wihether the water of an
interstate stream must be apportioned between the two States is a question of
'federal common law' upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of
either State can be conclusive." 304 U.S. at 110. Cf. In re Debs, 158 U.S.
564 (1895) (blocking railroads equals blocking highways equals a federal
common law nuisance).
This federal nuisance law is still largely undefined, and it is questionable
whether it creates any rights in private persons. Cf. Washington v. General
Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972). Even if the federal law does permit
private rights of action, they will necessarily be subject to the difficulties in-
herent in private litigation to prevent pollution which are discussed at length
in this article. Some of the problems of private pollution litigation will be
aggravated in the federal courts. For example, the problem of the plaintiff's
standing will be exacerbated by the federal jurisdictional amount requirements
as interpreted by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Zahn v. International Paper
Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
6. 33 U.S.C. §§1251 etseq. (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 33 U.S.C. §§1151
et seq. (1970). See also Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act
of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1974).
7. Throughout this article the word "pollution" will be used in the sense
of the definition given in FWPCA § 502(19), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) (Supp.
IV, 1974): "the man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physi-
cal, biological, and radiological integrity of water."
Throughout this article the words "pollution" and "polluter" are used
without derogatory connotatios. It would be desirable to use another term
to describe man-induced changes in the nation's waters, since conceivably
some such changes may be improvements. Unfortunately, no such word exists.
It is even more unfortunate that there is no neutral term for a "polluter." We
are all to a greater or lesser extent polluters. It would be unfortunate if we
were tempted to cry out that we are all sinners, and, therefore, we should do
anything to improve water quality. Almost all pollution has benefits associated
with it (e.g., the product of industry or the availability of modern plumbing).
The question is not whether pollution is immoral, but whether the costs are
worth the benefits.
8. OHio REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 6111.01 et seq. (Baldwin Supp. 1975).
9. 5 BNA ENvIRoN. REP. Ctnmr Dxv. 1285 (1974).
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Protection Agency to lower the water quality standards on the
Cuyahoga, Cleveland's infamous burning river?1 °
In any case, water pollution is a national problem that cannot
be regulated effectively by the states. It does not require a learned
understanding of the complexities of the hydrological cycle for
one to be aware that all waters eventually flow into the sea. Nor
does one need a thorough grounding in econometrics to realize
that the industries which are the sources of much water pollution
are part of a national and international economic system which is
not amenable to regulation by the individual states. This is so de-
spite the timid assertions of the national legislature that the states
have the "primary responsibilities and rights.. . to prevent, reduce,
and eliminate pollution. ... "I
Because the quality of the nation's waters is a national prob-
lem, the passage of the FWPCA is encouraging. But it takes little
prescience to foresee that it will be subjected to severe attack on
economic grounds. It is not contended here that the FWPCA is good
legislation; on the contrary, the Act is an abomination. One of
the gentlest comments about it from a lawyer is Professor Murphy's
remark that the FWPCA's definition of "pollutant"12 must have
been written by a stand-up comedian.13 Despite its shortcomings,
the FWPCA has the potential of supplying legislative authority for
regulations which could, if conscientiously enforced, result in im-
10. Tnm MAGAZNE, Aug. 1, 1969, at 41.
11. FWPCA § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. IV, 1974). See also
Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, § 202(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4371
(b) (1970), where the Congress declares that "there is a national policy for
the environment which provides for the enhancement of environmental quality"
and then concludes with a preposterous whimper: "The primary responsibility
for implementing this policy rests with State and local governments."
12. The term "pollutant" means dredged spoil, solid wastes, incinerator
residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes,
biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded
equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agri-
cultural waste discharged into water. This term does not mean (A)
"sewage from vessels" within the meaning of section 312 of this Act;
or (B) water, gas, or other material which is injected into a well to
facilitate production of oil or gas, or water derived in association with
oil or gas production and disposed of in a well, if the well used either
to facilitate production or for disposal purposes is approved by au-
thority of the State in which the well is located, and if such State
determines that such injection or disposal will not result in the degra-
dation of ground or surface water resources.
FWPCA § 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (Supp. IV, 1974).
13. In conversation of Professor E.F. Murphy of the Ohio State University
Law School, former Chairman of the Ohio Environmental Board of Review.
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proved water quality throughout the land. The passage of the
FWPCA over President Nixons veto required the expenditure of
tremendous amounts of political energy and goodwill;14 it seems
improbable that we could obtain a better law in the foreseeable
future. While the problems raised by the FWPCA's infelicities
and self-contradictions must be subjected to intensive critical ana-
lysis if that Act is ever to be implemented successfully, the first
priority must be to protect the FWPCA from evisceration by the
impersonal economic forces which have turned so many of our
nation's streams and lakes into sewers and cesspools. The FWPCA
should not be criticized without first demonstrating its necessity i5-
bad water is worse than bad law.
The natural inclination is to say that the necessity and justifica-
tion for governmental regulation of water pollution lies in the
desire of man for an uncorrupted world. The question of how
pure our world should be, and thus how pure its waters should
be, is one of ethics rather than economics. While that conclusion
is self-evident to some, it is denied by those who profit from
befouling our streams.'8
14. In his veto message to the Congress on October 17, 1972, President
Nixon said:
Legislation which would continue our efforts to raise water quality,
but which would do so through extreme and needless overspending,
does not serve the public interest... Even if this bill is rammed
into law over the better judgment of the executive... certain provi-
sions of § 2770 confer a measure of spending discretion upon the
President, and if forced to administer this legislation I mean to use
those provisions to put the brakes on budget-wrecking expenditures as
much as possible.
In the early hours of October 18, the House overrode his veto by a 247
to 23 roll call vote, and the Senate by a 51 to 12 roll call vote. 30 CONe.
Q. WsZY REP. 2754 (Oct. 21, 1972).
15. Originally, I sat down to write an article which would show how
badly the FWPCA was drafted and how difficult it would be to make it
work. Demonstrating the necessity for some water pollution control legisla-
tion-that the operations of neither the marketplace nor the common law of
nuisance will result in clear water-was to have been but a short preface.
That short preface has become this long article because that demonstration
demands more than a cursory treatment. I may yet write the article criticizing
the FWPCA, but first things first
16. "[Plrivate industry, when it bothers at all to justify its existence to
society, is prone to do so just on the grounds that the value of what it
produces exceeds the cost it incurs-gains exceed losses, in other words. But
what are costs under the existing law and what ought to count as costs is
just what is in issue." E.J. MisHAN, THE CosT OF EcoNOMIc GROWTH 70
(1967).
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I am writing what is, in effect, a brief against the arguments of
those who employ economic jargon to argue that the implementa-
tion of the FWPCA will "cost too much," and against those efforts
which attempt to apply economic theory to the moral and political
question, "How clean should our waters be?"
Unfortunately, this article is not brief. One of the primary
obstacles to brevity is trying to prove a negative with all of
the difficulties such an effort entails. Furthermore, I am attempting
to satisfy you that a very complex system of arguments-many of
which are couched in mathematical notation that I cannot fully
comprehend-is useless, misleading, silly, and immoral. At the
same time, I must assume that most readers are unfamiliar with
the details of the economic theories I am attacking. You have,
I am sure, come across arguments couched in terms of "economic
efficiency" and "cost-benefit analysis." Many of you have heard
of 'Pareto optimality" at some time or other. But, unless you are
well-grounded in economics, it is quite unlikely that you have
been exposed to the entire theory that underlies such arcane
jargon. Even if you are an economist, it is unlikely that you have
ever studied more than bits and pieces of the theory. 17 I have
found only two books 1I purporting to set out the complete theory
that are accessible to one, like myself, whose mathematical achieve-
ments have never gone beyond a nodding acquaintance with or-
dinary differential equations. However long this article may be,
these books are longer, so I would not lighten the burden I am
imposing upon you were I to insist that you read one of them be-
fore attending to my arguments. I am, therefore, constrained to
sketch both the theory and its applications in order to refute them.
The question of how clean our waters should be is not merely
a question of life and death. It goes to the very meaning and
17. The basic apparatus of analytical welfare economics is a branch
of the subject taken for granted at all levels. The student often pro-
ceeds to higher degrees without giving it serious study, though the
advanced literature in his chosen field will often assume familiarity
with it. Welfare economists write critiques of their subject on the
assumption that their readers will be familiar with what it is that
is being criticized. Practitioners of applied (welfare) economics all
too often pay lip service to the role of social values in such a way as
to emphasize only that they have never really thought about what
a social value is.
D. WINCa, ANALYTncAL WErxArE EcoNoMIcs 11 (1971).
18. J. GnAFF, TmzoRErscAL WEr.F4m ECONOMICS (1967); D. WINCH,
supra note 17. Two other books that may be helpful are M. DOBBS, WEL-
FARE ECONOMIcs AND THE EcoNoMIcs OF SOCIALISM (1969), and S. NATH,
A REAPPRmSAL OF WELFARE EcoNoMics (1969).
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quality of life, and of our lives, belonging more to eschatology
than to economics. Thus, though I write with some reluctance,
I must present all arguments that will expose the specious nature
of those anaylses used to justify the spoiling of the very waters
which sustain our lives. You may think that I belabor the issue,
but the cause is worth fighting for. Besides, I hope--pathetic
dream of gloxy-to kill and bury the claim that we cannot afford
to save the still waters and the quick and rushing streams-that
we cannot afford our very sustenance. 19
THE Fnwr PAR-T HxEiN oF ECONOMIcs
I. CAVFAT LFCOR
I should make two caveats at the beginning. The first caveat
is that I am obviously biased. I am pleading a cause. I would
suggest that this is not a reason to discount my argument, as
opposed to, perhaps, my rhetoric. I could, I suppose, disguise
my personal position behind a mask of scientific objectivity, but
that would not be quite honest.20 Moreover, the issues I am dis-
cussing are moral issues that involve, and are significant only to
the extent that they do involve, human feelings. I am arguing
against the prescriptions of an abstract mathematical machine.
Perhaps my most telling argument is that I, like you, have feelings
that I am descended from some finny ancestor whose native sea
still flows warmly in my veins. Beneath our skins we still require
an aquatic environment.
The second caveat is that all of my arguments are directed
against the application of welfare economic theory to the question
of whether we should preserve the quality of our waters. I am not
19. Of course, I am not arguing that the FWPCA cannot be improved. I
am not even arguing that economic analysis cannot give us insights into how it
might be improved. All I am claiming is that economics can say nothing about
how many resources and how much effort we should expend to preserve the
waters. The best application of those resources and efforts-once they are
committed-may well be a legitimate subject for economic argumentation.
20. No sober judge of human affairs will feel bound to be indignant
because those who force on our notice truths which we would other-
wise have overlooked, overlook some of those which we see. Rather
he will think that so long as popular truth is one-sided, it is more
desirable than othaerwise that unpopular truth should have one-sided
asserters too; such being usually the most energetic, and the most
likely to compel reluctant attention to the fragment of wisdom which
they proclaim as if it were the whole.
J.S. MmL, ON LmnarY 46 (Appleton-Century-Crofts ed. 1947).
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contending that the theory of welfare economics does not have
reasonable applications in other areas. I am not arguing, for
example, that we should or should not abolish the antitrust laws.
Furthermore, my arguments are directed only to what is known as
welfare economics. I am not attacking in any way the theories of
those who attempt to predict the positive economic consequences
of changes in our economic system. My argument is only with
those who would misapply economic theory to moral questions.21
Thus when I speak deprecatingly of "economists," it should be borne
in mind that I am referring to practitioners of welfare economics
who, more often than not, are law professors or engineers or pol-
luters practicing self-apologetics. We need a term to denote those
who dabble in law and economics, often to the shame of both
disciplines. I propose that we label them "lawconomists." 2
The points that I will be making in the first part of this article 23
are almost all concerned with an analysis of economic arguments.
Of necessity the discussion will be rather abstract with few re-
ferences to actual judicial opinions. In the second part 24 I shall
turn to an economic analysis-an efficiency analysis-of the work-
ing of the law of nuisance. I do, however, start my discussion
of economics with a description of an actual case or controversy
involving the destruction of a water course, a catastrophe that was
permitted, perhaps even encouraged, by the law relating to water
pollution.2 5 The question is whether economic arguments can
justify our bearing such a cost. I then discuss the interrelations of
law and economics 2 and explain the distinction between the con-
cepts of "distribution of wealth-a matter of primary concern to
lawyers and their clients-and "allocation of resources"- which is
the sole concern of welfare economics.
21. It is also true that not all economic moralizers can be described as
welfare economists. But in this country it is welfare economic theory that
clutters up our law reviews and supplies the theoretical foundation for the
cost-benefit analyses that are used to justify pollution. It is not so necessary
to answer Marxist moralizing.
22. There is a precedent for such a word; lawyers who dabble in petroleum
engineering have long been known as "lawgineers." See Junger, The Wyoming
Oil,& Gas Conservation Act: Private Rights and Public Policy, 13 Wyo. L.J. 3
(1958).
23. See text accompanying notes 40-423 infra.
24. See text accompanying notes 424-950 infra.
25. See text accompanying notes 40-43 infra.
26. See text accompanying notes 44-61 infra.
27. See text accompanying notes 62-78 infra.
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The major arguments in the first part of this article are directed
to the ethical and political, the moral and immoral assumptions
that supply the usually unstated basis for all economic arguments
directed toward increasing social welfare.28  These assumptions
include: the desirability of a so-called 'Pareto optimum," 29 the
rather unbelievable idea that you always know, and choose to do,
that which is best for you, 30 and the questionable proposition that
the only things of ethical value are human desires.31 These as-
sumptions lead to the conclusion that there are an infinite number
of optimal states 32 including all those optimal worlds in which
there are no human beings. One of the unstated moral bases of
most efficiency analyses is that all of these optimal worlds are
equally desirable, that it makes no difference to society's well-being
whether you are rich or poor, whether a river is corrupted or
whether it is clean.33
I then turn to a description of the manner in which economists
arrive at their social prescriptions on the basis of their peculiar
ethical assumptions: 4 This entails a discussion of the economic con-
cepts of benefits and costs, of value and of price.3 5 It also entails
a discussion of the grey art of "cost-benefit" analysis.36
The most important doctrine of welfare economics is that we
could reach one of the innumerable optimal states if the world-
including the law-behaved like an economic model of an efficient
market. This doctrine--dogma might be a more accurate term-
leads to the conclusion that we should try to change our legal
rules so that the world will act like the model. In the second part
of this article I demonstrate that our legal rules do not conform to
the prescriptions of the model. In order to make this demonstration,
I conclude the first part with a description of the model of an
efficient market;37 both how it works in theory,3 8 and why it does
not work in the real world.3 9
28. See text accompanying notes 79-88 infra.
29. See text accompanying notes 89-98 infra.
30. See text accompanying notes 99-98 infra.
31. See text accompanying notes 109-27 infra.
32. See text accompanying notes 128-35 infra.
33. See text accompanying notes 136-74 infra.
34. See text accompanying notes 175-243 infra.
35. See text accompanying notes 244-68 infra.
36. See text accompanying notes 269-89 infra.
37. See text accompanying notes 290-313 infra.
38. See text accompanying notes 314-50 infra.
39. See text accompanying notes 351-423 infra.
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II. A HomoR STORY
Although we as lawyers cann6t determine exactly how much
pollution there is in the world, nor how much that pollution "costs"
society, we should be aware that our nation's waters have been
corrupted for generations. Our own primary data base-the re-
ported decisions of courts- is replete with examples of our society's
ruthless destruction of its water resources. Consider the following
passages from the statement of the case in Cleveland v. Standard
Bag & Paper Co.:
Kingsbury run discharges into the Cuyahoga river a short
distance below the company's premises, and that river in
turn discharges into Lake Erie, all within the limits of the
city. From the admitted allegations ... and the undisputed
evidence it appears that the company for forty years and
the city for a period of more than twenty-five years
had been using this stream for the purposes of an open
sewer . . . the company through all that time discharging
into it the waste substances. of a noxious character con-
taining chemical ingredients from its entire plant and the
discharge from its water closets, the washings amounting
to a million gallons daily .... The other evidence in the
case shows that a condition of extreme pollution was pre-
sent in the stream prior to 1871. To that condition the
inhabitants of the valley of the run contributed generally.
Among the contributors are more than twenty large es-
tablishments discharging into the stream above the com-
pany's plant the contents of water closets and the refuse of
their business. They include a slaughter house, numerous
oil refineries, a paint factory, ice works, candle and axle
grease works, lubricating oil works and soap works....
[N]umerous private houses, located along the banks of
said run, discharged their wash water into the same, and
had privies located on the banks thereof .... [T]he fact
appears that the stream from a point approximately a mile
and a half above the company's plant to its mouth was for
more than twenty-one years before the beginning of the
suit given over wholly to the purposes of a sewer.40
This is not merely an illustration of the inevitable consequences
of those abstract phenomena that economists label "externalities",
"common pool resources", and "public goods", although it is that.
40. 72 Ohio St. 324, 327-30, 74 N.E. 206, 207 (1905).
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It is an actual description of the condition on July 6, 1900 41 of
what had once been a living stream.
It is also an illustration of the way in which the courts, spurred
on solely by private litigants pursuing private interests, must in-
evitably fail to preserve our waters from the forces that corrupt
them. The Bag Company's efforts to enjoin the city's discharges
of raw sewage into the stream were frustrated by the conclusion
of the Ohio Supreme Court: 'That during the period named the
city has increased the amount of sewage discharged into the run
is unimportant.... The added sewers required by the growth of
the city have been but a natural increase by it in the use of what
was already a public sewer."42
The court concluded with a delightfully macabre remark:
We trust that the view of the subject which we have taken
has not been influenced by a desire to enjoy the rare felicity
of awarding a substantial triumph to both parties. For
the operation of its plant the company can doubtless secure
a supply of sufficiently pure water from sources which have
become known in the thirty-five years during which re-
sort has been had to them. And the conclusion that Kings-
bury run is not within the rules of law for the protection
of streams devoted to their primary uses may exempt the
company from the ruinous consequences of indictment and
punishment under [the statutes] providing for the punish-
ment of offenses againsf public health.43
Admittedly, this one horrible example of a stream transmuted
into a sewer does not prove, nor could even a large number of
such examples prove, that the cost of pollution to society as a
whole exceeds the value of the associated benefits, or that there
would have been less pollution if the waters had been protected
by an efficient market rather than by the Supreme Court of Ohio.
But the inescapable fact is that the waters of Kingsbury Run were
corrupted at the turn of the century and for years before then.
Many other waters have since been destroyed. The most that
economic analysis can do is explain why-even if most men object
to such a state of affairs-individual pursuit of individual interests
will inevitably lead to such a horrid end. No economic analysis
41. Id. at 331, 74 N.E. at 207.
42. Id. at 345, 74 N.E. at 209 (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 346-47, 74 N.E. at 209.
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can justify such a despoliation of the world. Nothing could justify
it but some greater moral good. Nothing does justify it.
Ill. TBE ImELEVANCE OF WmxAmx ECONOMCS TO THE
ETHIcAL QuEsarON OF How CLEAN OuRa WATERis SHOULD BE
A. The Economic Background
This is not the place, nor am I qualified, to summarize or evalu-
ate the mass of data and articles which has accumulated over the
past few years relating to water quality. I am old-fashioned
enough to believe that a lawyer is most likely to be useful when
he applies his energies to those matters in which lawyers have
some competence. Unfortunately, but perhaps inevitably, more
and more discussions of the economic aspects of pollution are ap-
pearing in legal literature.44 This is not totally a bad thing. Some
of these works (usually by economists) are first-rate.45 Others
(often by lawyers) are unintelligible enough to be harmless,46 al-
44. Formerly law and economics intersected only in the fields of anti-
trust and public utility regulation; today the diligent reader of schol-
arly journals can also find economic analysis of crime control, accident
law, contract damages, race relations, judicial administration, corpora-
tions and securities regulation, environmental problems, and other
areas of central concern in the contemporary legal system.
R. POSNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW at ix (1973).
[The] relationship of the social sciences to law is again receiving new
emphasis. . . . Of all the social sciences, economics is perhaps
the one discipline most involved .... Regardless of how trite, useless,
and frustrating law professors may find this development, it behooves
law libraries ... to collect at least some of the literature of economics.
Ellington, The Literature of Economic Theory for Law Libraries, 65 LAw
LmnARY J. 33 (1972). But quaere whether it behooves us to read them.
"In recent years, lawyers increasingly have come to realize that arguments
about the allocative efficiency and overall desirability of particular govern-
mental and private decisions often can be effective in many of the forums
in which they represent those clients." Markovits, The Causes and Policy
Significance of Pareto Resources Misallocation: A Checklist for Micro-Economic
Policy Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1975). In this article I am attempting
to return arguments about allocative efficiency to their native state of
ineffectiveness.
45. See, e.g., Dewees, Economic Considerations in the Selection of Pollu-
tion Control Legislation, 10 OscoODE HALL L.J. 627 (1972). One tends to
appreciate the modesty of Professor Dewees' claims. For example, he says,
"[Tlhe economist's role does not include selecting the objectives for programs
such as pollution control." Id. at 632. See also J. DALES, POLLUTIoN, PRoP-
ERTY & PRICES (1968).
46. See Markovits, supra note 44. Professor Markovits is both a lawyer
and an economist. I mention this article only in my capacity as a lawyer for I
am sure it is intelligible to economists.
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though one may regret the loss of the trees which were pulped to
make the paper they were printed on.
Still others, though, are pernicious, either because the apparent
simplicity of their arguments may lead one to overlook the unten-
ability of their assumptions 47 or because their weighty style and
frequent references to mathematical proofs 48 (not included in their
text) may lead us innocents to believe that they contain the wis-
dom of a scientific oracle, if not of Apollo himself. Thus one recent
article of this genre by an economist moves cheerfully from the
bland remark that: "[G]eneral welfare to the economist is not in
substance very different from the lawyer's 'common good' or 'public
interest,' found in the preamble to many laws and as a criterion
for adjudicating disputes arising under common law" 49 through
the assertion that "[t]he value of having a competitive solution in
any market is assumed to be beneficial unless proved otherwise" 50
to the inevitable conclusion that "[p]ricing water at its true op-
portunity cost is the only way to ensure that society will derive
the highest possible benefit from its use of scarce water resources." 51
An otherwise excellent article by a lawyer and a brace of economists
concludes, in part on the basis of a cost-benefit study of efforts to
control water pollution in the Delaware River Basin, that the
FWPCA will result in billions being "wasted in a spurious war on
47. See, e.g., W. BAxTER, PEOPLE OR PENGuiNs, ThE CAsE FOR OPTRAL
POLLUTION (1974).
48. Economists have at times been guilty of seducing themselves with the
stark and meaningless beauty of their mathematics.
[Tihe problem of giving a meaning to the quantity of "capital" is
evaded by putting it into algebra. K is capital, nK is investment.
Then what is K? Why, capital of course. It must mean something,
so let us get on with the analysis, and do not bother about these
officious prigs who ask us to say what it means.J. Ronnsor, EcoNomc PmLosoPny 68 (1962).
49. Johnson, An Optimal State Water Law: Fixed Water Rights and Flex-
ible Market Prices, 57 VA. L. Rmr. 345, 347-48 (1971).
As a lawyer, I understand this remark of Dr. Johnson's to mean that "gen-
eral welfare" is a noise made by economists when begging questions.
50. Id. at 353. With this passage Dr. Johnson begs the question of the
"second best." See text accompanying notes 375-90 infra.
51. Johnson, supra note 49, at 374.
This sentence concludes Dr. Johnson's discussion of his proposed solution to
the problem of "how properly to allocate water resources among competing uses
in a way that maximizes general welfare." Id. (emphasis added). Dr.
Johnson argues that:
The market pricing system, which I have proposed, provides the
necessary unified approach. By requiring users to pay for water
according to the true cost of their use to society, the system guarantees
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'pollution' " 52 without the authors ever considering whether it makes
sense to extrapolate from a cost-benefit analysis of a pollution con-
trol program in one river basin to the adoption of a not-too-similar
program throughout the United States.53 I feel that some of these
economic prescriptions require an antidote, and the only remedy
that I can think of is, sadly, a homeopathic one.
that water will be allocated to uses getting the highest marginal bene-
fit from water. A user will be permitted to pollute only if he is pre-
pared to pay the price of pollution. That price will reflect the cost to
society of dealing with his pollution. Thus, pollution will be con-
trolled, and allocation will be based on actual ability to make the best
use of water resources rather than on a determination of which uses
provide the most benefit to society according to vague standards of
beneficiality.
Id. (emphasis added). If you think this passage is meaningless, you might
as well read on; I trust you will enjoy my exposition of our shared prejudices.
If, on the other hand, you understand what Dr. Johnson is saying (and
especially if you do so after reading his article), I can only assume that you
are suffering from an acute attack of the very metaphysical-economic flatus
that this article is intended to cure; it is to you I am preaching, not to the
converted.
52. Ackerman, Ackerman & Henderson, The Uncertain Search for Environ-
mental Policy: The Costs and Benefits of Controlling Pollution Along the
Delaware River, 121 U. PA. L. Rvv. 1225, 1295 (1973). See also Ackerman
& Sawyer, The Uncertain Search for Environmental Policy: Scientific Factflnd-
ing and Rational Decisionmaking Along The Delaware River, 120 U. PA. L. REv.
419 (1972).
Both of these articles are excellent and the one by Ackerman and Sawyer
is clearly a major contribution to the literature of both systems engineering and
environmental law. Most of the criticisms of the FWPCA contained in the
Ackerman, Ackerman and Henderson article are well taken; unfortunately,
they have chosen the easy road of describing how the FWPCA will probably
fail, rather than the harder, but necessary, way of explaining how it might be
made to work. For example, the authors are undoubtedly correct in assuming
that the Environmental Protection Agency will put too much emphasis on
oxygen-demanding wastes and too little on the control of poisons, 121 U. PA.
L. REv. at 1296, but there is nothing in the FWPCA that mandates this
unfortunate result. But cf. FWPCA § 301(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)
(1)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974) (mandating "secondary treatment," whatever that
may mean, for publicly-owned treatment works). There is a great deal of
work to be done by lawyers, economists, and systems engineers and analysts
if the dire predictions of Profs. Ackerman et al. are to be avoided.
53. It is always risky to take conclusions made on the basis of relatively
simple models and apply them to systems of several orders' greater com-
plexity. In this case, for example, the shift from a river basin to the entire
nation ignores the fact that a national system of pollution control would un-
doubtedly entail large shifts in the distribution of wealth and in taste through-
out the United States. See note 311 infra and accompanying text. Professor
Ackerman's wasted "billions" is, I am afraid, as meaningless a concept as Dr.
Johnson's "true cost' of pollution.
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Although I would prefer to stick to my own last, it is impossible
for me to substantiate my arguments without discussing economic
issues. And I must admit that when one deals with problems of
pollution, law and economics tend to become inextricably inter-
wined. To quote an economist who was concerned about pollution
a year or so before the subject became fashionable:
The branch of economics that is relevant to pollution
problems is concerned with social problems and social
decision-making; it is a relatively new branch of the sub-
ject and is less well-developed than the analysis of in-
dividual problems and individual decision-making that is
the main concern of traditional economics. My own foray
into this new area in pursuit of pollution problems has
led me to a vivid awareness of the very close relationship
between law and economics. Specifically, the linkage is
between prices-the stuff of economics-and the law of
property, or more explicitly of property rights.54
The reference in the preceding quotation to the linkage between
prices and property rights illustrates the dependence of economic
theory (and the very idea of economics) upon a particular type
of legal institution, viz., the institution of freely alienable property
or property rights.55 If there were no property, if anarchy were
54. J. DALES, supra note 45, at v. Professor Dales goes on to explain:
"Property rights constitute the set -of social rules that on the one hand gives
individuals the right to use their 'property' in certain ways and on the other
hand forbids them to use it in other ways." Id.
55. For most economic theory it is probably not too important whether
one considers that goods are "objects" or "rights." Even if one explicates
economic theory with examples of the demand for apples and oranges, it should
be apparent to any lawyer that the whole discussion would be meaningless if
it were not possible to own apples and oranges. Thus the "bundle of rights"
which we call property (or ownership) appears to be a condition precedent
to any economic discussion. I admit that one could describe the workings of a
black market in economic terms, but this merely means that the law (or
"custom" if the idea of illegal law offends you) that is operative in the market
differs from that espoused by the State-a situation not without precedent.
See the complaint of Chief Justice Holt in Buller v. Crips, 6 Mod. 30 (1702):
"The notes in question are only an invention of THE GOLDSMITHS in
Lombard Street, who had a mind to make a law to bind all those that did
deal with them."
The best exposition that I have found of the dogma that property is not
a "thing7" but a "right" appears in Eaton v. B.C.G.M. R.R., 51 N.H. 504, 509
(1872): "In a strict legal sense, land is not 'property,' but the subject of
property. The term 'property' ... in its legal signification 'means only the
rights of the owner in relation to it'."
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loose upon the world, there would be no science of economics. The
rules relating to the distribution of goods in a society whose sole
legal principle is "might makes right" could perhaps be formulated
by an anthropologist (or an ethologist, since it would probably be
impossible to have a human society based on such a principle),
but there would be nothing for an economist to study. If, on the
other hand, the distribution of goods were determined solely by
tradition or governmental fiat, it seems improbable that the science
of economics would ever have appeared, since the problems of
political economy became apparent only with the triumph of the
market system,50 which in turn probably depended on the devel-
opment of a legal system, which, for whatever historical reason,
encouraged the alienability of property, freedom and enforceability
of contract, and privately-created (but legally effective) corporate
organizations. 7
Of course when economists start talking (as they usually do) about money,
it becomes impossible in this age of unbacked currency and MDR's to pre-
tend that the discussion involves objects rather than highly abstract congeries
of jural relations.
Cf. E.J. MxsHrA, WELFARE EcoNomcs 226 (1969) ("[Tihe characteris-
tics of an optimal [economic] solution are not uniquely specified but depend,
in general, on the existing law.").
56. Although the societies of history have shown the most astonishing
economic diversity, although they have exalted kings and commissars,
used dried codfish and immovable stones for money, distributed their
goods in the simplest communistic patterns or in the most highly
ritualistic fashion, so long as they can by custom or command, they
needed no economists to make them comprehensible....
For the economists vaited upon the invention of a [new] solution to
the problem of survival. They waited upon the development of an
astonishing game in which society assured its own continuance by
allowing each individual to do exactly as be saw fit-provided he- fol-
lowed a central guiding rule. The game was called the "market
system," and the rule was deceptively simple: each should do what
was to his best monetary advantage ...
It was this paradoxical, subtle, and difficult solution to the problem
of survival that called forth the economists. For unlike the simplicity
of custom and command, it was not at all obvious that with each man
out only for his own gain, society could in fact endure....
It was the economists who undertook to explain this puzzle.
But until the idea of the market system itself had gained acceptance,
there was no puzzle to explain.
R. HE I.BRoNER, THrE WOnDLY PmosoPnEns 18-19 (4th ed. 1972) (empha-
sis added).
57. Economic situations do not automatically give birth to new legal
forms; they merely provide the opportunity for the actual spread
of a legal technique if it is invented. Many of our specifically
capitalistic legal institutions are of medieval rather than Roman
origin, although Roman law was much more rationalized in a logical
sense than medieval law. While this fact has certain economic
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It is this economic system which economics first set out to de-
scribe, with brilliant success. When one is analyzing the functioning
of a market, economic theory can supply a great deal of useful in-
formation, just as physics can tell us a great deal about solar or
atomic systems. But, when one considers the functioning of systems
which do not have a market, economics is less likely to be useful,
though it may still afford valuable insights into what is occurring.
Unfortunately, economists are so entranced by the idea of a market
that they continue to recommend that it be applied to the problems
of water quality,58 an idea that to my mind is as attractive as the
proposal that we should apply the second law of thermodynamics
to the writing of poetry-a proposal no physicist would make.
It is not necessary to my argument to insist that legal institutions
must take precedence (historically or otherwise) over economic
ones.5 It might be helpful, though, to keep in mind that the late
reasons, it is also due to a variety of reasons deriving entirely from-
differences of legal technique. The modes of thought of western
medieval law were in many respects "backward." Thus it was not
logic but a sort of legal animism or magic when the instrument in
writing was conceived as a tangible embodiment of "rights" rather
than as a rationale mode of proof. Not logical either was the custom-
ary practice, derived from legal particularism, of imposing upon all
sorts of communal groups solidary responsibility towards outsiders
for all their members; or the readiness to recognize separate funds
in the most diverse spheres, a phenomenon which, like the one men-
tioned just before, is explicable only in the light of purely political
conditions. These very elements of "backwardness in the logical and
governmental aspects of legal development enabled business to pro-
duce a far greater wealth of practically useful legal devices than had
been available under the more logical and technically more highly
rationalized Roman law. Quite generally one may observe that those
special institutions which, like those of medieval commercial law,
were particularly well suited for the emerging modem capitalism,
could arise more easily in the context of a society which, for
political reasons, produced a variety of bodies of law corresponding
to the needs of different concrete interest groups.
M. WEBE, LAw 3x EcoNomY AND Soc Ty 131-32 (Rheinstein ed. 1966)
(footnotes omitted).
58. See, e.g., J.. DAiES, supra note 45, at 77-100; Johnson, supra note 49;
cf. D'Arge & Hunt, Environmental Pollution, Externalities, and Conventional
Economic Wisdom: A Critique, 1 ENvmoN. AvAms 266 (1971).
59. Obviously, economic concepts (or their absence) can determine the
nature of legal institutions. See, e.g., R. voN JmmiNc, GEsT DS RoivIscMN
REcmrs 434-35 (5th ed 1898):
The reason why in all these cases one cannot account for the missing
profits does not lie in the rigors of the ancient law-rigors which
no one has yet defined clearly-but in the crudeness of an economic
viewpoint that considered only the visible and tangible object, the
good itself and its fruits, but not its intangible part, not the possibility
)f using it over time as an economic good and an object legally pur-
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middle ages did not sit down one day and, with a collective
stroke of genius, decide to create the market system.60 I am sug-
gesting that when we consider the problems of water quality, the
skills of a lawyer may be quite as useful as those of an economist;
I am not arguing that we should ignore all forms of economic
analysis. For example, the effects of the implementation of the
FWPCA upon unemployment rates are matters not past economic
conjecture, and such conjectures are relevant to the political-and
legal--questions as to how, and how rapidly, the FWPCA's man-
date should be implemented. What I am insisting is that economics
can give no help toward answering the teleological question of how
pure the waters should be, how stringently we should control the
sources of water pollution. Fortunately, "[e]conomics is not only
a branch of theology." 1
B. A Key Distinction: Distribution Versus Allocation
If only to prove that I am not blindly prejudiced against all
types of economic analysis, I wish to stress at the beginning of my
argument an extremely useful distinction, that between the "dis-
tribution of wealth" and the "allocation of resources." This dis-
tinction is so important to welfare economic theory that unless one
has a firm grasp of it, one is not likely to be able to follow my
arguments. It is also extremely useful apart from welfare econo-
mics, for it is one of those perceptive distinctions that supplies
the same sort of assistance to clear thinking as does the Hohfeldian
distinction between "rights" and "privileges."62 On the other hand,
this distinction, like that of Hohfeld, is completely descriptive; it
helps one think, but it does not supply answers. It certainly does
not supply answers to moral questions.
Although economists and writers on law-and-economics nor-
mally assume that their readers understand the difference between
sued. If its economic value had been properly recognized the courts
would also have had to recognize it. That which is esteemed by
commerce (magni facit) is also esteemed (aestimat) by the courts.
The judicial aestimatio comprises the legal expression of the eco-
nomic convictions about value that exist at the time and there can
be no significant divergence between them for any length of time.
60. "It is an old joke of history schools that the feudal system was intro-
duced into England in the seventeenth century; because in the seventeenth
century John Selden the lawyer and antiquary introduced the phrase into the
language." A. DUGGAN, DEvn's BROOD 14 (Arrow Books ed. 1960).
61. J. ROBINSON, supra note 48, at 21.
62. See notes 606-08 infra and accompanying text.
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"distribution" and "allocation," r: have repeatedly discovered in
conversations with lawyers and law students that it is generally
not understood by well-educated persons who have not been ex-
posed to economic theory. I am not sure that the implications
of the distinction are fully understood by most of those who use it.
As I think back to the days of my innocence before I traveled to
academia and fell among lawconomists, I realize that there was a
time not so long ago that I could make nothing of the distinction.
The term "distribution" is used by economists to refer to the
distribution of wealth or income or welfare or well-being or what-
ever among the various individual members of society. The term
"allocation," on the other hand, refers to the allocation of resources
to particular uses or applications. Thus the distribution of wealth
in our society is such that the Rockefellers are rich and I am poor.
On the other hand, those redwood trees in parks are allocated to
recreational and aesthetic use while others are allocated for use as
a source of lumber.
It is obvious that this distinction can be useful in many areas of
legal analysis. For example, if you own a grove of redwoods, the
government under its power of eminent domain may succeed in
allocating those trees to park uses but, if the just compensation'
that you are paid does in fact, as it does in theory, make you whole,
there will be no change in the distribution of wealth. On the other
hand, if the government "zones" your land for use for park pur-
poses only,63 there will not only be an allocational effect but also
a distributional one: viz., you will be poorer and those who use
the park will be richer.
Both "distribution7 and "allocation" normally denote relations.
A redwood tree may stand in relation to a person such that it is
distributed to that person, i.e., he owns it. It may also stand in
a relation to an activity such that it is allocated to that activity,
e.g., the tree is used in making lumber. In these examples, the
first terms of the relations are (at least verbally) the same, but in-
trinsically they are different. Well-being, for example, is often
said to be distributed among the members of society, but it would
be nonsense to speak of an allocation of well-being. Some words
have different meanings depending on whether they are used in a
distributional or in an allocational sense; the word capital, for
example, may mean either a generalized sort of wealth, as when
63. Cf., D. Wncu, supra note 17, at 98-99.
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one speaks of a firm's capital accounts, or specific resources allo-
cated to the production of goods, as when one says that a drill
press is a capital good. That which is said to be allocated is
usually far more concrete than that which is distributed. Specific
things--or specific legal rights and privileges relating to specific
things 64 -are allocated to specific uses, while it is only highly
abstract concepts like well-being or wealth that are said to be
distributed. If you sell your redwoods to a lumber company, the
trees' use may be reallocated, but there will be no redistribution
of wealth. Since you formerly owned redwoods worth $10,000
and now own $10,000 in cash, there has been no change in your
wealth nor has there, mutatur mutandis, been any change in the
wealth of the lumber company.65 Roughly speaking, allocational
changes are visible in the real world, while distributional changes
appear only as changes in the numbers on a balance sheet.66
There are some things that, though logically both distributable
and allocable, can only be allocated and cannot possibly be dis-
tributed because of legal rules. Thus, I have been discussing red-
woods rather than flowing streams because our law does not rec-
ognize the possibility of owning a stream.67 There are other things,
e.g., water quality, that cannot be distributed for more fundamental
reasons. Yet water quality can be allocated to particular uses, such
as disposing of sewage, on the one hand, or making soup on the
other. Thus the very subjects of this article, water and water
64. See note 98 infra and accompanying text.
65. In some respects this example may be oversimplified. If both you
and the lumber company increase your well-being and utility by making the
exchange, there is, in some sense, a surplus that is distributed between the
two of you after the exchange. There is, however, no redistribution. Further-
more, if there is a well-established market price for redwoods, that surplus
was distributed even before you made the exchange. If a unit of redwoods
has a market price of $10,000, if you would be willing to sell them for
$9,000, and if the lumber company would be willing to buy them even if they
cost $11,000, then there is a potential surplus of $2,000 that has already
been distributed ($1,000 to you and $1,000 to the lumber company) even
before the exchange is made at $10,000. On the other hand, if there is no
established market price, but the other facts remain the same, the $2,000 sur-
plus is not distributed until you negotiate a sales price at some place between
$9,000 and $11,000. As to the impossibility of determining the appropriate
optimal, efficient allocation when there is wealth that is not distributed, see
note 311 infra and accompanying text.
66. This point seems relevant to the confusing question of what is
capital-actual plant and equipment or the entries in the capital account?
Cf. note 48 supra.
67. See notes 448-52 infra and accompanying text.
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quality, cannot properly be said to be distributed. On the other
hand, one cannot discuss something in terms of welfare economics
unless it is subject to some distribution. This fact explains in
part the length of this article, since I must continually struggle
with nonexistent distributions. In order to describe the games law-
conomists play, I am forced to pretend that there is a distribution
of water quality, or of the well-being associated with that qualityP8
The distinction is of particular importance to welfare economists
because, in theory, they can make no recommendations with re-
spect to questions of distribution but purport to be able to tell us,
for any given distribution of wealth, how resources should be al-
located. In technical terms: "Pareto optimality is optimal given
a distribution of wealth, but different distributions of wealth imply
their own Pareto optimal allocation of resources." 9 Welfare eco-
nomists have opinions about how wealth should be distributed,70
but these opinions are not the product of their theorizing. Wel-
fare economic theory must take some distribution as given before
it can declare that a certain allocation is "efficient" or "optimal-
two words of praise that mean the same thing in economic vo-
cabularies.7 '
The distinction between "distribution" and "allocation" is purely
conventional, but, once one has accepted the conventions, strange
things can happen in an argument in which the parties deviate
from the accepted usage. Even stranger things happen, however,
when one attempts to apply the conventions where they can not be
applied. As I have already said, welfare economic theory can say
nothing about the appropriate distribution of well-being.72 Thus
68. See notes 875-88 infra and accompanying text.
69. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1096 (1972) (footnotes
omitted). The point made in the text is discussed at length at notes 133-35
infra and accompanying texL
70. See text accompanying notes 139-40 infra for a discussion of the pro-
pensity of welfare economists to glorify the status quo by assuming that the
present distribution of wealth should be the starting point for their analyses.
71. Some economists do recognize that some optima are better than
others. Thus, Professor Winch speaks of "the optimum optimorum (the best of
the best)." D. WnCH, supra note 17, at 80-83.
72. Welfare economists tend to use the words "wealth" and "well-being"
interchangeably. In this usage, "wealth" is not limited to those assets that
are normally valued in dollars and cents while in their theory "well-being" can
always be assigned a cash value, for the theory assumes that everything has a
price-even you, gentle reader. Cf. Leff, The Cultural and Social Impact of
Society on American Advertising, 1970 LAw & Soc. ORDER 397, 398. -
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it can say nothing about those cases in which a reallocation of
goods can be accomplished only by a redistribution of wealth.
Let us consider an example. Two men, each worth exactly
$50,000, own all of the land surrounding Catfish Lake, a land-
locked body of water. Able owns all of the land on the north side
of the lake, while Baker owns all of the land on the south. No one
really owns the lake itself, but the government may regulate the
use that Able or Baker or both make of it. Only Able and
Baker may make use of the lake.73 The present rule of law is
that neither Able nor Baker may use the lake without a permit.
Any permit that is granted will specify the ways in which the lake
may be used and will permit both Able and Baker to make the
authorized use. Able is an ardent fisherman and Baker is an
equally ardent waterskier. Unfortunately, fishing and water skiing
are not compatible uses. Able applies for a permit to allow fishing;
Baker applies for one to permit water skiing. Each man offers to
buy the permit that he desires for $5,000, provided that the appli-
cation of the other is denied. If Able is granted the permit he
desires, he would not sell it for less than $100,000.74 Baker, if he
gets the permit he wants, would not sell it for less than $100,000.
How should the use of the lake be allocated? Welfare econo-
mics can supply no answer, because it cannot suggest how wealth
should be distributed. If the fishing permit is granted, Able will
be $95,000 wealthier and fishing will be the optimal-efficient use.75
73. There is no way anyone: else could get to the lake without committing
a trespass. Cf., New England Trout & Salmon Club v. Mather, 68 Vt. 338, 35
A. 323 (1896).
74. Able (and this is also true of Baker) has only $5,000 available to buy
the permit, so that is all that he can offer for it. Once he has the permit,
however, he may be unwilling to sell it for any amount of money. If Able
gets the fishing permit, he will have paid out $5,000 and received an asset
that in return is worth (to him) $100,000. Thus, after he gets the permit, he
will be worth $95,000. (At least, that is how wealthy he will feel). If
Baker gets the permit, Able will be worth less than $50,000.
The one unrealistic assumption in this example is that Able for some reason
cannot or will not sell his land to another water skiing aficionado and that
Baker also will not or cannot sell out to another fisherman. It may be that
neither Able nor Baker can convey his interest; perhaps their land belongs
to a country club and is held by them pursuant to nonassignable 500-year
leases.
75. This problem was designed to avoid the possibility of any further
trading. If Able will not sell out for less than $100,000 and Baker has only
$5,000, there is no way in which the parties can bargain themselves into a
more satisfactory position. Either allocation is, in technical terms, Pareto




If Baker gets the permit, then he will be richer and water skiing will
be optimal. Thus, it should be clear that welfare economics can
say nothing useful about those cases, like the case of Able v. Baker,
where the question of allocation is inseparable from that of distrib-
ution. Until the distributional decision is made there is no way
to determine the efficient allocation.
Economists may be puzzled by this example because they always
assume that all wealth is already distributed. This assumption is
false, however, in those cases where there are resources that are
not subject to well-defined property rights.76 Among these re-
sources are water quality. No one owns the cleanliness of a
stream.
The case of Able v. Baker is very close to the situation that
prevails in the real world. Some of us (the Ables) want a world
with clean water, a healthy and pleasant natural environment
Others (the Bakers) want a world with a great deal of industrial
production, production that inevitably will pollute the waters and
destroy the living streams. If the Ables of the world have the
legally enforceable right to have the waters remain undefiled, there
is no price that the Bakers could pay that would induce them to
surrender this right. If the Bakers have the privilege of polluting
the waters in pursuit of the benefits of industrialization, there is no
price that the Ables could pay that would induce the surrender of
this privilege. We are concerned with two different worlds. The
Ables do not like the Bakers' ideal world. The Bakers feel the
same way about the Ables'. If the Ables get their way they will
be wealthy; if the Bakers prevail the Ables will be poor. In this
only slightly oversimplified 77 model of the world in which we live
it is clear that the question of how our waters should be allocated
76, See notes 448-62 infra and accompanying text.
77. There are two major simplifications. I have ignored the fact that
many people may be indifferent to, or at most tepid adherents of, one side
or another. More importantly, I have ignored the fact that the allocation of
our waters involves only one of the many facets of the problem: What sort of
world should we create for ourselves? But this ultimate question is even
more resistant to economic analysis than is the question of how clean we
want our waters to be. The ultimate question is one that is utterly incapable
of division into distributional aid allocational subdivisions.
It should be noted that the unrealistic features of the Able v. Baker ex-
ample are extremely realistic in the real world problem. The Ables cannot
sell out if the Bakers win, for there is no place for them to move. What-
ever world we create for ourselves, those who dislike it will not be able to run
away.
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is inextricably interwined with how well-being should be distrib-
uted. Thus welfare economic theory can supply no answer to the
question: how clean should our waters be?
Perhaps I have gotten ahead of myself. It is necessary, I think,
that you grasp the allocative-distributive distinction before you
attend to the rest of my arguments, but I can understand why one
might be puzzled by my claim that welfare economics cannot ad-
dress distributional issues. It may not seem sufficient that econo-
mists themselves admit this fact. So let me now proceed with my
argument in a more orderly fashion. Once I have demonstrated
the moral triviality that supplies the sole justification for welfare
economic theorizing, I trust that you will agree with me that
welfare economics has very little to say about anything.
And so I turn next to moral questions, to the value judgments
of welfare economics. These questions are not unimportant. In
the words of one welfare economist:
The Paretian value judgment is only a value judgment.
It may well be rejected by some. But before it is rejected
by economists, either explicitly or by implication, it must
be remembered that virtually the entire edifice of economic
theory as we know it today is built on Paretian premises.
If those premises are rejected, that theory becomes ir-
relevant to the world in which we live. Faced with the
policy issues of the modem world, economics in its present
state is either inadequate or irrelevant .... 78
I shall now try to demonstrate that these "Paretian" value
judgments must be rejected.
C. Economics as a Branch of Theology
1. The Ethical Judgments That Underlie Welfare Economics
When economists set out to answer moral questions, they are
practicing what is known as welfare economics.79 As moral ques-
78. D. WiNcH, supra note 17, at 199-200.
79. See note 82 infra for a discussion of the distinction between positive
economics and welfare economics.
It is not necessarily true, however, that welfare economics always deals
with moral or ethical questions. Theoretical welfare economics, for example,
does not address itself directly to real world problems at all, and thus at worst-
or at best-can be accused only of being a branch of metaethics. Cf. E.J.
MIsHAN, A Survey of Welfare Economics, in WELFmAE ECONOwCS 13 (1969).
On the other hand, once one has accepted the (I believe often untenable)
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tions include all significant political questions, welfare economics
is, if taken seriously, of great practical importance. As one Eng-
lish welfare economist has said of his dismal science:
The practical importance of an understanding of welfare
economics can be questioned today only by those unfamil-
iar with its subject matter. Whether the United Kingdom
should finance the building of the supersonic Concord air-
liner, whether a channel tunnel should be built, whether
Britain should enter the Common Market, whether to invest
in a road or a railway, or whether to conserve natural
beauty and how much, are all political questions which,
in so far as they are influenced by economic considerations,
must ultimately be referred to the propositions of welfare
economics. True, the informed public has recently become
aware of such things as public investment criteria, alloca-
tion rules, and cost-benefit studies. It is not, however, ex-
pected to know that these "new" devices derive their ra-
tionale from theories of welfare economics.30
If we lawyers are going to use arguments based on welfare
economics-if, for example, we are going to claim that cost benefit
studies show that the FWPCA is too costly-we had better know
the assumptions on which the propositions of welfare economics
are based."' If we are to evaluate arguments based on welfare
economics (or, what comes to nearly the same thing, on cost-
benefit analyses) we must pay particularly close attention to the
ethical, factual, and contrafactual assumptions that supply the sole
support for the great mathematical machine that arrived at those
conclusions.
[Welfare.. . is not an observable quantity like a mar-
ket price or an item of personal consumption. It is a bird
of another sort. It is in practice, if not in principle, ex-
ceedingly difficult to test a welfare proposition ....
The consequence [of this difficulty] is that, whereas the
normal way of testing a theory in positive economics is to
ethical assumptions which underlie welfare economics, an attempt to imple-
ment those assumptions need raise no new moral questions, if only because
the important ones have been assumed away at the start.
80. Id. at vii (emphasis added).
81. We are not alone:
Theoretical welfare economics proceeds from a number of definite
assumptions, factual and ethical, which are seldom stated explicitly.
If their nature were more widely appreciated by professional econo-
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test its conclusions, the normal way of testing a welfare
proposition is to test its assumptions .... The welfare
cake . .. is so hard to taste that we must sample its in-
gredients before baking.8 2
I am afraid that the arguments which I make in this section
will seem soft-headed and metaphysical to those who would insist
that the benefits of the FWPCA, or clean water, are not worth their
cost. The answer to this charge is simple enough: Any cost-
benefit analysis of a massive, nationwide undertaking like the im-
plementation of the FWPCA must be based on certain ethical,
theological, assumptions. Unless we know these assumptions, we
cannot know what the analysts mean by "costs" or by "benefits."
It is true that these assumptions are seldom revealed by those
who would peddle their welfare judgments and cost-benefit analyses
as scientific studies, but this is all the more reason why they must
be discussed. "The purpose of studying economics is not to acquire
mists, it is improbable that the conventional conclusions of welfare
theory would continue to be stated with as little caution as is at
present the custom.
J. GRAAF7, TosRmucAL WELFAE EcoNO mcs 1 (1967).
82. Id. at 2-3. Graaff points out that:
In positive economics, we can often simplify our assumptions as cava-
lierly as we please, being confident in the knowledge that their ap-
propriateness will be tested when we come to apply the conclusions
inherent in them to our observations of the world about us. In welfare
economics we can entertain no such confidence. The result is that our
assumptions must be scrutinized with care and thoroughness. Each
must stand on its own feet. We cannot afford to simplify much.
Nor can we blindly hope that two erroneous assumptions will somehow
"cancel out" and produce an acceptable conclusion-whereas in posi-
tive economics this procedure is as common as it is essential.
Id. at 3. Graaff goes on to give the following example of the legitimate use of
questionable assumptions in positive economics:
[I]f we assume inter alia that a man has a constant rate of time
preference and that the marginal utility of consumption diminishes
(two assumptions which are, in themselves, better described as "non-
testable" or "meaningless" than as "erroneous"), we can deduce that a
sufficient high rate of interest will always result in consumption
being planned to grow through time. The conclusion is testable and
may be acceptable, even if the assumptions from which it is derived
are not.
Id.
Cf. E.J. M sHN, WELFARE, supra note 79, at 15-16: "[So remote is
the likelihood of testing welfare implications that one is tempted to relinquish
the orthodox methodology and have recourse to an admittedly inferior
method-some might say an inadmissible method-of attempting to ascertain
the validity of the premises. . .'
These passages give a good idea of the distinction which economists make
between welfare and positive economics. Welfare economics is prescriptive
and normative; positive economics is descriptive and predictive.
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a set of ready-made answers to economic questions, but to learn
how to avoid being deceived by economists." 8 3
I do not wish to be unfair to those who have developed the
models which comprise the theoretical side of welfare economics.
Their studies are in a sense truly scientific and objective; in their
purest form they verge on being a branch of abstract mathematics.
These theoretical models are based on certain hypotheses, including
a hypothetical definition of "well-being." If one assumes, arguendo,
that these hypotheses are true, then certain conclusions about how
we can increase our well-being follow logically. But the key
hypotheses in these models are unlike scientific hypotheses. The key
hypotheses of welfare economics are unverifiable by any "scientific"
means because they are hypothetical ethical judgments, rather than
real propositions about the world. So long as a proposition of
welfare economics is phrased in the form: "If you accept certain
judgments (and certain, often unbelievable, factual assumptions),
then you should do this," it is unobjectionable. But it is not usable
unless we accept both the judgments and the assumptions.
The model builders themselves are well aware that the models
are not capable of making meaningful policy prescriptions for the
real world. Thus one standard 8 treatise on welfare economics
concludes:
[T]he job of the economist is not to try to reach welfare
conclusions for others, but rather to make available the
positive knowledge-the information and the understand-
ing-on the basis of which laymen (and economists them-
selves, out of office homes) can pass judgment.
No doubt many professional economists are reluctant
to abdicate what they may like to regard as their tra-
ditional prescriptive role, and are uneasy at the prospect
of becoming mere purveyors of information. If they are,
it is up to them to show how welfare economics can be set
upon a basis which is even reasonably satisfactory-or can
be made to yield conclusions with which a significant num-
ber of men are likely to concur.85
83. Joan Robinson, quoted in J. GALBRArr, EcoNoMIcs AND THE PUBLIC
PuuosE 11 (1973).
84. "If somebody asks me what modem welfare economics is about, I
always recommend to them Graaff's Theoretical Welfare Economics." Samuel-
son, Forward to J. GRAFFE, supra note 81, at vii.
85. Id. at 171.
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It is the scientific model-builders, theoretical welfare economists,
who have demonstrated that the foundations of normative eco-
nomics are questionable value judgments which cannot support
the weight that many would put on them. Unfortunately these
demonstrations are not readily available to lawyers who may be
misled into taking "economic" prescriptions as statements of ob-
jective fact.8
For these reasons I feel that I must discuss the ethical judg-
ment and other assumptions which underlie welfare economics. I
am not arguing that one may not accept the ethical judgments that
I will be discussing; but I do believe that one should be fully aware
that they are the underlying premises of any argument that claims
that the implementation of the FWPCA will be too expensive.
"[I]t is not a proper role for an economist to be accepted as a philo-
sopher kdng" 8 7 nor is it a proper role for him to be an invisible
eminence grise behind the throne of an unphilosophical robber
baron.
E. J. Mishan of the London School of Economics has listed
three "ethical judgments" which are necessary if one is to draw
any conclusions in welfare economics:
(i) "the individual-and no one else-is the best judge of his
own well-being;"
(ii) "the welfare of the community depends on the welfare of
the individuals comprising it, and on nothing else;" and
(iii) "if at least one person is better off, no one being worse
off, the community as a whole is better off." 88
86. For an example of this type of confusion see the opinion of Judge
Wright in Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir.
1972), where he cites Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Be-
half of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Re-
distribution Policy, 80 YAIE L.J. 1093 (1971), as if that theoretical exercise
in law and economics were a positive description of the way the world works.
In fact what-evidence there is indicates that the world works in quite another
manner. See Hirsh, Hirsh & Margolis, Regression Analysis of the Effects of
Habitability Laws Upon Rent: An Empirical Observation on the Ackerman-
Komesar Debate, 63 CAL. L. REv. 1098 (1975).
87. Liebhafsky, "The Problem of Social Cost"-An Alternative Approach,
13 NATvmuaL REsouncEs J. 615, 625 (1973).
88. E.J. MsHmN, WwLsARE, supra note 79, at 13-14.
Theoretical welfare economics is, then, that branch of study which
endeavors to formulate propositions by which we may rank, on the
scale of better or worse, alternative economic situations open to
society. The words "better" and "worse" obviously call for clari-
fication, and to this end we first consider the situation- of the in-
dividual. His indifference map may be regarded as a picture of
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That these three axioms of welfare economics are ethical pro-
positions is self-evident: "best," "well-being," "better," "worse,"
and, of course, "welfare," are all ethical terms. That anyone might
object to them is a little harder to see, just as it is difficult to see
how one could honestly reject the axioms. of Euclidean geometry.
a. Pareto optimaliWy. The third axiom, that "if at least one
person is better off, no one being worse off, the community as a
whole is better off," is particularly innocuous in appearance. The
state of affairs within a community in which no person can be made
better off without someone being made worse off is called a "Pareto
optimum7-"Pareto" after Vilfredo Pareto who dreamed it up,
"optimum" because--wel, because what could be better?8 9
his chosen ranking of the conceivable combinations of goods and ser-
vices. If we say that when he moves to a higher indifference curve
(or that when he expands the effective area of his choice) he is
better off, or he increases his welfare, we are giving expression to
an ethical judgment; namely ... that the individual-and no one
else-is the best judge of his own well-being. In the Crusoe eco-
nomy no more than this is required for welfare economics. But it is
required. Without it, we may remark that Crusoe moves to a higher
indifferenci curve, but we are then only describing how Crusoe acts:
we are not judging his welfare ....
Since welfare economics is ... concerned chiefly with community
welfare, we s&A require additional ethical judgments.
Id. (emphasis added). See aso S. NATE, A BEAPPnAisAL OF WELFAl
EcoNoacs -1 (1969): "[S]ince welfare is an ethical term, any theorems
incorporating the word welfare are also ethical and must rest on some obvious
or hidden value judgments."
89. "Whether Pareto-optimality is right or wrong, it, is normative to the
core. And my charge against most economists is that they are ready to-lex-
clude other normative viewpoints as unscientific, while permitting this one to
crawl under the fence because it is so obviously acceptable .... If it had
to compete in the marketplace for ethical ideas it could not, I believe, long
survive." Alexander, Human Values and Economists' Values, in Htu"
VALUEs AND ECONOMc PoLicY 101, 108 (S. Hook ed. 1967).
I can imagine that a mathematically inclined welfare economist might in-
sist that these words are not "ethical" but rather "primitive and undefined"
symbols which are used in certain mathematical equations. But unless welfare
economics is to be nothing but a trivial branch of abstract mathematics, its
equations, and their symbols, must be interpreted. If the interpretation is
not explicit, the possibilities of deception are, of course, extensive. If anyone
should actually claim that "better" and "worse" are undefined terms, I sup-
pose one might ask him if he objects to a interpretation under which society
should always make the "worse" choice.
Since some of us believe that lots of things might be better than a Pareto
optimum and since there are an infinite number of Pareto optima, some of
which might be deemed better than others, it would probably be better to
substitute the phrase "Pareto efficient" for "Pareto optimum."
We use the term "Pareto efficient" instead of the more common
"Pareto optimal" because the latter conveys more commendation
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Phrased that way, one can imagine lots of things that might be
better than the "optimum." I might believe, for example, that it
would be "better" if I were made better off even though it were done
at your expense. But this approach takes us into a morass of sub-
jectivity; "better" and "worse" become matters of individual taste
and de gustibus non disputandum est.90 Since welfare economists
desire to be scientific, they seek to define an "optimum" that no
one would object to, even though everyone might prefer something
else.
There is an objective criterion for choosing a "good" act
• . . namely, that if, for any change in circumstances, no
one is made worse off and at least one person is made
better off, then it can be unambiguously asserted that gen-
eral welfare is improved .... 91
In other words, if the world is not at a Pareto optimum, we should
improve the lot of those who can be benefited without cost to
others until such an optimum is reached. The optimum may not
be the best of all possible worlds, but we can all agree that it is better
(or at least as good) as the suboptimal world from which we
started. Despite its pretensions to objectivity, this is still an ethical
proposition. But it does appear, at first glance, to be an ethical
judgment in which we all can agree.
Whether it is a usable ethical judgment is another matter. If
we were to try to apply it directly to problems of water pollution,
than the concept should bear, since a Pareto efficient allocation might
assign extremely low utilities to some (indeed, possibly to all but one)
housbholds and thus not be optimal in any sense in which diitri-
butional ethics are involved.
K. AnRow & F. HAHN, GENmEAL CoulrrmrTvE AxALysis 91 (1971).
Unfortunately most economists insist upon using "optimum," if only as a
rhetorical ploy. This being the case I am afraid that I am stuck with the
normal usage, as I am going to have to quote extensively from economic
literature. Some economists avoid the problems associated with the existence
of an infinite number of optima by assuming that there is an optimal optimum
and labeling this the "optimum optimorum." See note 71 supra.
A "Pareto optimum" is often referred to merely as an "optimum." The
adjectives "efficient" and "optimal" are often used without the label "Pareto."
Any change that increases "efficiency," that moves society towards an "op-
timum," is often called a "Pareto improvement." These practices are some-
times followed in this article.
90. "[T]hough we all repeat 'de gustibus non est disputandum,' in prac-
tice we spend our time arguing about little else." Friedman, Value Judg-
ments in Economics, in HUMAN VALuES AND ECONOZIC POLICY, at 85-86.
(S. Hook ed. 1967).
91. Johnson, supra note 49, at 348-49.
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it might not seem very helpful: How can we make the pollutee 92
better off without hurting the polluter? Is it inconceivable that
making a Pareto improvement will make it impossible for us to ac-
complish something that would be "better" in a non-Paretian
sense?
Consider the possibility of envy because it exposes one of the
many weaknesses of analytical theory based on Pareto optimality.
If someone 93 feels that he is made worse off when the lot of any-
one else improves, then the Paretian criterion suggests that no
one's lot (except that of the envious) should be improved. What
started as a criterion for determining a "good" act, ends by for-
biding any act at all, and for rather distasteful reasons.
It will not do, if we are hoping to use Pareto optimality as a
criterion for deciding whether the FWPCA is a good thing, to simply
assume envy out of the world. We know it is there, and in some
forms we may even admire it. The football coach or politician
who wants above all for his team or nation to be "Number One"
exposes this weakness in the Paretian axiom.
Once we admit of envy, it even becomes conceivable that making
every individual "better" off will make everyone worse off. As one
of the standard expositions of welfare economics puts it:
[I]n the general case where external effects exist, it is con-
ceivable that envy and malice engendered by having more
of every good--or simply the mysterious movement of
fashion the new age brings forth-will leave society worse
off, or no better off, than before. (Given that everyone
else has atom bombs, my welfare may increase when I ob-
tain one for myself. But everyone may feel better off if all
bombs are destroyed over night.) ...
[This] may be unlikely, but it is conceivable. We
simply cannot rule it out of court .... 94
92. I regret this awful neologism but I cannot think of a better word to
denote the victims of pollution. The "polluted" might seem preferable, but
that probably should be reserved for streams, fish, and drunkards.
93. Remember the first axiom that the individual is the best judge of his
own well-being. See note 45 supra and accompanying text As to the fact
that envy and spite are characteristics of that social species known as "homo
sapiens," see E. WmsoN, SocIoBooGY: TAE NEw SYrTRss (1975).
94. J. GRAFP, supra note 81, at 51. See also E.J. MISFAN, A Survey
of Welfare Economics, in WE-,ARE EcoNoMics 82 (1969):
There is a temptation . . . to lose patience with human cussedness
and to insist that if both the Smith family and Jones family receive
a 10 percent increase in their "real" income they are better off, even
if they both sulk at the other's good luck .... We may be wise
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It might seem that envy does not completely vitiate the Paretian
concept. So long as the jealous do not assign an infinite value to
the sufferings of others, it should be possible in some cases to
arrange exchanges by which they can be compensated for the pain
which they suffer at others' pleasures. If this can be done, then
the Paretian axiom enjoins us to do it. But can we really think
well of an ethical judgment which requires the mean in spirit to
receive the lion's share of the world's income, especially when the
mean-spirited do not obtain any increase in well-being from their
additional goods?
Just as telling is the fact that we often deliberately choose to
make one person better off at another's expense. Consider the pro-
gressive income tax, for example, or welfare payments made out of
general tax funds. These examples at least suggest that Pareto.
optimality is not in fact our sole ethical criterion. Obviously the
Paretian axiom is of no help in determining whether we should
make one person better off at another's expense; it suggests no an-
swer as to how wealth (or well-being or goods) should be dis-
tributed in society. If someone were to suggest that we should aid
pollutees at the expense of the polluters, who would argue that
this is wrong because it is not required by the concept of Pareto
optimality? Sadly, but admittedly not obviously, this last argument
is all that is being claimed by those who would argue, "objec-
tively,"9 5 that a higher level of water quality is not worth its
cost.96
One of the most troublesome features of Pareto optimality is
its ability to persuade us that we should be gluttonous pigs. It
to invest more resources in social psychology in the hope of making
people more "rational," but in the meantime we have to concede that
an all-around increase of worldly goods may not make people any
better off and, indeed, may make them feel worse off.
Whenever an individual's well-being depends on what others have-
whether the individual suffers from envy, altruism, or some combination of
the two-the Paretian axiom tends to break down as an even theoretically
usable criterion. See also note 401 infra.
95. Of course, if they argue "subjectively" that by their lights the clean-
up is too expensive, there is no further ground for discussion. We are left
with the alternatives of giving in to their tastes, buying them out (i.e., com-
pensating them), outvoting them, or outlitigating them.
96. It should be noted that a change in water quality which benefits no
one and hurts someone (or everyone) might be called "objectively" undesir-
able. Considering the attachment of many environmentalists (and others) to
a high level of water quality, it does not appear probable that any improved
level of water quality that we might set as our goal would violate this in-
verse of the Paretian axiom.
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may not follow logically from the Paretian axioms, but the fact is
that, "as a consequence [of the acceptance of Pareto optimality],
economic analysis has concentrated on the quest for more" 97 rather
than, one must add, the good, the true, the beautiful-or the just.
There are a multitude of other ethical principles which might
replace Pareto optimality as the goal of social and political decisions.
Conformity to the will of God, for example-or living in harmony
with nature, or with ourselves. If any such principle seems to you
of greater merit than striving for a Pareto optimum and if reaching
a Pareto optimum conflicts at times with that which you deem the
greater good, then you should be prepared to reject the Paretian
principle and the conclusions of welfare economics whenever they
conflict with your value judgments. The claim that a proposed in-
crease in water quality is not Pareto optimal should not strike you
as a very convincing argument. To paraphrase Professor Coase,
actually very little analysis is required to show that an ideal world
is better than a Pareto optimal state, unless the definitions of a
Pareto optimal state and an ideal world happen to be the same. 8
It should also be noted that, once we reach the desired level of water
quality, the country may not be at a Pareto optimum. If this is so, I would
not object on ethical grounds to the argument that we should try to reach
one of the Pareto optima associated with that level of water quality. See
text accompanying note 159 infra; cf. note 373 infra.
97. Alexander, supra note 89, at 108.
The one first-level norm ... that still survives in economics is
regarded as so obvious as hardly to be normative at all. . . . That
norm is sometimes referred to as the pig principle, that if you like
something, more is better. Its corollary is the ethical value of ef-
ficiency-the only first-level ethical value normally admitted into
economic discourse. . . . [So] the economist can say . . . . "Bum
down your house if you want to, but mind you, don't use too many
matches."
Id. at 107-08. Alexander, a professor of economics at MIT, goes on to claim
that this "efficiency principle" together with "the belief in ... normative
judgments ...leads to Pareto-optimality." Id. at 108; cf. Leff, supra note
72, at 398:
The belief in the sovereign power of possessions ...is one of the
natural off-shoots of the most powerful and pervasive (though no
less insu cient for all that) of present-day Western philosophical
systems: pragmatic utilitarianism. Because of the difficulties in de-
fining nonmaterial goodness, the end of most utilitarian systems tends
towards gross increases in valuable (I use the word advisedly)
things.
The tendency to substitute the pig principle in its crudest form for the im-
practicalities of a Paretian analysis is particularly evident in actual "cost-
benefit" analyses.
98. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & EcoN. 1, 43 (1960).
I fear that Professor Coase may object to this distortion of his aphorism. But
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b. Baby knows best. The other ethical judgments which
underlie welfare economics lack the spacious self-evidence of the
Paretian axiom. Consider the proposition that "the individual-
and no one else-is the best judge of his own well-being." We
know perfectly well that this is not true. [D]rug-fiends should
be cured; children.should go to school. How do we decide what
preferences should be respected or restrained unless we judge the
preferences themselves?" 19
It might be that some of us-and I am one-would be willing
to let others do anything their hearts desire, provided that their
acts do not impinge upon the sensibilities or concerns of others.
This, however, is not a view subscribed to by all members of our
body politic. There are those who would constrain others to follow
the will (however determined) of God or the desires (however
expressed) of nature.100 It does not seem to me that economists
he does recognize that "problems of welfare economics must ultimately dis-
solve into a study of aesthetics and morals," and that "[a] better approach
would seem to be to start our analysis with a situation approximating that
which actually exists, to examine the effects of a proposed policy change and
to attempt to decide whether the new situation would be, in total, better or
worse than the original one." Id. at 43. As to the last remark I agree com-
pletely. Clearly, positive economics (and other positive sciences) are needed
to describe "a situation approximating that which actually exists" and the
"effects of a proposed policy change." Where Coase and I may differ is on
the question of how the choice should be made. At least in the case of a
major policy change like the FWPCA, I believe that the choice both should be
and, in the absence of any possibility of a market, must be made in the
political arena. See text accompanying notes 204-24 infra.
99. J. ROBINSON, ECONOMIC PHmIosopHy 49 (1962).
100. See, e.g., H. THOREAU, WALDEN, ch. ix, in WRrsucs 275-76 (River-
side ed. 1932): "In Wilderness is the preservation of the World." Cf. Stone,
Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45
S. CAL. L. PTRv. 450, 456 (1972): "I am quite seriously proposing that we
give legal rights to forests, oceans, rivers and other so-called 'natural objects'
in the environment-indeed to the natural environment as a whole."
Even those who would not adopt some religion of nature still can object
to the disregard with which economic ideology tramples upon the natural
world:
What has spread over the globe from western Europe, spread alike
by disciples of Adam Smith and Karl Marx, have been practices that
compose a system, or an order, even though a malfunctioning one ....
A civilization, a culture, a society, and an economy have been created
in the past two centuries different from anything previously known.
The immutable relationships between man and nature, contemplated
by all prior thinkers from at least Aristotle and Confucius, were the
first casualties. These eternal verities were cast in plain view into a




have the right to compel us to accept their definition of "well-
being," even though our rejection of that definition entails the
repudiation of most, if not all., of the prescriptions of welfare
economics. Moreover, every significant human action impinges
upon others. If you beat your dog or defile a sylvan grove, then
I am pained and you, I must insist, are diminished. I am not at
all sure that I must agree that you, mon semblable, mon frere, are
the best judge of your own well-being. Only if we are each
autonomous, isolated monads would that proposition be tenable.101
In fact, the contention that each individual is the best judge of
his own well-being is less an ethical judgment than an amoral
cop-out If one accepts the Paretian axiom, one must, before one
can apply it, determine when an individual is "better-off." If a
man is "better-off" as he comes more into harmony with nature
or accord with the will of God, then the economist is, qua econo-
mist, in a frustrating position, for he is not an expert on the har-
monies of nature or the mind of God. And even were he possessed
of such knowledge, he would be confronted with the fact that not
all of us would subscribe to his definition of "well-being" and
therefore could not agree on the implications to be drawn from
the Paretian axiom.
Some effort in the direction of salvation is long past due if every-
thing is not to go under in a giddy whirl . .. Continued existence
has been drawn into question by the past two centuries of urban
industrial practice.... Here is comprised for thinking men the
urgent and the physical present, for humanity itself has moved apoc-
alypse from the spiritual to the profane in a way probably most
pleasing to St. John the Divine.
Murphy, Has Nature Any Right to Life?, 22 HAsnxrms L.J. 467, 482 (1971).
Economists do speak occasionally of natural resources. Yet the fact
remains that, search as one may, in none of the numerous economic
models in existence is there a variable standing for nature's contrib-
ution. The contact some of these models have with the natural
environment is confined to Ricardian land, which is expressly defined
as a factor immune to any qualitative change. We could very well
refer to it simply as "space." But let no one be mistaken about the
extent of mechanistic sin: Karl Marx's diagrams of economic repro-
duction do not include even this colorless coordinate. So, if we may
use a topical slogan for a trenchant description of the situation, both
main streams of economic thought view the economic process as a
"no deposit, no return" affair in relation to nature.
N. GEOROESCU-ROEGEN, THE ENTROpy LAw Am THE EcoNoMIc Puocass 2
(1971). See text accompanying notes 122-23 infra for the rest of this
quotation.
101. Economic models normally assume exactly this type of autonomy;
there are no human transactions outside the market.
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Pareto optimality is universally acceptable only as a tautology;
to say that "we should make everyone better off so long as we
make no one worse off" is acceptable only so long as it means "we
should do what we should do." To make the proposition meaning-
ful, and debatable, we need to know what well-being or "welfare"
is. As one sophisticated economist puts it:
Attempts have been made, especially by natural scientists,
to give some objective meaning to a person's "welfare".
The daily intake of calories, the integration of the person-
ality (which some psychologists seem to think objective),
longevity-all these have been suggested at some time or
another. We need not discuss them. Their diversity pro-
vides sufficient indication of their arbitrariness; and for
quite a long time the economist's conception has in any
case been a subjective one. Something to the effect that
welfare is a state of mind, or that "the elements of welfare
are states of consciousness" is generally accepted. We shall
accept it too; but we shall try to maintain an element of
objectivity by linking individual welfare very closely to
individual choice.
The matter can be put somewhat formally by saying that
a person's welfare map is defined to be identical with his
preference map-which indicates how he would choose
between different situations, if he were given the oppor-
tunity for choice. To say that his welfare would be higher
in A than in B is thus no more than to say that he would
choose A rather than B, if he were allowed to make the
choice. 02
102. J. GRAAFF, supra note 81, at 4-5 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
This association, bordering on identity, between one's "choice" and one's
"welfare" is more palatable if one assumes, as welfare economists often do,
that everyone has perfect information. But an ethical principle that is based
on assumptions that are fot true is useless.
If the elements of welfare are states of consciousness, then they are not
choices, because states of consciousness (whatever they are: happiness, satis-
faction, envy) are not choices. One moment I feel hungry; the next moment
I feel full. Neither feeling is the intervening choice I made to eat a candy
bar. Quite clearly a choice cannot be equated with a state of consciousness:
Should my choice of a candy bar be equated with my hunger or with my
satiation? Even if there are no such things as states of consciousness,
even if that phrase is a meaningless sound, it is still clear that a choice (as
opposed perhaps to "what one would choose") is not equivalent to a state
of consciousness, since choices are objectively observable acts. I raise this
point because I suspect that Graaff has his doubts about the ontological status
of "states of consciousness."
Assuming the existence of a utility function does not entail assum-
ing the existence of any such thing or quantity as "utility" or "satisfac-
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Thus, by definition, and under the cover of the arcane incanta-
tion of preference maps, the prestidigitator converts your well-
being into whatever you choose, be it the elixir of life or a glass
of beer. The definition is necessary if the show is to go on, but
the fact remains: we do not always choose what is best for us. The
definition is a misuse of words. If you chose to go on the Titanic's
maiden voyage, then your "welfare" was improved by a voyage
to an icy death. If you chose to plunge your hand into a meat
grinder, your welfare was decreased if someone chose to stop you-
even though you mistakenly had thought that the grinder was a
cookie jar. My welfare was increased last night when I took
another brandy; paradoxically, it is decreased today by the same
act, since I now would make a different choice. Quite clearly I,
except by definition, am not the best judge of my own well-being.
The axiom that each individual is the best judge of his own
well-being converts the Paretian principle into the less plausible
proposition: If at least one person gets what he chooses, no one
else getting something that he chose not to have, the community
as a whole is better off. I can see that some might still be willing
to accept this as a basis for deciding questions of social choice.
"This, it may be held, is not a question of satisfaction, but free-
dom - we want him to have what he prefers so as to avoid having
to restrain his behavior." 1 03 But I cannot believe that anyone would
accept this proposition without at least two major qualifications:
(1) the choice must be an informed choice and (2) the choice
must be one that the chooser would stick to for at least a while
after he got what he thought he wanted. Unfortunately, neither
of these qualifications can be accepted in welfare economic theory
tion." Our definition of individual welfare... runs in terms of
conjectural choices....
When . . .we do not seek an explanation for choices (and classi-
cal utility theory is not really an "explanation" worth seedng-it is
little more than tautology), to say that "the utility of A is greater
than the utility of B" is just a way of saying that A would be chosen.
Whether or not utility is measurable-and whether or not it exists-
is irrelevant... . [Tlhe expression that "utility is measurable up to
a monotone transformation" .. . is unfortunate, as it quite unneces-
sarily suggests that utility is some thing or quantity which exists.
Id. at 35-36.
Admittedly, I share these ontological doubts, but then I have doubts about
the ontological status of ontological questions. The fact remains that a choice
is not happiness nor satisfaction nor utility.
103. J. ROBINSON, supra note 99, at 49. Mrs. Robinson quite clearly is not
willing to accept this argument.
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if the mathematical apparatus is to grind out an ethical prescrip-
tion.10 4
Economists base their ethical judgments on the slim reed of
"choice" or "preference," not because it is satisfactory but because
it can be measured (or, at least, observed) in the marketplace.105
But the market gives no indication of how well-informed are the
choices it records, nor does it tell us whether preferences have
changed between one transaction and the next.1°6 Most telling,
perhaps, is that there is no market in which individual preferences
for water quality can be recorded. 07 Thus, the Paretian axiom
and the axiom of individual choice (or of "consumer sovereignty")
appear, even if we are willing to accept them as ethical judg-
ments, 08 to be irrelevant to the question of the "cost" of imple-
104. Graaff supplies an extremely interesting example of the unsatisfactory
results which flow from equating "well-being" with "choice." He expressly
points out that when uncertainty exists "the economist is quite unable to say
what [the] effects on welfare are likely to be"; but he does so because in-
dividuals are not likely to agree upon "the contribution any one man's well-
being makes to social well-being," "the probable consequences of the event,"
or "the 'proper' way to allow for the uncertainty involved." Not once does
he consider the effects which the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the event
will have on well-being-and if well-being is defined in terms of choice, it is
clear that the actual occurrence of an event is irrelevant. J. GR&.rr, supra note
81, at 119. But this means that if we all agree that there is little risk that
our pollutants flowing to the sea will. kill the very life on which our oxygen
supply depends, then our "well-being" will not suffer if we do not choose to
reduce our pollution to avoid that risk, even though our agreement may be
wrong and we wake one day gasping for breath and die shortly thereafter in
agony.
105. A thorough search of the literature has failed to reveal that any
economist has yet produced the preference (or utility) function of any
life in being, including his own. Thus far in economics we have been-
able to postulate a theory of "Revealed Preference." It s basic axiom
is that the particular market basket of goods actually purchased by
a rational consumer with his given money income at given market
prices, when it was also open to him to purchase one or more other
market baskets of goods, must have been the one he preferred to
buy. Otherwise he would not have been the rational consumer we
assumed him to be.
Liebhafsky, supra note 87, at 631.
106. See J. Ro~nmsoN, supra note 99, at 50.
107. See text accompanying notes 447-52 infra.
108. If we believe that individual choices actually do govern the behavior
of our economic system, then there is a telling argument against accepting
"consumer sovereignty" as a valid ethical principle because, on that assumption:
If the goods . . . [produced] or the services . . . [rendered] are
frivolous or lethal or do damage to air, water, landscape, or the tran-
quility of life . . . . This reflects the public choice. If people are
abused, it is because they choose self-abuse. If economic behavior
seems on occasion insane, it is because people are insane.
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menting the FWPCA. There may, in theory, be ways of applying the
Paretian axiom and the axiom that individual choices define well-
being to problems-such as pollution-which stand resolutely out-
side the market system, but one cannot in such cases invoke the
justification that the market reveals the individual choices. What
should be done about water pollution is an extremely difficult politi-
cal question, and references to hypothetical choices in imaginary
markets are not likely to decrease the difficulties-they merely
supply ammunition for those who would obfuscate the issues in
hopes of avoiding a resolution of the problem.
c. Cui bono? That "the welfare of the community depends
on the welfare of the individuals comprising it," and nothing else,
is the third ethical judgment which Mishan states one must accept
if one is to make analyses (including cost-benefit analyses) based
on the theories of welfare economics. This axiom is subject, as
are the other two, to the charge that it excludes any direct con-
sideration of God or nature or any other abstract value from the
determination of what is good.109 But once one has swallowed the
ethical judgment that whatever an individual chooses is good, it
might appear to be straining at gnats to reject the contention that
the welfare of the community depends solely upon the welfare
of its individual members.
A more troublesome feature of this axiom is the fact that it
totally fails to specify the community. Though it is amusing to
speculate about the reaction of an economist called upon to make
a cost-benefit analysis from the point of view of an ecological
community,"x0 it is quite clear that the individuals comprising the
J. GALBRA1EH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE 6 (1973). If positive
economic studies prove that people are insane, we can hardly subscribe to the
moral principle that these madmen should be given what they choose.
109. A partial answer to this objection lies in the fact that some of the
individuals who comprise the community would undoubtedly place a high
value on their religious or environmental beliefs. This answer will not, how-
ever, satisfy the true believers; only those whose faith rests solely on the
sanctity of the individual can find it completely satisfactory.
110. An ecological community is an assemblage of species populations. See
E. Ko~mvoNDY, CONCEPTS OF ECOLOGY 113 (1969). There is a strong re-
semblance between economic studies and ecological ones; ecologists study the
flow of energy and nutrients through ecological systems in much the same
way that economists study the flow of goods and services through economic
systems. I find it hard to imagine, however, that the predators in an ecological
community (or an ecologist) would be willing to accept Pareto optimality as
their community's goal. Ecologists are nearly as prone as economists to speak
in terms of an equilibrium state, but the equilibrium does not depend on
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"community" of welfare economics are all members of the species
homo oeconimicus, "whose every action is prompted by the single
spur of selfish advantage and directed to the single end of mone-
tary gain."111
Admittedly, if one is to make any sort of useful analysis of
economic or political questions, one must first define whose interests
are to be considered. The troublesome problem is to fix, not the
geographical but the temporal dimensions of the community. It
is necessary if one is to develop a theory of welfare economics to
have a "well-defined" temporal "horizon" and "the observing econo-
mist [must be] assumed to know the composition of the com-
munity-the tastes of men who will die and of the men who will
be born-during the whole course of future time this side of the
horizon." 112 The fact that we do not in fact know much about
future tastes suggests that any attempt to apply welfare economics
to real world problems will require a "horizon" in the very near
future. But there can clearly be no agreement on where the
"horizon" should be located. Even if "we accept a value judgment
to the effect that the preferences of our contemporaries are to be
given great weight, and those of unborn generations negligible
weight," the fact remains that "[t]he further ahead we look, the
more insignificant becomes the place of our contemporaries in rela-
tion to that of the never-ending succession of future generations.
Unless we firmly believe the Day of Judgment to be just around
the comer, the mere weight of their numbers may win in the long
maximizing the individual choices. I doubt that a deer would choose to be
eaten by wolves, yet one of the prerequisites for an equilibrium population
of deer is the presence of predators. If the deer are not eaten by wolves
(or shot by hunters) they will die of starvation and their range will be damaged
- perhaps beyond repair. See R. DASMANN, ENVMONMENTAL CONSERVATION
236-37 (2d ed. 1968). There is a moral hidden here somewhere. See id. at
324. Unfortunately the moral has not been incorporated into any system of
welfare economics that I have seen.
111. Fardell v. Potts, in UNCOMMON LAW 1, 2 (A. Herbert ed. 1936)
(holding that "at Common Law a reasonable woman does not exist." Id. at
6). The learned Master of the Rolls in Fardell was of the opinion that
"Economic Man has under the stress of modem conditions almost wholly
disappeared from view." Id. at 4; but quaere?
112. J. GRAAFF, supra note 81, at 55. Though I have not seen this ex-
pressly stated, it is also clear that the "community" cannot include the dead.
The wishes-the choices-of those who are gone and the past choices of those
who are still with us cannot be taken into account by welfare economic theory
in defining the well-being of the community. This would appear to require
a mortmain statute more severe than any created by Henry VIII.
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run." 11 3  Where the "horizon" of our concern for the well-being
of future generations should be drawn is thus "a value judgment
which each man must make for himself." But if individuals cannot
agree on their value judgments about whose welfare should be
included in a welfare analysis, then the analysis cannot be made,
or at least cannot be described as an "objective" study.
The typical solution to this problem by those who would apply
the learning of welfare economics to the real world is simply to
ignore the interests of future generations. As one economist has
put it:
[I]s the heritage of future generations to be a polluted
planet justified by reliance on the concept of Pareto opti-
mality and increasing consumption or poetically by an
appropriate modification of Edna St. Vincent Millay's
lines so that they read, "If we burn our candles at both ends
it really will make a lovely light."? Of course, she did add,
"It will not last the night."
... Pareto optimality is ... a standard which contains
an economists version of a rule against perpetuities even
stricter than the one announced in the Duke of Norfolk's
Case. In economics, the preferences we maximize are all
preferences of lives in being; were they not, it would be
impossible to indulge in an oeonomic fiction that pref-
erences are discoverable "in principle" (i.e., are quasi-
discoverable)... j14
The questions of "who should be included within the com-
munity" and "what weight should be given to the interests of
future generations" have perturbed the law of late. In a way--
almost a perverse way-the question of who should be within the
community was the key issue in the Supreme Court decisions relat-
ing to the constitutionality of antiabortion laws. The fact that
the interests, and existence, of "inchoate" members of the commu-
nity may be cut off before they "vest" does not, of course, mean
113. Id. at 93-94 (emphasis added). Graaff also argues convincingly that
to discount the interests of future generations because of uncertainty does not
solve the problem: "Not only may different men discount for uncertainty
in different ways, and thus have different ideas about the (effective) length
of the stream, but our standards of reference (individual preference scales)
become more uncertain too. In solving one problem we land ourselves with
worse ones." Id. at 95.
114. Liebhafsky, supra note 87, at 629. "It is thus beside the point to
assert that the interest rate measures the preferences for current and future
consumption of present lives in being." Id.
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that the Court has said that we may disregard the interests of
those who are actually born in the future.1' 5 On the other hand
we have the express recognition in the National Environmental
Policy Act that we should "[flulfill the responsibilities of each
generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding gen-
erations." 11
The questions posed in the preceding paragraph are difficult
and probably admit to no satisfactory answers. Certainly we shall
have to make-if only by default "i7-- many significant decisions af-
fecting water quality and the environment as a whole long before we
115. Cf. Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960) (holding
that a child born with birth defects caused by the defendant's wrong before
the child's birth has, post natem, a good cause of action).
116. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 101(b)(1), 42
U.S.C. § 4331(6) (1) (1970).
There are other examples of the law taking conflicting positions in defining
the "community" for which the law exists. Compare Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 562 (1964) ("Legislators represent people, not trees or acres"), with
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741, 741-42 (1972) ("Contemporary
public concern for protecting nature's ecological equilibrium should lead to
the conferral of standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own
preservation.") (Douglas, J., dissenting). It should be noted that Justice
Douglas obscures the question of whether it is the "environmental objects"
themselves whose interest should be protected or whether the protection should
be accorded to human values. In one sentence he states: "The river as plaintiff
speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it." Id. at 743. In the
next sentence, however, he says, "Those people who have a meaningful rela-
tion to that body of water-whether it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a zoologist,
or a logger-must be able to speak for the values which the river represents
and which are threatened with destruction." Id. (emphasis added); cf.
E. CAHN, Tsm MORAL OF DEcisioN 312 (1955): "In the resolution of our own
moral problems, we . . . can scarcely rely on receiving testimony from a tree
or from running water."
117. A wide variety of what economists call external costs and
benefits . . . falls "between the stools of innumerable individual de-
cisions to develop individual technologies for individual purposes
without explicit attention to what all these decisions add up to for
society as a whole and for people as human beings."
In part, this phenomenon is a corollary of the value our society
has placed upon relatively unrestrained decision-making by autono-
mous individuals and institutions. In part, the phenomenon follows
from the "tyranny of small decisions-incremental choices that, taken
by themselves, may seem unworthy of notice but, taken altogether, may
create problems of major proportions." And in part, it is a corollary
of the inherent difficulty of predicting and evaluating certain kinds
of external costs and benefits, which make themselves felt indirectly
or at times and places far removed from the initial points of deci-
sion. ....
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, TECHNOLOGY: PRocEssEs
OF ASSSSMENT AND CHOICE 10 (1969).
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have agreed upon an answer. But this does not jusify our tramp-
ling upon the interests of our posterity solely because those interests
cannot be, even in theory, plugged into the standard cost-benefit
analysis.
A failure to include appropriate beneficiaries within the com-
munity of those whose well-being we wish to increase may lead
to unsatisfactory-and immoral-policy recommendations. One ex-
ample (not taken from economicsl) should suffice to establish this
point. Professor Forrester, in his model of urban dynamics, defines
the community to be studied as a city and then concludes (as one
would expect if one fails to consider the interests of anyone not
within the community) that the solution to unemployment is to
have the unemployed emigrate-whither he sayeth not.""' If we
accept economic nostrums based on the implicit assumption that the
interests of future generations are to be disregarded, we shall be
threatening the environment-and the world-with the same sort
of endgiiltige Ldsung.119
There is another reason-besides convenience-which induces
economists to disregard the interests of the future. The neoclassi-
cal economic model of an efficient markeW20 is a "mechanical"
model which in theory can run equally well in either direction.
Should tastes change so that those who once preferred high produc-
tion and bad water now want good water, even at the cost of less
production, the machine will simply run in reverse until those new
wants are satisfied. The machine and its builders cannot cope with
the fact that real-world processes are often irreversible.12 1
Classical mechanics is mechanistic because it can neither
account for the existence of enduring qualitative changes
in nature nor accept this existence as an independent fact.
Mechanics knows only locomotion, and locomotion is both
reversible and qualityless. The same drawback was built
into modern economics by its founders, who, on the testi-
mony of Jevons and Walras, had no greater aspiration
than to create an economic science after the exact pattern
of mechanics....
And these [early] architects succeeded so well with their
grand plan that the conception of the economic process as
a mechanical analogue has ever since dominated economic
118. J. FORRESTMa, URBAN DiYNAMCS 119-29 (1969).
119. Cf. J. Fons si-m, WoRL D AMICS 94-95 (1971).
120. See text accompanying note 314 infra.
121. N. GEOrnEScU-ROEm, supra note 100, at 1.
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thought completely. In this representation, the economic
process neither induces any qualitative change nor is af-
fected by the qualitative change of the environment into
which it is anchored. It is an isolated, self-contained
and ahistorical process-a circular flow between production
and consumption with no outlets and no inlets .... .22
The intriguing ease with which Neoclassical economists
left natural resources out of their own representation of
the economic process may not be unrelated to Marx's
dogma that everything nature offers us is gratis. A more
plausible explanation of this ease and especially of the
absence of any noticeable attempt at challenging the omis-
sion is that the "no deposit, no return" analogue befits
the businessman's view of economic life. For if one looks
only at money, all he can see is that money just passes
from one hand to another: except by a regrettable acci-
dent, it never gets out of the economic process .... 123
Thus standard economic models completely ignore, and implic-
itly deny, the possibility that our choices, implemented through
"the market," may cause irretrievable damage to the world-may
visit us, if not with "G6tterdanumerung at least with the "The
Damnation of Faust."124  Some have predicted that we are well
on our way to destroying Lake Erie forever as a living lake.125
Yet in an economic model such a grievous loss would be no trag-
edy because the mechanics of the model predict that "a corpse
may resuscitate to lead a second life." L2 The tragedy comes
when we apply the recommendations of the model to the world,
where corpses rot and putrid lakes discharge their flatulent bubbles
unto eternity.
The dangers inherent in applications of welfare economics to
the world in which we live are the inevitable products of the
limited, and distorted, data and values which are fed into the
machine.
[A] study of welfare which confines itself to the measure-
ment of quantities of goods and their distribution is not
only seriously limited, it is... positively misleading. For
122. Id. at 1-2. The remainder of this paragraph is quoted at note 100
supra.
123. Id. at 2.
124. I am indebted to Professor Wentworth B. Clapham, Jr., of the Case
Western Reserve University Systems Research Center for this analogy.
125. B. ComauoNER, THE CLOSINc CIcRLE 94-111 (1971).
126. N. GEORGESCU-ROEGEN, supra note 100, at 7.
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the things on which happiness ultimately depends, friend-
ship, faith, the perception of beauty, and so on, are outside
its range: only the most obstinate pursuit of formalism
would endeavor to bring them into relation with the meas-
uring rod of money, and then to no practical effect. Thus
the triumphant achievements of modem technology, ever-
swifter travel, round-the-clock synthetic entertainment,
the annual cornucopia of slick and glossy gadgets, which
rest perforce on the cult of efficiency, the single-minded
pursuit of advancement, the craving for material success,
may be exacting a fearful toll in terms of human happiness.
But the formal elegance of welfare economics will never
reveal it.127
2. An Embarrassment of Optima
Whatever one may think of ethical judgments which underlie
the conclusions of welfare economics, there remains the fatal defect
that the conclusions are meaningless for any practical purpose.
The damning fact is that there is an infinite number of points
available to our society which are Pareto optimal and that any
degree of water quality, good or bad, is almost certain to be con-
sistent with at least one of these points. Thus neither the ethical
judgments which underlie welfare economics nor cost-benefit anal-
yses based on those judgments can supply, even in theory, a usable
criterion for determining whether the world would be better off
with better water, or with worse. 8
That there is an infinity of Pareto optima is easy to demon-
strate. Imagine a community of two men on a desert island who
are about to catch a fish. If Crusoe gets to keep the fish, then he
will be better off than he was before, and Friday, who had no
fish and will have no fish, will be no worse off. Crusoe's getting
the fish is clearly a Pareto optimal solution. On the other hand,
if Friday gets the fish, this result is also Pareto optimal. Or they
could divide the fish in half, or Crusoe could take two-thirds and
Friday one, or vice versa, or Crusoe could take a quarter and
Friday... Clearly, there are as many Pareto optima as there are
ways to split a fish.
127. E.J. MISHAN, A Survey of Welfare Economics, in WELFARE ECONOm-
ics 86 (1969). It should be noted that Mishan is an optimist among econo-
mists when it comes to the prospects of welfare economics. See id. at 71-84.
128. This does not mean that the conclusions of welfare economics do not
suggest that one means of obtaining a given level of water quality might be
preferable to another. See notes 367-74 infra and accompanying text.
1976]
48 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
In such a simple example there may appear to be no appre-
ciable difference between the distribution of the fish and its alloca-
tion. Assuming that both men are hungry, it would seem that if
the fish is distributed to Crusoe, it will be allocated to being eaten
by Crusoe, while if distributed to Friday, the allocation will be
that it is eaten by Friday. Normal economic usage, however, is
designed to obscure this trivial, but important, fact. No matter
who gets to eat the fish, the result will be a Pareto optimum and
a welfare economist can therefore announce that there is only one
Pareto optimal, Pareto efficient allocation of the fish-that it be
eaten. Normal economic usage treats the question of who eats the
fish as a purely distributional one about which economists are
morally obligated to remain silent.
If, besides Crusoe and Friday, there were also a lawconomist
on the island, a Dr. Dee, one can readily imagine the conclusion
to the following scenario:
CRUsOE:. Doctor, we need your advice as to the proper
disposition of this fish.
DIR. DE: I am, of course, always happy to advise those
responsible for the welfare of the community on the scienti-
fically optimal allocation of the community's resources.
FRDAY: So, advise us.
DR. DEE: There is, in this particular instance only one
possible efficient allocation of the fish: You should eat it.
CRUSOE: Who should eat it?
DR. DEE: That is an unscientific question that I must de-
cline to answer. Surely, you do not expect me to inject
my value judgments into your concerns.
CRUSOE: What earthly use are you?
FRIDAY: We could eat hum.
cRUsoE: My dear Friday, what a remarkably distasteful
suggestion.... Efficient though ...
DR. DEE: But . . .
CRUSOE: Please Doctor, don't interject your value judg-
ments into our stew pot.
(Curtain)
In more complicated cases it is not possible for welfare econo-
mists to disguise the fact that there is more than one Pareto opti-
mum. Even in our example of the fish, matters would be more
complicated if Crusoe were not hungry at the moment and wanted
to use the fish for bait. In such an event, Dr. Dee would have
been forced to recognize that the efficient allocation depended on
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the distribution of the fish: "Well, Mr. Crusoe, the efficient alloca-
tion depends upon whether you or Friday gets the fish. If Friday
gets it, it should be allocated as a consumer good, whereas if you
get it, it should be used as a factor of production in the fishing
industry." One suspects that Dr. Dee will still be (optimally)
allocated to the stew pot.
However preposterous these examples may seem, they are a
precise demonstration of the limits of welfare economics. When-
ever the assertion is made that the Pareto efficient allocation of a
resource is in a certain use, one is given no clue as to who should
get the benefit of the resource. Worse, in any case in which peo-
pies' tastes differ (e.g., Crusoe desires fishbait and Friday wants
food), the assertion that a certain allocation is Pareto efficient
assumes--usually sub silentio-a certain distribution of wealth.
Thus the assertion that a certain implementation of the FWPCA
would be inefficient actually means nothing more than, "so long as
my clients, the polluters, are wealthy and their victims are poor, it
would not be a Pareto improvement to decrease pollution."
Of course, I have ignored many important factors in these two
simple examples of the workings of Pareto optimality. I have
ignored the possibility that Crusoe may be so jealous that he would
give up his umbrella to prevent Friday from enjoying the fish. In
this case, it could never be optimal for Friday to get the fish. I
have ignored the fact that Crusoe's welfare depends on Friday's
health, for if Friday becomes weak from hunger, Crusoe may have
to shine his own shoes. I have ignored the fact that if Crusoe
gets the fish, he might strangle on a fishbone. 129  I have even
129. If the exact degree of risk involved is known with absolute certainty-
for example, if there is one chance in ten that Crusoe will get a bone in his
throat-then a refined economic model can in theory cope with that risk. But
in the face of uncertainty of the type which pervades our world-uncertainty
in which we do not know, and cannot agree upon, the probabilities of the
risks involved-present welfare economic theory is helpless. See J. GRAAFF,
THroRancAL WE.Am EcoNoMncs 116-19 (1967). Graaff makes a telling
comment about the desirability of complete certainty:
Very often it seems to be implied that the reduction of uncertainty-
the provision of more complete information about the present or the
future-is bound to increase welfare. One can easily disagree with
such a view without going to the opposite extreme and proclaiming
that "ignorance is bliss." Much of the excitement of life would
vanish if we knew too much of the future. It would be a rather
curious use of words if we were to find ourselves saving that welfare
has increased, when all we mean is that life has become exceedingly
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ignored the fact that a fish is inevitably associated with fishbones.
Welfare economists assume that we can all be made "better off"
whenever more goods are produced 30 but this pig principle is
completely untenable when an increase in goods, e.g., fish or alumi-
num cans, necessarily entails a corresponding increase in bads,
e.g., fishbones or water pollution.13' Even if we assume that Crusoe
and Friday would be better off with a billion fish rather than just
one, it seems probable that there would come a time when the
burden of the leftover bones would exceed the benefits of the fish.
Those matters have all been ignored because they are normally
ignored in welfare economic theory. 32 My difficulty throughout
this article lies not so much in explaining welfare economic theory
as it does in explaining how anyone could be persuaded by the argu-
ments of welfare economists when they are both unrealistic in their
assumptions and trivial in their conclusions.
It is clear that in the theory of welfare economics there are an
infinite number of states which are Pareto optimal. One way to
get a Pareto optimal position is for the parties to trade until neither
could be made better off by further trades. It might appear that
130. See note 97 supra and accompanying text.
131. Economists pretend that they can avoid this problem by defining the
absence of a bad as a good (or as a factor of production). They then treat
the production of the bads as the consumption of the corresponding goods
(or factors). Thus, for example, if the production of steel entails a certain
quantity of water pollution per ton of steel, one can say that so much water
quality is consumed in producing a ton of steel. One can say that, but it is
misleading both in theory and in the real world. The theoretical objection
lies in the implication that those negative bads that are called goods (e.g.,
water quality) go into the plant at time t1 and that the goods (steel) come
out at time t 2, whereas, in actuality, both the steel and the pollution are
produced together. This may not be a terribly important objection, but it
seems to be related to the objection that mechanical economic models ignore
(and obscure) the fact that time flows in only one direction. The practical
objection is that such a formulation encourages one to separate the goods from
the bads even though they are inseparable. Thus, if a steel manufacturer can
persuade us that more steel is good for us and can also persuade us to ignore
the fact that more water pollution is bad, he will convince us, incorrectly, that
we desire unlimited production of steel. That part of the cost of steel rep-
resented by the consumption of water quality, (e.g., by water pollution), will
be ignored by us to our ultimate regret. It will also be ignored by the manu-
facturer, because the pollution will flow downstream and will not cost him
anything. We are the ones who will pay the cost, the cost we were per-
suaded to overlook. (This, by the way, is an example of an "externality.")
See text accompanying notes 393-99 infra.
132. For a description of the simplifying assumptions used in the basic
models, see notes 81-88 supra and accompanying text.
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if we let Crusoe and Friday trade with each other, there will be
only one final, Pareto optimal position which they will reach at
the end of their trading. In a limited sense this is true. But this
unique Pareto optimum depends upon and is completely specified
by the original distribution. Let us return to our example on
Crusoe's island, assuming that Crusoe has 20 oysters and Friday
has nothing. If Friday prefers oysters to fish and Crusoe prefers
fish to oysters, then Crusoe will always get the fish, once it is caught.
In order to prevent Dr. Dee from claiming that there is only one
possible allocation, we should also assume that Crusoe wants to use
the fish for bait and that Friday wants to eat it. The only Pareto
optimal allocation of the fish-the only efficient allocation-is for
Crusoe to get the fish and, more importantly, since Crusoe will use
the fish for bait, fish bait is the efficient allocation for the fish. But
this is true only if Crusoe has the 20 oysters to begin with. If Friday
had happened to have the 20 oysters, then the Pareto optimal alloca-
tion, if Friday catches the fish, is for Friday to eat the fish. Thus if
Friday has the oysters and catches the fish, the fish is efficiently al-
located to consumptive uses. But if Crusoe has ten oysters and
Friday has ten, then the efficient allocation may be that half of the
fish should be used for bait and half should be eaten. It thus ap-
pears that though there may bp only one Pareto optimal allocation
of the fish for each pre-existing distribution of oysters, there are at
least as many Pareto optima as there are ways to distribute the
oysters. In short there are "not one but an infinite number of such
optima, each differing from the others by a particular distribution
of welfare" 13 3 or, as in our example, oysters.134
Thus, even if one accepts all the necessary ethical judgments
underlying the theory of welfare economics, one must also accept
a given distribution of welfare (or income or wealth or whatever
term you prefer) before the application of those judgments can
indicate how water quality (or fish or oysters) should be allocated
in the United States, or even on Crusoe's island. It should be
noted that some of the consequences of Pareto optimality can be
133. E.J. MisaAN, WELE Im, supra note 127, at 39-40. "Over the past few
years it has been generally recognized that the nature of any optimal solution
depends . . . on the existing distribution of income." Id. at 225.
134. It should also be noted that each time a new fish (or a new oyster)
is injected into our model economy, the distribution of wealth on the island
changes. Thus, it is possible that the allocation of the first fish to Crusoe may
be Pareto optimal, whereas the second fish would be optimally allocated to
Friday.
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quite unattractive. For example, on Crusoe's island, if the one
who owned the oysters also got the fish, the other would starve
to death. "[W]hile we are enjoying our 'best of all possible
worlds', Paretian Optimality, some people may be starving." 3 5
In general, since the destitute have no goods with which to trade,
the pursuit of a Pareto optimum will leave them out in the cold;
if income is assigned to those who are already wealthy (in our
example, if the fish is assigned to him who has the oysters), the
result of the Paretian criteria will inevitably be that the rich get
richer while the poor get poorer.
3. The "Coase Theoren" That the Important Matters Don't Matter
By this point the rationale for my earlier argument-that the
economic theory (or, at least, its consequences) depends on the-
law, particularly the law of property'36--should be apparent. In
my examples involving Crusoe and Friday, I did not explain how
it was determined that Crusoe (or Friday) would get the fish
initially. The "law" could have been, "he who catches a fish owns
it;" but the law could also have been "no matter who catches a fish,
135. D'Arge & Hunt, Economic Orthodoxy and Externalities Revisited, 1
ENVMON. AFFAIrS 845, 850 (1972). D'Arge and Hunt prefaced this remark
with the following comment:
Inherent in the acceptance of the social constraints, within the
context of which the orthodox [Paretian] criteria are defined, are a
great many value judgments which orthodox economists generally ac-
cept. They must either approve or disregard the moral implications
of the existing distribution of income, or must assume that appropri-
ate actions will produce a morally desirable income distribution be-
fore the theory becomes relevant; they must approve of, disregard, or
assume appropriate changes will be made in the distribution of wealth;
they must approve of . . .etc., the existing systems of laws and
rules-including the laws of private property and the operation of
social control. They must approve . . .etc., of the power struc-
ture and the way in which power is wielded; they must assume there
are no handicapped individuals, or, in economists' jargon, they must
assume that every person has an initial endowment with which he
can "both survive and participate in the market."Id.
136. See note 55 supra and accompanying text. The concept of property,
if not of a law of property, appears to exist in even the most "primitive"
societies. See the materials collected in J. CRIBBEr, W. Farrz & C. JonNsoN,
CAs AND MATmtALS ON PROPERTY 1-24 (2d ed. 1966). The idea that
property is freely alienable, on the other hand, came into our law only during
the reign of Edward I. Quia Emptores, 10 Edw. I. c. 1 (1290). Some choses
in action are still not alienable under our law and this category of "inalienable"
things includes interests in land, viz., rights of entry for condition broken. 1
AMEmCAN LAW OF PROPERTY §4.68 (Casner ed. 1952).
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Crusoe owns it."137 These two laws have very different conse-
quences-the second dooms Friday to starvation-yet either law
is consistent with a Pareto optimum (although the two optima are
very different).
If one accepts the ethical judgments of welfare economics, there
remains the problem of how wealth and incomes should be distribu-
ted. Strangely enough, many economists will say, with appropriate
modesty, that this question involves an ethical judgment which
lies outside their "scientific" competency.1 38 Welfare economists
tend to accept the existing distribution of property and income and
to recommend, on that basis, minor improvements that will increase
the efficiency of what may well be an abominable state of affairs.
To paraphrase Mrs. Robinson's description of Alfred Marshall: they
are, certainly, great moralizers, but somehow the moral always
comes out that whatever is, is very nearly best.lm Or, as two
economists put it more bluntly than I would dare: "Economists
persist in traditional neoclassical welfare analysis for one very basic
reason. It is an elaborate apology for the status quo." 40
Some economists and lawyers wandering through the no man's
land where law and economics meet have even argued, in the con-
text of pollution and similar problems, that it does not matter how
property rights and liabilities are assigned'. They have suggested,
in effect, that given that Crusoe owns the 20 oysters, it does not
matter whether the law will assign the fish to Crusoe or Friday.
After all, so long as the law permits exchanges, Crusoe is going to
end up with the fish. It would be unscientific to contemplate the
agonies of Friday's death. The suggestion that the distribution
of wealth does not determine efficiency was first made by an econo-
mist, Professor R. H. Coase of the University of Chicago,141 but
137. Cf. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. B. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). How the
law comes to be obeyed is a matter not discussed in economic theory. The
assumption is always made that all parties are law-abiding-if they are not,
economics becomes a science without content.
138. See, e.g., J. DALES, PoLIunToN, PoPER--r & PnicEs (1968). It is
also true that there are lawonomists who mix their devotion to Pareto efficiency
with distributional moralizing. See W. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENQTiNs, ThE
CAsE FOR OpTnaAL Por.urxoN (1974), where the author comes out strongly
in favor of equality except to the extent that it may discourage the production
of goods as demanded by the pig principle.
139. J. ROBINSON, supra note 99.
140. D'Arge & Hunt, supra note 135, at 851.
141. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & EcoN. 1 (1960).
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the most precise formulation of this position is that of a lawyer,
Professor Guido Calabresi of Yale:' 42
[I]f one assumes rationality,143 no transaction costs, and
no legal impediments to bargaining, all misallocations of
resources would be fully cured in the market by bargains.
Far from being surprising, this statement is tautological,
at least if one accepts any of the various classic definitions
of misallocation. These ultimately come down to a statement
akin to the following: A misallocation exists when there is
available a possible reallocation in which all those who
would lose from the reallocation could be fully compen-
sated by those who would gain, and, at the end of this
compensation process, there would still be some who would
be better off than before. 44
This and other similar definitions of resource misalloca-
tion merely mean that there is a misallocation when a situ-
ation can be improved by bargains. If people are rational,
bargains are costless, and there are no legal impediments
to bargains, transactions will ex hypothesis occur to the
point where bargains can no longer improve the situation;
to the point, in short, of optimal resource allocation. We
can, therefore, state a. an axiom" 5 the proposition that all
externalities'" can be internalized and all misallocations,
142. Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-
A Comment, 11 J. LAw & ECON. 67, 68-69 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
143. For the meaning of "rationality" in the mouths of economists and
Professor Calabresi, see note 351 infra and accompanying text.
144. This rule is simply the Paretian criterion in a more sophisticated guise.
The suggestion that resources are properly allocated if compensation could
bring society to a Pareto optimum adds nothing but confusion. If the com-
pensation is not paid, the allocation will have made someone worse off, thus
violating the Paretian criterion. If the compensation is paid, there will be a
new distribution of wealth in society and there is no reason to believe that
new distribution will represent a Pareto optimum.
In fact, once the compensation is paid, the old allocation may be a possible
reallocation in which all those who would lose could be fully compensated by
those who would' gain. E.J. MisHAN, A Reappraisal of the Principles of Re-
source Allocation, in WELFmB EcoNOmwcs 123 (1969). Allocating resources
in accordance with a compensation criterion is likely to bounce us like a
shuttlecock from one allocation to another unless society prefers one particular
allocation "with reference to all conceivable distributions of Welfare." Id.
See also E.J. MisHAN, Tmn Cost OF EcoNoMc GnowTH 49-50 (1967).
145. I had thought it axiomatic that axioms are not the results of proofs
but rather the groundwork on which proofs are laid. I simply cannot tell
whether Calabresi "believes" this proposition or is only developing an axiom
system to be plugged into a model which may or may not have any relation
to the empirical world.




even those created by legal structures, can be remedied by
the market, except to the extent that transactions cost
money or the structure itself creates some impediments
to bargaining.
The examples involving Crusoe and Friday seem to illustrate
the truth of this "axiom." When the initial distribution of wealth
on the island is such that Crusoe owns the 20 oysters, then, in-
evitably, Crusoe will end up with the fish. If the fish is initially
given to poor old Friday, there is by Calabresi's definition a "mis-
allocation;" but the "bargain" by which the fish is exchanged for
five oysters automatically rights the situation. Of course, if Crusoe
gets the fish initially there is no misallocation to be righted, though
Friday starves. As Calabresi suggests in a footnote: "Any given
individual qua individual might be richer or poorer as a result of
the liability rules in force at the beginning of the bargaining process.
But this difference in distribution of wealth would ex hypothesis
not be one which would affect the total social product." 147 That is,
Friday qua individual may starve to death, but the "total social
product," i.e., the fish, remains unaffected.
Once again one can see the unpleasant consequences of pur-
suing a Pareto optimum as one's sole ethical goal. Surely anyone,
whether Coase, Calabresi, or Crusoe, would prefer Friday to get
the fish. It is only in games lawconomists play that anyone would
think of the efficient allocation of the fish rather than of Friday's
hunger. But the games of lawconomists are likely to return to us
as "scientific" prescriptions for the proper ordering of the world.
The so-called "Coase theorem" has led to a peculiarly nasty
approach to pollution (and other) problems. It has been claimed
that the Coase theorem suggests:
[An economic principle for deciding, in cases of con-
flicting land (or other property) uses, which party shall
have the right to exclude the other. The right should be
assigned to the party whose use is the more valuable....
By assigning rights in accordance with this principle the
147. Calabresi, supra note 142, at 68 n.4. One may wonder whether the
total social product would not be different under different liability (or prop-
erty) rules. In our example Friday would eat the fish, whereas Crusoe would
use it for bait. A pound of bait does not seem to be quite the same social
product as a pound of dinner. Furthermore, if Crusoe uses the fish for bait,
he may catch more fish, thereby affecting the "total social product," though
Friday starves in the meantime. Is Friday's death a part of the social product?
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law can anticipate and thus obviate the necessity for a
market transaction. Transaction costs are minimized when
the law (1) assigns the right to the party who would buy
it from the other party if it were assigned to the other party
instead and if transaction costs were zero, or (2) alterna-
tively, places liability on the party who, if he had the right
and transaction costs were zero, would sell it to the other
party.148
This rule would, if applied on Crusoe's island, lead to the star-
vation of the poor. For even on the island there are transaction
costs149 to making a bargain-both parties have to consume some
energy in reaching a deal. Since we know that Crusoe will end
up with the fish whether he catches it or has to bargain for it with
Friday, this Coasian decisional principle requires that the right to
the fish be assigned to Crusoe, no matter who catches it. It re-
quires that Friday starve.
Perhaps we should accept this principle; but if we do, we should
see where it leads us. It seems to be no more than an injunction
to move to the most easily obtainable Pareto optimum, to distribute
society's wealth so that the result is a Pareto optimum. But with
modern technology, isn't the most readily obtainable Pareto opti-
mum a world without life? In pollution cases this decisional prin-
ciple suggests that the "right" to pollute should be assigned to
rich industries and that their poorer victims should be denied the
protection of the law. Some courts have actually adopted such a
position,150 though others have protested "depriving the poor man
of his little property." 15'
Such protests may result from the fact that economic analysts,
in their quest for Pareto optimality (or as they are likely to call
it, "[tihe efficient, or value-maximizing, accommodation,") 152 tend
to completely disregard fairness, justice, equity, and all of the other
matters which we, both as lawyers and as human beings, are likely
148. R. PosNER, EcoNo uc ANALYSis OF LAW 18 (1973).
149. The importance of transaction costs is discussed at notes 252, 267-68
infra and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453
(1886), discussed at notes 582, 803, 807-08 infra and accompanying text.
151. See text accL.mpanying note 795 infra.
152. R. PosNma, supra note 148, at 17. See akso Samuels, The Coase Theo-
rem and the Study of Law and Economics, 14 NATuRAL BEsounms J. 1, 2
(1974). "[T]he language and reasoning used to derive the Coase theorem,
namely, maximizing the value of production, taking advantage of gains from
trade, market efficiency and the like, are precisely that of Pareto optimality."
[Vol. 27:3
WATER POLLUTION
to consider of primary importance. It is not that those who espouse
Paretian economic models do not knowiss that their quest for
"efficiency" may lead to results which-one trusts-even they
would consider unfortunate, but rather that, since their theories
(or, perhaps, their ideologies), cannot cope with justice, they tend
to ignore it in their articles. More sensitive economists have, to
their credit, invoked "[v]isions of criminals being bribed to desist
and of little children being regarded as 'hitting' automobiles in
153. Calabresi knows that different assignments of rights and liabilities lead
to different distributions of wealth throughout society. See note 142 supra.
Posner knows this too:
The initial assignment of rights, even where transaction costs are zero
so that efficiency is not affected, may affect the relative wealth of
the parties and this may affect the use of resources in two ways.
First, if the parties do not spend their money in identical ways, a shift
of wealth between them will alter demand for the various goods and
services that they buy however slightly. Second, where the right
ends up may depend on how the initial assignment is made, if the
value of the right represents a large fraction of the wealth of either
party. The extreme example is the right to a barrel of water as be-
tween two dying men in a desert.
B. PosNn, supra note 148, at 18 n.1. But Posner then says in the next sen-
tence: "Neither point undermines Coase's conclusion that efficiency is unaf-
fected by the rule of liability if transaction costs are zero... ." Id. What is
this "efficiency" that remains .unchanged when the crucial, the only, question is:
Which of the two men will die of thirst? The answer is that "efficiency"
means being at any one of the infinite number of Pareto optima.
Whether Coase was aware at the time that he wrote his seminal article
that the assignment of rights controls the distribution of wealth is not clear to
me. Unlike Calabresi and Posner, he is an economist rather than a lawyer;
he appears to have done his analysis using the standard economic trick of
invoking the Latin incantation "ceteris paribus," which means roughly, "every-
thing else remaining unchanged." Unfortunately he appears to have assumed
that the very variables he was changing remained unchanged. Compare
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & EcoN. 1 (1960) with d'Arge
et al., Introduction, Coase Theorem Symposium, 13 NATuRAL REsouracs
J. 557,557-59 (1973):
A ... problem of consistency in the Coase proposition is that if
liability rules are one component defining initial endowments of all
consumers and producers, how can they be variables in establishing
a competitive efficient allocation? In other words, if adoption of
liability rather than non-liability rule for externalities defines initial
endowments, it is doubtful that the allocation of goods between
parties would be the same, unless liability per se does not influence
wealth. If it does, then each individual's wealth would be different
depending upon whether liability was or was not adopted. f differ-
ences in initial endowments induced different allocations of resources
through, say, variations in demand for goods by differont parties, then
the allocation of resources clearly would not be the same as with non-
liability.
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pedestrian crossings, with Coasians failing to be morally of-
fended. . " 154
Despite Coase's conclusion that if the market functioned prop-
erly, any distribution would result in an efficient allocation of
resources, different assignments of rights and liabilities (different
"entitlements") will lead to different efficient allocations.155 Sur-
prisingly, it is Professor Calabresi who (together with Mr. Mel-
amed) has given us a concise example of how trivial the Coase
theorem is:
Taney's willingness to pay for the right to make noise may
depend on how rich he is; Marshall's willingness to pay
for silence may depend on his wealth. In a society which
entitles Taney to make noise and which forces Marshall
to buy silence from Taney, Taney is wealthier and Marshall
poorer than each would be in a society which had the
converse set of entitlements. Depending on how Marshall's
desire for silence and Taney's for noise vary with their
wealth,1 50 an entitlement to noise will result in negotia-
tions which will lead to a different quantum of noise than
would be an entitlement to silence. This variation in the
quantity of noise and silence can be viewed as no more
than an instance of the well accepted proposition that what
is a Pareto optimal, or economically efficient, solution varies
with the starting distribution of wealth. Pareto optimality
is optimal given a distribution of wealth, but different
distributions of wealth imply their own Pareto optimal
allocation of resources. 157
Obviously one can substitute "water pollution" for "noise" and
"pure water" for silence without changing this analysis. Calabresi
154. Randall, Coasian Externality Theory in a Policy Context, 14 NAr~uAL
REsouRcEs J. 35, 53 (1974) (citing an unpublished paper by John Weld).
155. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HAnv. L. REv. 1089, 1090 (1972)
(footnotes omitted).
156. Here is a striking example of the perverse use of language, and the per-
verse mode of thought, which results from equating "welfare" or "well-being"
with "choices." See note 102 supra. A moment's thought should satisfy any-
one that Marshall's "desire" for silence is unlikely to vary with his wealth-
it is just that if he is rich he can afford to "choose" more silence. Desires
may or may not change with wealth but the ability to implement one's desires
in the market, if not a definition of wealth, is certainly a function of wealth
and of nothing else (except the existence of the market itself).
157. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 155, at 1095-96. It would seem
that Professor Calabresi has abandoned his belief that differences in distri-
bution do not "affect total social product." See note 147 supra.
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and Melamed have also recognized that "[t]here should be no
implication that a Pareto optimal solution is in some sense better
than a non-Pareto optimal solution which results in a different
wealth distribution. The implication is only that given the same
wealth distribution Pareto optimal is in some meaningful sense
preferable to non-Pareto optimal."158  Welfare economic theory
does not supply any basis for arguing that efficiency is desirable
if one is not content with the distribution of wealth that is associ-
ated with the attainment of the efficient state.
Since this is so and since the rigorous enforcement of the FWPCA
would change the distribution of wealth throughout the country,
no one can legitimately argue on the basis of Pareto optimality or
efficiency that we would be better off without (or with) such
enforcement. Although I have no objection to attempts to apply the
FVVPCA in an efficient manner, I do not think that this is a very
practicable goal. "In the world in which lawyers must live, any-
thing close to Pareto efficiency, even if desirable, is not attainable." 159
There is no basis in the concept of Pareto efficiency for pre-
ferring one level of water quality to another. If people were able
to bargain among themselves as to what level of water quality
they should have, the result of such bargaining would be any con-
ceivable level of water quality; the exact level reached would be
a direct function of the wealth and the legal rights of the bar-
gainers. If one wants no water pollution whatsoever, one merely
needs to assign the right to enjoin any pollution to a fanatic and
158. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 155, at 1096 n.15. What stumps
me is how someone who recognizes the triviality of efficiency can spend
so much time in its pursuit as does Professor Calabresi. See, e.g., G. CAL&-
BnESr, TBE CoSTs oF AcCIDErNrs (1970). Although Professor Calabresi is
deeply concerned with problems of distribution and other problems of justice,
his analyses seem inevitably to be concerned primarily with considerations
like efficiency.
Calabresi and Melamed write of "knowledgeable choices" and the
"party or activity best located to make ... cost/benefit analysis;" but
that is to beg the all-im ortant question of the role of the existing
distribution of rights and power. Thus, they write of bringing us
"close to the Pareto optimal result which the 'perfect' market would
reach," where there is no unique Pareto optimal result, only results
specific to the power structure; and when the very act of legislating
(through statute or court decisions) liability rules ... will also govern
the rights and power structure and thereby the Pareto optimal result,
including the social determination of those best able to make knowl-
edgeable choices and best located to make cost-benefit analyses.
Samuels, supra note 152, at 24.
159. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 155, at 1094 n.10.
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wealthy environmentalist. The environmentalist can bargain away
the right, but he will not. The result is both a Pareto optimum
and the achievement of the FWVPCA's impossible goal of elimin-
ating all discharges of pollutants. In fact, this result could be
obtained under Paretian analysis even if those who have the right
to enjoin the pollution are neither wealthy nor environmentalists;
under a legal system in which the victims of pollution have en-
joined their oppressors, "whenever transaction costs are suffi-
ciently high to preclude exchange, the status quo preserved is one
of zero pollution, complete abatement. That could really put firms
out of business and people out of workl"' 6o You may not desire
this particular result-I don't-but it is not one which can be at-
tacked on any sort of "efficiency" theory. "Rights specify efficiency,
efficiency does not specify rights."161
"[U]sing cost-benefit calculations tends to bias the analysis
toward existing rights," '6 2 though there seems to be no logical
reason for this psychological fact: "Those ... who argue that regu-
lation (e.g., setting pollution standards...) distorts the free market,
are only giving effect to the antecedently (pre-regulation) speci-
fied rights, when the central policy issue is precisely that rights
pattern (and the accompanying cost structure) versus the new
rights pattern (and its accompanying cost structures)." 113 Pareto
optimality will always tend to preserve the status quo, provided
that the starting point of the analysis is the present distribution
of rights and wealth. But if one starts with other assumptions,
one ends with other results. Those who now pollute,. and their
economic apologists, may argue that to deprive them of their pres-
ent "rights" to pollute without liability would be inefficient but, if
160. Randall, supra note 154, at 54. This last example assumes transaction
costs and therefore is not a result which can occur in an "efficient" market, a
concept which is discussed below. See notes 313-36 infra and accompanying
text. Consider, however, "the argument that 'where a market for an ex-
ternal diseconomy does not exist it should not exist, since the benefits from
such a market clearly cannot exceed the costs of its operation. The absence
of an observable market is, in itself, a market solution."' Samuels, supra note
152, at 22, quoting Randall, Market Solutions to Externality Problems: Theory
and Practice, 54 AM. J. AcmcuvrL uA ECON. 175 (1972). Randall himself
does not believe that the quoted argument is without fallacies.
161. Samuels, supra note 152, at 9.
162. Id. at 12.
163. Id. at 15. This preference for the status quo is especially unfortunate




one starts the analysis with the assumption that the rights and
liabilities are those established by the FWPCA, the opposite conclu-
sion follows with equal force.
E.J. Mishan, probably the most active theoretical welfare econ-
omist writing today, has demonstrated, to his regretes
[TJhat so long as we have no rule for the ranking of wel-
fare distributions (a) comparisons between optimum plans
are not possible and (b) comparisons between optimum
and nonoptimum plans are, in general, not possible.... 165
Far from an optimum allocation of resources represent-
ing some kind of an ideal output separable from and inde-
pendent of interpersonal comparisons of welfare, a particular
output retains its optimum characteristics only insofar as
we commit ourselves to the particular welfare distribu-
tion uniquely associated with it. If, therefore, we insist on
eschewing interpersonal comparisons of welfare the logic
of choice impels us to be indifferent as between "good"
and "bad" allocations of resources.16
"[T]here can be no proper allocation of resources independent of
a judgment as to the best distribution of welfare." 187 Thus, "the
characteristics of an optimal solution are not uniquely specified
but depend, in general, on the existing law." '68
It follows that an analysis based on the principles of welfare
economics (or Pareto optimality or the efficient allocation of re-
sources) 169 cannot be used to argue for or against any particular
164. E.J. MrssA, A Reappraisal of the Principles of Resource Allocation,
in WELFAR EcoNozacs 134 (1969): "To those who, like myself, do not at
first take kindly to these conclusions .. "
165. Id. at 133. Mishan reaches a third conclusion:
(c) If the optimum and non-optimum plans to be compared already
form part of the existing community indifference map then the
method of hypothetical compensation is superfluous, the optimum be-
ing actually and unambiguously superior to the non-optimum.
Conclusion (c) is, however, not so much of an exception as it may
first appear...
166. Id. at 133-34 (emphasis in original).
167. Id. at 135.
168. Id. at 226. See also Mishan, The Economics of Disamenity, 14
NATURAL RxsounRcs J. 55 (1974), where he demonstrates that different Pareto
optima result depending on whether the polluter is given the privilege of pol-
luting or his would-be victim is given the right to be free of pollution.
169. [A] great deal continues to be written concerning economic efficien-
cy which deliberately eschews the language of welfare economics, rely-
ig instead on apparently more acceptable criteria-for instance, the
common sense" rule that total receipts should be able to cover total
costs supplemented, perhaps, by rules about marginal equalities. ...
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level of water quality or any particular distribution of wealth.170
Only if one makes the value judgment that our present level of
water quality171 and our present distribution of welfare are ideal
does it make sense to argue that the implementation of the FWPCA
would be inefficient or suboptimal. Of course, the passage of the
FWPCA is a legislative determination that the quality of our water
is dangerously unsatisfactory.
Considering the myriad of Pareto optima and efficient allocations
of resources available to us, it is clear that any attack on the goals
of the FWPCA based on the postulates of welfare economics must
be mere "ideological symbol manipulation... part of the libertarian
tradition which glorifies the market and denigrates government but
which has its own agenda for the state, an agenda which appears
to many to be specific to the interests of certain classes, . . . part of
the . . . theology of the market and of private property. ... 172
Such an attack on the goal of a decent environment is not in any
sense (except that of its pretensions) scientific; rather, it is the war
chant of laissez-faire economists tripping across the greensward of
the University of Chicago like the pale ghosts of their Austrian
predecessors striding through the Vienna woods.
We have fought this battle before, and now that Herbert Spen-
cer's Social Statics have been routed out of the Constitution 73
along with "freedom of contract" and "vested rights,"' 74 we should
This view, however, does not bear close examination.... [Clertain
familiar welfare criteria and the so-called optimum conditions of
resource allocation are raised on the same foundation: they stand
or fall together.
E.J. MisHAN, A Reappraisal of the Principles of Resource Allocation, in supra
note 164, at 118.
170. It may be possible in some cases to demonstrate that a particular dis-
tribution of wealth and a particular level of water quality are not compatible
with a Pareto optimum. But even if one comes to this conclusion, that does
not allow one to say (on the basis of a welfare analysis) that we would be
better off with a different distribution of wealth or a different level of water
quality.
171. Our present level of water quality is, of course, a function of our
present body of laws regulating pollution. For a description of private reme-
dies against pollution and a comparison of the level of water quality which
they engender with the level which would exist at a Pareto optimum given
our present distribution of welfare, see generally Part II of this Article.
172. Samuels, supra note 152, at 27.
173. "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
174. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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be cautious lest we let them come sneaking back into the law under
the false colors of science and positive economics. Laissez-faire is
no more a part of the corpus of science than it is of the Constitution.
4. Science versus Morality: Utilitarianism and the New Welfare
Economics
The most difficult problem that confronts me in this article is
not to demonstrate the distastefulness or the triviality or the unwork-
ability of the concept of "allocative efficiency" that is the peculiar
contribution of welfare economics to modem ethics. Rather, it lies
in demonstrating that Pareto efficiency is an ethical concept and in
explaining how so many intelligent men of goodwill can accept
that concept as the be-all and the end-all of society.
That there exist those who do not believe that welfare economics
has anything to do with morality can be easily demonstrated. Two
indignant economists protested recently during a fraternal row:
"[W]e should like to know how a theory yielding empirically re-
futable implications is vulnerable on psychological and ethical
grounds."175 This heartfelt cry was raised in protest at the claim
that the prescriptions of welfare economics rest on unsatisfactory
ethical and psychological premises. To be accused of acting on
ethical premises appears to be a grave indictment in this positivistic
175. Brown & Reynolds, d'Arge and Hunt on Externalities and Economic
Orthodoxy: A Critique Appraised, 1 ENvIRoN. AF7ARs 837, 838 (1972). This
article is a rather virulent response to d'Arge and Hunt, Environmental Pollu-
tion, Externalities, and Conventional Economic Wisdom: A Critique, 1
ENvroN. AFAms 266 (1971). The nature and tone of the arguments of
Messrs. Brown and Reynolds seem to be persuasive evidence that at least some
of the professional commitment to traditional welfare economics is ideological,
not scientific. D'Arge and Hunt do not need my help; they defended them-
selves ably in d'Arge & Hunt, Economic Orthodoxy and Externalities Re-
visited, 1 ENvmoN. AFFAms 845 (1972).
Other economists have on occasion attempted to interpret the axioms of
welfare economics as factual hypotheses rather than ethical propositions.
Thus, E.J. Mishan has argued that the claim that "a person's welfare has in-
creased whenever he believes that his welfare has increased" should be
treated "as a hypothesis; as a judgment of fact" rather than as either a value
judgment or a political judgment. E.J. Mim N, A Survey of Welfare Eco-
nomics, in Wr.F.xuE EcoNoMics 23-24 (1969). Mishan recognizes, however,
that this "hypothesis" is "not easy to test." Id. at 24. He also admits that
"[tihe transition from the individual to society cannot be made without in-
voldng value judgments." Id. at 25. He has elsewhere described the claim
that the individual is the best judge of his own well-being as an "ethical
judgment." See text accompanying note 88 supra.
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age. The fact remains, however, that "since welfare is an ethical
term, any theorems incorporating the word welfare are also ethical
and must rest on some obvious or hidden value judgments." 176
That the prescriptions of welfare economics and the nostrums of
the lawconomists are not empirical propositions is perhaps most
easily demonstrated by reference to a well-established empirical
hypothesis: Can you imagine the reaction of a Galileo to the charge
that welfare would be increased if the earth did not move? He
might find that his welfare would increase were he to agree, but that
the empirical fact remained: "Yet, it moves." "Welfare" differs
radically from concepts like "planetary orbits" or the "statistical laws
of inheritance.m " If one actually believes that welfare economics
yields "empirically refutable implications," one should be able to
cite at least one case in which a proposition of welfare (as opposed
to positive) economics has been empirically tested. But there are
none.
The fact that welfare propositions have not been, and cannot be,
put to the empirical test explains the unsatisfactory nature of welfare
economic theory. It did not start out to be trivial. The historical
basis of welfare economics is the utilitarian philosophy of Mills
and Bentham. That philbsophy was not encumbered by any theo-
retical inability to determine the optimal distribution of wealth or
the optimal legal regime. "[U]tilitarians like Bentham believed that
one could arithmetically combine the positive quantities (pleasure)
and the negative quantities (pain) to determine the sum total of
pleasure-pain that a particular act would produce, and thereby
evaluate it."177 The original program of welfare economists was to
prescribe policies for society that would maximize pleasure and
minimize pain on the ethical assumption that society would be
176. S. NAru, A RE"APRASAL OF WLxARuE EcoNowncs 1 (1969). Nath
goes on to state:
Some people might deny that welfare is an ethical term and might
want to maintain that propositions about it are of the same nature
as those about humidity-the only difference being that so far no
objective way has been found of measuring welfare the way we
can measure humidity. We doubt that an objective way will ever
be found of measuring welfare. Since most people consider it an
ethical term, even if somebody invented an instrument to measure
what he described as welfare, a number of people might object that
though the instrument had measured something, that something was
not welfare; so long as some people raised such objections, the
measure could not be accepted as objective."
Id.
177. J. sHAS'R PEILOSOPHY OF MuND 6 (1968).
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better off if there were the greatest pleasure for the greatest number.
This ethical assumption never was accorded universal acceptance,
but the early welfare economists did have what they considered
to be a workable empirical program. All that they had to do was
to find the rules for maximizing pleasure.
From that point on, the history of theoretical welfare economics
has consisted of demonstrations that the original utilitarian theory
was unworkable, modifications of the theory to account for the
difficulties, and further demonstrations that the theory as modified
was still unworkable. The final result is the so-called "New" Welfare
Economics that supplies the rationales of the lawconomists. In
working out this particular bit of intellectual history, the original
ethical assumption of the utilitarians was weakened beyond recog-
nition while objections to the claims of welfare economists- were
answered by the abandonment of every claim that could be-tested.
Since there were obvious difficulties with the idea of maximizing
pleasure and minimizing pain-what is one to make of a masochist,
for example' 7 81-the economists avoided the problem by changing
their vocabulary.'7 9 The ethical assumption of utilitarianism was
178. There is the old story of the sadist and the masochist who got mar-
ried. On their wedding night, the masochist begged: "Darling, beat mel
Hurt mel Hurt mel" The sadist said: "No."
If this problem presents difficulties for utilitarians, it should be noticed that
it presents equally difficult problems for modern welfare theories which
cannot admit that one person's decisions influence another's welfare. In
modern economic terms, the old story is about a pair of "externalities." See
note 401 infra. To the extent that some people may actually take pleasure
from-find utility in-the despoliation of the earth, the story actually is a
parable that is relevant to the problem of determining which level of water
quality society desires. Even if the polluters do not look upon their muck
and find it good, so long as they consider the pollution worth the concomitant
production, the story is relevant.
179. When criticism becomes too intense, economists abandon the of:
fending term, not without a struggle, and triumphantly adopt another
to the same effect. . . . Professor Pigou declares that value is "in-
definable," though we know that it is a spiritual quality and that it
is measured by price. Professor Cassel rejects this conception of value
"as an intensity of feeling in the individual soul" on the ground that
"we have no measure of such an intensity," and therefore proposes
that we abandon the category "value" in favor of price, since" "values'
are then represented by arithmetical figures which we call 'Prices.'
Thus we gain the great advantage that our valuations become measur-
able quantities." Professor Cassel likewise insists that "it is im-
possible to speak of the marginal productivity of any factor in the
great social process of production except when the prices of the dif-
ferent factors are assumed to be known. But in this case the marginal"
productivity of each factor is'simply its own price.", Similarly the con-
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changed to read "thou shalt maximize utility." There is a particular
advantage to this locution, for "utility" does not seem to refer to any-
thing. Since it has no referent, one can hardly claim that we should
not maximize it. Furthermore, "utility is a metaphysical concept
of impregnable circularity; utility is the quality in commodities that
makes individuals want to buy them, and the fact that individuals
want to buy commodities shows that they have utility."180 We are
told that we should maximize utility, and utility is defined as being
whatever we choose to maximize. 18' It is by this tautological in-
junction that utility (or individual welfare) can be called a "state
of consciousness" and still be closely linked to "individual
choices." 82  This linkage between choice and utility in turn allows
the true believer in welfare economics to claim, without blushing,
that he is being objective and scientific-for when you choose some-
thing that is an objective fact, it is empirically observable. There,
right before your eyes, a theory of moral philosophy has been con-
verted into what appears to be a scientific law.
Actually, this dodge replaces the arguable imperative of the
classical utilitarians with another imperative that is terrifyingly
meaningless-and not because it is tautological. "You should choose
what you choose" does not seem the most satisfactory ethical advice,
even if it does represent a coherent position. "Thy will be done," is
a traditional prayer, though you and I may find ourselves uncom-
fortable at having it addressed to ourselves. Vox populi, vox Dei.
But the injunction of the new welfare economics is not exactly that
ept of "utility" with its unconcealable subjectivity has been aban-
doned in favor of Pareto's subterfuge of "indifference," the present
popularity of which is based on the assumption that "indifference"
is not subjective, though dictionaries persist in defining it as "the state
of being unconcerned; lack of interest or feeling; apathy."
The net result of this extraordinary situation has been an increas-
ingly general disposition on the part of economists to refer all their
troubles to the philosophers.
C. Aymxs, THE THEoRY OF ECONOMIC PRornzss 82-83 (2d ed. 1962).
180. J. RoBINsON, EcONOmc PsnLosopay 47 (1962).
181. If you protest that you do not maximize anything, it will not help
you in the slightest. The true believer will simply insult you and assert with
fervid scientific detachment that people who do not maximize are not "ra-
tional." See note 351 infra.
182. See note 102 supra and accompanying text. In general, "utility" can
be substituted for "welfare," and vice versa, wherever those words appear
in economic writings. "Utility" is perhaps a bit dated and is generally ap-
plied only to individuals. If your "utility" is increased and no one else's is de-
creased, then (per Pareto) society's "welfare" is increased.
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you should choose whatever you choose; rather it is that "you should
maximize your choices?'
That last formulation is simple nonsense. Yet I have never heard
a welfare economist proclaim with Tertullian that he believes be-
cause it is absurd.183 It still is true that the maximization of choices
is impossible.1s4 Thus economists imply, but never directly state,
that "utility" or "individual welfare" is synonomous with "choice."
It remains an undefined and unobservable "state of mind" that, like
pleasure, can arguably be maximized.
By twisting their vocabulary in this convoluted fashion, welfare
economists have made trivial the ethical content of classical utilitar-ianism and disguised from themselves the difficulties inherent in de-
fining an individual's well-being in terms of maximizing pleasure or
any other "state of mind." The problem is that philosophy has gone
one way and economics another and in consequence economists are
virtually immune to the philosophical refinements which have be-
come commonplace since the days of Bentham and Mill.
183. To [Tertullian] is ascribed the sublime confession: Credo quia
absurdam est (I believe because it is absurd). This does not alto-
gether accord with historical fact, for he merely said: "And the
son of God died, which is immediately credible because it is ab-
surd. And buried he rose again, which is certain because it is
impossible."
JUNe, The Problem of Types in the History of Classical and Medieval Thought,
in PSYCHOLOGIcAL Trrxs 12-13 (R. Hull ed. 1971).
184. Of course, it would be meaningful to speak of maximizing the num-
ber of choices that one has. At least one welfare economist has taken this
as a theoretical goal. See E.J. MisH.AN, A Survey on Welfare Economics, in
WELFmAE EcoNo acs 24-25 (1969). "We are compelled to judge by some
index of choice-expansion. For instance, from the observation that a person
can now choose among sets of goods that were hitherto unavailable we might
infer a rise in his welfare, or infer rather his belief that his welfare has
risen." This is arguable but I must confess that I dislike being confronted
with too many choices. It seems to me that only if we assume that choices
can be made without cost, can we assume that being confronted with an in-
finity of choices would maximize our well-being. Welfare economic theory
must deny uncertainty and assume that we are always omniscient (at least
to the extent that we always know what we want and always know the conse-
quences of our choices). In this context, and only in this context, does it
make sense for us to say "Thy will be done." A theory that assumes we have
at least one of the traditional attributes of God is, however, not likely to be
subject to any realistic applications.
Mishan admits: "If we have any reason to believe that a person's tastes
have changed, evidence of an extension in the area of his choice can no longer
be accepted as an indication of a rise in his welfare." Id. at 25.
Those who think we should maximize the number of choices that we must
make should consider the fate of Buridan's Ass. See note 962 infra.
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[Clontemporary philosophers, led by Gilbert Ryle, have
pointed out that whereas the word "pain" is the name of a
bodily sensation, "pleasure," typically, is not the name of a
sensation at all. If someone is in pain as the result of row-
ing, it makes sense to ask where in his body he feels the
pain. But if someone gets pleasure from rowing, it does not
make sense to ask where he feels the pleasure. Here
"pleasure" means "enjoyment," and its opposite is "displea-
sure," not pain. This is why masochism does not invoke
inconsistency, although it does involve abnormality. A man
who finds pain pleasurable finds pain enjoyable; it is not
that he finds pain to be the opposite of painful1s5
The early utilitarians thought that the maximization of pleasure
was the same as the minimization of pain. Presumably the "state
of mind" that is today called "utility" and is to be maximized is
still somewhat like the "opposite of pain." If this is so, it still seems
worthwhile to examine the possibility and desirability of maximizing
"pleasure" or something like it.
Pain clearly is something that can be minimized-by taking an
aspirin, for example. The utilitarian hymn should be "Suicide Is
Painless." "The utilitarians ...suspect that happiness conceived
as an enduring human state is at best impossible and at worst a
dangerously seductive delusion. Happiness-the only happiness
men really know-is the temporary afflatus that comes from the
cure of some disease, the lifting of some yoke, the reconciliation of
some conflict, or the satisfaction of some appetite." 86 Thanatos is
a powerful god, but I do not believe that most lawconomists would
admit that they worship at the altar of Death.
If we define our good, our well-being, in hedonistic terms, then
"utility" must be something like "pleasure" or "happiness" As one
heterodox economist has said: "[T]he true 'product' of the economic
process is not a material flow, but a psychic flux-the enjoyment of
life by every member of the population." 17 But this flux, this en-
185. J. SHA.FE, supra note 177, at 6-7.
"Economists, and those who seek to honor economists, are fond
of quoting Keynes' dictum that practical men are only the slaves
of some defunct economist. It may afford philosophers in turn some
mischievous amusement to see the power of defumet philosophies
in economics and the other social studies."
Alexander, Human Values and Economists' Values, in HUMAN VALuES A"'
ECONOMIC POLICY 102 (S. Hook ed. 1967).
186. E. CAHN, THE MORAL DEcisioN 13 (1955).
187. N. GEORGESCU-ROEGEN, THE ENTROPY LAw AND TH EcoNoMIc PRO-
cEss 284 (1971). Unfortunately Georgescu-Roegen still seems to consider this
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joyment, is not quantifiable and thus is not subject to maximization.
As Gilbert Byle explained:
'[P]leasure" can be used to signify at least two quite
different types of things.
(1) There is the sense in which it is commonly replaced
by the verbs 'enjoy' and 'like.' To say that a person has
been enjoying digging is not to say that he has been both
digging and doing or experiencing something else as a con-
comitant or effect of the digging; it is to say that he dug
with his whole heart in his task, i.e., that he dug, wanting
to dig and not wanting to do anything else (or nothing)
instead. His digging was a propensity-fulfilment [sic].
His digging was his pleasure, and not a vehicle of his plea-
sure.
(2) There is a sense of 'pleasure' in which it is com-
monly replaced by such words as 'delight,' 'transport,' 'rap-
ture,' 'exultation' and 'joy.' These are names of moods
signifying agitations. 'Too delighted to talk coherently and
'crazy with joy' are legitimate expressions. Connected with
such moods, there exist certain feelings which are commonly
described as 'thrills of pleasure,' 'glows of pleasure' and
so forth. It should be noticed that though we speak of
thrills of pleasure coursing through us, or of glows of
pleasure warming our hearts, we do not ordinarily speak of
pleasures or of pleasure coursing through us or warming our
hearts. Only theorists are misguided enough to classify
either delight or enjoyment with feelings1 88
Just as we can minimize pain, so perhaps could we try to maxi-
mize "thrills of pleasure," although the process would probably at-
tract pathological labels like "drug addiction" or "satyriasis." But
if Ryle is correct in his description of what we mean by "pleasure,"
I fail to see how we could meaningfully claim that we should (or
could) maximize it. Certainly it seems that "pleasure" (unlike
pain) cannot be quantified. The most that could be done-although
this is a great deal-would be to increase the opportunities for
pleasure or happiness. But this would mean something very dif-
ferent from maximizing utility or minimizing pain. It would mean
psychic flux to be quantifiable since he treats it as a function of consumer
goods, leisure, and work-drudgery.
188: G. Ryma, THE CoNcEPT or Mnm 108-09 (1949). "Inclinations and
moods, including agitations, are not occurrences and do not therefore take
place either publicly or privately. They are propensities, not acts or states."
Id. at 83.
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structuring our world in a way that would facilitate our felicity; it
would involve, not the maximization of nonexistent occurrences, but
the establishment of constraints or of "constitutions." "The body
winces in pain, but happiness is defined by society."8 9
If one accepts Ryle's approach as I understand it, it becomes
apparent that the idea of maximizing utility is a will-o-the-wisp.
At the same time his arguments strongly suggest that interpersonal
comparisons (though of course, not of something like the nonexis-
tent utility) are not impossible:
A person's knowledge about himself and others may
be distributed between many roughly distinguishable
grades yielding correspondingly numerous roughly dis-
tinguishable senses of 'knowledge.' He may be aware that
he is whistling 'Tipperary' and not know that he is whistling
it in order to give the appearance of a sangfroid which he
does not'feel. Or, again, he may be aware that he is sham-
ming sangfroid without knowing that the tremors which
he is trying to hide derive from the agitation of a guilty
conscience. . . . But in none of the senses in which we
ordinarily consider whether a person does or does not know
something about himself, is the postulate of a Privileged
Access necessary or helpful for the explanation of how he
has achieved, or might have achieved, this knowledge.
There are respects in which it is easier for me to get such
knowledge about myself than to get it about someone else;
there are other respects in which it is harder.... No meta-
physical Iron Curtain exists compelling us to be forever
absolute strangers to one another .... 190
The last quotation touches on a difficulty with classic utilitarian
theory, one that is far more serious than the difficulty of maximizing
the pleasure or the utility of an individual. The utilitarian impera-
tive enjoined us to maximize the pleasure and minimize the pain
of all members of society. To do this would, of course, require us
to make interpersonal comparisons of pleasure and pain. If some
change in the world would increase your pleasure by two units
and increase my pain by one unit, then you were enjoined to im-
plement that change. There are ethical objections to such a pro-
gram. For example, it seems to suggest that if all of us, except
one insignificant child, could enjoy the bliss of heaven at the cost
189. K. ARmow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDrVIDUAL VALUES 104-05 (1963).
190. G. RYLE, supra note 188, at 180-81 (emphasis added).
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of that child's suffering-unbeknownst to us-the foulest tortures
of hell, this would be a desirable state of affairs.
The fatal weakness in the utilitarian program was, however, the
theoretical impossibility of ever finding units in which one per-
son's pleasure could be compared to that of another. Substituting
"utility" for "pleasure" and assuming that utility can be measured
in "utils" did not really solve the problem.
Initially economists simply ignored the difficulty.
It was Edgworth [sic] who made the largest claims. Hap-
piness is to be measured as a two-dimensional quantity, the
dimensions being intensity and time, and the unit the
minimum sensible increment in either direction. The Utili-
tarian principle that policy should be directed to the great-
est good for the greatest number requires the summation
of the happines of separate individuals, and Edgworth [sic]
saw no difficulty... 19
Edgeworth's program is as attractive as the pleasure garden at
Xanadu:
We cannot count the golden sands of life; we cannot
number the "innumerable smile" of seas of love; but we
seem to be capable of observing that there is here a greater,
there a less, multitude of pleasure-units, mass of happiness;
and that is enough.192
Unfortunately the worm was already in the garden, for Edgeworth
recognized that:
[I]f sentients differ in Capacity for happiness-under simi-
lar circumstances some classes of sentients experiencing on
the average more pleasure (e.g., of imagination and sym-
pathy) and less pain (e.g. of fatigue) than others-there is
no presumption that equality of circumstances is the most
felicific arrangement; especially when account is taken of
the interests of posterity.193
As Mrs. Robinson describes it:
Edgworth [sic] .. , and many after him, took refuge in
the argument that we do not really know that equality
191. J. ROBINSON, supra note 180, at 66-67.
192. F. EDEwoanrH, MATMATICAL PsYcHIcs 8, 9 (1881).
193. Id. at vii.
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would promote greater happiness, because individuals differ
in their capacity for happiness, so that, until we have a
thoroughly scientific hedonimeter, "the principle, 'every
man, and every woman, to count for one,' should be very
cautiously applied."
Many years ago, this point of view was ex-oressed by
Professor Harberler: "How do I know that it hurts you more
to have your leg cut off than it hurts me to be pricked by a
pin?" It seemed at the time that it would have been more
telling if he had put it the other way round.194
Right side up or upside down, however, Professor Harberler
certainly had a point. I do not want to roast a philosophical chest-
nut, but I suspect that most of us would agree that we cannot feel
another person's pain-we can sympathize but we cannot measure
its intensity.195 Even if we could find some brain wave whose fre-
quency appears to correlate with the intensity of our pain, we would
have no way of knowing that a reading of 10 on that intensity
scale means the same amount of suffering to you as to me.
Such considerations forced economists to avoid any comparison
of one person's utility with another's and threw them back on the
bright idea that an individual's utility must correspond with what
he chooses, an idea that I have jeered at previously in this article.
[N]early a century after hedonistic psychology had been
thoroughly discredited, economists announced that they
were abandoning psychological premises and using only
behavioral axioms that were intuitively obvious. The "sub-
stitute" for the older view was to assume that all individ-
uals, regardless of the nature of their motives, preferred
some things to other things. If these self-centered prefer-
ences were reasonably stable, economists needed only posit
a preference ordering that could take the place of the util-
ity relationship. Preference orderings were, of course, just
another name for the hedonistic preconceptions which most
economists brought with them to their analyses. 96
194. J. ROBINSON, supra note 180, at 138.
195. A more difficult question, I suspect, is whether we can measure the
intensity of our own pains. I picture a hedonimeter as some sort of torture
device, a combination of an oculist's iron maiden and a dentist's drill, and
the scientific torturer stands there asking-"Does it hurt more in your left
tooth or your right tooth? Now spit." But even if such measurements could
be made, can we compare the intensity of today's toothache with that of last
year's broken toe?
196. D'Arge & Hunt, Environmental Pollution, Externalities, and Conven-
tional Economic Wisdom: A Critique, 1 ENvIoN. ArF.ams 267 (1971).
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But the substitution of "preference orderings" did not solve the
problem of interpersonal comparisons, for how can one compare
your preference ordering with mine? As long as the goal of welfare
economics is to prescribe means of maximizing the well-being of
society, it would appear that quantifiable comparisons between
individuals are necessary, or else that society's well-being must be
something other than a function of the well-being of its individual
members. It was Paretos brilliant insight that this is not true in all
cases. For one can say that society's welfare has been increased by
a change that moves one individual up his preference ordering-
a change that leaves one individual in a situation that he prefers-
and does not move anyone else down his preference ordering.
Pareto's insight included the view that a small part of the utili-
tarian program could be saved if "utility" was defined in terms of
individual choices. One could not say much, but one could say that
"the welfare of society is improved if we make one person better
off without making anyone worse off."
Why welfare economists should waste their time on such a
trivial program is not totally explained by this short history of wel-
fare economics, but I fear that the major reason for pursuing Pareto
optimality is the tremendous amount of effort and emotional invest-
ment that has been expended in the pursuit of utilitarian ends.
Welfare economists seem incapable of obeying their own injunction
that one should disregard sunk costs.
Of course, the pursuit of Pareto efficiency does not appear to
be totally useless. It does not tell us how to maximize pleasure or
utility nor does it suggest how our world can best be ordered. If,
however, we accept the vestigial remains of utilitarian ethics that
are contained in the Paretian program, we can at least work some
"improvement" in the world. Furthermore, if we could-somehow
-agree upon the best distribution of well-being or wealth, we
could then follow the Paretian axiom, not to one of an infinity of
optima, but to the optimum optimorum,197 to the best of all effi-
cient worlds. This may not seem like a trivial goal but the sig-
nificant problem is the choice of the "best distribution," the very
problem that is ignored in a Paretian analysis. The goal, moreover,
is one that is not likely to be reached.
The attitude of the welfare economist, if it differs at all
from those of his colleagues, does so only in respect of
197. See notes 158, 164 supra and accompanying text.
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emphasis. He is not wholly satisfied with policies calcu-
lated to bring the economy closer to a top level optimum.
There is any 'number of such optima, each associated with
some particular distribution of income, and the notion of
the 'best' optimum, the optimum optimorum can be counted
on to put him in a wistful mood.198
One can see part of the reason for this wistfulness when one con-
siders how unlikely it is that we could ever agree on the best dis-
tribution of income. Furthermore, if we did decide on the best
distribution, we would discover that there are many Pareto optima
which can be reached only by moving to a bad distribution, for
"a Paretian optimum is not necessarily superior to any non-
optimum."a9 9 For example, if our distributional goal is absolute
equality of incomes, we would not want to move to a position where
I receive all the income in that world. Once we have adopted our
distributional goals, we must, before we can decide whether a
Pareto improvement will really make society better off, discover
some "social welfare function" that will allow'us to compare changes
in efficiencies with- distributional changes, for if we find that our
distributional goals can conflict with the requirements of efficiency,
"[m]ere satisfaction of efficiency conditions previously violated does
not ensure an ,increase in welfare unless we combine it with knowl-
edge of the welfare function."200
It seems unlikely both in practice and in theory201 that we could
ever agree on such a welfare function. If we could discover it,
there is no reason to believe that in the real world the best position
which we could actually reach would be a Pareto optimum. The
sad fact is that if we are not satisfied with the present distribution
of wealth, there is no feasible tax or subsidy that could be imposed
to achieve the desired distribution that would also allow us to
achieve a Pareto optimum. "Any feasible taxes, subsidies, and
transfer payments, etc., will then be such as interfere with some
Paretian marginal condition or other about the equality of various
ratios of partial derivatives."202
198. E.J. MISHAN, WELFAr ECONOMICS: AN AssEssm r 31 (1969).
199. S. NATH, A REAPPRAISAL OF WELFARE EcoNoMIcs 22 (1969).
200. D. WINCH, ANALYErcAL WELFARE ECONOMICS 83 (1971).
201. See, e.g., note 217 infra and accompanying text.
202. S. NATH, supra note 199, at 46. In theory such taxes might be possible




Thus, welfare economic theory cannot tell us anything very
useful about levels of water pollution. All it can say is that, if one
is willing to accept the current distribution of wealth, we should
seek the Pareto optimum associated with the distribution-provided
we see some merit to the watered-down utilitarian ethics that under-
lie Paretian optimality. If we succeed in achieving that optimum,
then we will have an efficient amount of pollution. It should be
noted, however, that there is nothing in the theory that suggests
that we should seek the efficient level of pollution when we are not
satisfied with the distribution of wealth.
The true welfare economists have done a valiant job of proving
that very little can be said by welfare economic theory. As one
economist has stated:
The contribution of welfare economics has been the
clarification of the theoretical meaning (or absence of it)
of a social welfare function and social indifference curves
and of the difficulties (or impossibility) of applying the
Pareto criterion in actuality. The disservice of welfare
economics has been that its terminology is used by econo-
mists and others without pointing out these theoretical and
practical difficulties. The false impression is created that a
simple criterion is available that can be used for legislation,
court decisions, administrative regulation, and social plan-
ning in general. 203
Those who out of malice or naivete would have us pursue
Pareto efficiency without regard to the distribution of wealth or
the social welfare function of our society have no basis for their
prescriptions. "Efficiency" is a nice-sounding word with scientific
pretensions but there is no reason, whatsoever, to seek it. Those
who believe, following the Coase theorem, that the distribution of
the well-being can be disregarded and that all we need to do is
arrive at some efficient state deserve to have their wishes granted.
That is not a fate that one would wish for the world, however, or
for the waters that cover its face.
5. Political Optimum Versus Market Optimum
a. Two differing distributions. Even if one were willing to ac-
cept the ethical judgments of welfare economics and were also
203. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Concepts Used as Economic Criteria for a System
of Water Rights, in LAw OF WArim ALLOCATION Tnr , EAsTERN UNITm
STATES 531, 547 (D. Haber &. S. Bergen eds. 1958).
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willing to accept the present distribution of welfare as ideal, these
judgments would still supply no basis for attacking the implementa-
tion of the FWPCA.
Leaving aside for a moment the fact that the present distribution
of legal rights and liabilities relating to water quality is undeter-
mined and indeterminate, there are two distinct distributions of
welfare in effect in the United States today. One is the distribu-
tion so dear to economists, that of money and the things that money
can buy, which controls the allocation of bubble gum and underarm
deodorants. But there is also the allocation of political power
which controls matters of more substance, including the entire sub-
stratum of laws, rights, liabilities, privileges, duties, and remedies
on which the "market" distribution of welfare rests.
If one wishes to argue that, in a Paretian sense, the implemen-
tation of the FWPCA would be suboptimal, there must be a starting
point for the argument. If that starting point is to be the status quo,
the question remains, "Which?" The status of wealth, which pro-
duces an "optimum" defined on the basis of one-dollar, one-vote?
Or that of the Constitution, which, so the Supreme Court has as-
sured us, mandates that political choices be on the basis of one-man,
one-vote?2o4
A laissez-faire economist is likely to be upset at this question
for several reasons. In the first place, although neoclassical eco-
nomics has always had egalitarian pretensions, its practitioners were
able early on to "sterilize" that egalitarian element "by slipping from
utility to physical output as the object to be maximized."205 This
204. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
205. J. ROBINSON, supra note 180, at 55. There are welfare economists
who believe that the distribution of wealth should be more equal than it is.
E.J. Mishan, for example, has argued: "In considering the implications of
alternative polices, an improved distribution is .generally treated as synonomous
with a more equal distribution." E.J. MisHAN, A Survey of Welfare Economics,
in WELFARE ECONOnCs, 62 (1969). Others, particularly lawconomists, have
been known to argue against too much equality on the ground that the conse-
quences of redistributing wealth would be inefficient. See, e.g., W. BAXTER,
PEOPLE OR PENGUINS, THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLTrrION (1974).
There are serious problems with any system that seeks to have an equitable
distribution of welfare as well as efficiency:
[Elither the competitive distributional equilibrium achieves equity
as a matter of definition, because equity existed in the initial pattern
of factor ownership, and therefore exists in the results that ensue
therefrom; or equity is considered to be an attribute of the distribution
of income or utility, rather than factor ownership, in which case any
effort to achieve distributional equity in a changing world undermines
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glorification of physical output is, of course, exactly what afflicts
us-for pollution is physical output.20 6  Thus, laissez-faire econ-
omists, as one would expect of the ancillae of great wealth, are not
likely to appreciate a status quo entailing equality or denying the
"pig principle" that "if you like somethin& more is better."2 07
Some economist might even object to the political distribution
on the ground that there is no "market" in votes and that the raison
d'etre of economics is to study markets. The short answer to this
objection is that the raison d'gtre of the law, and of the FWPCA, is
certainly not to make the world safe for economists.2 08 The most
persuasive answer, however, for the purposes of this article, lies in
the fact that there is not, and can never be,2 09 any kind of market
in water quality.
Our choice is not betwen a market based on a one-dollar, one-
vote distribution and a system of nonmarket regulation like the
FWPCA which is chosen on the basis of one-man, one-vote. The
only choice that we have is between some form of regulation like
the FWPCA adopted on the basis of the political distribution and
piecemeal, sporadic regulation by the judiciary under the doctrine
of nuisance law.
It is not to be expected that either the FWPCA or the law of
nuisance will lead to that allocation of the quality of our nation's
the foundations on which the efficiency of the competitive system
was based.
D. WmncH, supra note 200, at 9.
206. Pollution is not liked for itself but because it is inextricably associated
with more pleasurable things, such as aluminum cans and newspapers.
Although an x% increase of both goods and spillovers [e.g., pollutants]
cannot be expected at all times to make a person worse off than he
was before, the point will come when, if he has the choice of either
the consumption of the good (along with the spillover generated by
everyone's consumption of it) or going without both the good and the
spillover, he will opt for the latter.
Mishan, The Economics of Disamenity, supra note 168, at 73.
207. D'Arge & Hunt, Environmental Pollution, Externalities, and Conven-
tional Economic Wisdom: A Critique, 1 ENvIRON. AFFAmS 268 (1971).
208. But see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 12-27 (1970). See also The Emergence of
Societal Antitrust, 47 N.Y.U.L. Bzv. 903, 903-04 (1972):
Economists have traditionally justified a free enterprise system by
arguing that it triggers an efficient allocation of resources in a manner
consistent with desirable social and political objectives ... This
justification does not take the infallability of free enterprise for
granted .... In fact, the antitrust laws are a venerable acknowledge-
ment of an imperfect system, for their purpose is to make sure that
the gap between ideal and reality does not become dangerously wide.
209. See text accompanying notes 429-57 infra.
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water that would be obtained if there were a market in water
quality based either on the current distribution of dollars or of
votes. Welfare economic theory holds that if there is an "efficient
market,"2 10 those who partake in the market will trade themselves
into the Pareto optimum that is associated with the initial distribu-
tion of wealth. If there is no market, however, the only way that
one could expect to reach a particular optimal allocation would be
for the legislature (or some governmental official) to mandate such
allocation. But, as the optimal allocation is achieved through the
market by the individual members of society making choices, the
legislature cannot know what that allocation is unless the legisla-
ture knows the choices that each individual would make in the
market. In other words, neither the legislature nor anyone else
can know the optimal allocation associated with a certain distri-
bution of wealth unless they know the entire set of preference
orderings (or utility functions) of each individual.2 11  This ob-
viously will never be the case.
About all that one can say about the allocation reached by the
FWPCA is that the liabilities imposed on industrial polluters seem
to be what one would expect if our political system actually is
responsive to voter choice on the egalitarian, one-man, one-vote,
basis.
In the case of industrial pollution affecting citizens in the
neighborhood, it seems likely that emitters (industrialists
and their stockholders) may be more wealthy than the or-
dinary citizens who are the receptors. If so, people who
prefer a more equal distribution would prefer full liability
to be placed on the wealthier emitters.212
b. The political nature of the market distribution. Even if
there were a market in water quality, there would still have to
be political decisions that would determine the efficient allo-
cation of resources. The initial distribution of wealth and the
rules (including the law of sales and contracts) that govern the
very workings of the market would have to be created (or at least
legitimized and enforced) by some type of political process. In
the United States many of the applicable rules are enshrined in
210. See text accompanying notes 314-36 infra.
211. See S. NAna', supra note 199, at 46.
212. Randall, Coasian Externality Theory in a Policy Context, 14 NAuRA.L
Rasouucxs J. 41 (1974).
[Vol. 27:3
WATER POLLUTION
the Constitution, for example, in the "Taking Clause" of the four-
teenth amendment and in the sixteenth amendment. Even the
ConstitutiQn, however, can be amended. Moreover, most of the
rules that cover distribution and the transfer of wealth are sub-
ject to amendment by the federal or state legislatures elected on a
one-man, one-vote basis. This is certainly true with respect to
interests in water quality since they are not normally accorded
the protection of the label "property." 21 3 If the laws governing
the distribution of wealth and the regulation of the market are
adopted on the basis of the distribution of the political franchise,
it would seem somewhat paradoxical to argue that the optimal
allocation that is the inevitable consequence of these laws should
be determined by some other distribution.
As I have already pointed out, there is no basis in welfare eco-
nomic theory for claiming that an optimum resulting from one dis-
tribution is preferable to a nonoptimal position resulting from an-
other distribution.214 It all depends on which distribution is
preferable.
To determine whether society is better off at one point or an-
other, in a case where one, both or neither of the points are optimal,
one needs to know the "social welfare function." This "shows what
the welfare of society is supposed to depend on; in this sense any
statement of what the objectives of a society are is a social welfare
function." 215 It would seem that the only legitimate way a social
welfare function could be arrived at in a constitutional democracy
is for it either to be arrived at through the democratic political
process pursuant to the Constitution or to be specified in the Con-
stitution. As our Constitution was adopted in part to "promote
the general welfare" but does not specify the ingredients of that
welfare, only the first alternative is available in the United States.
Congress never enacted a social welfare function for the United
States and the Supreme Court has not read one into the text of
the Constitution. This being so, one cannot say a priori that any
Pareto optimum would be reached were we to maximize our-
nonexistent-social welfare function. Only if a social welfare func-
tion were adopted that incorporated all of the ethical assumptions
of Pareto optimality could we be sure that our optimal social welfare
213. See text accompanying notes 448-52 infra.
214. See text accompanying notes 158, 164-68 supra.
215. S. NATH, supra note 199, at 2.
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would occur at a Pareto optimum. At least one citizen of the United
States (viz, I) would vote against such a policy. Even if such
a function were adopted as national policy, it would be unworkable
because such a Paretian social welfare function would in turn be a
function of each individual's ordering of the states available to
society, and these individual functions cannot be known. This is
true no matter which distribution is chosen, no matter which weight
is assigned to each individual's utility.
A priori welfare economics has been based on the Paretian
value judgments, one of which lays it down that an in-
dividual is always to be considered the best judge of his
own welfare. Now if distributable judgments are to be
made in terms of the distribution of welfare and not the
means to welfare, then no progress can be made until each
individual's welfare function has been discovered. Such a
thing is impossible in practice. Indeed, to the extent that
any policy evaluation has to be done ex ante, even the in-
dividual himself may not always be able to foresee his exact
tastes in the future .... 216
To make matters worse for those who would take the entire
corpus of welfare economics' seriously, Professor Kenneth Arrow
received the Nobel prize for, among other things, proving that any
social welfare function adopted by society could be self-contradic-
tory if society does not have a dictator and if the social welfare
function is based solely on the preference orderings of the in-
dividual members of society' without interpersonal comparisons of
utility. Thus, even in theory, it appears that the legislature could
not find a consistently workable method of adopting a noncontradic-
tory Paretian social welfare function.217 This suggests that welfare
216. Id. at 145.
217; See K. Aimow, supra note 189. For an excellent nontechnical dis-
cussion of the problem, see Barbut, Does the Majority Ever Rule?, 4 PorT-
FOLIO AND ART NEWS ANNUAL 79 (1961). See also Arrow, Public and Private
Values, in HumAN VALums Amu ECONOMC VALuE-s 3 (S. Hook ed. 1967);
but cf. S. NATH, supra note 199.
Arrow gives the following example of the operation of his paradox:
There are three alternatives, A, B, and C, among which choice is to
be made. One-third of the voters prefer A to B and B to C, one-third
prefer B to C and C to A, and one-third prefer C to A and A to B.
Then A will be preferred to B by a majority, B to C by a majority,
and C to A by a majority.
Arrow, supra, at 17-18. In other words, a constitution or legal rule prescribing
that society must choose the option preferred by a majority of its members
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economics is meaningless, for "[w]elfare economics is meaningful
only if there is an objective that might or might not be achieved,
or might be capable of different degrees of achievement. In a dem-
ocratic society that objective, the welfare function, must be dis-
tilled from the divergent opinions of its members through a political
processf 21t
If Congress were by some miracle to discover each individual's
preference ordering and to get around Arrow's paradox, it then
could presumably adopt a social welfare function that includes the
Paretian value judgments. If it did so, one assumes that the weight
that would be assigned to each individual's preferences would not
correspond to the current distribution of wealth or monetary income,
but would approximate the current distribution of political power.
One could even argue, in view of cases like Reynolds v. Sims 219
and its progeny,220 that environmental questions, questions which
go to the ultimate nature of the world in which we live, can con-
stitutionally be decided only on the basis of one-man, one-vote.
Certainly the level of water quality throughout the United States
is a political question of more importance than any within the
jurisdiction of Midland County Commissioners Court.221 There
will not give any guidance, in the postulated circumstances, for choosing among
A, B and C. Arrow adds: "One might be tempted to suppose that the para-
dox of voting is an imperfection in the particular system of majority voting,
and more ingenious methods could avoid it. But unfortunately this is not so."
Id. at 18.
Arrow's impossibility proof holds true, however, only on the basis of certain
assumptions. One is that society does not have a dictator, i.e., that: "There
is no individual whose preferences are automatically society's preferences in-
dependent of the preferences of all other individuals." Id. at 16. More
importantly Arrow's proof depends on an assumption similar to that of the
axiom of individual choice which underlies neoclassical welfare economics.
See notes 100-08 supra and accompaning text. Each individual's preference
is assumed to be independent of each other individual's preferences; there is
no room in the theory as formulated for "[tihe principle of extended sympathy
as a basis for interpersonal comparisons." Arrow, supra, at 20.
218. D. Winch, supra note 200, at 176. See K. ARnow, supra note 189,
at 175-80.
219. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
220. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (requiring
that the general governing body of a county be apportioned on a one-man,
one-vote basis).
221. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). The Court has
declared: "Covernment-National, State, and local-must grant to each citizen
the equal protection of its laws . .. no matter how large the majority wishing
to deprive other citizens of equal treatment or how small the minority who
object to their mistreatment." Id. at 482 n.6.
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can be no serious question that the federal power to regulate com-
merce includes the power to regulate water pollution. 222 Since bad
water endangers both life and property, a political decision to allow
the wealthy to pollute ad libitem arguably could violate the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. 223 Yet, to allow water quality
to be regulated (whether by the market or by government) on the
basis of the present distribution of wealth would amount to such
a decision.
There are, however, reasons other than constitutional theorizing
for eschewing any efficiency analysis based on the current distribu-
tion of wealth as a means of solving our problems of water quality,
reasons which should appeal strongly to anyone who has honestly
accepted the ethical judgments which underlie the analyses of wel-
fare economics.
The most compelling reason that we have for adopting the
preference of individual members of society is that the majority
would reject any program of maximizing the welfare of the wealthy.
It is noticeable that, while some academics were deeply
impressed by the Coasian market solution approach to
policy for externalities, politicians, administrators and the
general public have largely ignored this approach....
If political rhetoric reflects anything about the beliefs
of ordinary citizens, morality and equity are important is-
sues to them. I believe the relative lack of success of the
Coasian literature, viewed as a polemic, among the general
public and its elected representatives is largely attributable
to the fact that its ethical and distributional implications
can be interpreted to run counter to widely accepted moral
precepts.224
c. The suboptimality of making corporations better off. There
is another argument that strongly suggests that the votaries of
welfare economics cannot consistently approve of the "optimum"
allocation of resources which would result from the present dis-
tribution of wealth in our society. One of the basic axioms of
222. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). For a definitive demonstration that the
FWPCA lies within the legislative jurisdiction of the federal government, see
Rosenthal, The Federal Power to Protect the Environment: Available Devices
to Compel or Induce Desired Conduct, 45 So. CAL. L. REV. 397 (1972).
223. Cf. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hoerner-Waldorf Corp., 3
Environ. L. Rptr. 20794 (D. Mont. 1970).
224. Randall, Coasian Externality Theory in a Policy Context, 14 NATURAL
REsOURCES J. 40-42 (1974).
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welfare economics is that nothing. counts except the choices of the,
individuals who compose the community.225 In the standard term-
inology of economics those individuals ^bear the honorific "con-
sumers.f In economic theory, if there'is an efficient market,2"
that is, .if there is a market which produces an efficient Pareto-
optimal allocation of resources. (including an efficient level of Water
quality), then "firms" will merely produce goods for the consumers
and will have no control over what goods are produced. "What
things :will be produced is determined by the dollar votes of con-
sumers."227 In our world instead of firms and consumers we have,
with some exceptions, business corporations and human beings.
The human beings (or some of them) constitute the'community
whose well-being welfare economists wish to maximize. If the
choices of the nonhumans,' the corporations, differ from human
choices and if those nonhuman choices are given voting power in
the market, it is clear that a market allocation will be suboptimal
and inefficient.
Human beings do all sorts of things which corporations would
never do. We go fishing, lie down by the still Waters, watch the
geese flying northward overhead. We dream. We fear. 'Odi ot
amo. Business corporations, on the other hand, maximize profits.
Or at least that is what they do in legal and economic theory.228
"A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
the profit of its stockholders. The discretion of the directors does
not extend to the devotion of capital or profits to humanitarian
purposes to benefit mankind at the expense of the stockholders." 22 9
225, See note 88 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 100-08
supra and accompanying text
226. See notes 314-36 infra and accompanying text for a description of
what this term entails.
227. P. SAmuErsoN, EcoNomzcs 44 (9th ed. 1973) (emphasis in original).
228. Once I knew a corporation that had a yacht.
229. H. BALLATr, MAN AL OF Co,'oRAnroN LAw Asm PRAcancE 207
(1930).
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised
in the choice of means to attain that end and does not extend to a
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits or to the non-
distribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them
to other purposes.
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919)
(emphasis added) (holding that Ford Motor Co. was required to distribute
a large part of its retained earnings to stockholders rather than carry out a
plan of steadily reducing prices, a plan which the court attributed to "certain
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Even though the rigors of this Calvinistic doctrine may have some-
what abated,230 a corporation which does not seek to maximize
profits could not long survive in a competitive market:
Precedent -aside, there are economic reasons for questioning
both the feasibility and appropriateness of major corporate
commitments to social goals other than profit maximization.
First, in competitive markets, a sustained commitment to
any goal other than profitability will lead to bankruptcy
unless collusion is permited. The firm that channels profits
into . . . pollution control will not be able to recoup its
losses by charging higher prices to its customers..... The
firm will.., have to defray the expenses of pollution con-
trol entirely out of its profits. But in a competitive market
there are no "profits" in an economic sense....
The prospects for social responsibility are only slightly
brighter in monopolistic markets. If the firm has no rivals,
it will be able to shift a part'of the cost of pollution control
equipment to its customers, but only a part .... To the
outsider, the result is a reduction in monopoly profits....
To the shareholder, however, it is a loss.... Managers will
be teluctant to visit such consequences upon their share-
holders.231
Furthermore, even if neither legal sanctions nor economic neces-
sity compel corporate decisionmakers to maximize profits,232 the
sentiments, philanthropic and altruistic, creditable to Mr. Ford." Id. at 505,
170 N.W. at 684). Cf. Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432
F.2d 659, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1970), dismissed as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972):
The management of Dow Chemical Company ... in essence decided
to pursue a course of activity which generated little profit for the share-
holders and actively impaired the company's public relations and re-
cruitment activities because management considered this action
morally and politically desirable.... We think there is a dear and
compelling distinction between managements legitimate need for
freedom to apply its expertise in matters of day-to-day business judg-
ment, and management's patently illegitimate claim of power to treat
modem corporations with their vast resources as personal satrapies
implementing personal political or moral predilections.
230. See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170.
231. R. PosER, Ecomomvc ANALYSIS OF LAW 186-88 (1973).
From this I would conclude that most people, including a socially-conscious
corporate director, would consider it desirable to have pollution control im-
posed upon all corporations, d la the FWPCA. If all must bear the burden,
none will be able to undercut their rivals and any loss of monopoly profits can
be blamed on the government rather than the innocent directors silently cheer-
ing on the sidelines. Professor Posner, however, appears to come to a different
conclusion. See text accompanying note 235 infra.
232. It has been suggested that corporate decisionmakers actually try to
"satisfice" rather than maximize: See, e.g., J. WnLEy, MODmS OF MAN (1957).
[Vol. 27:3
WATER POLLUTION
fact remains that the modem business corporation is a complex
and bureaucratic institution 233 which is likely to seek institutional
rather than human ends or else to react without purpose at all to
random 234 impulses induced by the ups and downs of bureaucratic
power struggles.
You may well wonder what harm there is in all this. Decisions
are still made by people and ultimately everything is gobbled up
to satisfy some human desire. It is, after all, classic economic
theory that firms should be profit maximizers. Thus, Professor
Posner argues that
[T]he exercise of social responsibility by the corporation
reduces the ability of the shareholders to exercise social re-
sponsibility themselves. Profit maximization increases the
wealth of the shareholders and so the resources they can
devote to political contributions, charitable gifts, and the
like. Has the manager any comparative advantage in
making such allocations? Arguably, individual choice and
decentralization of power are maximized when social re-
sponsibility is vested in the shareholders rather than in
management.28 5
The catch is, of course, that in our world most of the profits do
not go to the shareholders. 236 Maximizing profits and distributing
them to shareholders are two different matters. With the control
of most large corporations being separated from ownership,237 re-
233. See, e.g., R. ErLrs, Tm Covm.Er oF CoRPoRATIoNs (1962).
234. Economists classically believe that people and firms are simple en-
tities which maximize "utility" and "profits" respectively. Having practiced as
a lawyer for some years, I have the strong impression that corporations in fact
are impelled by random impulses originating among the conflicting goals and
desires of their various agents. Having an introspective nature, I am con-
vinced that human beings are impelled by similar impulses. Thus I find the
whole idea of maximizing our choices a rather silly goal. Perhaps the most
insane myth-or tautology-which the economists have foisted upon us is that
of our "rationality"--as economists define that much abused word. See note
372 infra.
235. R. PosNmE, supra note 231, at 189.
236. Nor do the shareholders necessarily want the corporate profits. The
shareholders generally are more concerned with the mark6t value of their
shares; this "value" is not closely tied to the size of dividends, as a consider-
ation of the history of IBM will show; what correlation there is between
share prices and earnings relates to earnings per share, not earnings distributed
per share. See A. Sarri, SuPERMONEY 30 (1972).
237. A. BmELE, PowER Wrrnour PnoPERTY 70-71 (1959): "Stockholder
'control' in a large enterprise does not ordinarily continue for any long space
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tained earnings represent a major source of new capital funds. 238
And these retained earnings will not be "voted" by the sharehold-
ers, as Posner implies, but by the corporation itself for its own
nonhuman ends. In theory, at least, the money will be spent in
search of further profits and this goal will never allow the corpora-
tion to waste its assets on pollution control, since there is no profit
to be made in cleaning up the waters. 239 General Motors, Exxon,
and others have a fair number of votes in the market and their
institutional choices are likely to be implemented even though no
stockholders, and no executive, of those corporations would make
such a choice were he allowed to pursue his own preferences. The
executive, "dragging his infected wounds homeward," may sit at
night fulminating against the spoilation of our world. At home he
has little power. High up on the ninety-ninth floor-where he
appears to have power-he is constrained by his institutional role
not to waste the corporation's assets on merely human desires.
Thus, if the believer in Pareto optimality must pick one of our
two distributions of welfare as his starting point, if he must start
from a status quo, he is constrained to choose the egalitarian dis-
tribution of one-man, one-vote, rather than the distribution of mate-
rial wealth which cannot lead to a maximization of human choices.
of time. Normally, a generation is its span. The really great enterprises now
are commonly not 'stockholder controlled,' though there are a few striking
exceptions."
238. Hearings on the Securities Industry Before the Subcomm. on Commerce
and Finance of the Comm. of Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 92-37, pt. 1, at 72-73 (1971).
"The major source of funds for this financing of [capital] acquisitions... has
been, for the period [1952 to 1968], internal funds including depreciation re-
serves." Id. at 72.
To the extent that Dodge, supra note 229, required that profits be paid
over to the stockholders, it is not representative of modem decisions; today it
stands primarily, if not solely, for the proposition that a corporation should
not be philanthropic.
239. See note 231 supra and accompanying text.
On the other hand, if the FWPCA is implemented vigorously, a firm could
make a profit manufacturing pollution-control devices. Thus we can all get
rich taking in each other's wash. Cf. K. LEuNG & J. KLEY , ThE ENVmON-
MENrAL CONTROL INDUsTRY 7 (1975). This suggestion is not as captious as
it sounds; the efficient profit maximizers will not be hurt by a uniform im-
position of pollution-control regulations-they are likely to be better off as the
less efficient firms go under. Furthermore, it has been argued that the
absence of a price on water quality-a void that could be filled by the imple-
mentation of the FWPCA-causes firms to lose profits (or, more properly speak-




There is, of course, a better reason for choosing the egalitarian
starting point. As Bonbright pointed out some forty years ago:
[T]he fact that a de luxe [sic] automobile may have a mar-
ket value of $10,000, while many people are starving be-
cause they cannot buy a sufficient supply of bread, is a
result of a distribution of wealth which permits some
people to gratify their slightest whims by offers of large
sums of money, whereas other people cannot buy the neces-
sities of life.240
Even the courts of a century ago, when the dream of progress
swept across the land, were unwilling to bow completely to the
ethical maxim that "him what has should get":
Much evidence has been offered . .. on the one hand
to show the great value of the complainants' property... ;
and on the other, the extent and value of the defendants'
manufacturing operations, and the benefit thereby con-
ferred upon the community in which they are located ....
But these considerations can exercise no influence in the
determination of the present case. The legitimate ground
for the allowance of the injunction is not so much the in-
trinsic value of the property sought to be protected as its
essential character and its importance to the complainants.
The injunction is allowed, not upon the ground that the
complainants' premises are occupied by a family of wealth
and taste or that the water is used for supplying fish ponds,
and fountains, and conservatories, and other purposes of
ornament, taste, and luxury, but because the wrong com-
plained of deprives the complainants of one of the es-
sential elements of life, because it seriously interferes with
the daily health, comfort, and enjoyment of the family, and
because the injury, in its essential character, is one for
which no damages which a jury may give can compensate.
And in this view the injunction should freely issue to
protect the humblest cotter who complains against the pol-
lution of the spring at his cottage door, from which his
family derives their daily supply of water for domestic
use.
2m
240. 1 J. BoNrnBwcr, TnE VALUATION OF PROPERTy 18 (1937). But cf.
B. MAmuvmLE, TH FABLE OF THEBEs: Oa, PrVATE VICES, PUBLICK BENE-
rts (3d ed. 1724).
241. Holsman v. Boiling Spring Bleaching Co., 14 N.J. Eq. 335, 346-47
(N.J. Ch. 1862).
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,Who would say that Chancellor Green was wrong to afford
protection to the humblest cotter? Is not his decision the one we
would expect from a society with an even distribution of wealth?
Is it not the conclusion which would be reached on the basis of
one-man, one-vote?
Welfare economists may argue as much as they like that the
cotter must be allowed to bargain away his right to clean water
if an efficient allocation of resources is to be reached. But, at the
most that argument suggests that the cotter should be allowed to
bargain away his rights, not that the rights should not be assigned
to the cotter. Once again, "Rights specify efficiency, efficiency
does not specify rights." 242
It should be clear by now that I believe that the question of
how clean our waters should be is a political question which must
be answered by the political process.
If a welfare economist were to look for that portion of our
social welfare function that relates to water quality, he would find it
in the FWFCA. Congress has never adopted a complete social
welfare function, but the part we are concerned with is in existence.
The truly scientific, value-free welfare economist would have
nothing to do except to implement the FWPCA even though that
law could not be part of a Paretian social welfare function. On
the other hand, a welfare economist who admits that he is mak-
ing a value judgment may argue that the FWGCA is bad because
it is inefficient, but he would be hard put to find a better way
of satisfying both the requirements of efficiency and the distribu-
tional judgments inherent in that Act. A welfare economist who
admitted he was making value judgments could even claim that
he thinks the FWPCA is bad because it is hard on the wealthy cor-
porations that happen to be his clients.
The great danger is not that such honest expressions of personal
values may be made to our political representatives, but that they--
and we-may be deceived by the apparently value-free, scientific
jargon of the laissez-faire priests of efficiency and wealth.
242. See note 161 supra. As to the question of whether the cotter should
be permitted to bargain away his right to "one of the essential elements of
life," see U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII. See also Calabresi & Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HAsv. L. REv. 1089, 1111 (1972).
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IV. WELFARE ECONOMICS AS A BRANCx OF ECONOMICS
A. The Meaning of Costs, Benefits, and Prices
Up to this point I have been discussing the ethical underpinnings
of welfare economics in order to demonstrate that any argument
based on those theories is an ethical argument and that the prem-
ises and the conclusions of any such argument cannot be ethically
acceptable. It may seem, however, that I have not been discus-
sing the major issues that I have promised to cover, for I have
avoided substantial discussion of costs, prices, money, and markets.
In fact, I seem to have avoided the entire subject matter of eco-
nomics.
There is good reason for this. The theories of welfare economics
do not depend on any of these more familiar-sounding economic
concepts. Furthermore, the most familiar of these concepts-
money-adds nothing but confusion to any discussion of welfare
economics.2 43 As one text explains it:
To many people economics seems difficult, even obscure.
The main reason for this impression often turns out to be
that the money or financial aspects of the matter tend to
be confusing. The crucial economic aspects, however, are
generally easier to grasp if the "veil of money" is lifted and
the problem is looked at in real terms.2"
On the other hand, a large part of economics does depend upon
the theories of welfare economics. E.J. Mishan, in a rather futile
effort to defend welfare economics from the criticism that "even
if all the propositions of welfare economics were quite general and
consistent, the subject would be misleading and unnecessary," 245
has argued that if that assertion were accepted:
For one thing, we should have to jettison some familiar
economic techniques, such as Project-selection criteria,
Traffic control and pricing, Mathematical programming,
Cost-Benefit analysis, and the like, all of which in fact
243. "'[Tlhe money which a person is prepared to offer for a thing measures
directly, not the satisfaction he will get from the thing, but the intensity of his
desire for it.' Evidently these two things often diverge: many advertisers, as
we know only too well, would have to go out of business were it not so."
M. Don, W.FAm EconomIcs AND m EcoNomlcs OF SocrAmIsm 30-31
(1969).
244. Introduction to P. Bomf, SociAL EFFicmncy xiii-xiv (1973).
245. E.J. MIsHAN, WELFAre EcoNoMIcs: AN AssEssMmm r 13 (1969).
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derive their rationale from familiar welfare propositions.
For another, we should be hard put to justify our approval
of the price system, or some "ideal" price system. . . . If
we reject welfare economics we may, indeed, have to re-
ject any presumption in favor of the market.24
In fact, any economic argument for adopting a particular social
policy-for example, that the implementation of the FWPCA would
cost too much-will almost certainly be supportable only on the
Paretian ethical assumptions of welfare economics, unless of course
the argument is merely an appeal to the selfish interests of the
listeners. In particular, "cost-benefit" analyses appear to make
sense only in the context of the Paretian axioms. But as will be
seen, even in that context they make little sense.
Since arguments that the application of the FWPCA will cost
too much are unlikely to be couched in terms of Pareto optimality,
the task remains to explain how all such arguments must have their
rationale in Paretian welfare economics. We often see one such
argument: that a particular social decision should not be made
because it would not be efficient, where the word "efficient" is left
undefined. Other arguments of this type are, however, more com-
plicated and require some additional explication.
1. The Unimportance of Money
The most common objection to money is probably that it is
associated with vulgar materialism. For our purposes, however,
the problem with money is that it leads to vulgar idealism, for
money is nothing but an idea in the minds of men. That it is a
brilliant idea of exceptional utility in the affairs of men does not
give it any claim to material existence.
In the good old days when money still had a physical existence
it took the apparent form of some good or commodity. Thus, £1
sterling was-in a sense-a pound of sterling silver. The pound
of silver could be used for many things: it could be turned into
jewelry, or it could be traded-as any commodity could-for other
goods or commodities, ten bushels of rye for instance. To the
extent that the £ was something different from the silver itself,
it was just a convenient idea that simplified bookkeeping, for the
£ represented not only the silver but the "value" of all the things
that the silver could be exchanged for. One could state the value
246. Id. at 15.
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of bushels of rye in terms of pounds of silver and, of course, one
pound of silver could be exchanged for one pound of silver. The
idea of the £ allowed one to calculate the exchange value of all
goods and commodities in terms of one particular unit of measure-
ment. The fact that today the £ has become detached from the
silver-like the grin from the Cheshire cat-is, though interesting,
not of great importance. The measurement of length called the
the foot is, after all, no longer attached to a particular foot. In
theoretical discussions of welfare economics, it is usually simpler
to pick one commodity and to use it as the standard by which
the exchange values of all other comodities are determined. Eco-
nomists call the chosen commodity the "numdraire," but it functions
in exactly the same fashion as does money.
There is, however, a reason for using a numraire rather than
any actual money, for money as it actually is-whether dollars
or pounds or marks-does not behave very well as a unit of measure-
ment. A week ago a quart of milk might have been exchanged
for thirty cents and a pound of potatoes for thirty-five cents. To-
day a quart of milk may be exchanged for thirty-five cents and a
pound of potatoes for thirty. Thus, the exchange ratio of quarts of30 6 whietodait is 3 0or 'y
milk to pounds of potatoes was- or w yi 3 5r
If one picks potatoes as the numraire at least one ratio will have
the decency to stay fixed, for the ratio of one pound of potatoes
to one pound of potatoes will always be-i= 1.
More importantly, however, real money is subject to inflation
or deflation. The price of milk and potatoes as it is expressed in
dollars may double because of inflation while the actual exchange
ratio between milk and potatoes may remain unchanged. When
you measure with money, the readings keep changing in a fashion
that is unknown to those who measure with yardsticks. Yardsticks
are Newtonian measures; money is frustratingly relativistic. Since
welfare economic theory is not prepared to deal with macroeconomic
changes like inflation and deflation, it is convenient to pretend that
they do not exist by using a numraire like potatoes.
Another advantage of using a numdraire is that it reveals the
fallacy hidden in a very common type of economic argument.
How often have you heard claims similar to the following: "If
we took all of the dollars that the FWCPA requires us to use for
pollution control and used them to make automobiles, we could
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have 3.8 cars for every citizen of the United States over the age of
seven." Notice what happens when one makes the same argu-
ment using a num~raire: "If we took all of the potatoes that the
FWPCA requires us to use for pollution control and used them to
make automobiles instead . . ." It sounds ridiculous, does it not?
Yet it is no more ridiculous than the same argument expressed in
dollars.
Thinking in terms of money also leads to the vulgar confusion
that the value of everything can be expressed in terms of money.247
If the value of a bottle of scotch is ten dollars, then what is the
value of the beauty of a mountain stream? That question almost
sounds reasonable. If one restates it in terms of a num~raire, the
effect is rather different: "If a bottle of scotch can be exchanged
for ten pounds of potatoes, how many potatoes will one get in
exchange for the beauty of a mountain stream?" How can one ex-
change beauty? If one cannot exchange it, how can it be said
to have an exchange value? Money is a way of measuring exchange
values, but it says nothing about the value of the unexchangeable.
What is the dollar value of eternity?
2. Of Benefits and Costs
Since arguments claiming that the implementation of the
FWPCA will cost too much are often cast in terms of a "cost-
benefit" analysis, I should explain the meaning of those two words.
"Benefit" is a word that we all understand. Economists use the
word in the same manner that we do. Webster's Seventh New
Collegiate Dictionasy gives us the following definition: "something
that promotes well-being." Suddenly one can see some connection
between cost-benefit analyses and welfare economies, for if a ben-
efit is something that promotes well-being, it can also be said to
promote welfare or utility. If you receive a benefit, your utility
is increased. 248
247. Cf. Leff, The Cultural and Social Impact of Society on American
Advertising, 1970 LAw & Soc. OnuDE 397.
248. One should notice that there is a distinction between a benefit
and the utility associated with it: an increase in benefits causes an increase
in utility but this does not mean that the one is the other. This distinction
may, however, be of only metaphysical importance as the significant fact
is that an increase in benefit entails-by definition-an increase in utility.
What must not be overlooked, however, is that since we defined "benefit" in




It would be convenient if the definition of "cost" were equally
simple but in this case economic usage differs slightly from or-
dinary usage-if only in emphasis. Here is an economist's example
of the use of the terms "cost" in economics:
[Slay that a person has bought some pieces of wood for
£1 each to build something and it later turns out that he
did not need them at all. Although it is certainly correct
to say that the boards did cost £1 each (and that an ad-
ditional piece would cost that much) this does not normally
say anything about the value of the remaining boards. The
value is determined solely on the basis of the possible ways
of using these boards that this person might now think
of. Having considered all the alternatives-including that
of reselling the boards-he may find that the best one,
after all, is to burn them. In that event, if his child comes
by looking for something to play with, giving the boards
to the child would certainly not entail a real cost of £1
each (the purchase price), but only what they are con-
sidered to be worth as fuel. A considerable part of eco-
nomics and especially the analysis of efficiency problems,
is based on a so-called opportunity cost argument of this
uncomplicated kind, that is on the value of the best alter-
native use of a given resource, be it an available com-
modity, a piece of machinery or an hour of work.249
In this article when I use the word "cost" without qualification,
I use it in the sense of "opportunity cost." 250 That is the normal
usage among economists and, in particular, that is what is meant
by "cost" in the phrase, "cost-benefit analysis." Thus, the cost of
decent water quality will be the steel or the chemicals or the elec-
tricity or whatever that we forego when we choose to abate pol-
lution. The "cost" is the "benefit foregone." The benefit of decent
water is, of course, the decent water itself"
Since the concept of opportunity costs is so important to eco-
nomic analysis, let me give another example, taken this time from
Professor Samuelson:
249. P. Bomt, supra note 244, at xiv. (emphasis in original).
This example was intended to illustrate that economic concepts become
clearer when the "veil of money" is lifted. See text accompanying note 244
supra.
250. There is a somewhat different type of cost that is usually called a "sunk
cost." In the example in the text the £I paid for the boards is a sunk cost.
The example demonstrates that such costs are not relevant to decisions made
after the time of their sinking. Thus the real cost in the example of giving
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The man in the street can clearly recognize costs that are
actual cash payments; the accountant must go well beyond
that. But the economist goes even further. He realizes
that some of the most important costs attributable to doing
one thing rather than another stem from the foregone op-
portunities that have to be sacrificed in doing this one
thing. Thus, Robinson Crusoe pays no money to anyone,
but realizes that the cost of picking strawberries can be
thought of as the sacrificed amount of raspberries he might
otherwise have picked with the same time and effort of
the sacrificed amount of foregone-leisure. The sacrifice of
doing something else is called 'opportunity cost."251
Perhaps I have overlooked something, but I am willing to go further
than Professor Samuelson's economist and assert that all costs are
(or at one time were) 2-5 opportunity costs.
the boards to the child is the foregone value of the boards as firewood, the
opportunity cost, not the P1 sunk (or historical) cost. There is no more use
in worrying about sunk costs than there is in crying over spilt milk.
The cost of implementing the FWPCA will undoubtedly include many fore-
gone benefits. This cost may arise in two different ways. Water quality may
be improved by a reduction in the production of other goods, in which case
less water quality will be used up as a factor of production. On the other
hand, resources may be applied to sewage treatment, in which case the cost
is the value of those resources (in their best alternative use). Though one may
wish to distinguish for some purposes between a reduction in the consumption
of'good water quality and the production of good water quality, the cost in
either case will be the unavailability of some other benefit.
251. P. SA. mELsoN, supra note 227, at 472-73.
252. In Bohm's example, note 249 supra and accompanying text, the
boards initially cost £ 1 each, yet the present opportunity cost of giving the
boards to a child is much less than that. The historical cost of the boards was,
however, whatever benefit the purchaser would have received for his money if
he had not bought the boards. Thus the historical (sunk) cost of the boards
was an opportunity cost although that cost is no longer relevant to the question
of whether to give the boards to the child. See note 250 supra. When the
boards were bought, their costs exceeded the benefit of having them. This
example raises certain problems from the point of view of welfare economics
because in theory the purchaser was made better off by. his choice to buy the
boards. See text accompanying notes 99-108 supra. But since the purchaser
gave up a greater benefit than he received (the cost of the boards exceeded
their benefits), his choice decreased his well-being, again by definition. This is
not a contradiction in welfare economic theory, however, because that theory
assumes that we never make mistaken choices. On the other hand, the example
clearly reveals that the policy of maximizing individual choices can have no
relevance to a world-including our world-in which people make mistakes.
The following passages suggest that there are costs other than opportunity
costs: "Cost ...is the price that must be paid for value, a price which may
take form either of physical or mental pain ('negative value') or of fore-
going other positive values (opportunity cost)." 1 J. Bounmcarr, VALUATION
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Since we now have definitions of "cost" and "benefit" it be-
comes possible to discuss-at the simplest level-what is meant
by a "cost-benefit analysis." I should first note, however, that
costs and benefits do not have the independent existence that char-
acterizes boards and strawberries and raspberries and all empirically
observable entities.25 3 "Cost" is defined as a foregone "benefit" and
benefit is defined as "something that promotes well-being." "Well-
being," however, like its near synonyms, "utility" and "welfare," is
an attribute of someone (or of a community). 254 Thus, there are
no costs and benefits as such, there are only costs and benefits to
someone.
If you are "rational"-as economists use that term-you always
seek to maximize your utility.255 This means that everytime you
make a choice, you decide that the benefits that you receive from
your choice exceed its cost. This all follows by definition-includ-
ing the definition of "rationality"-because you will always choose
the benefit that most increases your utility and forego all other
lesser benefits (including the next-best e alternative, the fore-
going of which is the cost of your choice). Welfare economic
theory assumes that you always consider the benefits that are avail-
able to you and choose those that most increase your utility.
OF PRoPERTY 19 (1937). Notice, however, that this so-called "negative value"
can be interpreted as an opportunity cost, viz., as foregoing the benefit of not
suffering from the physical or mental pain. In particular, the "negative value"
of water pollution can be seen as the foregone value of unpolluted waters.
Compare text accompanying note 286 infra. In algebraic terms: Let B be the
"benefit" of the act of polluting, N be the "negative value" of the act of
polluting, and C be the benefit of having unpolluted waters. Then the net
benefit of the act of polluting equals B+N and it also equals B-C. Thus
N=-C. "Negative value" is simply the negative of the benefit that is fore-
gone.
253. Of course, if you agree with Bishop Berkeley that to be is to be
perceived, then you will deny any independent existence to boards or
strawberries.
254. I do not deny that it would be proper to speak of the well-being of the
world or of Lake Erie, but such usage is contrary to that of welfare economics
with its emphasis on individuals, their choices and utilities. If you believe that
we should be concerned with the well-being of Lake Erie, you cannot con-
sistently believe the ethical principles that underlie the concept of Pareto
optimality and cost-benefit analyses. See text accompanying notes 58-59
supra.
255. See note 351 infra.
256. Note that opportunity cost is defined in terms of the next-best benefit
that is foregone, not all foregone benefits. Such a restriction is obviously
necessary. "The best alternative use is of course the proper one to use in
reckoning opportunity cost." P. S~aUELSON, EcoNoMics 473 n.8. (9th ed.
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One feature of this type of individual cost-benefit analysis should
be mentioned. When you maximize your utility you do not simply
choose something that is beneficial. You choose the alternative that
is most beneficial to you and forego all others. If you own a
private lake you would undoubtedly get some benefit out of dump-
ing your garbage in the lake. You would also get some benefit
if you did not turn your lake into a cesspool. When you set out
to maximize your utility, you must choose between these incom-
patible benefits. This does not mean, however, that you must
choose between an absolutely pristine lake and an absolutely be-
fouled one. As you walk beside the clean waters with a slop
bucket in each hand, you might decide that dumping one bucket
in the lake would increase your utility more than the consequent
pollution would decrease it. That does not mean that the benefit
of dumping the second bucket in the lake would exceed its cost.
You might decide that keeping the lake semiclean would do more
for your utility than dumping the second bucket. If that is the case,
you would maximize your utility by dumping only one slop bucket
in the lake. This is an example of the most fundamental and trivial
law of welfare economics: a utility maximizer will continue to do
something only so long as its marginal benefit is greater than its
marginal cost. You will continue to dump buckets of slop in the
lake until you reach the point that the next bucket dumped will
result in cost greater than benefits. If you should irrationally con-
tinue to dump beyond this point, your utility will decrease with each
bucket dumped regardless of the fact that for a while you will
still be better off than you would have been if you had not dumped
any of the buckets. Of course, all this assumes that there does
come a point where you will decrease your utility if you dump an
additional bucket of slops. 257 If that assumption (which is always
1973). To use Bohm's example once again, if a man purchases a board for
, 1, the cost of the board consists of his not having whatever it was he would
have bought if he had not chosen to buy this board. Perhaps the cost was
foregoing a bottle of gin. The cost of the board is not: foregoing a bottle of
gin plus foregoing a bottle of scotch (which happens to be the cost of a bottle
of gin) plus foregoing a sirloin steak (which happens to be the cost of the
scotch) plus . . . and so on unto infinity.
257. Although welfare economic theory assumes the validity of the pig
principle that if something is good, more is better, it also assumes that more
is not that much better. This second principle is called the law of diminishing
marginal utility. As Professor Samuelson explains it: "As you consume more
of the same good, your total (psychological) utility increases." That is the
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made in cost-benefit analyses) were not true, you could increase
your utility forever by dumping bucket after bucket without end.
The rule that one maximizes his utility by continuing to choose
a benefit until its marginal utility to him equals the marginal utility
to him of the best alternative benefit foregone also applies to at-
tempts to maximize social welfare. Society can be made "better
off" (whatever we may mean by that phrase) so long as the mar-
ginal benefit to society of pursuing a course of action exceeds the
marginal cost to society of pursuing that action. This is not a
startling revelation; it follows directly from the definition of a
benefit to society as anything that increases society's welfare and
a cost to society as the foregoing of the best alternative benefit
to society. "Cost-benefit analysis" is the name of that "science
that tells us how to maximize society's welfare by setting mar-
ginal social benefits equal to marginal social costs. We do not
as yet, however, have any means of determining what is a ben-
efit to society. We know that a benefit to society is something
that increases society's welfare, but we do not have a defini-
tion of social welfare nor do we have an operational means of
determining when social welfare is increased.258  What is needed
is a social-welfare function. But a social-welfare function is not
pig principle. "However," Samuelson continues, 'let us use the term
marginal utility to refer to the extra utility added by one extra last unit of
a good." Then, with each successive new unit of the good, your total utility
will grow at a slower and slower rate because of a fundamental tendency
for your psychological ability to appreciate more of the good to become less
keen. This fact, that the increments in total utility fall off, is described by
economists as follows: "As the amount consumed of a good increases, the
marginal utility of the good (or the extra utility added by its last unit) tends
to decrease." P. SAmuELsox, supra note 256, at 431. (Emphasis in original).
Thus welfare economic theory assumes that you eat like a pig but that it
is not true that the more you eat the more you want. If utility is treated as
a function of a particular benefit, then the first derivative of that function is
always positive and the second is always negative.
258. As you will recall, welfare economics avoids defining utility, except in
vague terms, but asserts that you increase your utility by getting whatever
you choose. Welfare economists and cost-benefit analysts have been reluc-
tant to take the next step and say that social welfare increases whenever
society gets what it chooses, that social welfare is whatever society in fact
maximizes. They are silent on this because such a claim (1) is unbelievable
and (2) would put them out of business, there being nothing further to
analyze. Note that objection (1) applies equally well to the welfare economic
definition of "utility."
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included among the professional paraphernalia of welfare eco-
nomics. 259
Unless cost-benefit analysts have some means of determining our
social welfare function, they have no way of telling us how to
maximize social welfare. Generally they avoid this problem by
assuming that the social welfare function includes the ethical as-
sumptions that underlie the whole idea of Pareto optimality. On
that basis they conclude that society will maximize its welfare if
it gets to a particular Pareto optimum, the optimum optimorum.
Not knowing the actual social-welfare function,260 that conclusion
is not of much help, for there are an infinity of other Pareto optima
at which society's welfare will not be maximized. As you will recall
there may even be points that are not Pareto optimal that are
preferable to any given Pareto optimum other than the optimum
optimorum.2' For example, a world without people is, by de-
finition, at a Pareto optimum, but surely many non-optimal states
(including our world as it is now) will have more social welfare
than will an uninhabited world.
Cost-benefit analysts avoid this problem by picking some dis-
tribution of wealth-usually the status quo-and then advising us
to pursue the Pareto optimum associated with that distribution.
There is, of course, nothing new here. So far, there is no difference
between welfare economics and cost-benefit analysis. There is a
distinction, however, for cost-benefit analysis is a branch of applied
welfare economics and purports to be able to supply actual answers
to the question of whether the social benefits of some social under-
taking are worth their cost to society. In order to supply prac-
tical answers to real world problems, cost-benefit analysis abandons
(although its practitioners do not say so) the value judgments that
underlie welfare economics theory. The cost of applying welfare
259. See text accompanying notes 215-18 supra. "The Social Welfare
Function ... is an elegant example of the kind of formalism, so much in
vogue today, which greatly facilitates analysis by supposing crucial problems
to be solved by some ingenious (but undisclosed) device, without providing
any actual means for their solution. A formal solution solves nothing if the
real problems remain untouched and their solution is only posited in terms of
the formalism." M. DOBB, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE EcoNoMIcs OF
SocrAjism 112 (1969).
260. When I speak of the social-welfare function, I do not intend to imply
that there is any such thing-I am not convinced that social welfare can he
maximized. I am not even convinced that social welfare can be defined in any
meaningful fashion.
261. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 158, 164 supra.
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economics is foregoing the benefit of the ethical system that consti-
tutes theoretical welfare economics.
Before I can describe how cost-benefit analyses are actually
undertaken, I should first mention one method in which, according
to welfare economic theory, social welfare can be maximized or
at least increased without reference to the concepts of social benefits
and social costs, and then I should explain the meaning of the term
"price.
If we assume that the social-welfare function of our society 2
includes the assumptions of Pareto optimality, then if the present
distribution of wealth is deemed to be satisfactory, one can say,
by definition, that social welfare is increased whenever the utility
of one person is increased and no one else suffers a decrease in his
utility. Let us assume that at the end of the day's fishing, Crusoe
has caught a fish and Friday has caught a lobster. Now Crusoe
would rather have the lobster while Friday prefers the fish. In
these circumstances both Crusoe and Friday can increase their
utility by swapping and no one (there is no one else on the island)
will be made worse off. If the swap is made, society will be better
off. To Crusoe, the benefit of swapping (having the lobster) ex-
ceeds its cost (having the fish). To Friday the benefit of swapping
(having the fish) exceeds its cost (having the lobster).
From this example, one can conclude that society's welfare will
increase if there is a market in which all possible commodities
can be exchanged by the members of society. Notice that once
the swap is made, the society of Crusoe's island is at a Pareto
optimum. This correctly suggests that if there were a perfect market
in everything, the trading in the market would result in a Pareto
optimum. Thus the creation of such a perfect market (or a simula-
tion of its workings) would result in the Pareto optimum associated
with the current distribution of wealth and would maximize our
social welfare function (if that function is based on the premises
of Pareto optimality, the current distribution of wealth, and nothing
else). '
A striking feature of this approach to maximum social welfare
is that there is nothing in it that can be called a social benefit or a
social cost. There are only individual costs and benefits and they
cancel out at the social level since in every case one man's benefit
262. See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 256, at 435-36; cf. 1 J. BONUmGHT,
supra note 252, at 16-18.
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is another man's cost. A more striking feature is the impracticability
of this approach, particularly as applied to the search for optimal
water quality.
3. Of Value and Price
Before I discuss the term "price," I should explain what is meant
by "value" since the two terms are likely to get confused. Un-
fortunately, there is no general agreement on the meaning of
"value." 263 Within the context of welfare economics (and within
the constraints of the other definitions in this article), "value" ap-
pears to be used as the measure of a benefit. Thus, if Crusoe
prefers a lobster to a fish, he considers that the lobster has more
value than the fish. Since we have defined "benefit" only in terms
of an increase in a person's utility (or in society's welfare), "value"
can only be used in the sense of "value to someone" (or of "value
to society"). Though the lobster was of more value to Crusoe
than was the fish, it was of less value to Friday. As a consequence
of these definitions, we can see that "value" and "utility" are closely
related. The more value a certain benefit has to Crusoe, the more
having that benefit will increase Crusoe's utility. The key differ-
ence between "value" and "utility" is that "value" is an attribute
of a thing while "utility" is an attribute of a person.26 4  Notice,
however, that you will maximize your utility only if you maximize
the value to you of your possessions.
Perhaps you have noticed that discussion of an increase or de-
crease in someone's utility never specifies how large that increase is.
We may know that Crusoe prefers lobster to fish and thus, if he
has a fish, he will increase his utility by trading it for a lobster.
We have, however, no units in which to measure Crusoe's utility.265
263. The leading authority on valuation found it advisable, before defining
the word "value," to quote Humpty Dumpty and also to quote Justice
Holmes' dictum that, "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged;
it is the skin of a living thought, and may vary greatly in color and content
according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." Towne v.
Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918), as quoted in I J. BONBRMGHT, supra note
252, at 3.
264. This follows only from the particular definitions I am using. There is
an earlier tradition in which "utility" was defined as the "usefulness" of a
thing. In that context it is rather hard to explain what its "value" is. For
an example of this, see 1 J. BONBrIrHT, supra note 252, at 16-18. See also
P. SAMUELSON, supra note 256, at 435-36.
265. Economists sometimes pretend that we could measure utility in "utils"
but they know that this cannot be done. This is no loss to Paretian welfare
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This implies that we have no units in which we can measure the
value of a lobster to Crusoe; we just know that to him it has more
value than a fish. We have no cardinal measure of either utility
or value; our measures are all ordinal. 268 It thus appears that the
concept of "value" does not increase our ability to make a cost-
benefit analysis from the point of view either of an individual or
of society. It is a convenient word, but not a necessary one.
There is, however, another-and apparently different-meaning
to the word "value." Since I have already discussed the "value of
something in exchange for something else," 267 it becomes neces-
sary to define "value in exchange" or "exchange value." Let us
once again consider Robinson Crusoe and his fish. The fish has
value to Crusoe; catching it increased his utility. Eating the fish
would be of benefit to Crusoe, but Crusoe receives more benefit
from swapping it for Friday's lobster. It is useful-if we are to
understand economic arguments to distinguish between these two
different values to Crusoe: the value of the fish for eating and the
value of the fish for swapping. In more general and traditional
terms, the first value is the value of the fish "in use" or "use value"
while the second is the value of the fish "in exchange" or "exchange
value." The important and deceptive fact about the "value in
exchange" of the fish is that it equals from Crusoe's point of view
the use value of the most desired benefit that can be received in
exchange. The exchange value of the fish to Crusoe equals the
use value to him of the lobster. Interestingly enough, the use
economics because that is concerned only with the question of whether some
change increases or decreases a person's utility. The amount of change is un-
important. "Probably the majority of economists in advanced graduate theory
today . . . would not care to look for any numerical measure of utility be-
yond such 'greater or less than' comparison .. ." P. SAmuSLsoN, supra note
256, at 433 n.3.
266. Even if we had a cardinal measure of an individual's utility function
(of the strength of his various preferences), we could not combine his utility
function with that of someone else to reach a social welfare function unless we
could make interpersonal comparisons of utility. Almost all economists today
will agree that such interpersonal comparisons are impossible. See text ac-
companying notes 186-97 supra. But see Tinbergen, Some Features of the
Optimum Regime, in OPT I M SOCIAL WELFABM AND PRoDucTIrrv 41-44
(1972) where the author speaks of his "tremendous optimism" that someday
such comparisons will be feasible. But cf. Markovits, A Basic Structure for
Microeconomic Policy Analysis in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best World: A
Proposal and Related Critique of the Chicago Approach to the Study of Law
and Economics, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 950, 984-87.
267. See notes 133-34 infra.
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value of the fish to Friday equals the exchange value to him of the
lobster.
It is tempting for both lawyers and economists to conclude
from this situation that the value of the fish equals the value of
the lobster. The law has a tendency to award damages on the
basis of market value, and "just compensation" in a condemnation
case is normally defined as the "fair market value" of the property
taken. There is, however, no single exchange value even though
both cost-benefit analysts and lawyers act as if there were. As-
suming that no costs are involved in the actual process of swapping
the fish for the lobster other than the cost of giving up one to get
the benefit of the other,2ss to Crusoe the value of the fish equals
the value of the lobster while to Friday the value of the lobster
equals the value of the fish. This does not permit us to conclude,
however, that the value of the fish to Crusoe equals the value of
the fish (or the lobster) to Friday. We have no more basis for
comparing the value of something to one person with its value to
someone else than we have for comparing one person's utility with
that of another. This is so because "value" has been defined solely
in terms of individual "utilities." In fact, if we could compare the
value of a fish to Crusoe with its value to Friday, we would be
able to make interpersonal comparisons of utility and this cannot
be done. We are not able to do the impossible by playing around
with definitions.
This may become a little bit clearer if we look at the situation
after the swap has been made. Crusoe now has a lobster which
he prefers to the fish and which has more value to him than the
fish. Friday has the fish which is of more value to him than the
lobster. Notice, however, that both of these values are use values,
not exchange values. Since Crusoe and Friday will not undo the
swap, it is difficult to see how either the fish or the lobster can be
said to have an exchange value, so let us introduce a new commodity
onto the island. Let us assume that Friday and Crusoe each catch
a seagull, but that they both prefer both fish and lobster to seagull.
268. This assumption is normally called the assumption that there are no
"transaction costs." The assumption is always false, even on Crusoe's island.
The transaction costs to Crusoe of swapping the fish for the lobster are the
time and energy it takes him to find Friday and make the deal. Thus the
cost to Crusoe of the lobster is not only the fish but also some additional time
and energy. Perhaps, if Crusoe had not used the time and energy in
swapping, he would have caught another fish; in that case the cost of the
lobster would be two fish, one of which represents the "transaction cost" to
Crusoe of the swap.
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This latter assumption is not realistic; did you ever try to eat
a seagull? Crusoe offers to swap his seagull for thie-fish, Friday
counters by offering to swap his seagull for the lobster. Naturally
no deal results, but we do have an exchangb value for both the
fish and the lobster. In each case that value is the use value of one
seagull. We have, however, no way of cdmparinig the use value
of a seagull to Crusoe with the use value of a seagull to Friday.
This does reveal, however, the fact that the exchange value of a
lobster or a fish to Crusoe or to Friday can be less than its total
value to him but cannot be more than its total value. It will
always be true if we assume that there are no transaction costs
in the relevant market that the exchange value of something to
someone will be less than or equal to that thing's total value to
that person. If the use value is greater than the exchange value
to the owner, then the owner will not exchange. If the exchange
value is greater than the use value to the owner, the owner will
exchange. Thus, the exchange value of something is its minimum
value but that something may be worth far more than its exchange
value. Since knowing the exchange value of something does not
mean necessarily that one knows the total value, "exchange value"
is not a very useful concept.
There is still the temptation to say that, at least before the swap
took place, the fish was worth a lobster since it could be traded
for a lobster. Cannot we free our definitions of value from their
dependence on the viewpoint of a particular person? We could
do that, but only at the cost of not being able to say anything
about utility. Let us instead define still another term, one that is
value (and utility) free. Webste's Seventh New Collegiate Dic-
tionary defines "price" as "the quantity of one thing that is ex-
changed or demanded in barter or sale for another." I. believe that
most economists would consider this a satisfactory definition.
It is now possible for us to say that the price of the lobster was
one fish and that the price of the fish was one lobster. If we take
fish as our numgraire, both the lobster and the fish have a price
equal to one fish. We can say that they are each worth one fish.
Their values to Crusoe and Friday, however, are still incomparable.
We can say that their exchange values to both Friday and Crusoe
are equal to one fish, but this does not mean that their exchange
values to Friday equal their exchange values to Crusoe. It does
not encompass the concepts of value in use or utility. It just means
that their prices are equal.
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We finally have broken out of the jungle of the undefined. Price
is something that is empirically observable. The study of price
is a major subject of positive economics. But we have arrived at
a positive concept only by cutting loose from the ethical concepts
that underlie welfare economics. The price of a lobster to you may
be the same as the price of a lobster to me, but that tells us nothing
about the effect of a lobster on our differing utility functions.
Practitioners of cost-benefit analyses, however, pretend that they
can maximize society's welfare by fooling around with prices.
B. Cost-Benefit Analyses
A cost-benefit analysis is an attempt to compare the costs to
society of an undertaking with the benefits to society of that under-
taking. It is difficult to see how cost-benefit analyses, especially a
cost-benefit analysis of the consequences of implementing the
FWPCA, can make use of the concept of price. Prices are estab-
lished by the act of an individual making (or perhaps of offering
to make) an exchange. An individual can make use of prices when
maximizing his utility because the prices help him in determining
exchange values, but society as a whole does not enter into ex-
changes and therefore is not directly concerned with exchange
values. For instance, if Robinson Crusoe has a fish that is priced
at one lobster and if the value in use of a lobster is greater to him
than the value in use of the fish, then he knows that he can im-
prove his utility by selling the fish for a lobster. Furthermore, if
the fish is priced at thirty seagulls and lobster is priced at twenty
seagulls, he can increase his utility by selling the fish for thirty
seagulls and then buying a lobster for twenty seagulls. But we still
have no definition of value to society (as opposed to individuals)
and, therefore, we have no reason to assume that prices are meaning-
ful to society. Moreover, price is a concept that makes sense only
in the context of an exchange. If you decide to go to church rather
than to sleep late, the benefit is going to church and the cost is
foregoing some sleep, but there is no price involved in such a de-
cision. If society decides to implement the FWPCA, the benefit
will be clean water and the cost will be, for example, a 1,000,000-ton
reduction in the annual output of steel. There is no price involved
in this transaction either. The question remains whether the clean
water has a higher value to society than the steel or, more exactly,
whether the marginal unit of clean water has a higher value to
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society than the marginal pound of steel.269 This does not seem
to depend on prices.2 70
One important point about cost-benefit analysis is that it is
a technique designed to answer far simpler problems than the ques-
tion of whether the FWPCA is worth its cost. A typical problem
which might actually be subjected to cost-benefit analysis is whether
the benefits associated with a certain proposed dam will exceed
the costs. A more complicated problem might be to determine
which of several proposed dams will be most beneficial. Even when
confronted with a small project, however, cost-benefit analysts are
forced to depart radically from the ethical criteria of theoretical
welfare economics.
One of the standard texts on water resources planning admits:
"Benefits and costs can only be measured with respect to a goal....
Ideally, the goal would be an unambiguous and unanimously ac-
cepted social welfare function. Practically, the goal becomes the
second-order efficiency objective of . . . maximum national in-
come. ..." 271 National income is of course nothing more than
the national product expressed in terms of the market price of that
product. The'price is usually given in dollars, but could just as
easily be given in potatoes, While one can see the relevance of
price to a cost-benefit analysis, any connection with Pareto op-
timality appears to have disappeared-as in fact it has. The same
text discusses the concept of a Pareto improvement and then blithely
continues:
In order to avoid the severe restriction of being unable to
make a choice which harms anyone at all, Kaldor proposed
the more widely applicable criterion: A change is an im-
provement if those who gain evaluate their gains at a higher
figure than the value which the losers set upon their losses.
269. The steel has a price on the market and a cost-benefit analyst may try
to plug this into his equations. This price will, however, do no more than
establish the current exchange value of tons of steel in terms of pounds of
potatoes, etc.; it will not help him in determining the exchange value of steel
in terms of water quality which has no exchange value because it cannot, as a
matter of fact, be exchanged.
270. One interesting fact is that welfare economists will almost always in-
sist that having a market system is a benefit of great value to society because it
increases our chances of reaching a Pareto optimum. There is, however, no
way of assigning a price to the market system itself.
271. L. JAmEs & R. LEE, EcoNoMIcs OF WATER RxsorRcEs PLANNING
163-64 (1971).
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From the point of view of the general economic welfare,
it is irrelevant whether the losers are actually compensated
by the gainers.2 72
This sounds very nice, but it cannot be justified by the concept
of a Pareto optimum. As soon as one adopts a criterion allowing
someone to be harmed, the alleged consensus that Pareto optimality
is unobjectionable disappears. At a minimum, those who are
harmed are likely to complain. Furthermore, if compensation is
paid, there is no reason to believe that the result will, in fact, be
a Pareto optimum or that the result reached will even be stable.
Without compensation the change is not a Pareto improvement;
with compensation it may turn out that the former p6sition will
constitute a Pareto improvement.273
Even more troublesome is the fact that the criterion attributed
to Kaldor appears to require interpersonal comparisons of utility.
How can you evaluate your gains at a higher figure than my losses
if we have no common measure? It cannot mean that he who can
dream up the largest arbitrary number should win. It is true that
272. Id. at 102-03 (footnote omitted). See also J. GRAAFF, THEonRrmcAL
WELFARE ECONOMICS 38 (1967); E.J. MisuAN, WEL .FAU ECONOMCS (1969).
273. L. JAMEs & R. LEE, supra note 271, at 103. See also note 144 supra and
accompanying text.
For a history and critique of Kaldor's Compensation Principle and similar
approaches that attempt to avoid the restrictions of Pareto optimality by using
"potential" rather than "actual" increases in welfare as a criterion, see M.
DOBB, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE EcoNoMIcs OF SoCIALISM 82-118
(1969). As one would expect, the weakness in all such approaches is that
they depend on particular distributions of income. Only if a change in the
allocation of resources is a potential improvement for each and.every possible
distribution of wealth can such a criterion
[be] consistent and . . . exclude the possibility of self-contradic-
tion .... This is . . .an unexceptionable definition, but one that
is difficult if not impossible to express in a verifiable form .... The
only case in which we can be sure of it on a priori grounds is where
all changes in output are in the same direction: where there are only
increases and no decreases. But this is something that was known
ab initio: it was derivable by simple common sense before sophisti-
cated debate started, and is very little help with the more complex
changes which generally confront policy-making. One of the baf-
fling things about discussion in this subject is that a new departure
setting out with promise seems to end up by returning to the same
point.
Id. at 101-02.
Notice that so long as an increase in manufactured goods entails a decrease
in water quality and vice versa, one cannot say a priori that an increase in
manufactured goods or an increase in water quality represents a potential, let
alone an actual, improvement in social welfare.
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one can measure the exchange value of an object to someone in
terms of its price, and that two different individuals will agree
on the empirically observable fact that that price is a certain figure,
but this does not mean that the exchange values of the object to
the two different individuals are in any way comparable.274 Even
if one should believe that the exchange values are comparablears
it must be remembered that the exchange values are only minimum
values and do not necessarily reflect the total value of the object
to either of the individuals unless those individuals are perfect eco-
nomic men in a "efficient market" at equilibrium.276
But the normal cost-benefit analysis ignores all of these matters
and assumes that "[t]he optimum project is the one most effective
in increasing national income." 277 In other words, it is assumed
that benefits and costs to one person, measured in terms of their
prices, can meaningfully be added to the benefits and costs to an-
other and that the total is the net benefit to society. Let us apply
274. The exchange values of two different objects to one individual are on
the other hand capable of comparison by that individual and knowledge of
the objects' prices facilitates this comparison.
275. [M]arket behavior, even if it can be treated as an index of
satisfaction, only indicates changes of satisfaction at (or close to)
the margin, and is not an index of total satisfaction... [This]
means that the method [of measuring welfare with the "measuring
rod of money" or prices] cannot be applied to a direct comparison
of different states of the economy, as distinct from comparatively small
displacements from an initial position; and it remains a crucial dif-
ficulty in problems concerned with substantial "indivisibilities" (where
change has to be by substantial jumps.) Here the marginal method
breaks down....
M. DOBB, WELFARE ECONOmICS AND THE ECONOmICS OF SOcALIsm 31-32
(1969). Marginal analysis breaks down, in other words, whenever the proposed
change will have significant effects on either prices or distribution.
276. See text accompanying notes 314-36 infra.
277. L. JAmEs & R. Iaw, supra note 271, at 103. Of course, "numerical
estimates of benefits and costs with respect to these goals are sometimes also
included. Strictly speaking, such effects cannot be measured in the same
units as efficiency benefits or efficiency costs. Combining the two requires a
value judgment on the relative merits of the goals...." Id. at 164. (Empha-
sis added). This value judgment is a political or ethical judgment which
the cost-benefit analyst has no particular expertise or legitimacy to make.
Since the goal of maximizing national income (in terms of market prices)
involves empirically observable data, the pursuit of the goal can be carried
out by a scientist, mathematician, positive economist, engineer or computer
without requiring any new value judgments. The value judgment that we
should pursue maximum national income is, on the other hand, an .ethical
judgment unsupportable by the ethical theories that engendered it. The value
judgments that we should pursue other goals may or may not be supportable
in ethical theory.
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this criterion to a ridiculously simple problem in cost-benefit
analysis. Assume that the analyst is asked to recommend the better
of two federally financed hydroelectric power projects. Project
I will consume steel, cement, and labor with a total price that is
the equivalent of 1 million pounds of potatoes (a pound of potatoes
being hereinafter referred to as a "spud") and will supply 100,000
kilowatts per hour of electricity to the Town of A. Project II will
consume exactly the same resources but will supply the 100,000
kilowatts per hour to the Town of B. Constructing either project
will necessitate that both A and B modify their sewage disposal
systems at a cost to each of 100,000 spuds or a total cost of 200,000
spuds.
Everything seems equal so far. The analyst however calculates
that the capitalized value of 100,000 kw/hr delivered at Town A
is 1,300,000 spuds, while the capitalized value of 100,000 kw/hr
delivered at Town B is 1,150,000 spuds. Town B has a much larger
population than Town A, but its inhabitants are so poor that the
majority cannot afford electric lights.
It should be noticed that neither project can satisfy the Paretian
criterion, since whichever project is chosen, one town (and its in-
habitants) will be out 100,000 spuds. Project I, however, does
increase the national income since the total benefit of 1,300,000
spuds exceeds the total cost of 1,200,000 spuds and results in a net
gain in society's (capitalized) income of 100,000 spuds. On the
other hand, Project II results in a net loss to that account of 50,000
spuds, even though Town B would be 1,050,000 spuds to the good
if Project II is adopted and will lose 100,000 spuds if Project I is
adopted.
Which project will the analyst recommend? If the analyst uses
only the criterion of maximizing national income, he will conclude
that Project I is better than Project II. He will also conclude
that Project I is economically feasible and that Project II is not.
Of course, if he is any good at all, he may note that Project II
will have desirable income-redistribution effects, but that these
cannot be taken into account so long as the criterion is the maxi-
mization of national income, often incorrectly called "efficiency." 278
278. Only in the case of a nonexistent perfect market would the maxi-
mization of national income in terms of market prices result in a Pareto ef-
fcient state. See text accompanying note 271 supra. If "efficiency" means
only maximization of national income, the word is a pretentious and fraudulent
term used to disguise the questionable desirability of the chosen goal.
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Even with this simple example there are certain other problems
that are, perhaps, not readily apparent. H6w did the analyst calcu-
late that the .electricity in Town A would have a capitalized ex-
change value of 1,300,000 spuds? Leaving aside the question of
where the discount rate used in the calculation came from, one
might also wonder where the 'market prices came from. Are they
1976 prices, 1944 prices, or 1991 prices? The ratio of the price of
a ton of steel or cement to the price of a kilowatt hour of electricity
is not likely to remain constant (whether the prices are calculated in
dollars, spuds, rupees or any other numeraire). This means that
there can be no consistent definition of an increase in national in-
come. If national income is defined as the aggregate value of the
individual incomes of each member of society adjusted to the values
of a given base year, then whether national income has increased
from one year to another may well depend on which base year
one chooses. 79 The ambiguity remains even if we pursue the con-
cept of income all the way to the' goods themselves and forget (or
try to forget) about their prices in dollars or spuds. The ultimate
catch is the fact that the very concept of a "good" is ambiguous;
one man's "good" may be another's "bad."
There is another problem associated with prices. Economic
theory suggests-and the economic model of an efficient market
requires-that ceteris paribus the price of a good declines if its sup-
ply is increased. "The more there is of a commodity, the less the
relative desirability of its ls little unit becomes, even though its
total usefulness grows as we get more of the commodity. So, it is
obvious why a large amount of water has a low price. Or why
air is actually a free good despite its vast usefulness. The many
later units pull down the market value of all units."280 Thus the
costs and benefits calculated in terms of current market prices may
have to be adjusted for price changes resulting from decreased or
increased supply. In particular, if the price of the electricity sup-
plied behaves the way economists assume prices behave-an un-
279. If in one year you were to have an increased income in the form of
one buggy whip, one celluloid collar and one kerosene lamp and an increased
outgo of one ounce of gold dust, the question as to whether your net income
increased or decreased for that year might vary depending on whether you
calculated your income and outgo in terms of 1904 or 1974 dollars. See J.
GR&AFF, supra note 272, at 156-60.
280. P. SAMsm.soN, supra note 266, at 436. Quaere whether clean air is
a free good? It is quite scarce around Cleveland.
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likely event- 281 the analyst will either have overstated the benefits
or have been compelled to make a blind guess as to how much
prices will change without knowing the individual utility functions
that will determine the prices once the project is completed.
Even in the case of a simple project,' producing goods with mar-
ket prices and using only factors with market prices, the type of a
project that has been the traditional subject of cost-benefit anal-
ysis, 28 2 the conclusions of the -analyst are ambiguous and nothing
more than guesses. Moreover, in such simple analyses, there is one
unresolvable value judgment which must be made: an appropriate
discount rate must be established. Is a hundred-dollars worth of
cement expended today worth ten dollars of electricity per year for
a thirty-year period starting three years from now? Would pos-
terity rather have the sack of cement (and the undisturbed dam site)
rather than the electricity? How much value should we -assign to
the desires of posterity?. 8  These-issues are hotly debated 28 and,
perhaps, are sufficient to discredit all cost-benefit analyses.
When the benefits of a project- are unpriced or there is produc-
tion or consumption: that reduces water quality, the costs cannot be
stated in terms of market prices. Cost-benefit analyses degenerate
into guessing games and deceptively scientific fictions. As one dis-
tinguished economist has. described normal accounting for costs
and benefits in terms of prices:
The bias of our accounting isrmost strikingly reflected in
our assessment of what occurs when a tannery or paper fac-
tory is set up. Its product-in terms of value added-is
registered as a positive increment to National Product.28 5
But the discharge from the factory pollutes the river. No-
body would deny that this is to be deplored; but such an
incidental effect is regarded as alien to the realm which we
agree to consider in earnest. Nobody says that on the one
hand the factory produces goods, but that on the other,
281. Utilities like electric companies tend to be "natural monopolies" that
violate several of the assumptions of perfectly competitive markets.
282. See, e.g., C. MEYERs & A. TARm.ocr, SELECTED LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
AsPEcTs OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 20-56 (1971); Poraci a, STANDARDS,
AND PROCEDUREs IN THE FonmULATioN, EVALUATION, AND REVIEW OF PLANS
FOR USE AND DEvELOPAmNT OF WATER AND RELATED LAND RESOURCES, S.
Doc. No. 97, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
283. For a discussion of these problems, see notes 112-14 supra and ac-
companying text.
284. See C. ME nERs & A. TARLocx, supra note 282, at 1-56.
285. And to national income. (P.D.J.).
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quite as concretely, it produces bads. I would argue that
this is what we should state: there are two forms of produc-
tion, one of positive value, the other of negative value.
Most economists are very unwilling to speak in this manner;
they would say that the positive values produced are proved
and measured by the prices paid for them in the open mar-
ket, while what I call negative values cannot be so proved
and measured. True enough, because people can buy
leather or paper by the yard, while they can not buy a
yard of unpolluted river. The factory produces its goods in
divisible form; it produces its bads as indivisible nuisances.
There are no economic means of stating their negative
values, yet this exists, and it is proved by the fact that we
become increasingly disposed to vast public expenditures
to remove such nuisances.286
We thus have no way of knowing whether an increase in steel pro-
duction increases or decreases aggregate real national income, even
though it does increase national income measured in dollars.
A cost-benefit analysis in terms of some given set of prices may
be a useful bit of empirical data, 87 but that does not mean that
we are ethically bound to try to maximize national income in terms
of that set of prices. Since cost-benefit analysis has been divorced
from the ethical premises of Pareto optimality, we have no basis for
adopting such a goal except the pig principle that "more is better,"28
with "more" being defined in terms of current market prices. This
is not a prescription for human well-being, but an exhortation that
286. De Jouvenel, Efficiency and Amenity (the 1970 Earl Grey Memorial
Lecture), in MICHoRECONo1MCS SELcraE READINcS 420, 426-27 (Mansfield ed.
1971) (footnote added).
287. If we are prepared to accept a valuation of 1949 income at i936
prices as a useful piece of information in its own right-and a valuation
in terms of recent prices as a piece more useful still-we need not,
as economists, .go on to draw welfare conclusions. That each man
can be left to do for himself, according to his own rights, and mak-
ing use of whatever information is available to him.
J. GR&AFF, supra note 272, at 166.
Such analyses are most likely to be useful when they are directed at projects
of relatively small scope whose costs and benefits can be calculated in dollar
prices: a hydroelectric plant, for example. They seem peculiarly inappropriate
for a nationwide scheme of pollution control where the major benefits are not
quantifiable in market prices and where what well may be the major costs
(the effects of the consequent economic dislocations upon individuals' hap-
piness) are equally unquantifiable and where the implementation of the
scheme will undoubtedly cause major shifts in the distribution of wealth.
288. See note 97 supra.
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we should all end up living like pigs, wallowing in our own
wastes.289
V. ON MM cxc A MODEL
A. Price as a Guide to a Pareto Optimum
Although cost-benefit analyses abandon the ethical underpin-
nings of Pareto optimality, prices are, in theory, relevant indicators
of a possible Pareto improvement. You will recall that if A and B
enter into a trade that each of them believes will improve his or
her lot, the trade will, by the Paretian axioms, make society better
off. The situation may occur, however, where for some reason the
trade cannot be carried out. Perhaps some aspect of the exchange
is against the law (selling oneself into slavery or prostitution),
or perhaps the goods involved are, like water quality, not subject
to market exchanges for some other reason. In such cases, prices
can be used as a measure of how much each party would improve
his position if the trade were possible and, since society's welfare
is defined as a positive function of individuals' well-being, as a
measure of the increase in social welfare that would occur if the
exchange were possible.
For example, let us consider the case where A has some heroin
and wants B, while B wants some heroin. B would sell (were pros-
titution legal) for $100 and A's heroin would sell at $100 290 (were
dope peddling legal). Assume further that B would willingly pay
one thousand dollars for the stuff and that A would pay two
289. It is amusing to note that one could come up with equal logic with
a less piggy-sounding project as a goal for cost-benefit analyses. Rather than
seeking to maximize Gross National Product we could attempt. to minimize
Gross National Expense. See D. WINCH, ANALYTICAL WELFARE ECONOMICS
23-24 (1971). Unfortunately, so long as water quality consumed does not
appear as an expense in national accounts, minimizing Gross National Expense
would not reduce pollution.
I am, of course, being unfair to pigs who given their druthers are dean,
fastidious beasts. Their filth is a function of the constraints we impose upon
them in the form of pig pens. The pig principle advocates that we should
impose the same type of constraints on ourselves.
290. I am assuming that both A and r are law-abiding, an assumption
that appears to underlie almost all economic ana:Ysis.
It may seem that the market price I have set for heroin is unrealistically
low, but I am assuming a market in which the sale of heroin is legal. The
fact that the "street price," as reported by the public relations office of a
police department, of a kilo of heroin may be a half-million dollars is a re-
vealing example of the dependency of prices upon underlying legal constraints.
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hundred dollars for B. If we permit the exchange we can say that
we have made society better off to the tune of $1,000291 and that
if we do not permit the exchange our legal system is costing society
that $1,000. We can say it, though few people would believe it.
To take another example, if A and B own all the land surround-
ing a landlocked lake, A might be willing to pay B $1,000 if B
would install a septic tank and B might be able and willing to in-
stall the tank for $500. In this case, if the exchange is made one
can say that society will be $500 better off. If one is willing to
forego the requirement of compensation-if one is willing to make
B worse off and A better off and thus abandon the Paretian crite-
rion-one can even say that society's welfare will increase by $500
if B is compelled by law to install a septic tank.
The fact that cannot be overemphasized, however, is that a cost
or benefit to society, even though it is expressed in a dollar price,
is not the same thing as a cost or benefit to an individual. If some-
thing costs you a hundred dollars you have, I trust, a fairly good
idea of what that means to you. If I received a hundred-dollar
benefit I know, roughly, what that means to me. If, however,
society should change its rules relating to water pollution so, that
I am a "hundred dollars" better off, and you are "two hundred
dollars" worse off, neither you, nor I, nor society for that matter,
knows what the loss of $100 means to society as a whole. In a
sense, the change in the law has meant a net loss to society of $100.
But it is quite possible that $100 means more to me than $200
means to you. If that is true, then an old-fashioned utilitarian
291. The calculation is simple. The opportunity cost of B's body is $100
and the benefit to her is $1,000, so she is ahead of the game by $900. The'
opportunity cost of the heroin is $100 (the amount A will have to pay to
replace his inventory) and the benefit to A is $200, so he is $100 ahead. $900
plus $100 equals the thousand. Of course, these figures are based on the
assumption that A has to buy at the market and that B would have sold her-
self for $100. If B makes a profit when she sells at the market, or if A
would have preferred an hour of leisure to a $100 trick, the calculation would
come out differently.
The $900 net benefit to B and the $100 net benefit to A are examples of
the "consumers' 'surplus "--"the amount a man is willing to pay rather than
go without the thing, over the amount he has to pay.. " E.J. MISHAN,
A Survey of Welfare Economir, in WELAR EcoNoamscs 63 (1969). This
concept can yield a figure for the benefit to society as a whole stated in
terms of dollar prices, but "[tihere is . . . still the familiar and inescapable
difficulty arising out of the interdependence of valuation and distribution.. ."
Id. at 70. A different distribution of wealth will, as always when one deals
with welfare economics, lead to different results.
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analysis would suggest that society is better off with the change
even though a cost-benefit analysis would show a $100 decrease in
the aggregate national income. It is, however, a fundamental
axiom of modem welfare economics that one cannot make that
type of comparison, that one cannot make "interpersonal compari-
sons of utility." If this is so, the $100 cost to society simply be-
comes a meaningless number. When we add together the dollar
values that two different people assign to the respective benefits
that they receive from an exchange, we are adding incommensur-
ables. "Value to A" is in no way related to "value to B" even
though both values can be stated in terms of prices.
What I have said about prices up to now may be unnecessarily
theoretical considering the problem I have set for myself. Perhaps
it is a waste of time to question the usefulness of prices in a dis-
cussion of water quality, which has no price. The fact remains,
though, that economists insist that prices do have a bearing on
pollution problems. Thus, Professor Scott proclaims in his ex-
cellent text, The Pricing System:
The rational way to decide whether cleaning up the air
and water is "worth it" is to consider the costs and benefits
involved, and these can only be measured in money terms
by the values determined in the marketplace. That part
of the economy in which the pricing system freely operates
provides the regulator with an index or measure of value
which can be helpful in determining the desirability of a
program of control. The measure may be imperfect; but
if all prices and quantities were controlled, one would
have no index worthy of the name 292
There is, unfortunately, a great deal wrong with this "rational way"
to approach pollution problems. 293
In the first place the claim that the "costs and benefits involved
... can only be measured in money terms by the values determined
in the market place" is glaringly false-both in economic logic and
in harsh reality. It is theoretically possible (even in a completely
292. R. Sco-T, TnE PRI ING SYsTm 282 (1973).
293. In fairness to Professor Scott I should point out that my quotation
from his work comes from a passage in which he attempts to demonstrate
possible applications of price theory, which he has elsewhere explicated with
refreshing clarity. It is as if someone who had written an excellent text on
atomic energy were to toss out the claim in his last chapter that it could be
used as the only "rational" solution to military problems.
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controlled socialist economy) to assign, by some social decision-
making process, "shadow prices" to goods which will perform the
same function in determining costs and benefits as do market prices
in unregulated economics. 29 4  Much more important is the fact
that "estimates for the costs of water pollution are not available" 295
nor are there available estimates of the benefits of cleaning up our
waters (which is much the same thing). Even if such estimates
can be made, they will never be based on market prices, for the
basic reason that "in matters of [environmental] quality the market
294. See Drewnowski, The Economic Theory of Socialism: A Suggestion
for Reconstruction, 69 J. POL. ECON. 341 (1961).
295. E vmoNmENTAL QuALT-THE FouTT ANNuAL OEPoRT OF m
CouNcm oN ENVxoNi i.s AL QuALrrY -77 (1973). For a discussion of .the
problems with, and possibilities of, conducting "economic studies of environ-
mental quality," see Kneese. Research Goals and Progress Toward Them, in
ENVmoNuNTAL.QuAxxrY 69 (H. Jarrett ed. 1966). Kneese comes to the
not too surprising conclusion that if we look only at the clean-up costs which
are incurred by inddstries and municipalities, the costs of' water pollution are
low. He is aware, however, that-
direct effects on peoples' satisfactions are the most straightforwardly
"economic' of all and it is in them that we must seek the major
justification for high water quality in streams-if such a justification
exists.
There is, of course, clear evidence of a close relationship between
water quality and human satisfactions. It does not seem to arise from
a feeling that health is really endangered to any great extent, or that
the cost of manufactured goods has been substantially increased be-
cause manufacturers have had to provide costly treatment to the water
they use. Rather, it is seen in the reactions of the fisherman who
has experienced aesthetically displeasing water (perhaps with dead
fish in it) and of the person who just prefers to see a clear stream
and might even be willing to sacrifice something else (pay higher
local 'taxes? or pay higher prices for manufactured goods?) to get it.
Politicians have been sensitive to these feelings which have permitted,
if not induced, progressively stronger federal legislation in recent
years.
Id. at 74-75.
But politically expressed discontent is a highly generalized phe-
nomenon. It does not say much about whether action is justified in
a particular instance and, if so, how much. What standard for a
body of water will balance costs and gains in a particular instance?
Clearly it depends on circumstances. How much does it cost to im-
prove quality? What present and future uses does the water have?
What alternatives are there? Economic analysis can go some distance
in helping to answer all these questions.
Id. at 75. Perhaps economic analysis can aid in answering'all of these ques-
tions, even the normative ones. I am afraid, however, particularly in view of
the parochialism of Dr. Kneese's examples of pollution costs to human sensi-
bilities, that, with' the exception of lawyers and perhaps engineers, no group
is less prepared to deal with these questions then are the economists.
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system often functions poorly or not at all. The production, distri-
bution, and use of natural resources often have profound effects
upon persons not directly concerned in these activities. Yet such
side effects are rarely bought or sold .... The market mechanism
doesn't work very well, because in these and similar situations the
controlling relationships are not between buyers and sellers." 296
Furthermore, even the costs of cleaning up our pollutants cannot
be estimated in market prices, although this is not so obvious at
first glance. One might think that the costs of installing pollution-
control devices and changing production processes would be as
calculable as the costs of any other large scale project.297  Unfor-
tunately, though, there is a real danger that those who must bear
the costs, particularly the industrial polluters, will exaggerate their
costs, either to discourage strict standards or to make a profit out of
their necessities.29s  More tellingly, the most important costs of
implementing the FWPCA will probably take the form of lost jobs
and other social dislocations (including changes in the distribution
of wealth) which cannot be meaningfully expressed in market
prices.299  Since neither the benefits nor the costs of water pollu-
296. Jarrett, supra note 295, at xi. See text accompanying notes 391-422
infra.
297. How well such cost studies can be done is a serious question. The
history of cost overruns in military procurement may be relevant to this prob-
lem. Consider the $2 billion cost overrun on the production of the 0-5 cargo
jet for the Air Force. New York Times, March 1, 1973, at 51, col. 1 (city
ed.).
298. The recent case of United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp.
11 (D. Minn. 1974), appears to have involved such an exaggeration of cost
on the part of the defendant in hopes either of avoiding an injunction against
its continued dumping of mine tailings, including asbestos fibers, into Lake
Superior or of obtaining compensation from the federal government to aid in
buying a new dump. NEwsVmmK, May 6, 1974, at 67. For an example of
polluters profiting from pollution control laws see BusrNEss WEEK, April 11,
1970, at 71. Of course, this example involves a case where the profit comes
from the "carrot" of quick write-offs under the federal tax laws rather than
the "stick" of effluent limitations such as are involved in the FWPCA. But
see FWPCA § 8, 33 U.S.C. § 1256 (Supp. IV, 1974) (providing for federally-
subsidized low-cost loans for pollution control devices).
299. "[S]uch effects cannot be measured in the same units as efficiency
benefits or efficiency costs. Combining the two requires a value judgment
on the relative merits of the goals." L. JAMES & R. LEE, supra note 271, at
164. It should be noted that the benefits of pollution control wiln be con-
tinuing, while the dislocation costs of adopting a regime of pollution control
could, in theory, be nonreoccurring. Unfortunately-and this is one of my
strongest objections to the FWPCA-the FWPCA appears to call for the con-
stant revision of standards giving complying polluters, at most, only five or
ten years of relative security. See, e.g., FWPCA § 303(c), 33 U.S.C.
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tion can be measured in the market, Professor Scott's proposal leaves
us stuck with his despairing conclusion that we have no "index
worthy of the name.
The second objection to Professor Scott's proposal lies in the
fact that in adopting "values determined in the market place" as
his guide, he has abandoned what little normative underpinnings
price theory has. As I have pointed out, the only significance which
"prices," i.e., "values determined in the market place," have to
decisons made by society as a whole is that they supply a guide
as to whether or not we can make one person better off without
damaging another. If someone is willing to buy something for
more than its price, then we approach a Pareto optimum if he is
allowed to buy it. Furthermore, according to price theory, if there
is an "efficient market" 300 we will, by the process of such trades,
approach such an optimum. But the series of trades will in turn
lead to changes in the prices at which goods are exchanged. It is
only the final set of prices which is associated with a Pareto op-
timum. As Professor Scott himself puts it: "Maximum welfare and
Paretian optimality exist under conditions of perfect competition,
and each owner of factors of production receives income equal
to the marginal revenue product of the factors he owns, so that
his income equals the value of what his factors produce." 301 The
basic ideal is that prices measure the exchange value of goods. If
goods are not exchanged, however, (as is the case with water qual-
ity) or if there are imperfections in the market, the market price
of a good is not likely to represent its exchange value at a Pareto
optimum. Except to the extent that the law imposes sanctions
upon polluters, our economic system treats water quality as being
§ 1313(c) (Supp. IV, 1974) (water quality standards); § 304(b), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(b) (Supp. IV, 1974) (effluent limitation guidelines); § 306(a), 33
U.S.C. § 136(a) (Supp. IV, 1974) (standards of performance for new
sources). I should suspect that society as a whole would be happier with
stricter, but relatively stable, effluent limitations.
300. This concept is discussed at greater length in the next section. See
text accompanying notes 314-350 infra.
301. R. ScoTT, supra note 292, at 135.
Professor Scott's suggestion that we use market prices to determine whether
the cost of pollution control is worth it disturbs me just because he is so
aware of the ethical issues. Following the passage quoted in the text, he asks
the following question: "Is the distribution of income, under a given equilib-
rium solution, the best distribution just because conditions of Paretian op-
timality obtain?" and he concludes: "Although .. .there is no way to know
the answei to this question, it is nevertheless true that people can observe a
particular distribution of income and say whether they like it or not." Id.
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"free," even though we all know that it has some value. The main
question is: How much value? The adoption of actual market
prices-when water quality has a zero price-will lead to worse
water than would occur if we had "perfect competition." Professor
Scott, like most other economists, abandons the very foundations
of welfare economics when he attempts to deal with the problems
of pollution. One can hardly blame him since Pareto optimality,
like paradise, though it may have great heuristic value, is not likely
to be achieved in this world. But once one abandons the Paretian
criterion, there is no reason to consider "the prices determined in
the market place" or any other prices, since the only use that can be
made of prices in reaching social decisions is as an indicator of the
road to a Pareto optimum. 302
Other economists are, unfortunately, even more ambitious than
Professor Scott They would have us set up markets in water
quality so that we can determine the exchange value of a unit of
water quality at the margin.303  Such schemes are doomed to
failure, however, because of the impossibility of marketing water
quality to all who desire it.30 4 More modest economists have pro-
posed that we first establish a desired level of pollution and then
allow would-be polluters to purchase the right to pollute up to the
permitted limits.3 05 I have no objection to this (though I think
that it would not be practicable), but such an approach does not
help us in fixing the level of water quality we desire; it merely
allows us to pursue a Pareto optimum once we have chosen a level
of water quality.
The price of something indicates nothing more than the
amount of something else for which it can be exchanged. If the
economy is at a Pareto optimum, the price of each good will be
such that, by the definition of a Pareto optimum, no one will be
302. Perhaps I misunderstand Scott's point. If he is suggesting that we
attempt to figure out what the exchange price of water quality should be-
what it would be if we actually had an efficient market in water quality-then
he has remained true to the normative theories of welfare economics. But in
that case he has, I am afraid, set himself an impossible task. I suspect that
the most one can do is conclude that we have worse water than we would
have with an efficient market and that we cannot say. how much worse it is.
For a development of this argument see Part II of this Article.
303. See, e.g., C. Jomnsow, Regional Water Quality Management and Con-
trol, in CONTEmpOnARY DEvELoPmENrs r WATER LAw 83 (1970).
304. This is the problem associated with the fact that water quality is a
"public good." See note 422 infra.
305. J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PIUcEs 107 (1968).
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made better off if he exchanges one-dollar market-value worth
of good Y for one-dollar market-value worth of good X. At a
Pareto optimum the marginal benefit to every member of society
of obtaining more X is exactly equal to the marginal cost of ob-
taining it: it is equal to the marginal benefit of retaining the Y
which would be traded for the X.306 If our economy is not at a
Pareto optimum, this state of affairs would not apply, however,
Professor Samuelson has described this point as the "law of equal
marginal utilities per dollar."
Each good-such as sugar-is demanded up to the
point where the marginal utility per dollar (or penny)
spent on it is exactly the same as the marginal utility of
a dollar (or penny) spent on any other good-such as salt.
Why must this law hold? If any one good gave more
marginal utility per dollar, the consumer Wcould gain by
taking money away from other goods and spending more
on that good-up to the point where the law of diminishing
marginal utility brought its marginal utility per dollar
down to equality. If any good gave less marginal utility
the consumer would buy Jess of it until the marginal
utility of the last dollar spent on it had risen back to
the common level.307
This is a very interesting law, in theory. It states that the
proper set of prices plus an efficient market will produce a Pareto
306. Economists insist on doing their analyses "at the margin" so as to
avoid the problems which would arise if one were to try to compare the ex-
change value of an ounce of gold with a pint of oil or a pound of gold with
a barrel of oil. Obviously one might be willing to pay an ounce of gold for
a pint of oil under some circumstances when one would not be willing to
pay two ounces of gold for two pints. The solution is to compare the values
of very small units of each.
Marginal cost, for example, is the ratio of the change in total cost
to a very small corresponding change in output. If we let t = total
cost and x = output, this may be written:
MC= At
Ax
or, if we take the increment in output to be infinitesimally small,
dt
MC =z
which is the derivative of total cost with respect to output ...
C. ALLEN, Er. NARY MATHEMATICS OF PRICE THEORY 33 (1962).
307. P. SAMuEIsoN, supra note 256, at 433-34. Professor Samuelson is not
claiming that every person has the same amount of marginal utility but that
each individual receives the same marginal utility from a penny's worth of
sugar as that individual would receive from a penny's worth of salt (or castor
oil). Interpersonal comparisons of utility are thus avoided.
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optimum. Together with the other laws of price theory, it leads
one to the conclusion that if there is a "perfect market" and if a
certain set of prices is established in the market, then society
will be at a Pareto optimum. If we knew the prices that would
exist at the Pareto optimum, we could conclude that the difference
between an actual price of a good and its optimal price is some
sort of meaningful measure of the amount by which society's wel-
fare would be increased if it moved to the Pareto optimum. Thus
prices calculated at a Pareto optimum can be used to measure how
far we are from that optimum. This is, however, only possible in
theory; we will never know the prices that would prevail at a
Pareto optimum. Furthermore, if the prices of several different
goods deviated from the optimum in differing amounts, we could
not tell-without a perfect model of the entire economy-the extent
to which one deviation is canceled out by another.308 Moreover,
even in theory the catch is that there are an infinity of Pareto
optima. If we try to figure out what the marginal cost of a unit
of water quality should be, we will find that for each distribution of
wealth there will be a different price structure. To try to use
present prices (either real or ideal) to determine how we should
implement the FWPCA, when the implementation of the FWPCA
will lead to a change in the distribution of wealth and to a different
price structure, would be about as logical as trying to use our no-
tions of trigonometry to survey a universe in which the value of
7r is 3.2.309
The FWPCA entails both benefits and costs which cannot be
quantified and certainly cannot be accurately presented in terms of
market prices.31 0  When a project, such as the implementation of
the FWPCA, is large enough to change the very meaning of a
dollar, an attempt to do a cost-benefit analysis in terms of dollars
becomes a futile enterprise, 31' if not positively misleading.
308. .ee text accompanying notes 375-90 infra.
309. Philip Morrison refers to "the famous bill of the Indiana State Legis-
lature, No. 246, 1897 (it died in the Senate after passing in the House), which
states by implication that r is 3 1/5." Morrison, Book Review, ScIENTIFIc
AM., June 1971, at 134-35.
310. See notes 295-99 supra and accompanying text.
311. I cannot demonstrate, although I think that it would be doubted by
few, that a forceful implementation of the FWPCA will work a significant
shift in the distribution of income in the United States. I believe, but per-
haps it will be doubted by many, that a change in water quality is likely to
change our tastes. Having gotten a taste of good water we will want more.
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Anyone with an understanding and knowledge both
of the methodologies of law and economics must conclude
that judges and lawyers ought not to allow themselves
to be intimidated or misled by the esoteric form and ap-
parent, but only apparent, precision with which welfare
conclusions asserted by economic theorists or produced
in cost benefit studies are presented.
The very precision with which they are presented may
obscure the qualitative nature and bases of such conclu-
sions.31
2
There is no nonarbitrary means to assign "prices" to the major
costs and the major benefits associated with improving water
quality. An attempt to apply a cost-benefit analysis in terms of
arbitrary prices begs the question it is supposed to answer, since
the assignment of prices will determine the outcome of the study.
And such an attempt may not only mislead us but may also induce
us to forget that "'priceless' does not necessarily mean 'worth-
less.' " 313
B. The Efficient Market
Up to now I have avoided any extensive discussion of the
economic construct called the "efficient market," 314 since it is not
essential to an understanding of the theological underpinnings of
If either of these predictions is correct, the meaning of a dollar expended on
water quality will change.
Moreover, that portion of the nation's wealth which is represented by water
quality is at present undistributed. See notes 594-98, 651-52 infra and ac-
companying text. A distribution of water quality rights to polluters might
well entail a potential Pareto optimum with bad water, while a distribution
of the same rights to the polluters' victims may lead to a radically different
state. The victims may be unable to buy the water quality rights in the first
case and be unwilling to sell them in the second. See note 168 supra. The
exchange value of a dollar under one such distribution will then, especially
as far as water quality is concerned, differ radically from the exchange value
of a dollar under the other distribution.
312. Liebhafsky, "The Problem of Social Cost"-An Alternative Approach,
13 NATunAL tsouRcES J. 615, 624 (1973).
313. Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Hoover, 327 F. Supp. 238, 242
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). (holding in an injunction action that alleged violations of
constitutional rights under the fourth and first amendments, though "difficult
of valuation," satisfies the $10,000 jurisdictional amount requirement of 28
U.S.C. § 1331), citing Comment, A Federal Question: Does Priceless Mean
Worthless?, 14 ST. Lours UNiv. L.J. 268 (1969).
314. In this article, I use the phrase "efficient market" to describe, rather
tautologically, a market that will, if given enough time, cause the participants
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welfare economics. It is possible, despite my flaunts and jeers,
that one could accept Pareto optimality as a desirable social goal
and our present legal constraints as a satisfactory starting point
for its pursuit.315 If one is to undertake such a task, it is necessary
to understand not so much how an efficient market works but how
it fails to work in actuality.
I have mentioned earlier 3 16 the theory that, if we are allowed
to trade with each other freely, eventually we should reach that
happy point where no exchange could make one person better off
without making another worse off. Such a Pareto optimum ob-
viously will represent a stable state so long as there is no change
in our tastes-or any other change.317  It should, however, be ap-
parent that welfare economics is not the major field of 'economic
studies. Despite such puffery as the claim that "[olne of the most
important functions of economic analysis is to evaluate public
policy," 318 the fact remains that "welfare economics does not ap-
pear at any time to have wholly engaged the labors of any one
economist. It is a subject in which, apparently, one dabbles for
a while, leaves and, perhaps, returns to later in response to a
troubled conscience .... " 319
in that market to bargain themselves to a Pareto optimum. One occasionally
comes across references to "perfect competition," but this phrase generally is
not used to describe a world that necessarily meets all of the conditions of an
efficient market, since some of these conditions have little or nothing to do
with competition. Perfect competition is just one attribute of an efficient
market.
315. I do not believe, anymore than you do, that one value judgment is as
good as another. But the fact remains that our "rational" techniques are not
capable of assisting us in choosing our ultimate goals. In the end each of
us will be heard by our auditors as proclaiming, if only sub silentio, "Credo
quia absurdum est." If my rhetoric has not persuaded you-and I have no
reason to believe that it will, a good canoe trip being more efficacious than
my verbal furbelows-I can only admit that "about that which cannot be
spoken, one must remain silent" and go on to a secondary, if more "rational,"
line of defense.
316. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 142-46 supra.
317. It takes small knowledge of the world to realize that such unchanging
stability is not likely to be consonant with the human condition. When one
aims at Pareto optimality, one is shooting at a moving target. The very elu-
siveness of the goal may be one of the more persuasive reasons for seeking it;
since we will never achieve an optimum we need never experience its mani-
fold disappointments.
318. Gaffney, Applying Economic Controls, BULL. ATOMic ScxmNrsTs 20
(June 1695); see also Kneese, supra note 295, at 70-71.




The major theoreitcal efforts of economists have been directed
not at normative questions but at the construction of models de-
scribing how our economic system does work or how an economic
system could work. These efforts have culminated in an elegant
model of a perfectly "efficient market" with which can be com-
pared our inelegant reality.3 20 This model of the efficient market
demonstrates that, if no perturbations are induced, if there are
no "exogenous" changes, the model will eventually arrive at an
equilibrium state which, not surprisingly, is a Pareto optimum. 3 21
At least it would be a Pareto optimum were the model occupied
by human beings rather than by mathematical symbols. Thus, the
model can be taken as a guide by which we can find the primrose
path to a Pareto optimum.
If we wish to arrive at a Pareto optimum in this world it would
appear that we could do so if we could only twist and bend the
structure of our world (both its physical realities and its socio-
economic patterns) until it conforms to the design of the model. It
is tempting322 to try to change the world until it is recreated in
the image of an economic model which was first constructed as an
aid to understanding how the market system, a small part of the
world we live in, happens to work. When economists undertake
to "evaluate public policy," they usually do so in terms of the policy's
conformity to this model.
Thus, the pursuit of Pareto optimality in practice 323 becomes
an effort to simulate 324 an efficient market. This means that some
320. See note 334 infra. It should be kept in mind that, though the models
of positive economics can be empirically tested (see J. GRAAFF, supra note
272, at 2), economics is no more an experimental science than is geology.
Since the data of economics comes into existence without regard for the wishes
of economists, it is far more difficult to verify an economic model than it is
to confirm a theory of physics. Although the mathematics of economic
models may be as rigorous as one likes, the fact remains that in practice one
can never have the same sort of assurance that they are valid interpretations
(and predictions) of the behavior of the real world than one has when one
deals, say, with something as arcane as a law of statistical mechanics.
321. See note 334 infra.
322. I cannot but think that this is a rather unhealthy temptation; it puts
me in mind of Des Esseintes in J.-K. HuYslAms, AGArNsr NAT RnE (A RxBous,
Baldick translation 1959) who "now . . . dreamt of collecting another kind
of flora: tired of artificial flowers aping real ones, he wanted some natural
flowers that would look like fakes." Id. at 97.
323. When it is not merely an attempt to increase our "national income."
See notes 272-77 supra and accompanying text.
324. To attempt to make the world conform to the model is similar to try-
ing to twist the "round earth's imagined comers" until they become an exact
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understanding of the concept of the efficient market, and, more
importantly, the manner in which the economy of the real world
deviates from that market, is necessary if one is to evaluate the
evaluations which economists may make of social policies. Since
I am concerned with possible claims that the implementation of the
FWPCA will be too "costly" in economic terms, I am compelled to
discuss the extent to which such implementation would deviate from
the way the world would work were it a perfect map of the model
of an efficient market. This is especially necessary because the
present economics of water quality do not conform to the structure
of the model, there being no market in water quality in our world.
I believe that it can be demonstrated that an implementation of
the FWPCA will bring us closer than we now are to the conditions
which would exist if the world conformed to the rules of the model
of an efficient market.
I have no intention of describing in any detail how the model of
the efficient market functions. An understanding of the workings
of the model is not a prerequisite for using it as a standard of
comparison. Rather, what is necessary is a grasp of the prerequi-
sites for the existence of an efficient market and of the ultimate
consequences of its workings; what happens between that super-
natural instant when the efficient market comes into existence and
the time when it arrives at its predestined equilibrium cur Pareto
optimum is not of much moment to my arguments.
Before quoting the preconditions which are necessary for an
efficient market, I should mention two points which, so far as I can
tell from my perusals of economic literature, are seldom explicitly
stated by economists.325 In the first place the efficient market, even
at equilibrium, is not some paradise in which our every wish is
granted.82
simulacrum of a map made by a Mercator projection. Welfare economic
models do not purport to simulate the real world-they merely are pictures
of a world which some economists find more attractive than our own. To
discuss the model's application to the world, one is forced-since the model
will not bend to reality-to bend the world to match the model.
325. But see as to my first point, P. SAMUTLSON, ECONOMiCS 18 (9th ed.
1973): "If an infinite amount of every good could be produced, or if human
wants were fully satisfied ... [t]here would hardly be any need for a study of
economics or 'economizing."
326. Cf. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & EcoN. 1, 43 (1960).
Economists do not mention this point explicitly because it is so obvious.
But my whole essay into economics in this article is an attempt to examine
matters which are so obvious, at least to economists, that they and their
[Vol. 27:3
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Economics is the study of how men and society end up
choosing, with or without the use of money, to employ
scarce productive resources that could have alternative uses,
to produce various commodities and distribute them for
consumption, now or in the future, among various people
and groups in society. It analyzes the costs and benefits of
improving patterns of resource allocation.327
If all wishes were granted, if all goods were without costs, there
would be no need for exchanges, no markets, and nothing for an
economist to model. Thus, the economic model requires at least
one constraint which might be lacking in paradise,3 28 viz, scarcity
of goods. I have argued above that it also needs those constraints
which make possible the exchange of goods, e.g., the concept of
property rights.329 The model also needs a starting point, an initial
distribution of wealth and, though my usage may be peculiar, this
fact, too, can be considered as a constraint upon the model. Cer-
tainly if the model is to have any application to our world, it must
be constrained, as we are, by the fact that time's arrow cannot re-
verse itself in its flight. Unfortunately, the models of an efficient
market, being mechanistic, appear to ignore this last constraint.330
Although they assume that there is only a limited supply of goods
and factors, they also assume that if the demand for some factor or
good increases, more of that good or factor will be produced by the
process of reallocating other factors to its production. This last
assumption is not true in the case of many-perhaps most-of our
natural resources. After some point damage to the life-sustaining
and life-enhancing quality of our waters becomes irreversible. An
even clearer case of irreversibility would occur were we to kill our-
selves off, a fact that does not appear to be technologically impos-
sible.
In the second place, a perfectly efficient market is not in theory
necessary for the attainment of a Pareto optimum. A genius of a
implications ordinarily go unnoticed. If an efficient market is not paradise,
and if it is as unobtainable as paradise, might not one conclude that the
pursuit of paradise is a more sensible activity than the pursuit of an efficient
market?
327. P. SAMUEw.so N, supra note 325, at 3 (emphasis in original).
328. A paradise in which all wishes were granted might be so boring that
it would be no paradise at all. Cf. note 129 supra; G. SHAw, MAN AND SUPm-
imr, Act m, at 168 (Penguin ed. 1952). Moreover, it might be hard to
even imagine such a paradise unless we all wished for the same things.
329. Sei note 55 supra and accompanying text.
330. See notes 121-23 supra and accompanying text.
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socialist planner could accomplish the same results without the use
of a market at all, though perhaps even such a genius could do so
only if he were blessed with an infinite amount of luck.331 If a
Pareto optimum were reached by some means other than the oper-
ation of an efficient market, there would be no reason to create such
a market thereafter, and if an efficient market were created in such
circumstances, one could not even be aware of its existence since
there would be no incentive for anyone to trade anything in the
market.
This second consideration suggests that, even if we cannot have
a perfectly efficient market, we could accomplish the same result by
legislating the consequences which would flow from such a market,
using the model of the market as a guide to that optimal state of
affairs.382 One text writer on welfare economics explains:
We come now to what is often considered to be the
heart of welfare economics: a theorem about the relation
between perfect competition and the Paretian optima. For
a long time this theorem was given great importance by
economists; and significant corollaries were derived from it
for practical policy purposes. But the theorem in fact is
hedged by so many restrictive (and therefore unrealistic)
conditions that it is trivial. 333
This theorem is:
If there is perfect knowledge both about the future and the
(relevant activities of others in the) present, if all individ-
331. It is also possible for a socialist system to take advantage of market
institutions so as to achieve an efficient allocation of resources while at the
same time reserving the "ownership" of the means of production, thus sep-
arating questions of allocative efficiency from those of distribution of wealth.
See, e.g., J. RAwiLs, A THEoRY OF JusnTcE 265-74 (1971):
It is necessary . .. to recognize that market -institutions are com-
mon to both private-property and socialist regimes and to distinguish
between the allocative and the distributive function of prices. Since
under socialism the means of production and natural resources are
publicly owned, the distributive function is greatly restricted, whereas
a private property system uses prices in varying degrees for both
purposes.
Id. at 273-74. See also M. DOBB, WELFARE EcONOMIcs AND THE ECONOMICS
OF SOcrALism: TowARDS A CoMMON SENSE CmTIQUE 146-47 (1969).
332. Besides the impossibility of simulating some of the conditions neces-
sary for the existence of an efficient market, there is also the problem of the
"second best," which is discussed in the text accompanying notes 375-90 infra.




uals aim to maximize their utility, if there are no external
effects whatsoever, if everybody is free to adjust the amount
and kind of purchases and sales (including of work) that
they will make, if everybody is rational, if there is perfect
competition among buyers and sellers, if all producers are
genuine cost-minimizers as well as profit maximizers and
if the economy comes to an equilibrium, so that supplies
and demands are equal at some stable prices-then the re-
sulting allocation of resources will be an optimal one ac-
cording to the value judgments of [Pareto optimality]; i.e.
the allocation will be an overall Paretian optimum. De-
pending on how the initial ownership of commodities and
factors is distributed, there is an infinite number of points
of equilibrium for such an economy; and therefore an in-
finite number of Paretian optima. Each optimum . . . is
distinguished by a different distribution of utility levels.334
334. Id. at 28.
If one admits of a world which contains producers (i.e., "firms") which
are not identical with the consumers, it is not self-evident, although it seems
probable, that a Pareto optimum among consumers will be stable. The firms
might be able to increase their profits by further trading. Moreover, it is not
self-evident that when the firms have maneuvered themselves into an equilib-
rium. position, the consumers will be at a Pareto optimum. However, it has
been demonstrated to the satisfaction of most economists that (provided that
certain technical assumptions about the nature of our tastes are met) "a
state where no consumer can make himself better off without spending more,
and no producer can make a larger profit" will also be "a state where no
consumer can be made better off without making another worse off" and that,
with a few more assumptions, the converse is also true. See Debreu, Valua-
tion Equilibrium and Pareto Optimum, 40 PROCEEDiNGS OF THE NATIONAL
ACADEm OF SCIENCE 588 (1954), also appearing in K. ARROW & T. SciTovrr-
SKY, RFADINGS IN WELFmAE ECONOMics 39 (1969). See also K. ARROW & F.
HAHN, GENERAL CoMErrrrvE ANALYSIS 90-97 (1971); Arrow, An Extension
of the Basic Theorums of Classical Welfare Economics, in PROCEEDING OF THE
SEcoND BERKELEY SYMnosIWM 507 (1951); Debreu, The Coefficient of Re-
source of Utilization, 19 ECONoMEmhIcA 273 (1951). The first state is the long-
term equilibrium (called "competive equilibrium" or "Marshallian equilibrium")
which is the ultimate resting point of the model of an efficient market; the sec-
ond state, of course, is a standard definition of a Pareto optimum. The fact that
the second state omits all reference to producers does not limit the generality of
the definition; producers have pleasure or utility or welfare only to the extent
that they are also consumers. In fact, one of the characteristics of a long-term
competitive equilibrium is that the producers have no "profits," as opposed to
a return on their investment of the factors of production which belong to
them (this return being wages, interest or rents). See R. Scorr, supra note
292, at 135: "Maximum welfare and Paretian optimality exist under condi-
tions of perfect competition, and each owner of factors of production receives
income equal to the marginal revenue product of the factors he owns, so that
his income equals the value of what his factors produce."
Although mathematical proofs exist of the equivalence of a competitive
equilibrium and a Pareto optimum, I must confess that I cannot understand
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If we could meet all of these conditions and more, then we
would have a Pareto efficient allocation of our resources. Although
it is obvious that we cannot meet all of them, one might conclude
that we would increase our social welfare if we attempted to come
as close as we can to the results of an economy that did meet those
conditions. In particular, it might seem desirable (and it does seem
desirable to most lawconomists ) 335 that we attempt to allocate water
quality in the same way that it would be allocated by an economy
containing an efficient market (though there is an infinity of such
them. I am required (as I suspect is true of many economists) to accept the
workings of the mathematical model on faith and on nonrigorous arguments
such as the following:
[T]he long-run equilibrium position of the competitive economy ap-
pears to constitute a Pareto optimum, in that no opportunity remains
to improve one person's situation without worsening that of someone
else. If competitive equilibrium does not exist, on the other hand,
there typically are opportunities to make some people better off with-
out making others worse off. If, for instance, factors are misallocated
and marginal products are not equalized, improved allocation will
permit a higher total output, which could benefit some without harm-
ing others.
P. TP scoTT, TRs Lowic OF THE PRICE SYSTEM 289 (1970).
Because economists distinguish between firms (that consume factors and
produce commodities) and consumers (who supply factors-including their
own labor-and consume commodities), some welfare economists distinguish
between "technological production optima" and "Paretian exchange optima."
"[TIhere is a technologically efficient allocation of ... resources when the
output of any commodity cannot be increased without at the same time
reducing the output of some other. In such a case we can say there is a
technological production optimum. However, there is nothing unique about
a technological production optimum; given the resources, there will be an
infinite number of technological production optima, each with a different
composition of output.... .S. NATH, supra note 333, at 13. The Paretian
exchange optimum occurs when the individuals who own the given goods
and productive services in an economy, "[bly free mutual exchange . . .reach
a point where any further exchange will increase the utility of one person
only at the cost of reducing the utility of some other." Id. at 16-17. There
are, of course, also an infinite number of Paretian exchange optima. Id. at
17. When "[the necessary conditions for a technological production optimum
and for a Paretian exchange optimum are combined" the combination results
in "the necessary conditions for an overall Paretian optimum." Id. at 18.
This "overall optimum" is also called the "Top Level Optimum." See E.J.
MISHAN, WELFARE EcoNoMIcs 29-30 (1961). In this article such refinements
are not necessary; when I speak of an "optimum" or of an "efficient state",
I am referring to a Top Level Optimum.
335. "If the market . . . does not work, design the law to 'mimic' the
market." Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A
Buyer's Guide to Posners Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARV. L. Rav. 1655,




allocations). Perhaps w6 could do this in theory, though I do not
believe that it can be done in practice. If we do attempt ,to ac-
complish such a -goal, we shall discover that some system of re-
straints on water pollution, such as those contained in the FWPCA,
will necessarily be included in our program in pursuit of opti-
mality.338
1. The Necessary Conditions for the Existence of an Efficient Market
If we are going to attempt to simulate the end result of an effi-
cient market, to duplicate the long-term equilibrium state which
would result from "pure competition," we need to know the condi-
tions which would lead to such an unheard-of state of affairs. Un-
fortunately, these are such that they can be rigorously represented
only in mathematical terms 337 , Furthermore, when the conditions
are represented in mathematical terms it appears that some are
imposed for purely mathematical reasons-and that those conditions
cannot be--or least have not been-fully interpreted in terms ap-
plicable in the real world .33  To compound these difficulties, when-
336. For arguments in support of this conclusion see Part II of this Article.
It should be noted that it may not be possible to come closer to a Pareto
optimum if we only attempt to have water quality regulated so that it con-
forms to the state of affairs which would prevail at a competitive equilibrium.
In order to approach a Pareto optimum we may have to impose constraints
on all economic activities; just regulating one part of the economic system
may take us further away from the "optimal" position. This is the problem
of the "second best." See text accompanying notes 375-90 infra.
337. This should hardly be surprising since an "efficient markee' and
"pure competition" exist only as mathematical constructs. Any attempt to
translate these constructs into plain English is probably impossible, since
one would have to exclude every conceivable condition which might exist
in the real world which would keep the model from reaching a competitive
equilibrium; I suspect that this would require an infinite number of negative
propositions. "Even though pure competition does not exist in real markets,
the model provides an ideal for judging the efficiency of actual markets
and guidelines to help develop criteria for establishing value when its condi-
tions are not met." L. JA~ms & R. LEE, ECONOMICS OF WATER REsoURcs
PLA'Nur 471 (1971).
338. For example, in the more mathematical models of an efficient market
some reference is inevitably made to the requirement of "convexity," which
is a purely mathematical concept. To make matters worse, "convexity"
sometimes is applied to functions, [See, e.g., D. WiNcE, supra note 289, at
33-34 ("initially, we shall assume .. . [t]hat all functions are continuous,
differentiable and cpnvex.")] while at other times the convexity requirement
is applied to sets [See, e.g., S. NATB, supra note 333, at 33 ("Activity
analysis has also needed the assumption of convexity in production and pref-
erences. This concept of convexity is in terms of the properties of sets of
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ever the conditions are stated in plain English, ambiguities and
variations in emphasis are almost certain, to appear. However,
since I do not propose to demonstrate how the model works, I will
quote, purely as a rough example, the conditions given by James
and Lee in their text, Economics of Water Resource Planning:3 9
points.")] I know-roughly-what a convex function is and what a convex
set is in mathematical terms ("A set is convex if all the points on a straight
line joining any two points within the set are also in the set." Id. A func-
tion is convex if it is part of the boundary of a convex set); but I do not
know what these mathematical concepts mean in the polluted world in which
we live and dream. One can find examples of circumstances that would
violate the convexity assumption(s), but the fact remains that; "Although
convexity plays a very important role in modem economic theory, it is dif-
ficult to give an intuitive explanation of this concept." Polinsky, supra note
335, at 1667 n.68. Professor Polinsky gives the following quite believable
real-world (intuitive) example of a violation of the convexity assumption:
"Suppose that a consumer prefers to swim in a clean river, but after pollution
exceeds a certain level he prefers to take up another form of recreation.
Once he quits swimming in the river he no longer cares how dirty the
river becomes." Id. at 1668 (footnote omitted). It would also violate the
convexity assumption if the pollution killed the swimmerl
It should be noted that as more powerful mathematical tools become avail-
able, many of the purely mathematical constraints on welfare economic
models may be eliminated. In particular a new "mathematical method for
dealing with discontinuous and divergent phenomena has only recently been
developed. . . . lilt can be applied with particular effectiveness in those
situations where gradually changing forces or motivations lead to abrupt
changes in behavior. . . . [Tihe most important applications of the theory
may be in biology and the social sciences, where discontinuous and diver-
gent phenomena are ubiquitous and where other mathematical techniques
have so far proved ineffective." Zeeman, Catastrophe Theory, 234 SciEnIc
AM., April 1976, at 65. Such a theory would obviously allow more realistic
assumptions about human behavior to be included in economic models. One
result might be that the "equilibrium state" of current economic models will
prove, on the basis of more realistic assumptions, to be in some cases the
one state that is unobtainable. See, e.g., id. ("Simple models that cannot
accommodate discontinuity might predict that the two stimuli would cancel
each other, leading ...to neutral behavior. That prediction merely reveals
the shortcomings of such simplistic models, since neutrality is in fact the
least likely behavior.")
339. L. JAMEs & R. LEE, supra note 337, at 46-47.
For another formulation of the conditions that must be met for there to
be an efficient market, see text accompanying note 334 supra. See also
R. Sco-r, supra note 292, at 126-34. See also d'Arge & Hunt, Environmental
Pollution, Externalities, and Conventional Wisdom: A Critique, 1 ENvmor.
AFFAras 266, 270-71 (1971) (footnotes omitted):
One of the most devastating attacks came from J. De V. Graaffs
tightly reasoned book, Theoretical Welfare Economics. Graaff de-
monstrated that economists had not really appreciated the long
restrictive list of assumptions necessary for the optimally efficient
[Vol. 27:3
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1. Consumers must be consistent 340 and independent.341 A
consistent consumer gets more satisfaction from a larger
amount of a given commodity than from a smaller
amount. , The satisfaction gained by one consumer must
be independent of purchases by others.
2. Producers must operate with the goal of profit maxi-
mization.342 The production processes of the firms must
allocation of resources envisioned in the model of a competitive,
free-market capitalism to be realized. He lists seventeen such as-
sumptions which he has shown to be necessary. Many of them are
so restrictive that one must agree with Graaff that "the measure
of acceptance . . . [which this theory] has won among professional
economists would be astonishing were not its pedigree so long and
respectable." A few of GraafFs seventeen conditions will suffice to
illustrate the flaws. The theory requires: (1) that any individual's
welfare is identical with his preference ordering, i.e., that children,
dope addicts, fiends, criminals, and lunatics, as well as all other
persons, always prefer that which is best for them and society
should accept their desires; (2) that neither risk nor uncertainty
is ever present; (3) that productivity is totally unaffected by the
existing distribution of wealth; and (4) that all capital goods as
well as consumer goods are infinitely divisible. These represent
but four of GraaFs seventeen restrictive conditions which must
obtain before the price-market system can be expected to achieve
"optimal economic efficiency" in the Paretian sense.
In light of this, it is obvious that perfect competition could never
be anything more than a normative model toward which government
policies might attempt to move a capitalist economy. The goal
could not possibly ever be achieved ...
See also d'Arge & Hunt, supra, at 845-46.
340. The requirement of consistency means that there can be no changes
in tastes, an obviously unrealistic assumption. It must also mean that there
can be no changes in technology or in the goods available.
James and Lee seem to bury the "pig principle" within the concept of
consistency; if some of a commodity is good, more is better. See note 97 supra.
This implies, of course, that we are never satiated. Whenever I am ex-
posed to this contention, I am forcibly reminded of a comic book featuring
Bugs Bunny which appeared during World War H. Bugs had been captured
by the enemy and was to be executed as a spy. Upon being given his
choice as to the manner of his execution he elected either to be smothered
in marshmallows or drowned in strawberry pop. Cf. P. SA-MIErSoN, supra
note 325, at 4: "In the striking words of one concerned member of the
New Left: 'Don't speak to me of Gross National Product, GNP. To me
GNP stands for Gross National Pollution."'
Consistency on the part of consumers must also require that their tastes
are "transitive." See note 351 infra.
341. This requirement of "independence" is the key condition. If con-
sumers (and producers) are not independent, "externalities" exist which
keep the market from arriving at a Pareto optimum. See notes 363-67,
449-53 infra and accompanying text. See also notes 90, 101 supra and ac-
companying text.
342. It is debatable whether this condition is met in the real world. See
notes 232-34 supra and accompanying text.
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be independent so that one firm's costs are not borne
by others.
3. The transactions by each buyer or seller must be too
small in relation to the market to affect prices paid or
received.3 43
4. No price regulation or rationing or other artificial con-
straints by government, labor, business, or other institu-
tions are placed on the demand and supply of goods
and resources or on their prices.3 "
5. Goods and services and resources must be mobile. This
requires free entry by firms into any industry and goods
and labor free to move from one local market to another
to seek the best price.3 45
343. This state of affairs does not, of course, prevail in the real world.
Many polluters are large enough to affect the prices of their products and
presumably large enough to affect the price of water quality if there were
such a price.
This condition conceals the requirement that there be no industries with
ever-increasing returns to scale (or ever decreasing marginal costs), where
such a state of affairs exists [and it seems to be true of pollution control
facilitiesl See L. JAmzss & R. LEE, supra note 337, at 65-66], "the first
firm to get a head start will find its advantage increasing the greater it
grows! ...The result must be obvious: Under persisting decreasing costs
for the firms, one or a few of them will so expand their [production]
as to become a significant part of the market for the industry's total [produc-
tion]. . . . [Diecreasing cost for a firm destroys perfect competition.
P. SAMULSON, supra note 325, at 473-74 (emphasis in original).
344. This condition obviously does not apply in the real world. Notice
that for the condition to be met we would have to abolish labor unions as
well as import duties, and abolish them not only in the United States but
throughout the world. Presumably we would also have to abolish laws
outlawing narcotics. The word "artificial" has a certain ambiguity. Are
laws against theft an "artificial constraint"? Literally they are. Like most
writers on economics, James and Lee ignore the fact that our economic
system could not function without the "artificial constraints" of property
law. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
345. This condition is at once contrafactual and cruel. As stated by
James and Lee it may seem innocuous, but it assumes that any factor of
production, including land and labor, may be instantaneously transferred to
another use without any cost. Thus today's steel mill can convert without
cost into tomorrow's bubble gum factory; a coal miner in West Virginia
can be converted, without cost, into a pea picker in California or, presumably,
a philosophy professor in Alaska. Perhaps, if coal miners have greater in-
comes than philosophy professors, the miner would costlessly be transformed in-
to two philosophy professors or, on the contrary assumption, two-thirds of a
philosophy professor. The cruelty comes when, in our search for a Pareto
optimum, we attempt to force labor, i.e., human beings, into a mold in
which few things besides two-penny nails could fit with any comfort. Peo-
ple are not able to transfer to new jobs in new locations without cost to
them, though, since the major cost is not monetary but rather the destruc-
tion of the victim's identity, his role, his ties with those whom he loves,
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6. Buyers and sellers must be aware of prices throughout
the economy. When buyers and sellers receive such in-
formation instantaneously, we have what is known as
perfect competition.3 46 The closest approximation to
this condition is on the New York Stock Exchange where
information on stock prices is transmitted continuously
to all parts of the nation.
7. Commodities must be sufficiently divisible so that sel-
lers can withhold all or part of the product from
individual buyers who do not pay the market price.34 7
8. The existing income distribution must be considered
equitable for the dollar votes of the individual partici-
pants to be weighted equally.3 4 8
9. All resources must be fully employed. When unem-
ployment persists, prices do not reflect opportunity costs
or returns from the viewpoint of the nation. 49
If these conditions (and possibly others) are met, the received
economic theory is that we-will have achieved a Pareto optimum:
and his community, the cost will easily be ignored by economic theoreticians
in the pursuit of an increase in "welfare." I would not be surprised if
the ongoing destruction of the traditional family turned out to be in part
a consequence of social policies designed to increase the mobility of labor.
The fact that neither land, nor capital goods, nor labor can easily be
transferred from one use to another is a major impediment to attempts to
impose constraints on pollution. See note 250 supra and accompanying text
where the problem of "sunk costs" is discussed.
346. This condition calls not only for the transmission of information
instantaneously but also that the transmission be without cost. If informa-
tion is not free, in some cases mutually beneficial trades will not be made
because the potential traders cannot afford the necessary information. While
it is true that the existence of markets such as the New York Stock Ex-
change increases the availability of information, the condition of instantaneous
information will never prevail in practice, for the requirement is that every
individual's bid and asked price for every good in the world, including
futures, be relayed instantaneously to every other individual. Can the
whole world be crowded simultaneously into the-pit of a commodity ex-
change?
347. This condition is one which water quality (taken as a commodity)
conspicuously fails to satisfy. See notes 422-23 infra and accompanying
text discussing "public goods."
348. This condition is not necessary to the working of an efficient market.
If the condition is violated we will still get a Pareto optimum. That optimumi
however, will be inequitable. See note 334 supra. The inclusion of this
condition is, in effect, an admission that those who are dissatisfied with
the distribution of income in our society should not pursue policies intended
to duplicate the workings of an efficient market.
349. This condition is probably unnecessary, since if the other conditions,
particularly conditions 4, 5 and 6, are met, there will be no unemployed
resources. The condition can be read as saying that an efficient market can
exist only in a world which has neither depressions nor John Maynard Keynes.
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Where the market is purely competitive in structure it
is easily shown that free exchange promotes an optimal
allocation of resources in the Paretian or social efficiency
sense; that is, resources will be allocated to each production
actively until the increasing increment to social cost from
that activity is just equal to the decreasing increment to
social benefits from consuming the ou[t]put of that activity.
In other words, assuming pure competition, resources are
allocated in such a way that the budgetary sacrifice which
consumers are willing to make in order to secure an addi-
tional unit of any type of output is exactly matched by the
sacrifice of resources which society must make in order to
produce that unit of output.50
Since it is obviously unlikely that all of these conditions prevail
in the real world, the question" becomes, for those who would pursue
a Pareto optimum, whether we can cause the conditions (or their
functional equivalents) to come into being. And, if that is not pos-
sible, and it obviously is not, can we determine what would happen
were such conditions to prevail in our world and then duplicate
that result? The answer to the latter question is: up to a point.
2. Deviations from the Conditions
a. In general. Some of the conditions of an efficient market
cannot be simulated meaningfully in the real world. Take, for
example, the condition that "consumers must be consistent." This
condition is not only a prerequisite for an efficient market, it is
also inherent in the very idea of a Pareto optimum. If a person is
inconsistent, making him "better off" may not make him "better off"
and therefore may not make the community "better off."351 If con-
350. Havrilesky, Information and Economic Analysis, 412 ANNALS 64, 66
(1974). The opacity of this quotation suggests that what is "easily shown" in
economics is not always easily said. I am puzzled by the distinction which Pro-
fessor Havrilesky draws between the "budgetary" sacrifice of consumers and the
sacrifice of "resources" by society but assume he means that when we have
an efficient (or purely competitive) market (and only when we have such
a market), costs to individuals will equal costs to society. But the "sacrifice
of resources" by society is a peculiar concept, unless all that is meant is their
exchange value (or price) at a Pareto optimum.
351. The concept of consistency, at least as used by James and Lee, seems
to include several ideas besides constant tastes. See note 349 supra. In
particular, it includes the two principles which economists often arrogantly
lump under the rubric of rationality, viz, maximizing behavior and transitive
tastes.
The naive psychological theories of economics are almost all based on the
idea that each individual maximizes his happiness or his "utility" or some-
thing-that everyone chooses to make himself as well-off as possible. This
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sumers actually are consistent, then to that very limited extent, the
model of the efficient market accurately describes their behavior.
But if they are not consistent, no efforts to see what would happen
if they were consistent can possibly show us the road to a Pareto
optimum in the real world. No Pareto optimum can exist in that
insight is either a tautology ("utility" can be defined as being that which
individuals in fact do maximize), without any claim to being a moral im-
perative or desideratum or an empirical assumption of questionable validity.
See notes 180-84 supra and accompanying text.
"Transitivity'" of tastes is even more fundamental to the concept of Pareto
optimality and even more subject to attack on empirical grounds. If a
person prefers A to B (or is indifferent between, them) and prefers B to C
(or is indifferent between them) then, if his tastes are transitive, he will
prefer A to C (or be indifferent between them). If someone like myself
exists who prefers oysters to clams, clams to crabs, and crabs to oysters,
then the whole idea of Pareto optimality, the idea that you can make me
and society better off by giving me my "druthers," crashes down into non-
sense. Furthermore, a market in which I am involved could never reach
a competitive equilibrium so long as I chase my preferences around in
circles.
Even Professor Arrow, who proved that the preferences of society need
not be transitive, assumed as his starting point that individual preferences
are transitive. See K. ARRow, SOCIAL. CHOICE AND INnrvMlUAL VALUES 19
(1963). Of course, it is possible to insist that at any given moment my tastes
are transitive (despite my disclaimer) and that they simply change the next
moment. This dodge preserves the theories of welfare economics at the cost
of making them empirically unverifiable and destroys any usefulness which they
may have, since, if I and others keep changing our tastes, the system will
never have the opportunity to reach a competitive equilibrium or a Pareto opti-
mum. If the grass always seems greener on the other side of the fence, as our
folk-wisdom has it, then when we get what we want (even a Pareto op-
timum) we will find ourselves wanting something else. "[To speak of a
tendency towards equilibrium that itself shifts the position towards that which
it is tending is a contradiction in terms." J. ROBINSON, ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY
82 (1962).
It should be noted that only an economist seeking an interpretation for
his mathematics could conceive of a human being as a consistent unity, not
divided into mind, body, and will; or ego, id, and superego; or parent,
adult, and child; or the whole aviary of the "Parlement of Foules." Once
we recognize that we are animated by more than a single drive:
Arrow's conclusions [that society's preferences need not be transitive]
will then provide a rational explanation, strangely apt, of the contra-
dictions and illogic of human actions; for in this respect, the solu-
tion he discovered to the problem of determining the "will of the
people," and which, for society, consists in delegating its powers
to a single person, will be an illusory one (from the abstract point
of view where we find ourselves). For this person will also be a
"collective whole" facing the same problem: a vicious circle.
Barbut, Does the Majority Ever Rule?, 4 PORTFOLIO & ART NEws ANNUAL
79, 163 (1961).
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world since the inconsistent cannot be said unambiguously to prefer
one state to another. Of course, a true believer in welfare economics
might be tempted to brainwash us in some fashions52 -rationalize
us with psychosurgery "P-so that, ant-like, machine-like, we func-
tion as "rational" economic men "[that never looked out of the eye
of a saint or out of a drunkard's eye." s54 But if we do not choose
to be robots, anymore than a pig would choose to be Socrates, s one
cannot justify compelling our conversion to rationality with a theory
whose sole ethical principle is that we should get what we choose.
And this is so even though our conversion would be required be-
fore the concept of a Pareto optimum could be meaningful or a
competitive equilibrium could be reached.
Another condition which cannot always be meaningfully simu-
lated is the requirement of "independence." To the extent our
pleasure and displeasure are functions of others' well-being, to the
extent that we love and hate, are jealous and compassionate, the
analyses of welfare economics are incapable of explaining how we
can get to a Pareto optimum.3 56 The model of an efficient market
may show that we could reach such an optimum if we were each
servant to no human passion other than obedience to the will of
the market's invisible hand, but-as we are human-the model
cannot tell how to fulfill our desires, our choices.
352. See E.J. HISHAN, A Survey of Welfare Economics, in WELFARE
ECONOMICS 82 (1969): "We may be wise to invest more resources in social
,psychology in the hope of making people more 'rational'...."
353. See generally Mearns, Law and the Physical Control of the Mind:
Experimentation in Psychosurgery, 25 CASE W. REs. L. Rlv. 565 (1975).
354. Yeats, Seven Sages, quoted in the heading of chapter four of K.
ARRow & F. HAHN, GENERAL COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS 75 (1971).
355. If, as is generally agreed, our economic institutions play a leading
role in shaping our culture, in determining what sort of people we
turn out to be, that is all part of the neighborhood effect, and
economists have not taken it into account in their approach to eco-
nomic policy. The neighborhood effect of economic institutions
in shaping what we in our culture-bound fashion call human nature
is opaque to Pareto-optimality because a man is not likely to be
prepared to pay for being made other than he is the amount that
it would be worth that he could recognize only if he were a different
man. The pig will not want to pay anything to be made into a
Socrates. He doesn't want to be Socrates.
Alexander, Human Values and Economists' Values, in HUMAN VALUES AND
ECONOMIC POLICY 101, 110 (S. Hook ed. 1967).
356. See notes 94, 101 supra and accompanying text; cf. note 355 supra.
Envy and compassion can be considered to be special cases of "externalities,"
a subject that is discussed in the text accompanying notes 391-408 infra.
See S. NA-, supra note 333, at 74-77, 140-42. Water pollution (if it
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The conditions of rationality and independence that are pro-
grammed into the model of the efficient market cannot be inter-
preted in the world of human action. They remain mathematical
symbols which cannot be given human meaning. On the other
hand, there are conditions imposed upon the model which could-
without destroying our very humanity-be imposed upon us. For
example, it-might not deny our humanity-although I am sure that
it would-for us to imagine that we could receive instantaneously
and at no cost all information about all prices, past, present, and
future, in the world. We might be able to interpret that particular
condition in the model in human terms. Unfortunately, such an act
of the imagination will not help us get closer to a competitive equi-
librium because, lacking the necessary information, there is no way
we can tell how we would act if we had it.a3T To take a more
realistic example, it is not self-contradictory to imagine a human
economy in which the transactions of each buyer and seller are too
small to affect prices or in which there are no "artificial" constraints
by government, although it is difficult to imagine an economy which
could exhibit both conditions for long.as We might even attempt
to impose such conditions on our world by rigorously enforcing the
antitrust laws and abolishing governmental restraints upon economic
activities.a 9 Or, if such a procedure seems too heroic, we might
try to reach the same end by taking governmental action to estab-
lish the same level of prices and production as would exist were
there no large industries and no tariffs, import quotas and so on.
is not the subject of market transactions) is another case where the indepen-
dence assumption is violated: the pollutee's ini-being is not independent of
the polluter's well-being.
357. Perhaps it would be possible to create a model of an economic
system in which information itself is a commodity. So far as I know, how-
ever, no complete model leading to a general equilibrium has been con-
structed along these lines. Even if such a model could be built, the at-
tractiveness of a Pareto optimum produced by it would be greatly diminished,
since it would be hard to argue that what we choose is good for us if our
choices are uninformed. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
358. Economists succeed in such a feat of imagination only by assum-
ing that there are no decreasing-cost industries, no natural monopolies. See
note 343 supra and accompanying text. Perhaps they assist their fantasy
by defining "artificial constraints" as excluding the antitrust laws. If the
antitrust laws are an attempt to impose the laws of the efficient market upon
the real world, perhaps they could be considered "natural" (cf., note 208
supra) but no more natural surely than an attempt to legislate the laws
of Euclidean geometry upon a relativistic universe.
359. Including abolishing the antitrust laws?
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Unfortunately for this latter possibility, since we lack perfect in-
formation, we can never do more than guess which price and
production levels would prevail were the large industries broken up
and the artificial constraints abolished.
This last approach is not, of course, totally hopeless. We could
try, somehow, to implement our guess. At least we can be fairly
sure3'6 -- if we believe in the model of the efficient market-that
certain prices would be lower and production of certain goods would
be greater if we had no monopolies and no tariffs.361 Thus, though
we may not know how much lower and greater, we know at least
the direction in which we should shift our economy if we wish to
improve our welfare as defined by welfare economists.362
There is another condition which we can imagine 'existing in a
human economy (provided that we ignore certain aspects of physical
reality). We can imagine that each consumer and producer is in-
dependent 363 of the others in a more limited sense than that de-
scribed earlier. If we ignore the existence of compassion and jeal-
ousy, we can imagine a human world in which no one's actions
impinge upon the interests of another without that other's consent
We can, for example, imagine a primitive society in which every
individual "owns"364 forty acres and a mule and in which each in-
360. No matter how great our faith, we cannot reach the same sort of
certainty about economics that we have with respect to the laws of physical
science. We cannot in this world compare the functioning of our economy
with and without large industries, everything else remaining unchanged. As I
said earlier, economics is not an experimental science.
361. This statement is true only if we ignore the problem of the "second
best." See notes 375-90 infra and accompanying text.
362. It should be noted that if the "shift" involves a redistribution of
wealth, the comparison between prices before and after the shift is not
very meaningful. See notes 301-09 supra and accompanying text. "In the
very process of approaching some optimum the distribution is being altered,
with the result that the initial optimum aimed at may cease to be relevant."
E.J. MiSHAN, Second Thoughts on Second Best, in WELFARE EcoNoMIcs
143 (1969).
One clue to a possible means of accomplishing such a "shift" is given
in the following quotation: [Ilf there is a price-marginal cost ratio common to
all the constrained sectors in the economy, the rule is simple: adjust output in
all the remaining "free" sectors until the same ratio prevails there also. Id. at
145. This solution . . . is no less of an optimal solution than one wherein
every price is set exactly equal to its marginal cost, though, of course, it carries
with it a different distribution of income. Id. (emphasis added, footnotes
omitted).
363. See notes 364-71 infra and accompanying text.
364. For a striking example of a system of "ownership" so alien to ours
that a common law court can hardly conceive that it is ownership at all, see
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dividual has the absolute right to do whatever he likes with his own
"property." If A wants to raise corn on his land he may do so. If
A needs the services of two mules, he can rent or buy B's. If B
needs more fertilizer he can buy it from A. In such an economy
there is no interdependence, except to the extent that the parties
enter into bargains. One might imagine that if we defined property
rights precisely enough, we could create this sort of limited inde-
pendence in the real world. It is clear, on the other hand, that
there are many things in the real world which are not subject to the
absolute type of ownership I have just hypothesized.3 65 Among
them are rivers, lakes, streams, and oceans.
Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd. 17 F.L.R. 141, 268-74 (Austl. N.T. Sup.
Ct. 1971), noted in 45 Ausm. L.J. 333 (1971). The concept of "owner-
ship," of some body of law or custom which defines and enforces the
hypothetical property rights each individual has in twenty acres and his
mule, may actually violate the limited assumption of independence discussed
in the text. Cf. d'Arge & Hunt, supra note 339, at 275:
Unless people in modem societies are completely homogenous self-
serving robots responding only to price and cost, practically any
deviant social behavior results in an externality. In fact, one of the
reasons cited for the founding of societies is the common need for
protection. Yet protection achieved by an individual through group
participation is a form of reciprocal externality-I receive added
protection by your presence as you receive added protection from
mine. Such benefits of group participation are not priced at all
or by a well-defined market.
D'Arge and Hunt's argument seems to be that the very existence of laws
violates the limited assumption of independence. It is probably best to
define "externalities" so that they do not include all "interdependencies"
-otherwise the existence of an efficient market would be an externality
(since we are all participants and each benefits from the others' participa-
tion) and thus, the efficient market's existence would violate the conditions
of the efficient market's existence. "External effects" should be defined
as "untraded interdependencies" since only the latter interfere with the
attainment of an equilibrium state. See S. NATH, supra note 333, at 64-67.
365. Our legal system recognizes no such absolute property rights. At the
very least the "sovereign" always has the right to "take" property under
the power of eminent domain. See e.g., Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S.
367 (1875). Furthermore, the "sovereign" always has the right to regulate
the use of property to protect the public health, safety, welfare and morals.
See, e.g., Eiger v. Garrity, 246 U.S. 97 (1918). But cf. McCarthy v.
Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 817 (1954).
The judicially developed law of "nuisance" also regulates the use which
each person may make of his property. See notes 541, 577 infra and ac-
companying text.
The further one looks into such matters, the clearer it becomes that the
absolute rights which I have hypothesized simply cannot exist under any
conceivable legal system. The very fact that A has a right means that B
has a duty not to violate it and, mutatis mutandis, if B has a right then
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The entire problem of water pollution can be explained (by one
who believes that a competitive equilibrium and Pareto optimum
based on the present distribution of wealth is the summum bonum)
by the fact that most natural bodies of water are not subject to
such absolute ownership by one person. If A's land borders on a
stream and if A throws his slops in that stream, then B who lives
downstream ends up bearing the burden of A's activities. The
burden born by the pollutee in such a case is called an "external
cost" or "downstream cost" or "neighborhood effect" or "spillover
effect." The nature of such costs will be discussed in more detail
below.3 66  For the moment it is sufficient to say that the existence
of such effects violates the condition that consumers and producers
must be independent.
Some economists have proposed solving the problem of water
pollution by creating well-defined property rights in water quality
so that the independence condition of the model will be simulated
in the real world.367 Some even argue that once such property
rights are established, the market mechanism will (automatically)
produce that level of water quality which is demanded by the
"general welfare." 368 Others, more modestly and sensibly, propose
that we should first establish, through the political process, the
level of water quality we desire and then create property rights
to pollute (up to the preordained limit) and a market in such
A must have a corresponding duty. Only if it were impossible for B to
violate A's right, only if B could not possibly trespass on A's land or allow
his mule to stray on A's land, could A's right be both absolute and not an
infringement of B's absolute rights to do whatever he wants with his prop-
erty. But in such an extreme case, it does not make any sense to assert
that A has a right at all; Robinson Crusoe (before the arrival of Friday)
had no rights. "A right . ..is a legally enforceable claim of one person
against another, that the other shall do a given act or shall not do a given
act." REsTATEMENT OF PRoPERTY § 1 (1936). If there is no "other,"
there can be no right. Cf. Cook, Hohfeld's Contributions to the Science
of Law, 28 YALE L.J. 721, 729 (1919).
In the first part of this article, I have not thought it necessary to
distinguish between Hohfieldian "rights' and "privileges:' When I speak
of "property rights in water quality," I mean both the "right" to keep others
from polluting and the "privilege" of polluting. For a discussion of the
importance of this Holfeldian distinction to questions of water quality, see
notes 606-08 infra and accompanying text.
366. See notes 396-98 infra and accompanying text.
367. See, e.g., J. DALF.s, PoI LrTiON, PRoPERTY & PsUcrS 93 (1968); John-
son, An Optimal State Water Law: Fixed Water Rights and Flexible Market
Prices, 57 VA. L. REv. 345 (1971).
368. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 367.
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rights.3 69  The first approach proposes that we let the market, in
its impulse towards a Pareto optimum, set the level of our water
quality; the second approach proposes that we should set a level of
water quality as a constraint and then let the market approach a
Pareto optimum defined by that constraint. The first approach is
ridiculous; the second, I think, is impracticable. Neither approach
supplies an answer to the ultimate question which concerns us:
How clean should our waters be?
The first "scheme is of course highly dependent on the ef-
ficacy of the existing distribution of income," 370 or rather on
the distribution of income which will exist after the new property
rights in water quality are assigned to their lucky new owners.
It is so dependent on the distribution of income or wealth that
we can obtain any level of water quality we might desire by
juggling our allocation of these new rights in water quality; we
would have good water if we assigned them to members of the
Sierra Club and bad water if we assigned them to a steel com-
pany.3 7 ' We cannot, therefore, use the market to determine what
the level of water quality should be without first answering that
question (at least answering it implicitly) by choosing the bene-
ficiaries of the new rights.37 2 The second scheme expressly requires
369. J. DAIm, supra note 367, at 93.
370. D'Arge & Hunt, supra note 339, at 277. The authors go on to say:
.. so fortunately [it] has heretofore evaded consideration as a viable
policy alternative. In fact, there is evidence accumulating which suggests
that recipients of pollution are largely the poor with little or no political
or economic ability to induce a betterment of their environment." Id.
Although Professors d'Arge and Hunt cite Professor Dales as their sole ex-
ample of a proponent of a market solution to pollution problems, their argu-
ment, which I have quoted, does not apply to Dales' proposal, for Dales
expressly avoids the trap of making the level of water quality dependent on
the distribution of wealth.
[I] have argued . . . we can find no best solution to [pollution
problems]; and that any anti-pollution policy is therefore bound to
be in the nature of a social experiment that is neither right nor
wrong, but only more or less successful in leading to wise and
socially agreed-upon patterns of use of our air and water re-
sources....
I would have the . .. government set up a Water Control Board
... [whose] legislative function . . . would be to decide what the
quality of all natural waters . .. should be...
J. DALEs, supra note 367, at 77.
371. See notes 160-61 supra and accompanying text for a development of
this point.
372. One cannot argue in this case that we should use the present distribu-
tion of wealth as our starting point, because the new "property rights" to
pollute do not exist at present. Cf. note 51 supra and accompanying text.
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us to determine by some nonmarket process the desired level of
water quality. It requires that effluent limitations be established in
a manner similar to that required by the FWPCA and it differs from
the FWPCA's approach only in allowing the polluters to bargain
among themselves as to how much each of them shall be con-
strained. I have no objection to this refinement of the approach
embodied in the FWPCA, except for my doubts as to its work-
ability.3 73 The second approach, however, does not tell us any-
373. My objections to the workability of the second scheme .-e perhaps
just a lawyer's bias. Like most lawyers I am more comfortable with the
idea of direct regulation than I am with the idea of getting the same result
indirectly through market processes or taxation schemes. Economists, on the
other hand, are more familiar with market and tax schemes than they are with
the workings of direct regulation, and therefore they may tend to prefer the
former. There are administrative problems with each approach. Direct regu-
lation is clearly unlikely to be "efficient" in the economists' sense of that word,
since there probably will be trades which could be made among polluters which
would leave both parties better off. Furthermore, there is always the problem
that there will be cheaters-pollution bootleggers-under a regulatory scheme.
But to me the advantages of a regulatory approach still seem convincing, par-
ticularly if the effluent limitations are not tied directly to water quality, but
rather to available technology as is done in FWPCA § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311
(Supp. IV, 1974).
A proposal to create a market in rights to pollute runs up against the
practical objection that each source of pollution has differing effects upon
the receiving waters, the difference depending on the nature of the pol-
lutants, the location of the source, and the activities of other polluters. Profes-
sor Dales, the major proponent of creating a market in pollution rights,
argues that:
Control by regulation... does not seem to be a very attractive way to
enforce our pollution policy. If it is of the across-the-board type it is
likely to be unfair and inefficient (i.e., more costly to the polluters
than some other scheme that would achieve the same reduction in
pollution). If it is point-by-point regulation the whole thing seems,
quite simply, impracticable.
J. DALES, supra note 367, at 86. Unfortunately, I am afraid that any scheme
of marketable rights to pollute fixed to a desired level of water quality would
entail all of the impracticability of point-by-point regulation, because the right
to discharge one quart of "gunk" in the Cuyahoga River is not the equivalent
of the right to discharge one quart of "glop" into Lake Erie or into the
Missouri River. The expense of determining equivalents would be prohibitive.
Furthermore, I favor nationwide technology-based effluent limitations because
they would seem-even though they may be "inefficient," if one does not take
the cost of information into account-to be less likely to cause economic dis-
locations throughout the country. To me they simply seem to be the fairer
solution. One could even argue that technology-based effluent limitations
are the most efficient type of pollution control; welfare economic theory recog-
nizes the constraints of technology and could easily deal with constraints on
technology. What difference does it make if a certain act is technologically
impossible or only legally impossible?
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thing about the level of water quality which we should have or
how much clean water we can afford.
As is the case with monopolies and tariffs, we could in theory
determine what would happen if we created absolute "property
rights" in the use of water, in water quality, and then attempt
to duplicate those results by some type of governmental fiat. Once
again, however, it is absolutely certain that we can do no such
thing in practice because we do not have the necessary information
about how prices (i.e., human preferences) would behave. The
one thing we can determine is that we would have less water
pollution than we do today if, ceteris paribus, such absolute rights
were actually created. 374
This suggests that if we wish to pursue a Pareto optimum, if
we desire to have a more "efficient" allocation of our water re-
sources, we should enforce some sort of reduction in water pol-
lution. Although welfare economics, price theory, cost-benefit
analyses and other normative applications of economic theory
cannot demonstrate that the implementation of the FWPCA will be
too "costly," they do lead inevitably to the conclusion that the
cost of water pollution today exceeds its benefits. If one accepts
the normative judgments of welfare economics, one is compelled
to conclude that implementation of the FWPCA is a step in the
right direction, although, as I would be the first to admit, there is
no assurance that any particular implementation will not overshoot
the goal of the "optimal" allocation.
b. The problem of the "second best." Unfortunately, there is
an inescapable schizophrenia lurking in the argument that the im-
plementation of the FWPCA will be a step toward an efficient
allocation of resources. The FWPCA is concerned, as I am, with
water quality. Welfare economics, on the other hand, is concerned
with Pareto optima. It should be obvious, at least at first glance,
that there is no direct correlation between the pursuit of a socially
But all of these differences of opinion are over secondary points. I am sure
that there are better schemes than the FWPCA for improving our water quality.
Perhaps some day I will get around to writing the article to which this lengthy
essay was intended to be a mere preface. But for the moment all that I am
claiming is that no argument can validly be made on the basis of welfare eco-
nomics that the implementation of the FWPCA, or some other scheme that de-
creases water polution, is too "costly" to society. Professor Dales would not
disagree with my claim. J. DALEs, supra note 367, at 54-57.
374. With the exception of the discussion of the problem of the "second
best," the remainder of this article is intended as a proof of this proposition.
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desirable level of water quality and the pursuit of a Pareto opti-
mum. And this is so even though we might be convinced that at
the Pareto optimum determined by our present distribution of
wealth our waters would be, say, 99.44 percent pure. Assuming
that we are not at a Pareto optimum-a safe assumptionS7 -what
assurance do we have that we would be closer to our Pareto opti-
mum if we achieve that level of water quality but do not at the
same time correct the other "sub-optimal" aspects of our economy?
What assurance do we have that we will make someone better
off without making someone else worse off if we achieve the opti-
mal level of water quality but still have monopolies, tariffs, and
all of the manifold other "imperfections" which keep us from actu-
ally attaining the optimum?
The answer is, unfortunately for the apostles of welfare eco-
nomics, that we have no assurance that meeting the conditions of
a competitive equilibrium in one area of the total economy will
in fact make anyone better off.
Trying to construct a model of an entire economy-even a very
simple and abstract model-is obviously a complicated task. It
is much easier to construct models of parts of the economy, models
based upon just one or two participants and the assumption that
everything else remains unchanged or that any changes in the total
economy are "exogenous" to the activities portrayed in the model.
Of course, in reality the activities of each segment of the economy
have consequences in other segments. Although under the ceteris
paribus assumption each model of a segment of the whole economy
tends toward a competitive equilibrium and a Pareto optimum, it
should not be surprising that when the various models are inter-
connected, no such optimum appears.37 6  Surprisingly, however,
375. Well, fairly safe. Remember that if there are two jealous persons who
will feel that worse off if anyone is made better off, then we are at a Pareto
optimum already. See notes 93-94 supra and accompanying text.
376. Cf. Henderson, Information and the New Movements for Citizen Par-
ticipation, 412 ANNALS 34, 36-37 (1974):
All of [the] uncoordinated institutional activity in the United States
today is based on the atomistic Cartesian view of the world which has
held sway in our minds for three centuries. This Cartesian world
view is predicated on the idea that we can comprehend whole systems
by analyzing their parts ...
We are now witnessing the collapse of policies based on this Car-
tesian world view....
This must lead us to question a very basic assumption underlying
both our economic and political systems: first, the assumption in our
economic system that the aggregated goals and activities of micro-
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most economists were surprised 3 77 by the publication in 1957 of
an article on "the general theory of the second best."3 78 Professor
Arthur A. Left of Yale Law School has recently described the
theory in simplified form:
One might assert a general theory of the second best as
follows: "If a state of affairs is the product of n variables,
and you have knowledge of or control over less than n
variables, if you think you know what's going to happen
when you vary 'your' variables, you're a booby." That is,
in complex processes (which most social processes are) a
move in the right direction is not necessarily the right
move. To pick a simple illustration, if I am on a desert
island, subsisting solely on coconuts and oysters and be-
ginning to hate it a lot, and across the bay from me is
another island, lush and fertile, I do not improve my
position in life by swimming half way across.3 7 9
One recent text describes the problem:
A disquieting feature of general equilibrium concerns
the way this system is affected when, for one reason or
another, one of the welfare-maximizing conditions is un-
obtainable. In searching for the second-best solution it
economic units will somehow add up to the public welfare. There is
increasing evidence in our mounting social and environmental costs
that the very opposite may be true....
Secondly, the same questionable assumption underlies our political
system; one should have new doubts whether the competing special
interests and their jostling can ever add up to even an approximation
of the public interest. It is interesting to note that in many other
disciplinary contexts, such as general systems theory, biology and ecol-
ogy, it is considered almost axiomatic that optimizing subsystem goals
is antithetical to optimizing the macrosystem of which they are a part.
377. While formal demonstration of the general theorem of the second
best is, in substance, unassailable since ... its negative corollaries rest
securely on the posited absence of empirical limitations, it must be
admitted that its forceful presentation several years ago disturbed us
somewhat and carried just so much farther [sic] the process of disillu-
sion with conventional welfare economics. Not that we had any right
to be disturbed, for it is clear enough now that in talking of optimum
conditions we were, in any case, saying precious little....
E.J. MIssAN, Second Thoughts on Second Best, in WELFAnE EcoNoMIcs 141
(1969). Earlier Mishan had concluded that the theory of the second best
"does seem, at first blush, to reduce drastically the applicability of ... [wel-
fare] analysis." Id. at 73.
378. Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV.
EcoN. STunmzs.l1 (1957).
379. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60
VA. L. Rlv. 451, 476 (1974).
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may be necessary to depart from other maximizing con-
ditions. If so, it is difficult to know with certainty whether
a policy designed to remove, say, a restriction on free
trade will in fact leave members of the community eco-
nomically better off than they would be if the existing
impediment to free trade were retained....
.. l. [T]he second-best solution set of prices and
quantities may involve departing from paretian optimality
in other ways as well, perhaps by imposing another tariff
on a complementary good. The precise nature of the
secondary departure from paretian optimality is some-
thing about which economists are uncertain, but that a
secondary departure is required to achieve a second-best
solution in certain cases has been demonstrated.
... There is, as yet, no general theory of the second-
best, but the possibility that one could be devel6ped raises
many questions about the promotion of economic policies
that press toward the attainment of paretian optima. Can
these policies be carried out in a "piece-meal" fashion
without considerable loss of welfare in the process? Pre-
sumably, the potential loss in welfare could be avoided if
progress toward optimum conditions could be made si-
multaneously on all fronts. But this is not politically
feasible in a world in which most problems are likely
to be attacked successfully only one at a time. Thus, the
second-best issue will doubtless persist as a cloud over
the general equilibrium paradigm and its prescriptions for
economic welfare for a considerable time to come.380
The problem of the "second best" has been succinctly summarized:
"We cannot place our faith in an imperfect price system, nor can
we state that fewer imperfections make an imperfect price system
a better guide to decision making." 3 8 1
380. R. ScoTT, THE PmcniGc SYsTEm 136-39 (1973).
381. Zeckhauser & Schaefer, Public Policy and Normative Economic Theory,
in THE STuDy OF Poiacy Fonms-noN 27, 48 (R. Bauer & K. Gergen eds. 1968).
The virtue of a price system, whether implicit or explicit, is that if
it functions smoothly it is a guide to efficiency.. . . [I]n order to
reach a Pareto optimum the market rate of exchange between any two
commodities must be equal both to every individuals marginal rate
of substitution between the two commodities and the marginal rate of
transformation between them. Imperfections such as the existence of
monopolies or excise taxes often lead to situations in which these con-
ditions are not met. If a monopolist is making a substantial profit,
it is likely that his product is being overpriced in the market place,
thus disturbing the desired equality between relative prices and mar-
ginal rates of substitution and transformation. It might be thought
that if we can remove some imperfections, so that at least one more
pair of relative prices satisfies the required equality, then we shall have
[Vol. 2.7:3
WATER POLLUTION
The recognition that a partial analysis of an economic system
cannot be safely used as a guide to economic efficiency3s 2 has, I
believe, tended to discourage serious attempts to analyze questions
of public policy in terms of the theorems of welfare economics.
Despite all the other weighty difficulties with welfare theories, the
moved to a Pareto-superior point This need not be the case. All we
know is that in order to reach a Pareto optimum all the specified
equalities must be satisfied. This does not tell us whether a point
with only five equalities unsatisfied will be Pareto superior to one
where fifYty-five are unsatisfied. We can only be sure of moving to a
Pareto optimum if we correct every single imperfection. In the real
world we will never be in a situation in which we can eliminate all
imperfections. In such situations it may he difficult for us to select the
best of our feasible actions. This problem-what should we do if we
cannot reach a Pareto-optimal point-is known as the problem of sec-
ond best. We encounter second-best problems whenever we must
make decisions in a world with market imperfections.
Id. at 46-47.
Zeckhauser and Schaefer append the following note to the quoted passage:
In correcting for these imperfections we may also alter the distribu-
tion of income. It is thus quite possible that some individuals will be
hurt when we make these corrections-that the Pareto optimum will
not be Pareto superior to the original point For example, we will
cut into the profits of monopolists if we make them charge a price
equal to their marginal cost in accord with the requirements for ideal
conditions.
Id. at 47 n.16. It should be noted that the questionable features of welfare
economics are to a large extent interrelated. It may be that any single ob-
jection to the application of the theorems of welfare economics to real world
problems may be overcome or, at least, ignored, but the cumulative effects
of all of the objections must be overcome before those theorems can legit-
imately be used as a basis for making social decisions. As is the case with
Pareto optimality, so is it with welfare economics-a failure to satisfy any one
of all the many necessary conditions makes the entire project questionable, if
not counter-productive.
382. Welfare economics has yet to provide much help to policy analysts
who are interested in predicting the effect of policies on allocative
efficiency in our worse-than-second-best world. Those applied wel-
fare economists who have focused on specific policy problems have
usually ignored second-best considerations while those theoretical wel-
fare economicts who have tried to develop general principles to guide
policy analysts have confined themselves to working out second-best
solutions in which one or perhaps two imperfections are operating in
a system in which information is assumed to be freely available. Un-
fortunately, in most cases, second best can neither be ignored nor
achieved in the sense that it could be achieved in a world in which
information was costless. Hence, although the existing theoretical
literature can provide some important insights, it cannot be relied
on by anyone who is interested in determining the impact on allo-
cative efficiency of a particular policy in a highly imperfect world in
which information is very expensive.
Markovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis in our Worse-
Than-Second-Best World: A Proposal and Related Critique of the Chicago
Approach to the Study of Law and Economics, 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 950, 992-93.
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problem of the "second best" appears to be the straw which broke
the camel's back. Sadly, just as economists have retreated from
their normative speculations into far more useful studies of positive
economic problems, the at-least-partially discredited apparatus of
welfare economics has been appearing, usually in an extremely un-
sophisticated form, with increasing frequency in legal and quasi-
legal journals.38 3  I suppose that such a result is to be expected in
view of "Keynes' dictum that practical men are only the slaves of
some defunct economist."384  That does not, however, make the
prospect of being deluged with such pseudoscientific trivia more
attractive.
Even the important articles appearing on the interface between
law and economics-important if only because they are taken seri-
ously-have for the most part indulged in the gross oversimplifica-
tion of analyzing only a small part of the economy and have reached
their conclusions without regard to the existence of market imper-
fections other than those with which they are directly concerned.385
During the remainder of this article I shall be indulging in the same
sort of partial analysis, not because I believe that it is particularly
legitimate, but rather because, when confronted with a real world
problem like water pollution, a partial analysis is the only type of
analysis that one can practicably conduct. My conclusion is that
we have more water pollution under our present legal regime than
we would have, ceteris paribus, if there were an efficient market in
water-quality rights. If some welfare economist or cost-benefit an-
alyst wants to claim that my conclusion may be wrong because there
are innumerable other deviations from the "optimal" conditions
in the world which I have ignored with the phrase ceteris paribus,
I shall be only too happy to agree with him. But in that case we
will have both agreed that neither of us is saying anything useful
383. See notes 44-48 supra and accompanying text.
384. Alexander, supra note 355, at 102. "It may afford philosophers in turn
some mischievous amusement to see the power of defunct philosophies in
economics and the other social studies." Id.
385. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 326.
"Analytically, the Coase theorem represents a partial equilibrium model and
chain of reasoning inclusive only of a selected subset of the variables involved
in the interrelation of legal and economic processes .... What the Coase
theorem represents, unfortunately, is the taking of a partial equilibrium propo-
sition, one generated in a particular way to particular normative ends, for a
general equilibrium conclusion, as if it covered the entire field of law and
economics." Samuels, The Coase Theorem and the Study of Law and Eco-
nomics, 14 NAruRAL REouscES J. 1, 28-29 (1974).
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about water pollution problems when we discuss these problems in
terms of welfare economics. On the other hand, those who insist
that cost-benefit analyses of programs like the FWPCA can be done
in some meaningful way must admit that, whatever the demerits of
my partial analysis, the fact that it is only a partial analysis is not
a legitimate basis for dismissing its conclusions.
The strongest defense I have seen of welfare economics in light
of the problem of the "second best" is that of Ezra Mishan. And
that defense is based on the weaknesses of the theories of welfare
economics.386 In effect, Mishan claims that since the theorems of
welfare economics say "precious little," the loss of usefulness en-
tailed by the additional problems imposed by the theory of the
"second best" does not amount to much.387  His conclusion is that
we should pursue a "rough and ready" solution, "a sort of third
best," which he contends is superior "to the rather paralyzing con-
clusion that unless all optimal rules are everywhere met nothing at
all may be said, a conclusion that is too often eagerly embraced as
an anodyne against further thought."88  In the end he justifies this
approach by appealing to the fact that we will never achieve a
Pareto optimum in any event:
[T]o descend for a moment to the exigencies of the
real world, since time is taken to adjust the sizes of in-
dustries in response to continual changes in the over-all
pattern of demand, it is unlikely that at any instant of time
we shall, even in the absence of all such constraints, attain
a Pareto optimum, much less that we should for long main-
tain it. We can only hope to be moving in that direction
most of the time and not to be too far away from an opti-
mum for any prolonged period.38 9
If we were seriously to pursue a Pareto optimum, even a moving
one, we would have to do far more than reduce the amount of
water pollution. I am convinced, however, that we would have to
reduce water pollution if we were seriously to pursue such a goal.
My remaining arguments, therefore, are directed to those who are
386. See note 377 supra.
387. E.J. MISHAN, supra note 377, at 141-56.
388. Id. at 156. I confess that I would embrace the anodyne-I would even
swallow it-to avoid further thought about the theorems of welfare economics.
I have better things to think about; unfortunately welfare economists do not.
389. Id.
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more concerned with having our nature imitate an economic model
than they are with creating a livable world-or one in which our
economy exists in harmony with nature.390
c. Externalities. In a world with an efficient market, or, rather,
in the model of such a world, there is no problem associated with
pollution. Water and water quality are goods or factors of pro-
duction. They are presumably scarce 391 resources. But the work-
ings of the market, in the model, insure that we will have the "effi-
cient," "optimal" level of water quality. Once the model reaches
its equilibrium there will be an "optimal" level of pollution because
-under the rules that govern an efficient market-any decrease in
the amount of good water would result in a higher price for the
remaining water of decent quality. This price would be higher than
the price of other goods of equal value (at the margin) to all mem-
bers of society. Some members of society or all of them would
then be able to make a "profit" by producing more water of good
quality,392 and the amount of that water quality would thus increase
until the additional demand was satisfied and the price of water
of good quality returned to the equilibrium level. An increase in
water quality would, of course, mutatis mutandis, cause the price
of the other goods to exceed that of good water, and again trades
would occur until the two prices were again at the equilibrium
level.
But the real world differs radically from that of the model. A
manufacturer or a homeowner can toss his slops into the waters at
little or no cost to himself. It is those downstream who bear the
390. Cf. White, The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis, 155 SCMNcE
1203, 1204-07 (1967).
391. If they are not scarce, there is no problem at all; water, and water of
good quality, will be available to anyone without cost no matter how much
pollution there may be. Part of the problem with our treatment of water in
the real world is that we have assumed until recently that good water quality
is so abundant that it is a free good: we have assumed, incorrectly, that we
can pollute without cost. Cf. E. MuRPY, Govmua.c NATtrE 49-77, 138-70
(1967).
392. How this additional water of decent quality would be produced is not
mentioned in economic theorizing. If it cannot be produced, then some con-
dition of the model of the efficient market has been violated by the real world
and the model would have little or no meaning in terms of the real world.
If the point of no return had not been reached in the real world, then good
water quality could be produced by producing less of other goods and com-
modities. This would be a case in which a reduction in "productive" manu-
facturing processes would lead to an increase both in welfare and in national
income. See text accompanying notes 285-86 supra.
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costs. Unless the polluter can be induced in some fashion to recog-
nize the costs which others bear, he will produce more pollution
than would be produced in an efficient market. The manufacturer
will produce more goods and sell them at a lower price than he
would if he had to pay the costs associated with his production.
The home owner will buy more goods-a new car, perhaps-than
he would have bought if he had to pay the cost 39 3 of his pollution.
If there were an efficient market in our world, or even an efficient
market just in water quality, such a state of affairs could not occur.
Even if the slops did go downstream, there would still be an "effi-
cient" level of water quality. Either the polluter would have to buy
permission to pollute from those downstream or those downstream
would be willing to pay the polluter not to pollute. In either case
the polluter would have to take the opportunity cost of polluting
into account. If the burden is on the polluter, the opportunity cost
consists of the amount of money (or potatoes) that he must pay
to those downstream for their permission to pollute. If the burden
is on those downstream, the opportunity cost to the polluter is
foregoing the payments which the victims would make to be free
from pollution.394  As our world is, however, such trades do not
take place with any frequency.3 5
From an economists point of view, the problem of water pollu-
tion results from the fact that one of the necessary conditions of
the efficient market is violated: the condition of independence.396
When I pollute, someone else pays the price. Welfare economics
does not have any objection to water pollution as such. All that is
objectionable from that point of view is the divergence of the cost
to the polluter from the cost to society. We, who are human, may
object to the pollution itself but welfare economics is concerned
393. It is not necessary that this cost be paid in money. Having to smell the
stink is one way of paying the cost. If the homeowner had to pay such a
cost, he might well forego the new automobile and put in a septic tank in-
stead.
394. It is the apparent symmetry involved in these two different cases which
leads Professor Coase to argue that it should not make any difference, in an
efficient market, whether the polluter is privileged to pollute or his victims
have the legal right not to be polluted. In either case trades will result until
an "efficient" level of pollution is reached. See notes 141-46 supra and ac-
companying text. The symmetry is, however, only apparent. Unless the tastes
of polluters and pollutees are identical, different levels of water quality would
result from the two possible legal regimes. See notes 156-61 supra and ac-
companying text.
395. See note 443 infra and accompanying text.
396. See note 341 supra and accompanying text.
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only with the relatively trivial question of how we can obtain an
efficient allocation of resources.
Economists use the word "externalities" 97 to describe the sit-
uation where one person receives a detriment (or a benefit) as a
result of another's activities. "Neighborhood effects" is a term
synonymous with "externalities." If the externality is an "external
cost," the graphic phrase "downstream cost" is sometimes used.
One sometimes gets the impression from reading economic literature
that there are no externalities in a world with an efficient market,
but that is not correct. If I sell you a rabbit for ten dollars, you
have (as a result, in part, of my activities) received both a cost
and a benefit. Both the cost and the benefit can be described as
externalities. Quite clearly we are not independent of each other
when we make the trade. And yet such exchanges are of the very
essence of a market. The externalities which cause a deviation from
the efficiency of the model arise in those cases where one man
imposes a cost (or confers a benefit) upon another without the
other's consent.
Such exchanges tend to violate the Pareto principle, since typi-
cally they will make at least one person worse off than he would
otherwise have been. Furthermore, the existence of such un-
bargained-for exchanges, such uncompensated externalities, is an
indication that bargains would have resulted in a more efficient
allocation of resources.3"8  Hereafter I shall try to limit my use
397. For other labels that are applied to externalities, see text accompanying
note 366 supra.
398. Even when the externalities are external benefits, the result is likely
to be suboptimal in the Paretian sense. A traditional example of an external
benefit is an orange grove belonging to one man visited by bees owned by
another. If the beekeeper is not charged for the nectar the bees consume, he
receives a benefit without cost to him. If the orange grower decides to sell
the grove to a real estate developer the value of the nectar will not be taken
into account, because it brings no return to the grower. Thus the orange
grove may be converted to tract housing, although if the value of both the
oranges and the nectar were taken into account it would be clear that the land
is more valuable as an orchard. See R. ScoTT, supra note 380, at 276-77.
Scott concludes:
If the owner of the orange grove had received some compensation for
the services he provided to the beekeeper, he might not have been
willing to sell the land. Thus, because all benefits are not measured
in the marketplace, it is possible that resources will be misallocated
from their social optimal use.
Id. at 277.
It might be well to note that there would be no misallocation of resources
if the beekeeper owned the enforceable right to have the orange grove main-
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of the word "externalities" to those violations of the principle of
independence which lead to inefficient, suboptinal allocations of
resourceoA99
taied for the dedication of his bees. In such a case, the would-be developer
would have to purchase the rights of both the orange grower and the bee-
keeper; thus there would be no uncompensated externality and no concomitant
misallocation of resources. This illustrates that the existence of well-defined,
transferable property rights tends to counteract the misallocations which result
from externalities.
For our purposes, external benefits are not likely to be of much importance.
It is seldom that water pollution will confer a benefit on anyone, although
occasionally the discharge of pickle liquor from a steel mill may partially
counteract the noxious effects of a neighboring discharge from a sanitary sewer.
It is normally relatively easy to deny your neighbors the external benefits
which you might confer upon them. If this is not possible then there is a
problem of public goods. See notes 422-23 infra and accompanying text. The
orange grower can always spray the bees with DDT. This suggests that the
orange grower can persuade the beekeeper to pay something for the bees'
"free lunch." Recent research indicates that in fact orange growers and bee-
keepers do enter into bargained for and quite complex contractual relations.
See Cheung, Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J. LAw & EcoN.
11 (1973).
Since pollution control schemes generally afford external benefits to those
downstream, a part of the pollution problem can be ascribed to the failures of
our system to make those beneficiaries pay for their benefits. If they did have
to pay, more such benefits (i.e., higher water quality) might be forthcoming.
The failure of compensation leads to the denial of the external benefits. For
more on this point, see the discussion at note 422 infra and accompanying text.
My favorite example of a beneficial externality appears in Gilbert Whites
journal entry for August 21, 1791.
Many creatures are endowed with a ready discernment to see what
will turn to their own advantage and emolument; and often discover
more sagacity than could be expected. Thus Benham's poultry watch
for waggons loaded with wheat, and running after them pick up a
number of grains which are shaken from the sheaves by the agitation
of the carriages. Thus when my brother used to take down his gun
to shoot sparrows, his cats would run out before him to be ready to
catch up the birds as they fell.
G. W rsm, JouraNr..s 391 (W. Johnson ed. 1970). I like this example be-
cause it may well confound the normative preconceptions of welfare econo-
mists. The primary beneficiaries here appear to be the chickens and the cats.
Once we abandon the thought that "merely human" choices are all that count
for the welfare of the world, it becomes apparent that nature (the "environ-
ment," call it what you will) confers many an external benefit upon us without
thought of her own profit. Is it not possible that ecological harmony is pref-
erable to economic optimality?
399. That is, "Pareto relevant" externalities. See R. Scorr, supra note 380,
at 277.
One economist has sensibly argued that "externalities" should be used to
describe only "untraded interdependencies." S. NATH, A REAPPRAISAL OF
WELFAE EcoNoVIcs 64 (1969) (emphasis is original). It is in this sense
that I use the word.
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Economists generally treat pollution problems as examples of
externalities. 400 It should be noted that pollution is only one type
of externality. Love and hate, altruism and spite can (unless they
are bargained for) also be considered externalities that inevitably
stand between us and our optimum. 401  It is a strange world in
which an optimum is achievable only if all men are islands, cut
off from the main.
In the metaphysical system called a market economy
any action of one individual or enterprise which induces
pleasure or pain to any other individual or enterprise and
is unpriced by a market constitutes an externality. Thus,
if some guest at a formal dinner belches loudly and con-
tinuously and this belching causes discomfort to other
guests, then the economy is said to be in an inefficient
state. Of course, we omit consideration of cultures where
such behavior is taken as indicative of the superior quality
of the meal.
A more incisive example of externality is the upwind
factory that emits large quantities of sulfur oxides and par-
ticulate matter inducing rising probabilities of emphysema,
lung cancer, and other respiratory diseases to residents
400. Even those like Professor Liebbafsky, "The Problem of Social Cost"-
An Alternative Approach, 13 NATuRAL RFsouRcEs J. 615, 625 (1973), who
object that maximizing our choices today disregards the desires and needs of
future generations are, in a sense, still discussing externalities. Our spoilation
of the world imposes external costs on those who come after us. In this case
the "downstream costs" flow down the river of time.
It is perhaps significant that, unless future occurrences determine what has
happened (what will happen?) in the past, there is no way in which the future
can return the favor and impose external costs upon us.
401. lAin externality exists when there is (untraded) envy or compas-
sion. If envy exists, then as a person or a group of persons have more
income and wealth while the others' absolute shares of these remain
the same, it does not follow that the others' utility levels also remain
the same. Since the relative distribution of the economic means to
welfare has turned against them, if they suffer envy their utility levels
would be reduced....
Envy might be roused not just by the relative distribution of wealth
but also by the absolute size of others wealth. In other words, even
though everybody's wealth increased in the same proportion, every-
body would feel increased envy. With this assumption it is possible
to imagine an extreme situation whereby a simultaneous and propor-
tionate increase in everybody's income of [sic] wealth would reduce
everybody's utility level; and similarly a proportionate reduction in
everybody's income and wealth would increase everybody's utility
level.... Similarly, compassion might exist.... The existence of
compassion also constitutes an externality only if it is untraded, or
uncompensated.
S. NATH, supra note 399, at 74.
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downwind. The externality arises because the factory-
owners historically have not had to bear the burden of
health and psychic damages which they caused. In ef-
fect, their use of the air as a medium of waste disposal was
(and in most areas still is) unrestricted and free.402
Economists are likely to claim that externalities exist in the real
world only because of its manifest imperfections. These imper-
fections include such matters as: defects in the legal system, and
ill-defined property rights in particular;403 the fact that informa-
tion is costly;404 the fact that bargains cannot be consummated
without costs; the fact that people do not always obey the laws;
the fact that the enforcement of legal rights is costly;40 5 the second
law of thermodynamics; and-at least in the case of water pollu-
tion-the law of gravity.
Since some of these matters seem rather intractable, the obvious
solution is to distribute goods and factors of production by some
sort of fiat, so that they end up in the same hands that would have
received them were there an efficient market and a Pareto optimum
in the world. Unfortunately, our lack of information precludes such
a solution.
The currently popular analysis, traceable primarily to the
seminal work of Ronald Coase and Guido Calabresi, is
roughly as follows: If the market operated perfectly-with
free competition, full information, and no costs to arrang-
An external effect is assumed to exist whenever the production by
a firm or the utility of an individual depends on some activity of an-
other firm or individual through a means which is not bought and sold.
. .. All this can also be expressed by saying that an external effect
exists whenever ...costs are imposed on others which do not have
to be paid for, or benefits are bestowed on others for which no pay-
ment is received ....
Id.
402. D'Arge & Hunt, supra note 339, at 275.
403. See notes 543-45 infra and accompanying text.
404. See Davis & Kamien, Externalities and the Quality of Air and Water,
in EcoNomncs OF Am AND WATME POLLUTIoN 12 (W. Walker ed. 1969).
Davis and Kamien conclude "li]t is important to emphasize that nonpecuniary
externalities alone do not lead to a failure in the market mechanism. It is
the absence of markets wherein information regarding the consequences of
technological externalities can be transmitted that creates the difficulty." Id.
at 21. Cf. note 346 supra and accompanying text. See also Coase, The Prob-
lem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & EcoN. 1 (1960).
405. If, at times, I seem harsh toward economists, it should be noted that
there is no work for lawyers in the model world of economics, a world without
negotiations, ambiguities or crime-or even torts.
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ing and enforcing agreements-then . .. [people] would
bargain their way to an equally "efficient" outcome regard-
less of which way the law assigned "rights." If instead
some of the conditions for a perfect market are not met
(the typical case), all we need do (apart from distributive
considerations) is minimize the sum of blindness costs
and blindness-avoidance costs (since it is net total wealth
we wish to maximize); and the most efficient way to
achieve that result is to impose liability for damages on
whichever party is in the best position to make the re-
quisite cost-benefit analysis between blindness costs and
blindness-avoidance costs and to act on that analysis once
it is made, thereby assigning a compensable "right" to the
other party.406
Whatever may be the merits or demerits of this "popular ana-
lysis," 407 it is clear that common law techniques for regulating pol-
406. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits
of Instrumental Rationality, 46 CAL. L. REv. 617, 628 (1973) (emphasis
in original; footnotes omitted).
Professor Tribe is not enamored with this solution. As he points out:
Of course, once all rights have been assigned on this basis, we must
examine the resulting distribution of wealth; but to whatever extent
we regard the overall distribution as unjust, we need only employ
taxes and subsidies to transfer "lump sums" of cash so as to yield a just
pattern.
One major difficulty with this approach is that it assumes a principle
of distributive justice that looks to the pattern of end results rather
than to the process that generated them. In this respect, the approach
shares a failing common not only to virtually all applications of policy-
analytic methods, but also to much of contemporary moral theory.
Id. at 628-29. (Emphasis in original, footnotes omitted).
It should also be noted that the redistribution of 'lump sums" of cash should
lead (if the market is not too imperfect) to a new allocation of rights. If it
does not reach such a new allocation because of market imperfections, then
it would seem that the "currently popular analysis" does not lead to a maxi-
mization of net total wealth as wealth is defined by the final distribution of
goods in society. If the final distribution makes those who like clean water
wealthy, they would choose (ex hypothesis) to surrender some of their new
wealth for better water quality. Transfer payments of "lump sums" of cash
will not lead to an optimum level of water quality in any economic system in
which there is no market in water quality. See also text accompanying notes
303-05 supra. Money cannot buy everything, and it is especially true that it
cannot buy those goods which are not sold in a market.
407. I am not certain that I understand the terms "blindness costs" and
"blindness-avoidance costs," but I take it that they refer, respectively, to the
costs which result from lack of information and the alternative costs involved
in obtaining that information. I am certain that none of the theoreticians who
favor the approach described by Professor Tribe have done a cost-benefit anal-
ysis of the complications inherent in the problem of determining who in turn
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lution are ill-adapted to implementing it. In theory-ancient
theory-the maxim of the law is "sic utere tuo, ut alienum non
laedas,"408 which, roughly translated, simply says: 'Thou shall not
create external costs." In practice-in the few cases which get to
court-the doctrine is that one should not pollute to an "unreason-
able" extent. Such a doctrine-which is fundamental to the law of
nuisance-does not easily encompass a cost-benefit analysis except
of the most rough-and-ready sort.
Before I explain how nuisance law fails to overcome the in-
efficiencies that result from the external costs associated with water
pollution, there are two economic concepts closely related to "ex-
ternalities" that should be described. These are the problems as-
sociated with "public goods" and with the existence of "common
pools" or, as we lawyers would say, of "commons."
d. The common pool. The problem associated with a "com-
mon pool" results from correlative externalities which cause each
person's pursuit of his "rational" self-interest to hurt others and
himself as well.409 A "common pool," or "commons" is the label
applied to goods which are owned in common (or not owned at
all) and which the common owners (or users) can exploit with-
out legal liability for waste.
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that
each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible
on the commons ...
As a rational being each herdsman seeks to maximize
his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously,
he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one more
animal to my herd?"
[T]he rational herdsman concludes that the only sen-
sible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to
his herd. And another; and another. ... But this is the
conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman
sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is
is in the best position to "make the requisite cost-benefit analysis" between the
two types of costs.
408. "[Elvery person is bound to make a reasonable use of his property so
as to occasion no unnecessary damage or annoyances to his neighbor." Camp-
bell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 577 (1876). See generally 1 F. HAn'al & F.
J AEs, THE LAw OF TORTS 70-72 (1956). See also notes 577-80 infra and
accompanying text.
409. See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 ScwNcs 1243 (1968).
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locked in to a system that compels him to increase his need
without limit-in a world that is limited.410,
It should be noted that the existence of a commons does not nec-
essarily lead to such dire results. If a commons is subject to the
jurisdiction of some governmental authority (or to some other
source of law, such as the "Custom" of a manor), it is possible to
regulate the maximum use which each of the common "owners"
may make. Thus, at common law the allowable use that could
be made of a common of pasture was normally "limited to such
beasts as were levant and couchant on his estate, because such
cattle only were wanting to plough and manure his land." 411
In more modem times, oil and gas have presented complex prob-
lems involving resources in a common pool.412  Because oil fields
tended not to have a single owner, each owner felt compelled to
produce from his wells as rapidly as possible. This led inevitably
to an excess supply (and decreased prices) as well as to the physical
loss of oil which could have been produced if production had been
slower and more orderly. The response of the oil-producing states
was to pass statutes regulating the spacing of wells and their rate
of production and requiring owners of interests in oil fields to
operate the field under common management.413
410. Id. at 1244.
411. 3 J. KmEr, ComnENTA~s 404 (13th ed. 1884). The rule limiting the
use of the commons to beasts levant and couchant applied to a "common
appendant" created by prescription. By private agreement other arrangements
could be made between the parties in interest.
The law concerning common appendant received great discussion
and consideration, in Bennett v. Reeve [Willes 227], in 1740. It was
admitted to be settled law, that common of pasture appendant belong-
ed only arable land, and could not be severed from it; and that if the
land be divided ever so often, every little parcel was entitled to com-
mon appendant, but only for commonable cattle, or such as were
necessary to plough and manure the tenant's arable land. The Court
of C.B., after two arguments rejected the claim of a tenant, who, by
the process of subdivision, claimed only a yard of land to a right of
common for sixty-four sheep. He was entitled only to a rightof com-
mon for such cattle as were wanted to plough and manure his yard
of land, and in this way the court brought his claim within reasonable
limits.
Id. at 404-05. Cf. The Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315, 315 (m) (1970).
See also A. CASNER & W. LEAcn, CASES AND TEXT ON PRoPERTY 237-39
(1969).
412. See Junger, The Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Act: Private
Rights and Public Policy, 13 Wyo. L.J. 1 (1959).
413. See Junger, supra note 412; Tullock, Control-Laws and Regulations-
Property Rights, in EcoNOMIcs OF Am AND WAT=R POLLuTION 92 (W. Walker
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Other commons have not fared so well. Perhaps the clearest
example of a commons that is not regulated by any effective rule
of law is the oceans. The whaling nations, for example, are rapidly
destroying the whaling industry, to say nothing of the whales,
because of the "if you don't .... there's others will" 414 syndrome.
The problem is clear enough, but international solutions are hard
to come by. Still, despite the complexities, the dangers inherent in
treating the oceans as unregulated common pools seem--ever so
slowly-to be compelling the creation of an enforceable law of
the sea.
Whenever a limited resource is allocated on a first-come, first-
served basis, there is a danger that it will be consumed more rapidly
than it would be if it were allocated by a market mechanism. It
could be argued that our environmental problems stem in part
from the fact that our future is a commons; 415 I may believe
that it is not desirable that we are consuming the world's energy
reserves as rapidly as we are, but if I do not, there are others who
will. I do not believe that we should consume the life-sustaining
quality of our waters the way we have been up to now, but if
I do not, there are others who will. It is a truism that one cannot
keep one's cake and eat it too. But with a commons, one cannot
keep one's cake in any event. One can only eat it or lose it. The
result is likely to be indigestion today and starvation tomorrow for
everyone.
That our waters are, in effect, a commons has long been rec-
ognized by the courts. In 1885 Justice Gray, writing for the Court
in Head v. Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.4 6 sustained the New
Hampshire general mill act which permitted any person to build
a milldam on his own land on any nonnavigable stream upon pay-
ment of compensation to those whose lands were flooded by the
dam. The attack on the statute was based, as one would expect, on
the theory that it permitted private property to be taken for private
use in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Justice Gray denied that the mill act constituted a taking
of property at all and instead held that "such a statute, considered
ed 1969). See also Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900) (holding
such regulations constitutional).
414. T. S. Eziar, The Waste Land, in THE WASTE LAND AND OTHER PoEMs,
canto HI, line 149, at 32 (1940).
415. Cf. note 400 supra.
416. 113 U.S. 9 (1885).
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as regulating the manner in which the rights of proprietors of lands
adjacent to a stream may be asserted and enjoyed, with a due
regard to the interests of all, and to the public good, is within
the constitutional power of the legislature." 417 The basis for this
holding was the fact that
[t]he right to the use of running water is publici juris, and
common to all the proprietors of the bed and banks of the
stream from its source to its outlet. Each has a right to
the reasonable use of the water as it flows past his land,
not interfering with a like reasonable use by those above
or below him418
Until the passage of the FWPCA, the quality of this commons has
not been effectively regulated by any rule of law, except the vagaries
of the law of nuisance and the requirement that the use of waters
must be "reasonable."
The problem with a commons is that lack of private ownership
and control, or lack of governmental regulation, leads to over-
production from the commons and excessive depletion of the com-
mons itself. A different legal regime which allowed the commons
to be preserved for future consumption would clearly be "Pareto
preferred" to (i.e., more "efficient" than) a system which permits
unregulated commons. Whenever a commons exists it would ap-
pear that, so long as the users of the commons are "rational," 4 9
one could make each and every one of them better off either by
dividing the commons into individually owned parcels exchangeable
in a market 420 or by limiting, through governmental regulation,
the rate at which they are exploited.
417. Id. at 21.
418. Id. at 23.
The decision in Head should be contrasted with that delivered by Justice
Gray-on the very same day-in Cole v. La Grange, 113 U.S. 1 (1855), hold-
ing on the authority of Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655
(1875), that bonds issued by the city of La Grange to help finance an iron
and steel company (for the purpose of operating a mill) were void because
they amounted to a taking of private property, by taxation, for a private use.
419. I.e., so long as they are profit or utility maximizers with transitive
tastes. See note 351 supra.
420. Of course, all people will be made better off only if the change from
common to separate ownership does not entail a redistribution of wealth. In
actual practice, the partitioning of commons has tended to have vicious conse-
quences for the poor. Whenever one is tempted to accept the typical econ-
omist's offhand solution to the problem of the commons, whenever one thinks
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There appears ... to be some truth in the conservative
dictum that everybody's property is nobody's property.
Wealth that is free for all is valued by none because he
who is.foolhardy enough to wait for its proper time of use
will only find that it has been taken by another. The
blade of grass that the manorial cowherd leaves behind is
valueless to him, for tomorrow it may be eaten by another's
animal the oil left under the earth is valueless to the driller,
for another may legally take it; the fish in the sea are value-
less to the fisherman, because there is no assurance that
they will be there for him tomorrow if they are left behind
today. A factor of production that is valued at nothing in
the business calculations of its users will yield nothing in
income. Common-property natural resources are free
goods for the individual and scarce goods for society. Un-
der unregulated private exploitation, they can yield no
rent; that can be accomplished only by methods which
make them private property or public (government) prop-
erty, in either case subject to a unified directing power.421
At this point I think it is safe for me to assert that, so long as
water quality is treated as an unregulated commons, more water
pollution will exist than there would be in a world with an efficient
market. Of course, the FWPCA supplies-or at least, in the future,
may supply-the necessary regulation and "unified directing
power." And this is exactly the reason why I am convinced that
that the solution may lie in partitioning the commons, one should recall the
social and economic consequences of the enclosure acts in 18th century Eng-
land. See McCloskey, The Enclosure of Open Fields: Preface to a Study of
its Impact on the Efficiency of English Agriculture in the Eighteenth Century,
32 J. ECON. HLsr. 15 (1972). See also 0. GOLDsmrE, THE DxsEzmnm VIL-
LAGE (Babcock ed. 1783).
421. Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The
Fishery, 62 J. POL. EcoN. 124, 135 (1954). If rights to water quality are
treated as free factors of production, Professor Gordon's argument strongly sug-
gests that neither those who exploit our waters nor society as a whole receive
any net benefit from the exploitation. This does not mean that firms which
pollute water are unprofitable; it does mean that both those firms and society
are deprived of a profit ("rent") which would otherwise be available from the
exploitation of the water itself and that because of this loss in rent, the waters
are, in purely economic terms, overpolluted. See also Friedman, The Eco-
nomies of the Common Pool: Property Rights in Exhaustible Resources, 18
U.C.L.A.L. Rxv. 855 (1971).
Unfortunately, one of the major problems which I foresee with the FWPCA
is the lack of any -unified" direction within that Act's byzantine organization.
It will take real administrative acumen for the Administrator of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency to convert the FWPCA's disorganization into a viable
legal institution.
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it cannot be rationally attacked from the premises of normative
economics. It may, however, be possible to assert that common law
legal institutions, and particularly the law of nuisance, already
supply such controls. That they do not will be demonstrated here-
after.
e. Public goods. If water and water quality are common goods,
good water is also a "public good." "Public goods" and "commons"
seem in economic theory to be merely two sides of the same coin.
It is necessary for the operation of markets that the goods
and services bought and sold be readily identifiable and
appropriable, in the sense that the good or service can be
supplied to some individuals and withheld from others.
Where this is possible, individual producers can sell their
products to persons willing to pay the market price, while
others who choose not to purchase this product do not en-
joy its use .... There is, however, an important class of
goods, called public goods, which are not appropriable.
Goods in this class are such that if one individual enjoys
their use all may do the same. An investment which pro-
duces a good of this type yields benefits to everyone,
whether or not they make any payment whatsoever. As
a result, it is not in general possible for a private entre-
preneur to capture the value of such benefits through user
charges; consequently, it will not be profitable for him to
undertake the investment ....
It is clear ... that public goods may be of immense
value and that if each individual were accurately to reveal
the value to him of having this good, total benefits would
far exceed costs. However, if an individual knows that
this good may be available whether or not he contributes
an amount equal to the benefit he receives, he is likely to
withhold payment in the expectation that others will pur-
chase this good and that he will receive the benefits free
of charge. This strategy consideration makes it impossible
for an entrepreneur to capture the benefits through volun-
tary payments; therefore, if the investment is to be made
it must be made by the government. 422
422. Lind, Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Criterion for Social Investment, in
WA- REsoucES MANAGEmmN AND Punuc PoLIcy 53 (T. Campbell &
B. Sylvester ed. 1968). Of course, Professor Lind's final statement is rather
misleading: If the investment is to be made, it must be either made or con-
pelled by the government.
Professor Lind considers public goods to be a special case of externalities.
Even though we assume that there is a market in water quality rights, if
someone succeeds in getting a free ride on another's investment in preserving
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Water quality is clearly a public good by the foregoing definition.
Cleaning up Lake Erie would make me happier and it would
probably increase the utility of millions of other people in Ohio,
Pennsylvania, New York, and Canada-and perhaps in other parts
of the world as well. If, however, we are all afflicted with the
"rationality" of economic man, we will all lie through our teeth and
deny that we would give a fig for the lake, leaving it to its fate of
premature senility. The Jersey meadows, San Francisco Bay, the
Atlantic, will all be devalued by our rational pursuit of our own
self-interests.
"The public goods problem shows why the market process will
fail in the application of normal value tests to air and water pollu-
tion. The principle alternative is an attempt to impose efficient
allocation through government action or regulation." 42 3
TH SECOwND PA n: BING AN EmcmncN ANALYSIS OF UE
LAW OF NuxsANcE AND EmLATDm DocrmN
I. Tim IMiossorrrn OF AN EmricFwcy ANALYSIS OF
TE LAW OF NuiSAN C
Having attempted both to explain and to discredit the workings
of welfare economic theory as it applies to problems of water
pollution, I now turn to a plea in confession and avoidance. The
question presented is: Assuming, despite all my preceding argu-
ments, that one wants to obtain a Pareto optimal level of water
quality, can we conclude that governmental regulation like the
FWPCA is more likely to achieve that optimal efficient state than
is the body of the law without such regulations? My arguments
water quality-which is exactly what happens with public goods-then the free
rider is receiving an external benefit
The chief and very important contribution of the concept of the
public good . . . is that it exposes the fallacy in the very common
assumption that an individual's welfare function coincides with his
utility function as revealed by his market choices. This common as-
sumption is also expressed by claiming that the market produces only
what the consumers want and does not produce what the consumers do
not want.
S. NATH, .upra note 399, at 87.
423. Goetz, Public v. Private Goods, in EcoNoMIcs OF Am AM WAMM POL-
LuTiON 26 (W. Walker ed. 1969). Professor Goetz goes on to say: "From the
standpoint of the economist, the ideal goal of such government action is dear:
It should be to simulate the result that would have emerged from a market
in air and water pollution externalities if the public good interdependency
problem did not exist... ." Id.
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shall henceforth be directed toward showing that the answer to
that question must be: "Yes, for if you believe that Pareto efficiency
is a good thing, you must favor some form of governmental regula-
tion of water pollution."
The reason that I come with pleasure to this portion of my
article is that I shall be talking about matters within my professional
competency. It is strange but most articles on law and eco-
nomics written by lawyers give short shrift to the law cases, 42 4
while the economists entertain us with witty references to The
Duke of Norfolk's Case 425 or English decisions dealing with plagues
of rabbits and flies. 428 I cannot speak for the economists, but after
spending several years swimming around in that academic sheepdip
known as law and economics, I can understand why lawyers tend
to avoid discussing the law. The theories of welfare economics
seem to have had little influence upon judicial decisions and thus,
if our business is to predict what a court will decide tomorrow,
welfare economics is of little value. If, on the other hand, we feel
the need to say what the law should be, we can come up with
predigested answers based on what we believe to be the dictates
of economic morality. At least we can do this if we are careful
not to confuse ourselves with the facts, with real cases, and with
real controversies.
I submit, however, that one who is trained as a lawyer can
only bring one insight to discussions of law and economics, and
that is to contrast the workings of the law with the way things
should work under normative economic theory. To the mix of law
and economics, we should bring the law and leave the economic
theories to the economists. I therefore attempt, in the second part
of this article, to ascertain whether the law of pollution as it exists,
excluding the FWPCA and its congeners, is efficient. The answer
is that it is not. Furthermore, when one examines the workings
of the pertinent body of law, the law of nuisance, it becomes strik-
ingly clear that the inefficiency tends overwhelmingly to result in
suboptimally dirty water, rather than water that is too clean. The
424. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalien-
ability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
425. Liebhafsky, "The Problem of Social Cost"-An Alternative Approach,
13 NATuRAL RalsouncFs J. 615, 625 (1973), discussing The Duke of Norfolk's
Case, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1682).
426. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & ECON. 1, 44 (1960),
citing Boulston's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 216 (C.P. 1597) and Bland v. Yates,
58 Sol. J. 612 (1913).
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inescapable conclusion is that some regulation such as the FWPCA
is necessary if we are to work a Pareto improvement upon the
fluvial world.
Though I attempt to describe the workings of the law of nuisance
and then show how to achieve the results that would exist if
there were an efficient allocation of our water resources, there are
several difficulties that I have not been fully able to overcome. In
the first place, I can come to no conclusions about the efficiency
vel non of most of the substantive rules of nuisance law. This is
partially because these rules are not rules at all. As will be seen
the prototypical "rule" of nuisance law is: "'Thou shall not pollute
unreasonably." 427 That clearly is less a rule than an invitation
or summons to exercise judicial discretion. Even if the law of
nuisance contained more rigid standards, I would have no way
of knowing what the efficient level of water quality actually would
be. In fact, it is theoretically possible that the courts in the ex-
ercise of their discretion, or the legislature in adopting pollution
standards in the exercise of its discretion, may opt for waters that
are more than optimally clean.
On the other hand, there is a large body of rules relating to
private water pollution litigation that cannot be called substantive
but can be subjected to economic analysis. The rules relating to
the questions of standing, burden of proof, remedies, limitation of
actions, and so on, can be shown to result in theory in inefficiently
dirty water. Thus, I find myself unfortunately compelled to in-
dulge in another fad that is nearly as pernicious as law and eco-
nomics; I am compelled, even when examining real cases, to do
more of a "functional analysis" than a "legal analysis."
The greatest difficulty of all, however, is that, though I can
safely conclude that nuisance law is inefficient and can argue per-
suasively that the inefficiency consists of an excess of filth, I can-
not suggest the extent to which we should clean up our waters if
we hope to arrive at a Pareto optimum. This difficulty, however,
afflicts not only me. The first part of this article should have
made it clear that there is no way we can tell how clean is Pareto
optimal. Any careful economist will admit that before we can pur-
sue efficiency with respect to water quality, we must first determine
how clear the waters should be and must reach that determination
on some other basis than an efficiency analysis.428
427. See notes 463-74, 483-531 infra and accompanying text.
428. See text accompanying note 369 supra.
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My reason for continuing despite these difficulties is that, if
I cannot supply the answers that are promised by the theories of
law and economics, I can at least demonstrate that the proponents
of such theories promise more than they can deliver.
I. A BmF GLANcE AT =HE Rx- Wonw.
Having spent so much time looking at the world through the
distorting lenses of welfare economics, I shall now bring my own
lawyerly myopia to bear upon the problem of water pollution. It
is necessary, however, to pause for a moment in recognition of the
fundamental truth that the world is something greater, more com-
plex and more valuable than any construct of economic science or
legal craft. Any scholarly attempt to explicate the mysteries of
human values or of the natural order runs the danger of slipping
into a cheap-jack rationalism that denies the primacy of our blood
and bones, of rivers and mountains, of things as they are, and
offers in their place the flatus vocis of academic incantations de-
signed to ward off understanding. The danger is aggravated by
the fact that all of scholarship appears to be divided into an un-
countable number of discrete parts, each quite disconnected from
the others and each purporting to have the total truth. Here,
lawyers possess what might be a slight advantage, for they at least
claim to be generalists.429
If we fragment our view between the economic, the geologic,
the biologic, the anthropologic, the religious, the this, and the that,
we will never perceive that the ultimate questions have slipped
between the cracks in our Weltanschauugen.430
Admittedly, it is difficult to think with any clarity in such all-
encompassing terms. Perhaps if we are going to get a handle on
our problems we must use simpler categories. But even if this is
so, neither law nor economics seems the most appropriate approach
to water quality. If we must simplify the world in order to under-
stand it, we must also be careful not to distort our perceptions of
the important matters. Hydrology, for example, can afford a far
429. Cf. Ackerman & Sawyer, The Uncertain Search for Environmental
Policy: Scientific Factjlnding and Rational Decisionmaking Along the Delaware
River, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 419, 496 (1972).
430. "[Tunnel vision ... is the price we pay for avoiding total blindness."
Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L.
REv. 451, 477 (1974).
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more useful perception into the dangers of water pollution than
can the mechanistic simplicities of welfare economics.
The term "hydrological cycle" is applied to the march
of events marking the progress of a particle of water from
the atmosphere through various environments upon or un-
der the earth's surface and back to the atmosphere again.
The continuity of the cycle is a basic hydrologic principle;
because of that continuity, the distinctions between water
in the severed phases of the hydrologic cycle (precipita-
tion, soil water, ground water, surface water) are only
transient at many places and times.431
"The water cycle is a global phenomenon. Therefore, water
resources are a global problem with local roots. The occurrence
and movement of water in one part of the world are consequences
of its occurrence and movement in all other parts of the world." 43 2
It is this global and cyclical behavior of water which makes it
peculiarly intractible to market analysis or solutions. Any change
which we induce in water quantity or quality at one point is likely
to have repercussions throughout the world. The recently reported
discovery of DDT in penguins is just one example of the com-
plexities and interdependencies of the hydrological cycle.43 3 Merc-
ury pollution of fish, and the potential poisoning of those who eat
the fish is another example.434
Water does not stay fixed, and pollution of the waters, therefore,
inevitably imposes external costs on others far removed from the
source of the pollution. In such circumstances, it is not possible
to create a market mechanism in water quality which will be free
of uncompensated externalities and the paradoxes associated with
public goods and commons.
Lawyers have specifically been warned by hydrologists that
"[A] classification commonly is made to suit man's convenience.
431. Piper & Thomas, Hydrology and Water Law: What is Their Future
Common Ground, in WATER REsoUncEs AmD Ta LAw 8 (1958).
432. Nace, Water Resources: A Global Problem with Local Roots, 1 EN-
VmON. Scr. & TEcssNoLooy 550, 551 (1967). It is the global aspects of our
water problems which lead me to believe that a federal water pollution con-
trol law is preferable to piecemeal legislation by the states. See W. tB~s
& C. ANDESON, MANAcING Tm ENvmo1I~mm: AN ECONOMIC PRIMER 131-34
(1972).
433. See. e.g., W. BAXTER, PEOPLE AND PENQUiNS, THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL
PoLLUToN 4 (1974).
434. B. CommoNER, THE CLosiNG CmCLE 40 (1971).
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He is likely to become confounded, however, if he assumes a separa-
tion that does not exist in nature, or vice versa, and legislates or
renders judgment on the basis of that false assumption." 435 Eco-
nomic theories that urge us to create (or simulate) a market in
water rights invite classifications that are sure to confound us.
No matter what economists or lawyers might have ordained if they
had created the world, the fact remains that "[a]ll the rivers run
into the sea; yet the sea is not full, unto the place whence the
rivers come, thither they return again." 48 6
III. EmFcsmNcy AN Tr= CONCEPT oF PROPERTY
A. The Economic Importance of Property
It is necessary to realize that the prescriptions of ecology and
hydrology contradict a fundamental tenet of lawconomy. Once one
believes that our salvation lies in economic efficiency, there is an
immediate tendency to glorify the idea of the efficient market.
This, in turn, leads to a belief in the desirability of well-defined,
transferable, and easily divisible property rights, for such rights
are a precondition to the existence of any actual market. In fact,
they are the subject of any market transaction.437  Any failure of
435. Piper & Thomas, supra note 431, at 9. Piper and Thomas specifically
point out:
Our common failure to recognize and heed natural hydrologic areas
as the basis for development and regulation of water has brought us
into conflict with the principle of continuity in the hydrological cycle.
The boundaries between nations and states have created problems in
water allocations.... [M]any districts formed primarily for water
development or control-including irrigation districts, drainage dis-
tricts, reclamation projects, ground water districts-have area bound-
aries unrelated to hydrologic reality. Many instances could be cited
where the regulation of water has been ineffective because' part of
the water was beyond the jurisdiction of the responsible agency.
Id. at 11.
An effort to divide the natural waters into fragmented parcels incompatible
with "hydrologic reality" clearly is going to lead to hydrologic disaster. But
that is exactly what will happen if we attempt to create the large number of
water and water quality rights that would be needed if there were to be an
efficient market in water and its quality.
436. Ecclesiastes 1:7 (King James).
437. "When a transaction is concluded in the marketplace, two bundles of
property rights are exchanged. A bundle of rights often attaches to a physical
commodity or service, but it is the value of the rights that determines the
value of what is exchanged." Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights,




actual markets, any deviations from a Pareto optimum, can thus
be explained as a failure of property rights. Once the existence
of externalities or public goods or commons is brought to the at-
tention of economists, they are likely to point an accusing finger
at the law for allowing such anomalies to exist. But how can one
create property rights in a flowing stream so that there are no down-
stream costs? 438  To claim that we could create distinct property
rights or entitlements in water courses is to deny the reality of the
hydrological cycle and the meaning of ecological systems. To
fragment the world or a river into discrete exchangeable parts is
to deny the world and destroy the river. A river is more than a
casual assemblage of puddles or molecules.
Even if we ignore ecological and hydrological reality, the doc-
trine that we should create property rights 439 ad libitem borders
on the foolish. In theory it might be possible to avoid the prob-
lems of external costs, public goods and common ownership by
creating new types of property rights." ° In practice, however, it
does not seem possible to assign a transferable "property" right to
every human activity. It would be difficult, for example, to solve
the problem of public goods by creating a right in riparian owners
438. I suppose you could assign all property rights in a single stream to a
single owner. Unfortunately, this would tend to produce monopolies rather
than markets. The decisionmaking problems of the Mississippi River Corpora-
tion with respect to desirable pollution levels would not be appreciably
easier than the same problems are for the Environmental Protection Agency and
the other organs of the federal government. Such a corporation can find its
allocation problems simpler than does the government only because the cor-
poration will ignore factors the political process considers important, such as
the quality of life. See A. KsEw & B. Bowxa, MANAGING WATm QuALtry:
Eco-rozcs, TEcHNoLoGY, INsTrrIUoNs 89-94 (1968).
439. It is very important that economists and law professors alike under-
stand at the outset that phrases such as "property rights," "legal
structure," "economics of law," or "entitlements" all mean fundamen-
tally the same thing.... The important thing for lawyers to under-
stand is that Hohfeldian concepts like rights, privileges, duties, etc.,
are all comprehended within any of the phrases mentioned above.
A Hohfeldian "duty," for instance, would simply represent a disutility
or cost attaching to some status or relationship, so that, in the case
of goods, the value of ownership would be lessened.
H. MANNE, THE EcoNoimcs oF LEGAL RELATONsmPS 7 (1975).
Manne goes on to say that "[a]s useful as the Hohfeldian categories may
have been for some legal analyses, they would present economists with the
problem of adding apples and oranges." Id. Quaere, however, whether it is
really easier to add apples and oranges if one calls them both fruit. See
notes 598-614 infra- and accompanying text for a discussion of the Hohfeldian
theory.
440. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 421, at 872-76.
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which could effectively exclude other members of the public from
taking aesthetic pleasure in the mere fact that there is a clear river
flowing to the sea. Moreover, the costs of creating and maintain-
ing a market in rights to water quality would probably be too ex-
pensive to contemplate outside of theoretical discussions in aca-
demic journals.4'
It must be realized that almost every act we make has an ex-
ternal effect upon others. If I mow my lawn or fail to mow my
lawn, I am inducing changes in the welfare of my neighbors,
changes which impinge both upon the quality of their lives and the
market value of their property. Consequences of the same sort
occur if I give a party or park a new car in my driveway or cut down
a tree in my back yard. Even economists must recognize such con-
sequences and how frequently they occur. The simple fact is that
such small decisions, which in the aggregate are the major deter-
minants of the future, are seldom made as a consequence of market
transactions.
Economic models tend to contain discrete-if infinitely di-
visible-goods and factors which are "owned" by "consumers" and
"firms." But the models-at least those of welfare economics-tend
to ignore the fact that each good and each factor would be use-
less and worthless if its owner could not make use of it without
first bargaining about any side effects which might be imposed on
others by that use. If I cannot park my car in the driveway or
drive it downtown without purchasing the privilege to do so,442
my car is of no use to me.
Professor Coase says in the conclusion to his famous article on
social cost that
441. From a lawyer's point of view, one of the great frustrations in reading
economic literature arises from the failure of most economists to consider the
costs of the market mechanism itself.
If we insist either that all actions (services or commodities) be priced
in the market or that the government intervene, we are insisting that
we do not economize on the cost of producing exchanges or govern-
ment services. Thus, most welfare propositions concerned with side
effects are based on an invalid use of the standard optimality theorems,
i.e., they ignore the cost of some of the goods.
Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J. LAw &
EcoN. 11, 14 (1964). This criticism applies with just as much validity to
propositions which ignore the costs of not establishing governmental regula-
tions.
442. Or without being affficted by tempting offers from my neighbors who
wish me to change my mind.
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[a] ... reason for the failure to develop a theory adequate
to handle the problem of harmful effects stems from a
faulty concept of a factor of production. This is usually
thought of as a physical entity which the businessman
acquires and uses (an acre of land, a ton of fertiliser
[sic]) instead of as a right to perform certain (physical)
actions. ....
If factors of production are thought of as rights, it
becomes easier to understand that the right to do some-
thing which has a harmful effect (such as the creation of
smoke, noise, smells, etc.) is also a factor of production.4 3
All that I would add to this is that the economic concept of "goods"
suffers from exactly the same inadequacy. Goods, too, are "rights
to perform certain (physical) actions." Apples are traditionally
classified as goods, but their "goodness" to you resides-at least
in part 44 4-n your right to eat them. Now the simple fact js
that the law is not capable of assigning a specific transferable well-
defined right (or "entitlement") to every physical use which we
may wish to make of the bits and pieces of a world that is in-
finitely more complex than the most sophisticated model of that
world's economy. Economic models normally contain only "en-
titlements protected by property rules," 445 and only such as are
443. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3. J. LAw & EcoN. 1, 43-44 (1960).
The fact that economic transactions involve legal rights is hardly a new per-
ception. See, e.g., 2 R. VON JEING, GMsr DEs ROmSCHEN REcHTs 435 (5th
ed. 1898):
From a legal viewpoint commercial transactions do not consist of an
exchange of tangible things, but rather of a transfer of rights. The
thing is worthless without the right, the value of a thing is not deter-
mined solely by its economic usefulness and suitability, but essentially
by the fact that, and by the manner in which, its use is legally pro-
tected.
444. Actually the "right to eat an apple" is only a necessary, but not a
sufficient, condition for the apple's being a good. You also need the apple.
The apple has to be edible. You have to have teeth. And so on. The prob-
lem with the approach of Professor Coase is-as is the problem with any
analytical approach to the questions under discussion-that in concentrating
upon one aspect one tends to lose sight of others which may be equally im-
portant.
445. The phrase is Professor Calabresi's. See Calabresi & Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,
85 HAnv. L. REv. 1089, 1092 (1972).
An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that
someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must
buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the
entitlement is agreed upon by the seller. It is the form of entitle-
ment which gives rise to the least amount of state intervention: once
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well-defined and self-enforcing. When we deal with water, and
even more, when we deal with water quality, we are not likely to
come across any such entitlements.
As I have already pointed out, the concepts of "property" and
"market" are related.446 Property or property rights or "entitle-
ments protected by property rules" are the very things, and the
only things, which are traded in a market. Thus, it is not unrea-
sonable to conclude that there can be no type of market, efficient
or otherwise, in something that is neither property nor a property
right.
B. The Absence of Property in Water
Under our present legal system, interests in water quality are
seldom categorized as property or property rights. And even if
one chooses for some purposes to denominate water rights as
property, these interests are normally not transferable 7 in a
market or otherwise. Furthermore, it seems inconceivable that
one could create a legal interest in water quality without also
transferring an interest of some sort in the water itself. The very
idea sounds like transferring the orangeness of an orange without
transferring the orange. This point is not trivial. If there is little
property and even less market in water, then it would seem that
there can be little market in water quality. Thus, the fact is sig-
nificant that the courts have been reluctant to recognize property
the original entitlement is decided upon, the state does not try to
decide its value....
Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is
willing to pay an objectively determined value for it, an entitlement
is protected by a liability rule.... Obviously, liability rules involve
an additional stage of state intervention: not only are entitlements pro-
tected, but their transfer or destruction is allowed on the basis of a
value determined by some organ of the state rather than by the parties
themselves.
It should be clear that most entitlements to most goods are mixed.
Taney's house may be protected by a property rule in situations
where Marshall wishes to purchase it [and] by a liability rule where
the government decides to take it by eminent domain....
Id. at 1092-93. It appears that Calabresi and Melamed ignore the fact that
all entitlements protected by property rules must also be protected by liability
rules. If you "own" an apple. your entitlement is protected by a property
rule, but if I steal and eat your apple, your only protection is a liability rule
against theft-and even then you have to catch me!
446. See notes 54-55, 443 supra and accompanying text.
447. Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 445, at 1092-93, 1111-15,
1123-24 where they discuss "unalienable entitlements."
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in water. As stated by the Supreme Court: "Ownership of a
private stream wholly upon the lands of an individual is conceiv-
able; but that the running water in a great navigable stream is
capable of private ownership is inconceivable." 448
Even those courts that have spoken of "property" or "entitle-
ments" in water have been careftd to explain that this "property"
is not like the ownership of Blackacre or of a ton of fertilizer. In
the leading case of Tyler v. Wilkinson,449 Mr. Justice Story said:
Prima facie every proprietor upon each bank of a river
is entitled to the land, covered with water, in front of
his bank, to the middle thread of the stream... .. In
virtue of this ownership, he has a right to the use of the
water flowing over it in its natural current, without di-
minution or obstruction. But, strictly speaking, he has
no property in the water itself; but a simple use of it,
while it passes along.450
448. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69
(1913). In two respects this famous quotation is rather inapposite to the
point I am making. Chandler-Dunbar involved the assertion in a condemnation
proceeding by the power company that it owned property rights in the water
which were enforceable against the federal government. Thus Chandler-
Dunbar does not hold that one cannot have a property right in navigable
waters which is enforceable against other private parties. On the other hand,
Chandler-Dunbar involved a claim to ownership of the waterpower in the
stream; it is easier (for me, at least) to conceive of property rights to make
consumptive use of a stream's energy (or its water), than it is to conceive of
property rights in water quality. Be that as it may, Justice Lurton clearly
believed that navigable waters can only be treated as public goods.
The Federal Power Act recognizes that private property rights in water
can exist under state law which are enforceable against other private persons;
a licensee from the Federal Power Commission who is authorized to construct
a hydroelectric plant must acquire these rights by condemnation and is re-
quired to pay for them. 16 U.S.C. § 814 (1970). The holding in Chandler-
Dunbar has been extended by United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1970),
and has in turn been modified by the River and Harbor Act of 1970,
§ 111, 33 U.S.C.A. § 595(a) (Supp. 1976).
449. 24 F. Gas. 472 (No. 14,312) (C.C. D.R.I. 1827).
450. Id. at 474 (emphasis supplied). The right of ownership of lands under
water and the right to use the water are in general not as interrelated as
Justice Story suggests; the right to use the water is an attribute of owning the
banks of the stream, not of the bed (whence comes the term "riparian rights").
Title to the beds of navigable streams often are in the states rather than in
private ownership. See, e.g., Bankline Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 899
(9th Cir. 1937), affd in part and re'd in part on other grounds sub nor.,
Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938).
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Chancellor Kent, the other great explicator of American riparian
law,451 makes the same distinction:
He has no property in the water itself, but a simple usu-
fruct while it passes along. Aqua currit et debet currere
ut currere solebat is the language of the law ...
Though he may use the water while it runs over his land
as an 'incident to the land, he cannot unreasonably de-
tain it, or give it another direction, and he must return
it to its ordinary channel when it leaves his estate.452
If ownership of a great running stream is inconceivable to the
Supreme Court, what would it think of efforts to create ownership
of the right to pollute such a stream?
Although some change in water quality453 is a concomitant of
any consumptive use that may be made of a stream, most private
451. For the role played by Justice Story and Chancellor Kent in the de-
velopment of riparian law, see Wiel, Waters: American Law and French
Authority, 33 HARv. L. REv. 133 (1919) and the rejoinder to Wiers article,
Maass & Zobel, Anglo-American Water Law: Who Appropriated the Riparian
Doctrine, 10 PUBLIC POLICY 120 (1960).
452. 3. J. KENT, Comm:ENTARrEs ON AamEcAN LAw 439 (13th ed. 1884).
But cf. Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns Ch. 162, 165-66 (N.Y.
Ch. 1816) where Chancellor Kent says: "A right to a stream of water is as
sacred as a right to the soil over which it flows. It is part of the free-
hold. ... However, earlier in Gardner the Chancellor spoke of the entitle-
ment "to the use of a stream" and stated the remedy at law was for "private
nuisance." Id. at 164. Furthermore, Gardner may well be a ease in which
the plaintiff has obtained additional rights to the stream by prescription (al-
though the plaintiff's use of the stream was not "adverse"). Id. at 168 (where
the Chancellor speaks of the plaintiff's "undoubted and prescriptive right")
(emphasis added). See notes 725-33 infra and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of prescriptive rights.
453. I have throughout this article been speaking as if water quality were
some unitary concept which can be measured on a scale running from excel-
lent to bad. Actually, different users evaluate water quality in different and
conflicting ways. "The term 'quality' must therefore be considered, relative
to the proposed use of the water." Borchardt & Walton, Water Quality, in
WATER QuALrrY & TREATMENT 13 (1971). A chemical company which needs
water with little or no dissolved oxygen will not rate a trout stream as excellent,
while a trout (or a trout fisherman) would consider distilled water as being
of low quality. The 1972 amendments to the FWPCA avoid this problem by
defining "pollution" as the man-made or man-induced alteration of the chem-
ical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity of water." FWPCA § 502
(19), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362 (Supp. IV, 1974). Distilling water is thus, by defi-
nition, a form of pollution.
The fact that different uses of water cause different changes in water qual-
ity which impose different external costs and benefits on different people ap-
pears to require that any effective scheme of transferable entitlements to pollute
contain a separate entitlement for each conceivable use.
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litigation has turned on the availability of water, not on its quality.
Many uses of water do not require particularly high quality and
those that do can often be served at a relatively low cost.
45su It
is only the life-sustaining and life-enhancing uses of a stream
which require that the stream be left in its natural state, and
these "conservative uses,"455 if the word "use" is even appropriate
to describe what amounts to a "non-use," are classic examples of
public goods which no economic man would "rationally" buy.46
The complexity of water quality and its interrelations with the
rest of the environment is such that it does not seem conceivable
that one could create transferable and well-defined property rights
to it. Even if one could create such rights, one could not over-
come the problem that the improvement in the mere maintenance
of water quality is a public good. Thus, the model of the efficient
market is never likely to be incarnated in the real world. Nor
could the problem that the waters are a commons be solved by
creating such property rights; since all the waters flow together
through the hydrological cycle, the only way to partition them
would be to place them under the dominion of a world govern-
ment or in the ownership of a supranational corporation.457  Such
454. Borchardt & Walton, supra note 453, at 33-37.
455. See notes 589-93 infra and accompanying text.
456. See notes 422-23 supra and accompanying text.
457. It is perhaps significant that the Supreme Court has always frowned on
efforts to partition our major commons into private ownership. See, e.g.,
United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967); United States v. Chandler-
Dunbar Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1 (1824) (holding per Marshall, J., that a state cannot grant a monop-
oly to run steamboats on a navigable river).
In United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), Justice Douglas com-
mented:
It is ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the land ex-
tended to the periphery of the universe-Cuius est solum ejus est
usque ad coelum. But that doctrine has no place in the modem
world. The air is a public highway, as Congress has declared. Were
that not true, every transcontinental flight would subject the operator
to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To
recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog these high-
ways, seriously interfere with their control and development in the
public interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
the public has a just claim.
Id. at 260-61. Perhaps the most significant of these cases is Illinois Cent.
R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), which held that the State of Illinois did
not have the power to make an irrevocable grant of lands underwater along
the entire Chicago waterfront to a railroad. If this case is read as holding
that the control of navigable waters and the lands under them is a govern-
mental function which cannot be granted into private ownership, it strongly
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a government or corporation could not market the waters, it could
only regulate them. Thus, it seems impracticable, if not impos-
sible, to create the well-defined, discrete, transferable, and divisi-
ble property rights in water quality that would be required to
create an efficient market in such quality.
Absent some form of governmental regulation, we must have,
ceteris paribus, worse water than we would have were there an
efficient market in the world. Since many of the costs of pollu-
tion are uncompensated, external, downstream costs, the polluters
will spew forth more gunk than they would were they obligated to
bear those costs. Since water quality is a commons, polluters will
consume water quality more rapidly than they would in a world
with an efficient market where they would have, by definition,
separate and distinct property rights in such quality. Since good
water quality will remain a public good in the real world, those
who would buy good water quality as a private good under the
regime of the efficient market will rationally refuse to pay for
good water in our world.
This leaves two questions. First, how much lower is the water
quality in our world than it would be if we had an efficient mar-
ket? Second, does the law of nuisance offset the absence of an
efficient market? As to the first question there can be no answer.
There is no way to tell what value would be assigned to a public
good like good water by an efficient market; the whole problem
of public goods is that people lie about their value. Since there
can be no efficient market in water quality, the discussion of the
market value of such water is meaningless.
As to the second question, I propose to answer it in the re-
mainder of this article. It should not surprise you to hear that
my conclusion is that nuisance law makes for worse water than
does an efficient market.
IV. THE SUBSTANTvE LAW OF NUISANCE
Though interests in water quality are too poorly defined to be
denominated as property rights, this does not imply that such
interests are without legal protection; like other interests in water,
suggests that any attempt to create property rights in the quality of navigable
waters would be as unconstitutional as it is impracticable.
For a short discussion of the possibility of placing public goods in unitary
ownership see R. PosNEE, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF LAW 27-28 (1973).
[Val. 27:3
WATER POLLUTION
they are protected by various branches of the law of nuisance.4 58
In order to analyze the efficiency of our present regime of private
law relating to water quality, it is necessary to focus upon the
law of nuisance itself.
In general, nuisance actions relating to water pollution can be
divided into two distinct categories: private nuisance and public
nuisance. Private nuisance can, in turn, be divided into two sep-
arate subcategories: actions in which it is alleged that the defend-
ant-polluter has interfered unreasonably with the use and enjoy-
ment of plaintiff's land and actions in which the plaintiff alleges
that the defendant-polluter has interfered with a "natural ease-
ment" that is an appurtenance to the plaintiff's land. As will be
seen, there is little practical difference between these two sub-
categories.
It should be noted that, though one can affix the label of "nui-
sance" to all water pollution cases, this does not mean that there
is a consistent body of law that applies to all pollution cases.
Professor Prosser has claimed:
There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the
entire law than that which surrounds the word "nui-
since." It has meant all things to all men, and has been
applied indiscriminately to everything from an alarming
advertisement to a cockroach baked in a pie. There is
a general agreement that it is incapable of any exact or
comprehensive definition.459
It is also quite true that "[t]he American common law concerning
pollution of watercourses is by no means clear or unconfused.
The cases constitute a morass of conflicting doctrines, and repre-
sent efforts to deal with individual situations rather than to provide
clarity in defining legal rights."460
A. Private Nuisance
Private nuisance is traditionally defined as a nontrespassory
interference with the use and enjoyment of land.461 "A private
458. "[It is more common for the courts to speak in terms of the tort of
nuisance rather than of property rights." F. TELEASE, WATER RIGHTs 244
(ist ed. 1967).
459. W. PnossER, THE LAw OF TORTS 571 (4th ed. 1971).
460. Davis, Theories of Water Pollution Litigation, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 738.
461. W. Paossmi, supra note 459, at 591.
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nuisance is a civil wrong, based on a disturbance of rights in
land." 462  Whatever else may be uncertain about private nui-
sance actions, it is clear that the action lies only for interferences
with interests in land.
a. In General
The underlying theory of liability in private nuisance cases
is often expressed in a form which suggests that pollution is un-
reasonable per se and thus always an actionable nuisance. As
Blackstone puts it "the rule is, 'sic utere tuo, ut alienum non
laedas;"'"46 "Don't use your property so as to cause injury to
another." Although this rule appears to be an absolute prohibi-
tion on injurious conduct such as pollution, it was never actually
interpreted in that fashion. The early commentators do not ex-
pressly say that something is an actionable nuisance only if it is
unreasonable, but they do recognize that not all annoyances are
actionable. Blackstone says that "depriving one of a mere matter
of pleasure, as of a fine prospect, by building a wall, or the like;
this, as it abridges nothing really convenient or necessary, is no
injury to the sufferer, and is therefore -not an actionable nui-
sance." 4" Chancellor Kent, when discussing the related doctrine
that riparian owners are entitled to have the stream flow by their
land in its natural quantity and quality,4" 5 stated that this rule
must be subject to qualifications, "otherwise rivers and streams
of water would become utterly useless, either for manufacturing
or agricultural purposes. The just and equitable principle is
given in the Roman law: 'Sic enim debere quem meliorem agrum
suum facere ne vicini deteriorem faciat."40 To hold that one
may never use his property in a fashion which would hurt some-
one else would be to hold, as Chancellor Kent recognized, that
462. Id. at 572.
463. 3 W. BLAc rONE, CosmasmerAnms 0217.
464. Id. See also William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 821 (K.B.
1610) where Chief Justice Wray finds that the law does not give an action
for such things of delight.
465. See notes 480-82 infra and accompanying text.
466. 3. J. KENT, CommmsrrAnms ON AmiucAN LAw 441 (13th ed. 1884).
The Latin tag, "one should improve his farm so as not to make the neighbors




one can never use his property at all.467 The courts have never
interpreted the maxim in this restrictive fashion but have usu-
ally based liability on "unreasonable" uses. Once one recognizes
that the rule is not to be taken literally, it becomes clear that'it
is impossible to predict the manner in which it will be applied in
particular cases. As one judge has stated:
The cause of action, if any, lies in the excess of the
damage beyond what is considered reasonable, after tak-
ing into account the circumstances of time and place,
and quantity of annoyance, and the relation of adjoin-
ing properties to each other. This cause of action is im-
mersed in undefined uncertainty; there is no standard
by which to measure degrees of annoyance, or to esti-
mate the effect of circumstances; each neighbour is a
source of some annoyance; proximity necessitates mutual
forbearance; the degree of forbearance to be required is
measured by the sensibility to feelings of delicacy of the
tribunal which has to decide the case, and cannot be
foreseen till that decision is given. The maxim, "sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas," is no help to decision, as it
cannot be applied till the decision is made; and the use
of the word "nuisance" in the discussion prolongs the
dispute, because it means both annoyance that is ac-
tionable, and also that which is not actionable; and where
the question is, whether an annoyance is actionable, the
word nuisance introduces an equivocation which is fatal
to any hope of a clear settlement.468
Another court, with good nineteenth century hardheadedness,
put the matter this way-
[Elvery proprietor has absolute control over his own
property, and may do with it whatever he pleases, un-
less he thereby 'infringes some fixed legal right of an-
other. Loss or damage to one person arising from the
use made by another of his own property is damnum
absque injuria, and affords no ground of action.
467. See also Auburn & Cato Plank Rd. Co. v. Douglass, 9 N.Y. 444 (1854),
where the court agrees that such a literal interpretation would "enjoin a
man against any use of his own property which in its consequences might
injuriously affect the interests of others; but no such legal principle ever
existed. The affairs of life could not well be conducted under the restraints of
such a rule." Id. at 445-46.
468. Undelivered judgment of Sir W. Erie, former Chief Justice of Common
Pleas, appended to the judgments in Brand v. Hammersmith & City Ry., [1866]
L.R. 2 Q.B. 221, 245.
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While, therefore, sic utere tuo, etc., may be a very
good moral precept, it is utterly useless as a legal maxim.
It determines no right; it defines no obligation. 46 9
With such a history, it is not surprising that modem courts
do not pretend that there is an absolute prohibition against an-
noying your neighbor and instead declare the rule that only an
"unreasonable" interference with the use and enjoyment of land
is an actionable nuisance. This formulation at least reveals that
the "cause of action is immersed in undefined uncertainty." We
cannot reasonably ask for more from judge-made antipollution
laws developed from case to case.
There is, however, one advantage which the "sic utere" maxim
has over the shorter and less elegant modem injunction: "be rea-
sonable." As one commentator stated:
[M]uch the greater part of the work of the courts has
been done by taking what were really extra-legal prin-
ciples, of justice or policy proper for the consideration
of the legislature, treating them as rules of law, and then,
under the pretence-not always consciously false-of
interpreting them and applying them to particular cases,
making new rules of law based upon them....
The familiar maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, is .. .one of . . . [this] character. There can-
not be said, I think, to be any general rule of law for-
bidding a person to cause damage to another by the
manner in which he exercises his own rights. But the
principle expressed in the maxim, has been the guiding
principle in the evolution of many more special rules
469. Auburn & Cato Plank Rd. Co. v. Douglass, 9 N.Y. 444, 446 (1854).
Judge Selden goes on to say: "The cases to which the maxim has been gen-
erally applied are those where the owner of one tenement does some act upon
his own premises which injuriously affects the interests of the proprietor of
an adjoining tenement." Id. After reviewing the cases he concludes that:
"The -true meaning of the maxim . . .is simply this, that one who owns a
tenement which is subject to a servitude to another tenement must take care
so to manage his own as not directly to infringe the rights of the owner of the
dominant tenement." Id. at 449. This formulation, when applied to water
pollution problems, gets one no further on. One concept of riparian rights is
that they constitute a "natural servitude," enforceable by each riparian owner,
that the stream not be unreasonably (or unnaturally) polluted. Judge Selden's
argument thus reduces to the proposition that water pollution nuisance cases
should be decided in terms of riparian rights, which are no more precisely




forbidding various kinds of conduct which are likely to
produce harm to others.470
It may be that our modem brevity of phrase may remove some
of the moral force from nuisance law to the detriment of the
environment. The "legislative" goal of reducing annoyances to
others has some advantages over the modem, "value-free" pursuit
of "reasonableness," which is likely to be construed as the sterile
and selfish "rationality" 471 of homo economicus. 47
2
This description of the law of private nuisance does not get
us very far. All we know is that an interference with the use
and enjoyment of land constitutes a private nuisance if that inter-
ference is "unreasonable." The question remains, how do courts
determine whether an interference is unreasonable? Unfortun-
ately for those who like rules of black letter law, and for those
who are trying to do an efficiency analysis of the law of nuisance,
the question of reasonableness is normally treated as a question
of fact. Each case seems ultimately to turn on its own facts.473
Thus Dean Prosser states:
In every case the court must make a comparative evalua-
tion of the conflicting interests according to objective
legal standards, and the gravity of the harm to the plain-
tiff must be weighed against the utility of the defend-
ants conduct.
Many factors must be considered in this evaluating
process, any one of which is seldom conclusive.474
B. Water Rights
It might appear, since courts do speak of "water rights," that
interference with these rights is something other than a private
nuisance. 475  The short-though admittedly unsatisfactory--an-
swer to this suggestion is that traditionally actions brought in
trespass on the case for interference with so-called "natural ease-
ments," including riparian rights in water, were described as ac-
470. H. TEy, SoMm LEADiNG PRINCIPLES OF ANGLo-AmERCAR LAw 7-8(1889).
471. See note 351 supra and accompanying text.
472. For a discussion of the "sic utere" maxim, see Smith, The Use of Maxims
in Jurisprudence, 9 HAuv. L. REv. 13, 14-17 (1895).
473. See Davis, supra note 460, at 746-49.
474. W. Pnossme, supra note 459, at 596-97.
475. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 460.
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tions in nuisance.478 A better reply is that water rights are either
appurtenant to particular parcels of land (as is true under the
riparian system of water rights) or are interests in land (as is
true under the appropriative system) and that interference with
such rights is therefore within the definition of private nuisances.
This is not just playing with labels. In general, the test for
liability is the same in pollution cases involving water rights as
in other more generalized nuisance actions. One is liable for
pollution that interferes with "water rights" only to the extent
that the pollution is "unreasonable."
There are two systems of water rights that are recognized in
the United States: riparian and appropriative. The riparian sys-
tem prevails in the eastern and some of the midwestern states
while the appropriative system is in force in the more recently
settled states of the mountain west The most westerly of the
midwestern states and the far western states of the Pacific coast
have a mixed system with both riparian and appropriative rights.477
1. Riparian Rights
The riparian system was developed along the eastern seaboard
where there originally was more than enough water for normal
needs and where little land was held in public ownership.478 In
its original form the riparian system theoretically gave a riparian
owner the absolute
right to the use of the water flowing over it in its natural
current, without diminution or obstruction.... The con-
sequence of this principle is, that no proprietor has a right
to use the water to the prejudice of another. . . . The
natural stream, existing by the bounty of Providence for
the benefit of the land through which it flows, is an in-
cident annexed by operation of law, to the land itself. 479
476. See notes 479-508 infra and accompanying text. See also note 631
infra.
477. For a map showing the distribution of the various regimes of water
law throughout the United States, see F. Tsm.E sg, WATa LAw 5 (1st ed.
1967).
478. The aridity of the western states and the fact that many streams flowed
through lands in the public domain are the two major factors which led to
the development of this appropriative system in the West. See text accom-
panying note 528 infra.
479. Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (No. 14,312) 474 (C.C.D.B11.
1827) (Story, J.). Most of the early riparian rights cases involved disputes
[Vol. 2.7:3
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The attitude was well expressed by Chancellor Kent in an action
to enjoin a village from diverting a stream from the plaintiff's
land:4 80
[Ilf [the trustees of the village] are suffered to proceed
and divert the stream, or the most essential part of it, the
plaintiff would receive immediate and great injury by the
suspension of all those works on his land which are set in
operation by the water. In addition to this, he will lose
the comfort and use of the stream for farming and domestic
purposes; and, besides, it must be painful to any one
to be deprived, at once, of the enjoyment of a stream
which he has been accustomed always to see flowing by
the door of his dwelling. A right to a stream of water
is as sacred as a right to the soil over which it flows. 481
And as a modem commentator has stated:
The premise underlying the law ... was that land was
not essentially an instrumental good or a productive asset
but rather a private estate to be enjoyed for its own sake.
The great English gentry, who had played a central role
in shaping the common law conception of land, regarded
the right to quiet enjoyment as the basic attribute of dom-
iion over property. Thus, the New Jersey court regarded
the legitimate uses of water as those that served domestic
purposes and husbandry, requiring insignificant appro-
priations of the water's flow. All other interferences with
the natural flow of water, including both diversion and
obstruction, were illegal "without the consent of all who
have an interest in it." Exploitation of water resources for
over the consumption of the water in a stream or over water power which
could be used for driving mill wheels. The doctrine that the riparian owner
was entitled to the stream in its natural quantity was, however, also applied
to water quality. See, e.g. Holsman v. Boiling Spring Bleaching Co., 14 N.J.
Eq. 335 (Ch. 1862).
480. Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
This case is a remarkable example of "higher" law principles being applied
to inhibit governmental action. The Village of Newburgh, pursuant to statu-
tory authority, diverted the stream which flowed by the plaintiff's land without
compensating the plaintiff. Chancellor Kent enjoined the diversion even
though there was no constitutional requirement for just compensation in the
New York Constitution.
481. Id. at 165-66. (Emphasis added). Chancellor Kent went on to de-
scribe the right to a stream as part of the freehold; but he clearly did not
mean that an action of trespass would lie for a diversion of the stream. Earlier
he stated that "[t]o divert or obstruct a watercourse is a private nuisance."
Id. at 164.
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irrigation or mill dams, which necessarily required signi-
ficant interference with the natural flow of water, was thus
limited to the lowest common denominator of noninjurious
development, just as conflicts over the use of land were
invariably resolved in favor of economic inactivity.
482
It is questionable, however, whether the right to the natural
flow of a stream was ever actually absolute. In its strictest con-
struction the natural-flow theory seems to have been invoked only
against industrial users. Even if the doctrine had been applied to
the slightest interference with the natural quantity or quality of a
stream, a nuisance action still would not have guaranteed that
water quality would have remained at a high level, or even at a
level higher than would have been produced by an efficient mar-
ket.483 It is true that those who wished to purchase the privilege
of polluting would have faced the problem of negotiating with
several different riparian owners, a fact which would have made
it more difficult to purchase the privilege than would be the case
in an efficient market.484 But if the polluters simply polluted with-
out having purchased the privilege, it may not have appeared
worth it for all the riparian owners to go to court.48 5 Furthermore,
482. Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of Property in American
Law, 1780-1860, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 248, 253 (1973). The mention of the
New Jersey Court refers to Merritt v. Parker, 1 N.J.L. 526 (Sup. Ct. 1795).
483. The allocation of absolute property rights in water and water quality
to the country gentry meant that this class was in a sense richer than it would
have been had the absolute privilege of polluting been alloted by the courts
to the rising class of industrialists. Thus, even if an efficient market had
existed, one would expect a different Pareto efficient state to arise under the
first allocation than would arise under the second one. If the absolute right
to have the waters left alone were assigned to the country squires, then one
would assume that a fairly high level of water quality would result if there
were an efficient market. This is so since "[o]ne may ...assume, in gen-
eral, that there is an indefinite number of optimal collections of goods that
can be produced with the existing resources of the economy, each one gen-
erated by some particular income distribution and associated with a distinct
set of product prices." E.J. MISHAN, THE CosT OF ECONOmIC Gaowns 48
(1967). Furthermore, if "we focus on a small segment of the economy [like
water quality] and disregard as negligible all price changes other than those
operating within this segment ... [then] ...it will transpire that the richer
is one party compared with the other, the more likely will the optimal solu-
tion coincide with his own interest." Id. at 61 n.1.
484. It is not unheard of for industries to purchase the privilege of polluting
from riparian owners. See, e.g., Johnson v. Armour & Co., 69 N.D. 769, 291
N.W. 113 (1940).
485. See text accompanying notes 606-07 infra.
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only riparian owners had "standing" to complain of the pollution;486
the right to water in its natural state was part of the freehold,487
and as such could not be transferred separately from the land.
Thus, only the riparian owners' adhesion to the standards of landed
gentry could protect water quality. If the owners as a class
succumbed to gross economic motives-or if they sold out to less
genteel profit maximizers-there would have been no protection
for the waters even though many others who did not own riparian
lands might have placed a high value on decent water quality.488
This is all speculative, however, because the courts soon reduced
the right to the "natural flow of the stream" to the right to make
"reasonable use of the stream." 48 9 The leading nineteenth century
authorities on water law were able to assert both the "natural-
flow" theory and something approaching the "reasonable-use" doc-
trine in the same passage. Justice Story in Tyler v. Wilkinson,490
after stating the natural-flow doctrine, went on to say:
... I do not mean to be understood, as holding the doc-
trine, that there can be no diminution whatsoever, and no
obstruction or impediment whatsoever, by a riparian ap-
proprietor, in the use of the water as it flows; for that would
be to deny any valuable use of it. There may be, and
there must be allowed of that, which is common to all,
486. See notes 623-52 infra and accompanying text.
487. See note 481 supra and accompanying text.
488. To the extent that riparian lands were purchased by profit-making
firms they would have probably considered themselves ethically, and legally,
bound to disregard the external costs of their activities; see notes 229-31 supra
and accompanying text.
489. See, e.g., Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
The Court in Palmer did not use the word "reasonable," but the majority
clearly decided that the interference by one mill with the operation of another
was damnum absque injuria. justice Livingston specifically stated:
As well, therefore, to secure to individuals the free and undisturbed
enjoyment of their property, as to the public the benefits which must
frequently redound to it from such use, the operation of the maxim
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas should be limited to such cases
only where a manifest and serious damage is the result of such use
or enjoyment, and where it is very clear indeed that the party had
no right to use it in that way. Hence it becomes impossible, and,
indeed, improper, to attempt to define every case which may occur
of this kind.
Id. at 314.
For a recent discussion of the development of the "reasonable use" doctrine,
see Horwitz, stUpra note 482. See also Lauer, Reflections on Riparianism, 35
Mo. L. REv. 7-10 (1970).
490. 24 F. Cas. 472 (No. 14,312) 474 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827).
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a reasonable use.... The diminution, retardation, or ac-
celeration, not positively and sensibly injurious by diminish-
ing the value of the common right, is an implied element
in the right of using the stream at all. The law here, as
in many other cases, acts with a reasonable reference to
public convenience and general good, and it is not betrayed
into a narrow strictness, subversive of common sense, nor
into an extravagant looseness, which would destroy private
rights.491
Admittedly Justice Story appeared ready to hold relatively minor
interferences with the flow of water actionable.492  Even this re-
strictive standard of reasonableness, however, is sufficient to cause
some external costs to be born by others downstream. There was
no evident concern by the Justice with damage to the public but
only with damages caused by one plaintiff to one defendant. Even
if the damage done by one individual to another is de minimis,
the summation of all of these damages may be significant. Further-
more, once the absolute right of the riparian owner to have the
stream in its natural condition is abandoned, there is an element
of chance at work which would discourage those who might other-
wise assert their rights. If one is not certain of one's rights, is
not certain of winning, one is not likely to undertake the burden
of suing a polluter-especially when that polluter is a wealthy in-
dustrial establishment which can afford to nickel and dime the
plaintiff to death.
In any event it was not Justice Story's "schizophrenic" 493 rule
which prevailed. "By the time of the Civil War . . . most courts
had come to recognize a balancing test, making 'reasonable use
of a stream 'depend on the extent of detriment to the riparian pro-
prietors below.' "494 The reasonable-use test was applied to dis-
putes involving the quantity of water which each party could take
from a stream.495  As disputes over water quality became more
491. Id. at 474. But see Horwitz, supra note 482, at 257, for the argument
that Justice Story "wished to perpetuate the principle of natural flow."
492. As to Justice Story, see note 490 supra; Chancellor Kent dissented in
Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307, 318 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805), discussed in
note 489 supra.
493. Lauer, supra note 489, at 8. See also Horwitz, supra note 482, at 256
n.22.
494. Horwitz, supra note 482, at 258-59, citing Snow v. Parsons, 28 Vt. 459,
462 (1858).




common, it was natural to apply the same test to disputes over
pollution, especially since the reasonable-use test appears to be
at least verbally identical to the test used in other types of nuisance
cases where there is no issue involving riparian (or appropriative)
interests.498 One commentator discussing the rule of reasonableness
in the context of disputes over water quality, has supplied the
following description of its workings:
In determining reasonableness . . . it is necessary to
consider in detail the relative positions of the conflicting
parties. Conflict, of course, is necessary, for unless orne use
interferes with another, the controversy giving rise to the
need to ascertain which use shall prevail never materializes.
And reasonableness will be determined only as between
parties to the litigation. Their uses may or may not be
reasonable as against other persons not parties, but the
court does not reach this question.497
It would be misleading, however, to insist that since the Civil
War the courts have been unanimous in applying a balancing test.
There are twentieth century cases which appear, if one takes the
courts" language seriously, to apply the natural flow (or natural-
quality) doctrine to pollution cases.498  Some of the cases which
apparently fall within this category can be explained by the fact
that the polluter was a nonriparian.499 In other such cases it is
496. See note 585 infra and accompanying text. Notice that both the mod-
em nuisance and modem riparian rights tests turn on the reasonableness of
the defendant's conduct
497. Lauer, supra note 489, at 10 (emphasis added). Professor Lauer does
not cite authority for the passage which I have italicized; I believe, however,
that it is a proper description of the practices of most courts when the issue
is purely one of damages. There is some authority, however, for the proposi-
tion that courts do consider the interests of persons not party to the litigation
when the issue is whether an injunction should be granted against the polluter.
See, e.g. Borough of Westville v. Whitney Home Builders, Inc., 40 N.J. Super.
62, 122 A.2d 233 (App. Div. 1956).
498. See, e.g., Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E.
805 (1913) (damages and an injunction granted to the owner of a farm against
a polluting paper mill, even though the damages to the farm were only $100
a year and the mill represented an investment of more than $1,000,000 and
employed 400 or 500 workers); Weston Paper Co. v. Pope, 155 Ind. 394, 57
N.E. 719 (1900) (defendant was not a riparian owner).
499. See, e.g., Weston Paper Co. v. Pope, 155 Ind. 394, 57 N.E. 719 (1900);
Beach v. Sterling Iron & Zinc Co., 54 N.J. Eq. 65, 33 A. 286 (Ch. 1895), aff'd
sub nora. Sterling Iron & Zinc Co. v. Sparks Mfg. Co., 55 N.J. Eq. 824, 41
A. 1117 (Ct. Err. & App. 1897). Cf. Stanton v. St. Joseph's College, 233 A.2d
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quite probable that the court would have reached the same result
even if it had used the reasonableness test.
Another factor which may lead courts to speak in terms of an
absolute right to pure water is good advocacy; if the plaintiff's law-
yer can make the pollution sound sufficiently disgusting, there is
a good chance that the court will not stop to balance the economic
interests of the parties.500
The cases seldom enlighten the reader with a single definition
of the rule of reasonableness, and the schizophrenia that beset
Justice Story continues into the language of the modem decisions.
The verbal formulations in which the rule is couched do not permit
one to make a prediction in a particular case; deciding whether
pollution is unreasonable involves the same type of factual deter-
mination that is involved in deciding whether a driver was negligent.
The question is not really one of law but of judicial psychology.
The question of what it means "to follow a rule" is one of notorious
philosophical difficulty even when the rule seems clear. 501 How
can a court follow a rule that says that every riparian owner can
make reasonable use of a stream?
718 (Me. 1967), appeal denied, 254 A.2d 597 (1969). A riparian owner is
often said to have an absolute right to natural water quality against a non-
riparian owner. Cf., Young v. City of Asheville, 241 N.C. 618, 86 S.E.2d
408 (1955), where a farmer, whose irrigation water was so polluted by sew-
age that he lost his entire crop, was nonsuited because he failed to allege
and prove that he was a riparian owner, even though the court was satisfied
that the defendants had negligently polluted the stream.
500. But see Borough of Westville v. Whitney Home Builders, Inc., 40 N.J.
Super. 62, 122 A.2d 233 (1956), where the court commented:
We have already taken notice of the plea of plaintiff that the effluent
flowing into the ditch and pond is "noisome" and necessarily a pol-
lutant because its origin in association with human excreta and secreta
engenders such revulsion in the average person as assertedly must
substantially impair the use of the pond as an important part of the
public recreational and park area....
Under the reasonable use approach we are called upon to counter-
weigh social uses and harms. And this we must do in a realistic
rather than a theoretical way, and on the basis of the evidence of
record, rather than on emotion or runaway imagination.
Id. at 81-82, 122 A.2d at 242-43. Notice, however, that Westville was an
action solely for an injunction brought by a municipality which was a riparian
owner. If the suit had been for damages the result might have been different.
Despite its avoidance of emotional arguments, the court did recognize that the
"state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion." Id.
at 82, 122 A.2d at 243, quoting Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 20 N.J. 359, 368,
120 A.2d 11, 15 (1956).




I have looked for a case applying a typical formulation of the
reasonable-use rule to typical facts. I am not surprised that I have
not been able to find such a case, but I was surprised that there
are few reported cases involving water pollution.502 With judicious
editing one can pick out a sentence or two and say that it states
the rule; for example: "The essential question in each particular
case is, what is reasonable under the conditions and circumstances
there presented." 503 Of course, this is not a very helpful propo-
sition. Even if one makes an extensive examination of the opinion
from which the quotation was extracted and discovers the consider-
ations the court weighed or balanced to reach its conclusions, one
still cannot arrive at an accurate formulation of the reasonableness
rule. First, no other judge is likely to formulate the issue in the
same way, and second, even though one knows the factors that the
court will consider, one cannot be sure of the result on any given set
of facts because one cannot know the weight which will be assigned
to each element.,04
It might seem that even if we could formulate a rule of reason-
ableness, it would be impossible to predict the consequences to
water quality, but at least one court, weaving together the threads
of the natural-flow, de minimis, and reasonable-use doctrines, faced
the issue and came to a grim conclusion:
[T]he natural right of the plaintiff to have the water
descend to him in its pure state, fit to be used for the
various purposes to which he may have occasion to apply it,
must yield to the equal right in those who happen to be
above him. Their use of the stream for mill purposes, for
irrigation, watering cattle, and the manifold purposes for
which they may lawfully use it, will tend to render the
water more or less impure. Cultivating and fertilizing the
lands bordering on the stream, and [in which are its
502. "An examination of all water pollution cases which could be found
in jurisdictions following riparian law reveals 445 American cases which can
be categorized as riparian rights or as nuisance." Davis, Theories of Water
Pollution Litigation, 1971 Wis. L. RE . 738, 742. In contrast there are some
26,000 bodies of water within the United States. McThenia, An Examination
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 30 WAsH. &
LEE L. REv. 195, 200 (1973).
503. Kyser v. New York Central R.R., 151 Misc. 226, 229, 271 N.Y. Supp.
182, 186 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
504. It should also be kept in mind that a judicial opinion is a justification
for the result reached; it does not purport to describe the actual process by
which the court reached its decision.
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sources,] their occupation by farm-houses and other erec-
tions, will unavoidably cause impurities to be carried into
the stream. As the lands are subdivided and their occupa-
tion and use become multifarious, these causes will be ren-
dered more operative, and their effects more perceptible.
The water may thus be rendered unfit for many uses for
which it had before been suitable; but so far as that con-
dition results only from reasonable use of the stream in
accordance with the common right, the lower riparian
proprietor has no remedy.
When the population becomes dense, and towns or
villages gather along its banks, the stream naturally and
necessarily suffers still greater deterioration. Roads and
streets crossing it, or running by its side, with their gutters
and sluices discharging into it their surface water collected
from over large spaces, and carrying with it in suspension
the loose and light material that is thus swept off, are
abundant sources of impurity, against which the law af-
fords no redress by action ...
It may readily be supposed that a small stream like Mill
Brook, with a considerable city like Worcester upon either
bank, and the adjacent lands descending rapidly towards
its bed, would cease to preserve its waters from impurity,
and become valueless for any purpose except that of
drainage and the creation of power by its head and fall.
All this may result even though no unjustifiable act be
done to effect it. 505
505. Merrifield v. City of Worcester, 110 Mass. 216, 219-20 (1872). The
decision in Merrifield was an interlocutory one establishing the rules under
which damages should be ascertained. It is interesting that most of the sources
of pollution discussed in the quoted passage are nonpoint sources which will
not be affected-at least directly-by the 1972 amendments to the FWPCA.
The declaration alleged that the pollutants, "great quantities of filth, dirt, gravel,
refuse material, matter discharged from sewers, ... and . . . other noxious
materials and ingredients," interfered with the plaintiff's boilers and engines
and that "the waters of the brook so corrupted are thereby rendered so offen-
sive that it is difficult and expensive to procure competent engineers and
workmen to operate said works." Id. at 216.
Although the rule in Merrifield may seem harsh, it could have been worse.
The defendant was, after all, a municipal corporation and as such could assert
immunity to suit. As the court noted:
For the incidental disadvantages, loss or inconvenience necessarily
resulting to individuals, in their rights of property, from [the laying
out of common sewers]; or from the execution of the work, in a proper
and skillful manner, as so laid out; or from the maintenance and use
of the drains in a proper and reasonable manner, without negligence
in their care and management, no action of tort can be maintained
against the city.
Id. at 221. Thus, the fact that the court was willing to entertain the complaint
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It may be that this prediction is too pessimistic, although it does
not appear to be an exaggerated description of what has happened
to many of our nation's waters.506
Clearly both nuisance and riparian-rights cases turn on the
courts' varying interpretations of the word "reasonable." When
one is dealing with the typical water pollution case, there is little
reason to distinguish between the two labels and most courts do
not bother to do so. 07  Since the riparian-rights doctrine is ap-
plied to consumption of water as well as to its pollution, it seems
quite clear that in riparian states there can no more be a market
in water rights then there can be in water quality rights.508
shows a certain liberality. If the defendant had been a business corporation
the court might well have been more protective of the interest of pure water.
See Parker v. American Woolen Co., 195 Mass. 591, 602, 81 N.E. 468, 470
(1907), where the court, speaking of the Merrifield decision, felt it "was de-
cided on the doctrine that a city is not to be held in damages for having adopted
an improper sewerage system."
506. If the court in Merrifleld is saying only that some small streams "like
Mill Brook, with a considerable city upon either bank" will become so polluted
that they will be usable only for waste disposal and for power, it is possible
that a market would make the same allocation. If we had an ideal market
system not only in water quality rights and privileges but also in every other
sort of economic good, some water would undoubtedly be allocated to drain-
age and power, while the rest would be allocated to other uses, such as drink-
ing, irrigation, industrial processes and fish breeding. One difficulty is that it is
not possible simply to divide up the total amount of water available to the
nation among such competing uses; one would have to allocate entire streams
and lakes to one purpose or another. In any world more realistic than an
economists model, such "zoning" would be very difficult to achieve without
governmental intervention except in the rare case where only one or two
individual decisionmakers owned all the water quality rights to an entire
stream or lake. The problem is, of course, that the segregation of water.
courses for different uses is itself a public good. A person who has the
privilege to pollute a stream will exaggerate the value of that privilege in
hopes of obtaining a higher payoff than the selling price he would actually
accept, while those who want the water to remain clean would undervalue
their desires in the hope that others would buy the rights to clean water. ft
would appear that an imperfect market system in which water quality is a
public good would tend to result in a low level of water quality throughout
the country; one holdout can pollute the stream, whereas it takes the coopera-
tion of all those who are potential users of the stream to maintain its quality.
507. Thus, Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805
(1913), which quite clearly is a riparian-rights case with natural-flow lan-
guage, was considered to be squarely on point (on the question of remedies)
by the court in an air pollution case necessarilv decided on pure nuisance
grounds. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y. 2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870,
309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
508. "The interesting case is where the water is sought to be sold apart
from the land, or where the purchaser proposes to use the water off the
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The only instance where the distinction between pollution af-
fecting riparian rights and other water pollution may be of im-
portance is where one (or both) of the parties to the pollution is
not a riparian owner. If neither is a riparian owner then the pollu-
tion obviously cannot be considered a violation of riparian rights,
and any litigation must be determined on the basis of nuisance
doctrines. The puzzle here is not what rule will be applied in
determining liability, but how such litigation could arise at all.
It is difficult to see how a private nuisance action can be brought
for water pollution by a nonriparian landowner. If your land
does not border on a stream, how can pollution of the stream
interfere with your use and enjoyment of your land? The ugliness
of the stream may offend you, but visual blight has never supplied
a cause of action in nuisance.5°9 The only question in this area
is whether the protection of visual aesthetic interests can justify
police power regulations.5 10 The stream may stink up your land
but stinks would seem to be a primal type of air pollution which
one would expect the law to regulate under pure nuisance (as
opposed to riparian) doctrines.
There is one case, Young v. City of Asheville,511 which
suggests one other means by which such litigation could arise;
the nonriparian landowner could bring the polluted water to his
land. In Young the action was
to recover damages for the loss of a crop of cabbages and
collards growing on leased land by reason of the negligent
maintenance and use of a sewer line along the banks of
Beaverdam Creek by both defendants, which permitted
live human sewage and poisonous and deleterious sub-
stances to be discharged into the waters of the Creek,
thereby contaminating and polluting its waters used by
plaintiff to irrigate by overhead irrigation his crop of vege-
tables.512
riparian land. And it is here that we have almost no information about the
operation of the riparian system." C. MEYERS & R. POSNER, MARKEr TRANS-
FERS OF WATER RIGHTS: TOWARD AN IMPROVED MARKET IN WATER RESOURCES
15 (1971).
509. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *217. But cf. Parkersburg Builders
Material Co. v. Barrack, 118 W.Va. 608, 191 S.E. 368 (1937).
510. See People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734,
appeal dismissed per curiam, 375 U.S. 42 (1963).
511. 241 N.C. 618, 86 S.E.2d 408 (1955).
512. Id. at 619, 86 S.E.2d at 409-10. The extent of the pollution to the
stream was unquestioned: "A witness for the defendants testified that in Sep-
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The injury to the plaintiff was clear enough:
Because plaintiff had sprayed or sprinkled the polluted
and'contaminated waters.., upon his crop... an action
was brought against him . . . by ... [the] Commissioner
of Agriculture . . . to prohibit the sale or disposition of
the cabbages and collards. The court issued an injunction
as requested, whereupon plaintiff cut up his cabbages and
collards, and disked them into the land, resulting in the loss
of his entire crop, and a loss to him of $17,000.001.3'
The court noted in finding for the defendants that plaintiff was
not a riparian proprietor but rather one who had pumped the
creek's waters into his irrigation system. Thus, plaintiffs rights
had not been invaded by the defendants since hetir pollution of the
creek was not the cause of his damage.5 4
It may be that the municipal polluters in Young were riparian
owners, although there was no finding that they were.515 If they
were riparian owners, then the decision in Young becomes a little
more supportable since they would be privileged to use the creek
against anyone except other riparian owners. One factor that may
have been at work in Young was that the polluters were municipal
corporations. It was clear that the court thought that their liability,
if any, would lie on the theory that a nuisance by a municipal
corporation to a private owner is "regarded and dealt with as an
appropriation of property to the extent of the injury thereby in-
flicted." 5 11 In general, the courts are reluctant to pursue municipal
tember and October of 1953 there were a number of breaks in the sewer line;
that essentially all the liquid in Beaverdam Creek at that time was sewage,
and the condition there was a nuisance." Id. at 621, 82 S.E.2d at 411.
513. Id. at 621, 86 S.E.2d at 411.
514. Id. at 628, 86 S.E.2d at 416.
515. "The city would apparently not be considered a riparian proprietor by
virtue of its political sovereignty over land riparian to the river." Cindler,
Water Pollution and Quality Controls in 3 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER
RicGrHs 82 n.27 (1967), citing Durham v. Cotton Mills, 141 N.C. 615, 54 S.E.
453 (1906).
516. Young v. City of Asheville, 241 N.C. 618, 627, 86 S.E.2d 408, 415
(1955). See also City of Valparaiso v. Hagen, 153 Ind. 337, 53 N.E. 1062
(1899), where the court in denying both an injunction and damages against
a municipal polluter said: "The sewage must be dispatched or the city aban-
doned. The place adopted for the outpour is that provided by nature and can-
not be had elsewhere. The facts present a case wherein the principle of the
greatest good to the greatest number must be permitted to operate and private
interest yield to the public good." Id. at 342, 54 N.E. at 1064.
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corporations with the same vigor as they do profit-making polluters.
The fact that the polluters were municipal corporations makes it
much less likely that the pollution in Young could have been
treated as a public nuisance. However, even in more typical
nuisance actions brought by nonriparian owners it seems irrelevant
whether the defendant polluter is a riparian owner. 517
There are few cases which have involved actions by riparian
owners against nonriparian polluters. It is probable, however,
that the courts would hold that any substantial pollution from a
nonriparian source is unreasonable and thus actionable insofar as
riparian pollutees are concerned. At least this is the rule which
is generally applied to nonriparian uses of water.518
One can probably find exceptions to everything which I have
said in this section; I am not trying to write a definitive work on
riparian rights. Still this should suffice to show that "[u]nblessed
is the riparian proprietor, for he knows not where he stands." 519
There seems to be no appreciable difference in outcome between
517. See, e.g., Masonite Corp. v. Burnham, 164 Miss. 840, 146 So. 292
(1933). The Masonite decision involved the allegations that the defendanes
pollution of the stream caused stinks and mosquitoes; the court apparently
believed that those forms of air pollution were actionable. Nevertheless, it
held that the plaintiffs, not being riparian owners,
[H]ad no right or title to the fish of the creek; they were not con-
cerned as to whether they were destroyed by the pollution of the
stream or not, unless their destruction resulted in offensive odors that
reached [the plaintiffs] . . . [and] were not concerned as to whether
the waters of the creek were rendered unfit for bathing, or drinking,
or cooking, or washing -..
Id. at 859, 146 So. at 296. There are cases where nonriparian owners have
prevailed as plaintiffs in actions based on violations of riparian rights. See, e.g.,
Lawrie v. Silsby, 76 Vt. 240, 56 A. 1106 (1904). These cases, however, involve
grants of the use of the water by a riparian owner to the nonriparian plaintiff.
Presumably, the test of reasonableness in such cases is whether the actions of
the defendant would have been unreasonable against the riparian owner who
made the grant. Id. at 252-53, 56 A. at 1108-09. It is perhaps significant
in Lawrie that the plaintiffs ("orators") took their water from the stream at
a point below the defendant's land.
518. See, e.g., Stratton v. Mount Herman Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103
N.E. 87 (1913). Notice, however, that in Mount Herman it was a riparian
owner who diverted the waters to a nonriparian use; this seems typical of
such cases. A continuing polluter will almost always be a riparian owner,
and, though the pollutants may be generated off the riparian land, the use
involved is waste disposal which presumably would be deemed riparian. This
may explain the paucity of cases involving nonriparian polluters. See also
note 499 supra.




the rules of nuisance and those of riparian rights. Only in the
case of pollution by a nonriparian owner is the pollutee likely to
be better off asserting riparian rights and such cases are, to put it
mildly, not common. More importantly, the rights of a riparian
owner are no better defined than those of any other victim of a
nuisance. Nothing in the law of riparian rights suggests that
such rights are property rights of the type that can be the subject
of an efficient market and this is especially true of those riparian
rights and privileges which pertain to water quality. It may be
that, as a practical matter, a plaintiff can improve his position by
stressing riparian rights concepts rather than nuisance; the courts
may be influenced more by the absolute sounding maxim of
"natural flow," Aqua currit et debet currere, ut currere solebat,520
than they are by the equally absolute, and equally meaningless,
maxim "sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas," oft repeated in nui-
sance cases.
Such distinctions can, however, be of little assistance in com-
paring the consequences of one regime of water quality law with
those of an efficient market. Undoubtedly different judges at
different times and places will apply the rules of riparian rights,
and of nuisance, in different ways in differing factual situations.
Except for broad changes in attitude over time,521 there is little
520. "Water flows, and ought to flow as it has been wont to flow." 3 J.
KENT, COMM NTAREES ON AmmiCAN LAw *439 (13th ed. 1884), as quoted
in Kinyon, supra note 519, at 517.
521. For a study of such changes in judicial attitude, see Horwitz, The
Transformation in a Conception of Property in American Law, 1780-1860,
40 U. Cm. L. REv. 248 (1973). Professor Horwitz is not concerned directly
with problems of water quality, although a major portion of his article deals
with water rights. Id. at 251-79. He does not attempt to analyze the results
of particular cases on the bases of their "facts," for he is concerned with
changing legal doctrines. It would be a peculiar lawyer who would deny
that there was some positive correlation between the doctrines espoused by
the courts and the results that they reach on particular facts; my problem in
this article is that there does not seem to be any way to compare the results
of the relevent legal doctrines (particularly the concept of "reasonable use")
with those of an efficient market. I am, therefore, compelled to consider the
difficulties surrounding the enforcement of rights to clean water rather than
the nature of those rights themselves. It may be that Professor Horwitz has
imposed more order on the legal doctrines relating to water law than the
cases themselves will bear; his conclusions, however, are relevant to the prob-
lems considered in this article.
Professor Horwitz begins with the following observation:
As property rights came to be justified by their efficacy in promoting
economic growth, they also became increasingly vulnerable to the
efficiency claims of newer competing forms of property. Thus, the
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which one can make of this diversity, except to say that it leaves
the rights of the parties ill-defined and imposes heavy transaction
costs on any attempt by riparian owners to reach a market ac-
commodation of their various interests. It would be interesting
to know how different courts would resolve identical factual sit-
uations involving water pollution but this is something which no
one can ever pretend to know. Ceteris paribus is not an assump-
tion available to lawyers.
In the case of appropriative rights one might expect a different
result since the states that have the appropriative system do not
rely on the law of nuisance--and do not expressly use a criterion
of reasonableness 52z-for the rules governing permissible use of
water. The fact is, however, that the only private remedy for
water pollution in a state that has only the appropriative system
will be a generalized nuisance action-except in the uncommon
case where the pollution of a junior appropriator interferes with
the use of a senior appropriator.
2. Appropriative Rights
The system of appropriative rights which is the typical regime
of water law in the western United States developed initially in
California in the period following the gold rush. Neither the
miners nor any other private persons had title to large portions
of the riparian lands in California; the miners were trespassers on
the public domain. Still they needed some means to settle dis-
putes among themselves as to who could use the waters.
rule of priority, wearing the mantle of economic development, at first
triumphed over natural use. In turn, those property rights acquired
on the basis of priority were soon challenged under a balancing test
or "reasonable use" doctrine that sought to define the extent to which
newer forms of property might injure the old with impunity. Pri-
ority then claimed the status of natural right, but only rarely did it
check the march of efficiency. Nor could a doctrine of reasonable
use long protect those who advanced under its banner since its func-
tion was to clear the path for the new and the efficient. Some of
its beneficiaries eventually reclaimed the doctrine of priority, this
time asserting the efficiency of "natural monopoly" and the inevita-
bility of a standard of priority.
Viewed retrospectively, one is tempted to see a Machiavellian hand
in this process.
Id. at 251. And he concludes: "In the process of responding to the changing
and often unstable utilitarian standard of efficiency, the American conception
of property was harnessed to the paramount goal of economic development."
Id. at 290.
522. But cf. note 585 infra.
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The miners met this problem just as they met the prob-
lem of adjusting the right to use a limited number of
mines among a multitude of people. They applied the
doctrine of prior appropriation to the water just as they
did to the mining claims, and they limited the amount
of water each person could use to the amount that he
originally appropriated from the stream to operate his
mine.523
The California courts recognized this "customary" water law of
the miners,524 and both the Congress 525 and the Supreme Court 5 28
of the United States eventually recognized the validity of water
rights acquired by appropriation on the public domain.5 2 For what-
ever reason, either because most of the land in the western states
was in the public domain, or because a system of prior appropri-
ations encourages the development of water resources, the states of
the arid west universally adopted some version of this appropriation
system; many of the states even specified in their constitutions that
water rights were to be allocated on the basis that first in time is
first in right.528
In a state which has a pure appropriation system, there is little
opportunity in water quality litigation (or in other types of water
litigation) for the courts to justify their results in terms of reason-
523. McGowan, The Development of Political Institutions on, the Public
Domain, 11 Wyo. L.J. 1, 14 (1956).
524. The appropriation system was first developed in California after the
gold rush but before 1860. See, e.g., Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855);
Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249 (1853). In these early cases the impetus toward
the appropriation system came less from a scarcity of water than from a scarcity
of owners of riparian land. In the western states large portions of the land
belonged to the federal government as part of the public domain, and the
government in distant Washington had no interest in asserting riparian rights.
Thus, miners simply diverted the water from streams on the public domain to
their diggings, and the problem of allocating such waters came to the courts
only when different miners attempted to use the same water. Though both
claims to the water were in a sense on the rights of the federal government,
the courts were willing to settle their disputes on the basis of first in time,
first in right. "[Qlui prior est in tempore, potior est in jure." Irwin v. Phil-
lips, 5 Cal. 140, 147 (1855).
525. Act of July 26, 1866, 14 Stat. 253.
526. Basey v. Gallagher, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 670 (1875).
527. It has also been suggested that "[t]he law of prior appropriation existed
under the Mexican republic at the time of the acquisition of New Mexico.'
United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 9 N.M. 292, 306, 51 P. 674,
678 (1898). But see State v. Valmont Plantations, 346 S.W.2d 853 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1961), aft'd, 163 Tex. 381, 355 S.W.2d 502 (1962).
528. See, e.g., Coro. CoNsT. art. XVI, §§ 5, 6.
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ableness. In theory, the first appropriator has the right to have the
waters (in the amount which he appropriated) come to him unpol-
luted and he is privileged to use the waters for the purpose for
which they were appropriated without concern for the interests of
any subsequent appropriator. 529 The second appropriator on the
stream has the same right to unpolluted water with respect to all
subsequent appropriators, though not of course with respect to the
first appropriator. The third appropriator has the same right, except
with respect to the first and second appropriators and so on. Of
course, even under a pure appropriation system, water pollution-
even if caused by an appropriator-constitutes an actionable nui-
sance if it interferes unreasonably with the use and enjoyment of the
plaintiFs land;53 0 such cases are, however, rare in the reports from
western jurisdictions. There is also some authority allowing a junior
appropriator to recover from a senior appropriator who unreason-
ably befouls the waters to the detriment of the junior; such cases
are also rare 31 even though one would expect that the western
courts would, in their compulsion to squeeze the last drop of benefit
out of a dry gulch, be extremely alert to prevent any wasteful (and
therefore, to them, unreasonable) use of water, whether the waste
results from consumption or pollution.
529. But see, e.g., Dripps v. Allison's Mines Co., 45 Cal. App. 95. 187 P.
448 (1919).
A prior locator cannot insist that the stream above him shall not be
used by subsequent locators or appropriators for mining purposes,
and that the water shall flow to his claim in a state of absolute purity.
While the subsequent locator will not be permitted so to conduct his
operations as to unreasonably interfere with the fair enjoyment of
the stream by the prior locator, . . . nevertheless, the law recognizes
the necessity for some deterioration, which, within reasonable limits,
is damnum absque injuria. Any other rile might involve an abso-
lute prohibition of the use of all the water of a stream above a prior
location in order to preserve the quality of a small portion taken
therefrom.
Id. at 99, 187 P. at 450. Notice that even the first appropriator cannot obtain
a right to totally unpolluted water. This is a striking example of the law's
bias against "conservative uses." See notes 574-99 infra and accompanying
text.
530. See, e.g., Conley v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 74 Idaho 416, 263 P.2d
705 (1953). Such cases are necessarily rare since a landowner in an appro-
priation state has no right to have the quality or quantity of the water in the
streams remain unimpaired. The only actionable nuisance that a riparian
owner could suffer because of water pollution in such a state would appear
to be from smells or, perhaps, from the threat of disease. If the riparian
owner appropriates the water that has been polluted by a prior appropria-
tion, then the conflict will be between the two appropriators.
531. See, e.g., Suffolk Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. San Miguel Consol.
Mining & Milling Co., 9 Colo. App. 407, 48 P. 828 (1897).
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Thus, it appears that there is less legal protection for private
persons who desire waters of good quality under the appropriative
system than there is under the riparian system. What protection
there is is based on the standard of reasonable use present in both
"nuisance" and "riparian" cases.53 2
C. Public Nuisance
The law of public nuisance need not detain us for long, if only
because many public nuisances relating to water quality will be the
subject of statutes purporting to regulate pollution. In fact, the
FWPCA can be considered as establishing the standards by which
pollution which is not a public nuisance can be differentiated from
that unreasonable pollution which is a public nuisance. For the
most part, public nuisance actions can only be brought by public
authorities. Such actions are therefore not relevant to this discussion
of the efficiency of private rights and private causes of action re-
lating to water quality.
To the extent that public nuisance actions can be brought by
private parties, it is perhaps anomalous that they bear the same
name as do private nuisance actions since there is little theoretical
connection between the two forms of action except that both are
subdivisions of trespass on the case. "The two have almost nothing
in common, except that each causes inconvenience to someone, and
it would have been fortunate if they had been called from the be-
ginning by different names- a8
Public nuisance was originally a purely criminal action "and no
common person could have a remedy in respect of it."5 4 Today,
however, a public nuisance is actionable by a private plaintiff, pro-
vided that he can show that he has "suffered damage particular to
532. See note 599 infra; cf. note 529 supra.
533. W. PitossER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 86 (4th ed. 1971) (footnote omit-
ted). Dean Prosser continues: "Add to this the fact that a public nui-
sance may also be a private one, when it interferes with the enjoyment of
land, and that even apart from this there are circumstances in.which a private
individual may have a tort action for the public offense itself, and it is not
difficult to explain the existing confusion." Id. (footnotes omitted). In a case
where a private party has a public nuisance action for water pollution, he will
almost always have a private action based on the same facts. See notes 638-
39 infra, and accompanying text. The near identity in fact-if not in theory-
between the two types of nuisance actions, in so far as water pollution is
concerned, reduces confusion and justifies my assertion that all private actions
relating to water quality sound in nuisance.
534. Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 L.Q. REv. 480, 483 (1949).
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him, and not shared in common by the rest of the public."5 3 5 Al-
though the requirement that the wrongful act be a common law
crime has been abandoned in many jurisdictions, it is still true that
"[tlo be considered public the nuisance must affect an interest
common to the general public, rather than peculiar to one individ-
ual, or several. Thus the pollution of a stream which merely in-
conveniences a number of riparian owners is a private nuisance
only, but it may become a public one if it kills the fish."536
For our purposes the most important characteristic of public
nuisance actions is the test of wrongfulness. "A public nuisance is
an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general
public."3 7 Thus, the test for liability is the same as in other nui-
sance actions: to be an actionable nuisance, public or private, water
pollution must be "unreasonable."
D. Efficiency and the Rule of Reasonableness
Having summarized the law of nuisance as it applies to water
quality, it would seem necessary to compare the substantive work-
ings of that law with the results of an efficient market. Unfortu-
nately, it is impossible to make such a comparison since the cause
of action in nuisance "is immersed in undefined uncertainty."88
To a certain extent the law of nuisance, like the market, is a
means of resolving conflicting desires about the use and consumption
of resources which are "owned" by members of society. But it is
535. W. PROSSER, supra note 533, at § 88. Dean Prosser adds:
[Ilt is uniformly held that a private individual has no action for
the invasion of the purely public right, unless his damage is in some
way to be distinguished from that sustained by other members of
the general public. It is not enough that he suffers the same incon-
venience or is exposed to the same threatened injury as everyone
else. Redress of the wrong to the community must be left to its
appointed representatives. The best reason that has been given for
the rule is that it relieves the defendant of the multiplicity of ac-
tions which might follow if everyone were free to sue for the com-
mon harm.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
536. Id. (footnotes omitted). There are examples of the private-public
nuisance dichotomy discussed in the quoted passage. .Compare Smith v. City
of Sedalia, 152 Mo. 283, 53 S.W. 907 (1899), with State ex rel. Wear v.
Springfield Gas & Elec. Co., 204 S.W. 942 (Mo. Ct. App. 1918).
537. RESTATEMENT (SEcoNn) OF ToRTs § 821B(1) (Tent. Draft No. 17,
1971).
538. Undelivered opinion of ErIe, C. J., in Brand v. Hammersmith & City Ry.,




also a means of assigning the "ownership" of resources. As I have
pointed out repeatedly, the distribution of wealth determines the
"efficient" allocation of resources.539 To the extent that nuisance
cases are decided upon distributional grounds or to the extent that
such decisions have distributional effects there is no way to study
the relative efficiencies of the various possible distributions. One
cannot compare apples and oranges. Though one distribution may
be closer to a Pareto optimum than another distribution is to an-
other optimum, so long as the two optima differ, there is no way
to compare the efficiency of the two distributions.5
40
The courts have tended to analyze pollution problems in terms
of property rights. Blackstone quotes the maxim "sic utere tuo, ut
alienum non laedas,"541 as the basis for liability in nuisance.
Roughly translated, this means "use your own property so that the
property of another does not suffer." The English translation re-
veals a threshold question which every court must face before the
maxim can be applied: which is your property and which is that of
There is no standard by which to measure degrees of annoyance, or
to estimate the effect of circumstances; each neighbour is a source
of some annoyance; proximity necessitates mutual forbearance; the
degree of forbearance to be required is measured by the sensibility
to feelings of delicacy of the tribunal which has to decide the case,
and cannot be foreseen til that decision is given. The maxim, "sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas," is no help to decision, as it cannot
be applied til the decision is made; and the use of the word "nui-
sance" in the discussion prolongs the dispute, because it means both
annoyance that is actionable, and also that which is not actionable;
and where the question is, whether an annoyance is actionable, the
word "nuisance" introduces an equivocation which is fatal to any hope
of a clear settlement.
Id. at 246-47.
539. See, e.g., text accompanying note 160 supra.
540. See notes 164-65 supra. and accompanying text.
541. 3 W. BLAcKsToNE, Co as Tamrrus 0120.
[I]t is a nuisance to stop or divert water that used to run to another's
meadow, or mill; to corrupt or poison a water-course, by erecting a
dye-house or a lime-pit for the use of trade, in the upper part of the
stream; or, in short, to do any act therein that in its consequences
must necessarily tend to the prejudice of one's neighbor. So closely
does the law of England enforce that excellent rule of gospel moral-
ity, of "doing to others, as we would they should do unto ourselves."
Id. at 204 (footnotes omitted).
See also William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (1610).
[I]f a glover sets up a lime-pit for calve skins and sheep skins so near
the said watercourse that the corruption of the lime-pit has corrupted
it, for which cause his tenants leave the said house, an action on the
case lies for it, as it is adjudged in 13 H.7. 26. b. and this stands with
the rule of law and reason, sc. Prohibetur ne quis faciat in suo quod
nocere possit alieno: et sic utere tua ut alienum non laedas.
Id. at 821 (footnotes omitted).
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another? In many cases this question presents no problem. Your
car, for example, is your car-my bedroom, my bedroom, We
would hardly worry about who owned what if you drove your car
through my bedroom window, and questions of ownership are not
likely to bother the judge when I drag you into court. But who
owns a living stream? It seems to be typical of nuisance cases (and
it is certainly true of water pollution cases) that the question of
who owns what is not resolved until a court decides the litigation,
and even then the resolution is likely to be limited to the particular
facts and parties involved. No one "owns" the water quality in a
stream.r2
Physical scientists have long been aware that physical "things"-
matter or energy or mass-are neither created nor destroyed, though
they inevitably will lose their usefulness to us.543 For the most part,
economists have failed to grasp the crude physical fact that for
every useful physical input into an economic process, there must be
a less useful, or possibly harmful, output.544 Until recently they
have also failed to grasp the fact that market exchanges are con-
cerned less with physical goods and factors of production than with
legal (or customary) rights and privileges relating to physical en-
tities. It is perhaps Professor Coase's greatest contribution to have
stressed the fact that:
If factors of production are thought of as rights, it be-
comes easier to understand that the right to do something
which has a harmful effect (such as the creation of smoke,
noise, smells, etc.) is also a factor of production . 45
To draw a comparison between the results of nuisance law and
those of an efficient market, it is necessary to know what some of
the results of the efficient market would be. This entails an exam-
ination of the distribution of legal rights, for one must know this
distribution before one can predict, even in theory, the allocation
of such rights that would be reached by an efficient market. As will
be demonstrated, in the typical nuisance case, the typical water
542. See text accompanying note 457 supra.
543. See N. GEORGESCU-ROEGEN, THE ENTROPY LAw AND TBE ECONOMIC
PRocEss 5-6 (1971).
544. Georgescu-Roegen is the outstanding exception. And he is hardly an
orthodox economist. See generally N. GEORESCU-ROEGEN, supra note 543.
545. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & ECoN. 1, 44 (1960);
see text accompanying note 443 supra.
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pollution case, there is no original distribution of the pertinent rights
and privileges.
It is easy for an economist to say as does Professor Coase: "In
this section, I will take the initial determination of rights . . . as
given."546 Unfortunately, I cannot do that, and I cannot do that
for reasons which Coase himself gives but apparently fails to ap-
preciate fully:
The reasoning employed by the courts in determining
legal rights will often seem strange to an economist because
many of the factors on which the decision turns are, to an
economist, irrelevant. Because of this, situations which are,
from an economic point of view, identical will be treated
quite differently by the courts. The economic problem in
all cases of harmful effects is how to maximize the value
of production.... But it has to be remembered that the
immediate question faced by the courts is not what shall
be done by whom but who has the legal right to do what.547
546. Id. at 16. For an even more striking example of an economist assum-
ing away the entire problem of undistributed rights, see Stubblebine, On Prop-
erty Rights and Institutions, in H. MAsEn, THE EcoNoarics OF LEGAL EZLA-
TIoNsMaPs H (1975). Professor Stubblebine favors us with the following
"Axiom of Existence": "At any moment, property rights are specified fully to
all choosing individuals." Id. at 14. This "axiom" is in turn qualified by the
following footnote: "Although fully specified, there may be considerable un-
certainty in the minds of some, or all, individuals as to just what the rights
are." Id. at 21 n.3. To a lawyer, this comes as somewhat of a shock. If the
law is a prediction as to what a court will decide, then it makes little sense
to say that an unpredictable decision is "specified" before the decision is made.
This process of reifying the not (yet) existent allows its practitioners to assume
the very problem under consideration out of existence; it is closely related to
the more common assumption of welfare economists that everyone has perfect
information. Professor Stubblebine is, however, aware of the limitations of his
methodology, for he concludes:
Laws modified in one period condition behavior in the future periods;
nature and men always in some measure are unpredictable; man's
capacity to discover new modes of behavior and new technology
seems unbounded. Multi-period-uncertainty analysis seems unavoid-
able.
Even if men in concert could discover a reward-punishment struc-
ture leading each individual to conclude that the expected pay-off to
him of every proscribed act is negative, at this writing such a struc-
ture seems likely to gut the qualities which make life attractive.
It may well be that men are destined to exist forever on the edge
of the jungle.
Id. at 20-21.
547. Coase, supra note 545, at 15 (emphasis added). Coase goes on to say:
"It is always possible to modify by transactions on the market the initial legal
delimitation of rights. And, of course, if such market transactions are cost-
less, such a rearrangement of rights will always take place if it would lead to
an increase in the value of production." Id.
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In other words, courts are concerned with the distribution of rights
and privileges among the members of the community and, unlike
the economists, they are not concerned in all cases with the maxi-
mization of the value of production.
To the extent that nuisance law determines this initial distribu-
tion, that law cannot be evaluated in terms of the model of an
efficient market. The distribution is part of the data that must be
fed into the model. Since the courts have not yet made a deter-
mination in the majority of potential nuisance actions, there is no
initial distribution of rights or privileges that can be cranked into
the model. Therefore, we cannot compare the results of the model
with those of the law.
One could make a comparison between the market and the law
assuming some purely hypothetical initial distribution. Unfortu-
nately, such a comparison merely strengthens my belief that no
meaningful comparison can be made.
Assume a community in which the initial distribution is one
in which everyone has the absolute right to clean water. Or, if the
market is to work, assume one in which everyone has an absolute
right to have a distinct, but undivided, share of the community's
pristine water quality.5 48 In the model of the efficient market, those
who want to pollute will be able to buy 49 some of these rights and
an "efficient" level of pollution will result. As far as the model of
the market is concerned, exactly the same level of pollution will
result if we assume an initial distribution in which everyone has
That last sentence is the famous Coase theorem. Professor Coase recognizes
and is concerned with the fact that market transactions are not costless. What
he fails to recognize, although he demonstrates it quite clearly, is that there is
no initial distribution and that, in the absence of such distribution, "the value
of production" is undefined.
548. This refinement should not disturb a lawyer. Each member of the
community holds an undivided share in the water quality as a tenant in com-
mon. Still, the mind boggles at the idea of anyone "owning" a "quality." The
normal subject matter of property is some sort of an entity (e.g., an acre of
land or a pencil), and it offends both our language and our logic to treat a
quality that is predicated on entities as itself being an entity. One can own
a field of grain, but can one own the goodness of the field? Cf. text accom-
panying note 448 supra.
549. Remember, the public goods problem is not present in the model.
There is, however, one limit on the would-be polluters which may prevent them
from purchasing the privilege to pollute. They may have no assets other than
the right to clean water and, like Friday in one of my earlier examples, be
doomed to starvation in an optimal world. Even if that state of affairs prevails,
the would-be polluters can "consume" their own shares of water quality, though
they might more sensibly trade those shares for a crust of bread.
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an absolute privilege to pollute a distinct but undivided share of
the community's waters. Whether the law permits or represses
pollution appears to make no difference so long as the different
rules of law do not imply different distributions of wealth.mo If one
changes the distribution so that the rights or privileges are not evenly
distributed, then there will be different exchanges leading to dif-
ferent allocations.
Despite the fact in pollution cases there is no preexisting dis-
tribution of the relevant rights and privileges, several lawconomists
have hypothesized that the courts reach their decisions on the basis
of efficiency analyses:
The common law recognized the danger of assigning
exclusive rights either to pollutors or to their victims.
Under the doctrine of nuisance and cognate doctrines ap-
plicable to special areas such as water rights, courts fol-
lowed a standard of reasonable use. Pollution was lawful
if reasonable in the circumstances, which meant (but only
approximately) if the benefit from continuing to pollute
550. [Nlegotiating and administrative costs-the economic literature re-
fers to them collectively as "transactions costs'-tend to rise rapidly
with the size of the affected public and its spread over a given area,
such being the case, whatever the state of the law, the alternative out-
comes tend to be polar: under... permissive laws, the production of
pollution-creating goods is no more restrained than that of goods
which produce no pollution. In contrast, there would be no produc-
tion of polluting products under a pollutant-repressive law. Either
outcome is, then, economically justified under its own law since,
under either law, the transactions costs involved in reaching agreement
about allowing or curbing the polluting goods exceed any mutual
benefits calculable in the absence of such transactions costs. Using
words evocatively (and ... [supposingl that mutual agreement on
the output of polluting goods is the only method in use), permissive
laws would result in a world having "too muich" pollution; repressive
laws in a world having "too little." To be more precise, "too much"
and "too little" refer here to the resulting unchecked output and zero
output respectively, when either is compared with some hypothetical
ideal, or optimal output that would have been agreed upon by both
parties in the complete absence of transactions costs.
E.J. MIsH.w, MArING 'rM Wo=rn SAFE FOR PORNOcmUPHY AN OrH INTrL-
LECrTUAL FASmONS 83-84 (1973). Although I agree with Professor Mishan
about pollution up to a point, I do not in general subscribe to his views on
pornography. I am afraid that I am one of "today's pallid liberals for whom
sexual morality poses no problem. 'Every man to his taste' is the crucial dictum
here, with the occasional proviso that nobody be manifestly hurt in the process."
Id. at 112. I believe that pollution may cause severe damage both to the
earth and to humanity; I doubt that pornography can cause serious damage to
either one. Pornography is not, for example, something that we impose on
future generations. And I am afraid that I am an extreme believer in freedom
of speech.
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exceeded the cost to the victims of pollution of either
tolerating or eliminating it, whichever was cheaper. This
is the same standard we suggested earlier for arbitrating
conflicts in land use .... 551
Professor Coase makes the same point more cautiously:
A thorough examination of the presuppositions of the
courts in trying such cases would be of great interest but
I have not been able to attempt it. Nevertheless it is clear
from a cursory study that the courts have often recognized
the economic implications of their decisions and are aware
(as many economists are not) of the reciprocal nature of
the problem. Furthermore, from time to time, they take
these economic implications into account, along with other
factors, in arriving at their decisions. 552
The courts do, on occasion, attempt to justify, and even per-
haps to reach, their decisions in nuisance cases on grounds of eco-
nomic efficiency. Thus, supposedly, one early case held that "le
utility del chose excusera le noisomeness del stink," 553 while over
a hundred years ago Baron Bramwell argued to the House of Lords:
It is said that the railway and the working of it are for the
public benefit, and therefore the damage must be done,
and be uncompensated. Admitting that the damage must
be done for the public benefit, that is no reason why it
should be uncompensated. It is to be remembered that
that compensation comes from the public which gets the
benefit. It comes directly from those who do pay the
damage, but ultimately from the public in the fares they
pay. If the fares will not pay for this damage, and a fair
profit on the company's capital, the speculation is a losing
one, as all the gain does not pay all the loss and leave a
fair profit. Either, therefore, the railway ought not to be
made, or the damage may well be paid for.s54
551. R. PosNEa, EcoNomuc ANALYSIS OF LAW 25-26 (1973).
552. Coase, supra note 545, at 19.
553. J. STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEw OF THE CRIINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 106
(2d ed. 1890). See also Coase, supra note 545, at 19-20 and n.16. Sir James
Stephen cited this bit of economic doctrine in support of his contention that
"[a] remarkable matter in connection with the law of nuisances is the nature
and extent of the limitations upon it. To a considerable extent the law upon
the subject is made up of compromises." Id. at 106. He hardly sounds like
an economist in full pursuit of a fleeting Pareto optimum.
554. Hammersmith & City Ry. v. Brand, [1869] L.R. 4 H.L. 171, 191.
The Hammersmith decision was what we today in this country would classify as
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When, however, judges make such economic arguments, either they
must implicitly assume that the rights and privileges in question
have already been assigned to various "owners" or else they must
decide how well-being is to be distributed. Baron Bramwell as-
sumed that the railway's neighbors had the legal right not to be
annoyed by the railway while the old spouter of low French was,
whether he knew it or not, holding that one of society's assets (i.e.,
the privilege of stinking) belonged to the stinker rather than the
stinkee.
It is also clear from the reports that many judges in nuisance
cases base their decisions not on economic efficiency but on the
judge's idea of how legal rights and privileges have been, or should
be, distributed. A generation before Baron Bramwell advised the
law lords in terms of economic theory; Chancellor Green of New
Jersey noted in a water pollution case that the plaintiffs should get
their injunction not because they were rich (which would have an
efficiency argument) but because the pollution deprived them of
"one of the essential elements of life" which the court would pro-
tect for even the humblest cotter. 55
There is no reason to believe that the opinions of Baron Bram-
well and Chancellor Green are irreconcilable.556  One can tell a
railroad that it should not exist if it cannot pay damages to its
a "taking" case. The question was whether a railway with the statutory power
to (as we would say) take property under the power of eminent domain was
liable to pay compensation for the damages resulting from the vibrations caused
without negligence by passing trains. The holding was that there was no
right, at least no statutory right, to such compensation.
555. See note 241 supra and accompanying text.
556. There is one important distinction between Baron Bramwelrs approach
and that of Chancellor Green. The Baron was discussing damages, the Chan-
cellor an injunction. I should only point out that our new crop of lawconomists
are strongly biased in favor of the damage remedy in those areas where the
distribution of rights and privileges is unclear and a market does not exist.
Thus Professor Posner tells us:
In conflicting-use situations where transaction costs are high, the allo-
cation of resources to their highest valued uses is facilitated by deny-
ing property right holders an injunctive remedy against invasions of
their rights and instead limiting them to a remedy in damages (why?).
When transaction costs are low, injunctive relief should be allowed as
a matter of course (why?).
R. Pos cna, supra note 551, at 29 (footnote omitted). On the other hand, it
is in injunction cases that the courts are most likely to reject the plausible
arguments of efficiency for more appealing ones of justice.
For an analysis by one who professes to see no difference between the in-
terests of polluters and the interests of their victims, see Sax, Takings, Private
Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971).
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victims and still earn a fair profit for its owners; one does not
thereby obligate oneself to tell a humble cotter that he should not
exist. Sometimes distributional considerations will appear to con-
trol a case; other cases will be decided on efficiency grounds. The
decision in either case, however, will have both distributional and
efficiency consequences. The two cannot be separated except in
the mind of an economist.
In the following examples taken from equity decisions, the courts
rejected efficiency arguments in favor of distributional considera-
tions. In McCleery v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co.,55 7 the court
stated and rejected 558 the efficiency argument in the following
terms:
The substantial contention of the defendant is that it is
engaged in a business of such extent and involving such a
large capital that the value of the plaintiffs' rights sought
to be protected is relatively small, and that therefore an
injunction, destroying the defendant's business, would inflict
a much greater injury on it than it would confer benefit
upon the plaintiffs. Under such circumstances, it is as-
serted, courts of equity refuse to protect legal rights by
injunction and remit the injured party to the partial relief
to be obtained in actions at law. Stated in another way,
the claim in effect is that one wrongfully invading the legal
rights of his neighbor will be permitted by a court of
equity to continue the wrong indefinitely on condition that
he invests sufficient capital in the undertaking.
I am unable to accede to this statement of the law.
If correct, the property of the poor is held by uncertain
tenure, and the constitutional provisions forbidding the
taking of property for private use would be of no avail.
As a substitute it would be declared that private property
is held on the condition that it may be taken by any person
who can make a more profitable use of it, provided that
such person shall be answerable in damage to the former
owner for his injury. In a state of society the rights of
the individual must to some extent be sacrificed to the rights
of the social body; but this does not warrant the force-
557. 140 F. 951 (C.C.D. Utah 1904), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 146
F. 1023 (8th Cir. 1906).
558. An unconditional injunction was not issued because the complainants
were willing to sell their interest and because their cause was barred by the
doctrine of laches. The court gave the defendant a choice between paying
damages for a permanent right to maintain the nuisance and being enjoined.




able taking of property from a man of small means to give
it to the wealthy man, on the ground that the public will
be indirectly advantaged by the greater activity of the
capitalist. Public policy, I think, is more concerned in
the protection of individual rights than in the profits to
inure to the individuals by the invasion of those rights.559
In Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co.,560 which
was "disguise it as we will, or call it what we may . . . , a suit
between the mining counties [upstream] and valley counties.
[downstream],"5 61 the court first had to determine whether the
plaintiffs were privileged to engage in hydraulic mining and to
discharge their mining debris into the Feather and Sacramento
Rivers. Having decided that the downstream plaintiffs had the
right to clean water,562 the court faced, and faced down, the ef-
ficiency argument:
A great deal has been said about the comparative pub-
lic importance of the mining interests, and also the great
loss and inconvenience to those defendants if their opera-
tions should be stopped by an injunction. But those are
considerations with which we have nothing to do. We are
simply to determine whether the complainant's rights have
been infringed, and, if so, afford such relief as the law
entitles him to receive, whatever the consequence or in-
convenience to the wrong doers or to the general public
may be ....
. . . If the smaller interests must yield to the large,
all small property rights, and all smaller and less important
enterprises, industries, and pursuits would sooner or later
be absorbed by the large, more powerful few; and their
development to a condition of great value and importance,
both to the individual and the public, would be arrested
in its incipiency. But if the comparison could be made
in this instance, it would be impossible to say that the
interests of the defendants, and of those engaged in the
same pursuits, would be more important than those of the
complainant, and such as he represents in this con-
test . . . . But we have nothing to do with this ques-
559. 140 F. at 952.
560. 18 F. 753 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884).
561. Id. at 792.
562. "[If Congress had attempted to authorize an unlimited discharge of
mining debris into the navigable waters of the state . . . it had not the power
to render it lawful." Id. at-777. The court also found "the state had no
constitutional power to authorize the acts complained of, and any statute de-
signed to effect that object is void." Id. at 782.
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tion as to the comparative importance of the conflicting
interests, or the inconvenience to the defendants by the
stoppage of their works, if they infringe the material,
substantial rights of others. It is the province and im-
perative duty of the court to ascertain and enforce the
legal rights of the complainant, no matter what the con-
sequence to defendants may be. This duty no court could
evade if it would.5 68
Fiat justitia, ruat coelum! Yet, the court in Woodruff had the
option to decide that the defendants had the legal privilege to
continue dumping their debris into the waters; the question was
disputable. A cynic might point out that no injunction was granted
in McCleery and that the court in Woodruff said that it could not
tell whose activities were most beneficial to the public.564 The
fact remains though that some courts purport to place distributional
considerations above the claims of economic efficiency.
Other courts have decided nuisance cases on grounds which
relate neither to economic efficiency (at least not directly) nor to
the initial distribution of legal rights and privileges. One of the
traps inherent in the simplicities of the model of the efficient market
is that the model leads one to think in static terms. One plugs in
a distribution of wealth and out of the machine pops a description
of the corresponding optimal equilibrium. It is possible, however,
to think of the world as more flexible than that, and to evaluate a
proposed measure not in terms of the Pareto optimum associated
with the present distribution of wealth, but rather in terms of some
future distribution. A court which favors, or believes that the law
favors, "progress" or industrial growth is not likely to assign legal
rights and privileges either on the basis of "justice" considerations
or on the basis of short run efficiency, 565 but rather on the belief
563. Id. at 807-08 (emphasis added).
564. See Keeton & Morris, Notes on "Balancing the Equities," 18 TEx. L.
REv. 412, 425 (1940) and cases therein cited.
565. Some may protest that increased industrialization increases efficiency
because it increases the supply of goods available for consumption. However,
even if one assumes that industrialization inevitably increases the supply of
goods, this does not mean that the result is efficient (from the standpoint of
the initial distribution of well-being) unless compensation is paid to those
who are ground down beneath the wheels of progress. See note 144 supra and
accompanying text. In point of fact, the typical cases pushing industrialization
use progress as a reason for denying compensation to its victims. See text
accompanying note 569 infra. More telling still is the fact that there will come
a point with industrialization where the increased "goods" are exceeded by the
increased "bads" associated with them, resulting in a net decrease in goods.
See notes 272-73 supra and accompanying text.
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that the assignment will promote industrialization. Lord Justice
James could contend in 1874 in Salvin v. North Brancepeth Coal Co.
that
It would never have done, as it seems to me, for this Court,
in the reign of Henry VI to have interfered with the further
extension of sea coal in London, because it had been ascer-
tained to their satisfaction, or predicted to their satisfaction,
that by the reign of Queen Victoria both white and red
roses would have ceased to bloom in the Temple Gardens.
If some picturesque haven opens its arms to invite the com-
merce of the world, it is not for this Court to forbid the em-
brace, although the fruit of it should be the sights, and
sounds, and smells of a common seaport and shipbuilding
town, which would drive the Dryads and their masters from
their loved solitudes.5 66
But that judgment, though "economic" in a sense, was not justified
by his Lordship as leading to a Pareto optimum567 and was not
based on considerations of "distributive justice."5 68 Another ex-
ample is the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
566. Salvin v. North Brancepeth Coal Co., L.R. 9 Ch. 705, 709-10 (Ch. App.
1874).
567. Perhaps this statement is unfair. Inviting the commerce of the world
may have appeared to Lord Justice James as an increase in economic "effi-
ciency" in the sense that the end result would be an increase in wealth that
could be used to make someone better off without harming his fellows. But
it is doubtful that the Lord Justice was thinking in such terms since he made
no direct reference to compensation of the victims. Furthermore, an increase
in commerce would not necessarily increase goods more than bads.
To the extent that Lord Justice James was concerned with such questions,
he seems to have believed that the coal mining, which the plaintiff did not
desire, more than compensated him for the loss of the world that he wanted:
"A man to whom Providence has given an estate, under which there are veins
of coal worth perhaps hundreds of thousands of pounds per acre, must take
the gift with the consequences and concomitants of the mineral wealth in
which he is a participant." Id. at 710. Surely that is not the ghostly voice
of Vilfredo Pareto.
568. I am sure that a Marxist would cite Salvin as an example of the work-
ings of dialectical materialism and claim that Lord Justice James was moti-
vated by class interest. The plaintiff, wherever he had gotten his gelt, seems
to have stood for the landed gentry, while the defendant clearly was a repre-
sentative of the interests of nineteenth century bourgeois capitalism. I am not
sure that the Marxist would be wrong-Marxists are not always wrong-but I
am quite certain that his Lordship did not realize that he was making a de-
cision that took from the feudalists and gave to the capitalists. His Lordship
left that sort of thing to "Providence." See notes 570-72 infra and accom-
panying text.
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setts in Merrified v. City of Worchester,569 recognizing the in-
evitability of "progress," without claiming that the corruption of
Mill Brook was worth it. The fact remains that bowing to the in-
evitable was not justified by, and could not be justified by, an appeal
to Pareto optimality. The Supreme Judicial Court did not believe
that it was distributing or redistributing wealth. The theory under-
lying the opinion requires that those downstream bear the costs
imposed upon them by "those who happen to be above him,"
whether or not the court approves of this. Such an opinion can
only support my arguments, for either the court was motivated by
the desire to encourage "progress" and only used its "inevitability"
as an excuse for the result, or else the court was declaring that it
was powerless to reach a more optimal result. Whether the courts
encourage "progress" out of love or out of weakness, the very exis-
tence of such encouragement speaks against the theory that the law
of nuisance is designed to achieve economic efficiency.
It may sound paradoxical to argue that the goals of progress and
industrialization are not identical with economic efficiency. But
such identity does not exist unless "efficiency" means nothing more
than "industrialization." If an efficient state is defined as a Pareto
optimum, then there is no reason to believe that an increase in
industrialization will lead to an increase in efficiency. Those who
would encourage us to pollute the waters are perhaps not above
taking advantage of the confusion inherent in the various meanings
of "efficieney"
The following passage is striking not only because it reveals how
far the courts went to make the law of waters subservient to the
gods of industrialization, but also because it reveals how "efficiency"
can be confused with "progress."
In the nineteenth century... there were few limits to the
dominant mentality of maximization. When proportionate
use was regarded as more efficient than priority, propor-
tionality became the standard of reasonable use. When, in
turn, proportionality stood in the way of efficient use of
water resources, the law returned to priority as the standard
of reasonable use.
... Once the question of reasonableness of use became
a question of efficiency, legal doctrine enabled common law
judges to choose the direction of American economic devel-
opment. By [1844], they were so captivated by the spirit
569. 110 Mass. 216 (1872). See note 505 supra and accompanying text.
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of improvement that they were willing to manipulate the
concept of property to conform to their own notions of the
needs of industrialization.570
This "efficiency" that leads to a "maximization" of "industrialization"
is not a Paretian efficiency, nor is it the goal of welfare economics. 571
If one pursues a Paretian efficient allocation of wealth, one is at-
tempting to "optimize" society's activities so that there will be that
level of production of goods and their concomitant bads at which
no one can be made better off without making someone else worse
off. If one successfully pursues a policy of maximization of indus-
trial production, one will pass the point where the balance between
goods and bads is optimal and start sliding down the slope to Hell
or Cleveland, where the very rivers burn. 572
I am not saying that the nineteenth century courts were wrong
to encourage industrialization. I am not saying either that modem
courts should discourage further industrialization or that they should
encourage it. What I do claim is that the implementation of any
policy, other than the policy of seeking the Pareto optimum that is
determined by the present (undetermined and inchoate) distribu-
tion of wealth, will take us away from or (at least if the policy is
continued long enough) past that optimum.
The law of nuisance is too closely intertwined with the courts'
ideas of public policy for one to be able to compare its worldngs
570. Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of Property in Ameri-
can Law, 1780-1860, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 248, 261 (1973) (emphasis added).
571. This is not to say that economists or engineers doing cost-benefit anal-
yses do not at times pursue such a goal. It is to say that such a goal cannot
be justified even by the questionable morality of welfare economics.
572. So we moved beside
our guide
along the bank of the scalding purple
river
in which the shrieking wraiths were
boiled and dyed.
D. Axiamm, INFERNO, canto XII, lines 100-02 (J. Ciardi transl. 1954).
If Cleveland's Cuyahoga River is no longer inflammable the credit cannot
go to the law of nuisance, for no nuisance cases have been brought to protect
the purity of the effluents from Akron's sewers as they flow past Cleveland's
mills into Lake Erie. If today the Cuyahoga will not burn (and I am not
saying that it will not), the credit must be given either to enlightened self-
interest (would you want your drains to catch fire?) or to the federal and state
statutes designed (or, like the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, distorted) to
protect water quality. But cf. State ex rel. Bar Realty Corp. v. Locher, 30 Ohio
St. 2d 190, 283 N.E.2d 164 (1972) (writ of mandamus to command City of
Cleveland to enforce its water pollution control laws denied).
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with those of the invisible hand of the efficient market. Not only
are its applications unpredictable because they are based on factual
determinations as to reasonableness but also because those factual
determinations in turn are based on judicial perceptions of public
policy that change with time.
The law of nuisance plays between two antithetical ex-
tremes: the principle that every person is entitled to use his
property for any purpose that he sees fiMt, and the opposing
principle that everyone is bound to use his property in such
a manner as not to injure the property or rights of his neigh-
bor. For generations, courts in their tasks of judging, have
ruled on these extremes according to the wisdom of the day,
and many have recognized that the contemporary view of
public policy shifts from generation to generation.573
In these circumstances about all one can do is assume that the
allocation of rights to water quality determined by the courts in
nuisance cases is distributed about a point more or less at random.
But where that point is located with respect to the efficient alloca-
tion of water quality is a matter beyond conjecture. One could
even assume that the point represents an efficient allocation since
any allocation is likely to correspond to the Pareto optimum speci-
fied by some distribution of wealth. On the other hand, the allo-
cation is not likely to be efficient when one examines the distribu-
tion of resources that actually prevails-including that portion of the
distribution that results from judicial determination in nuisance
cases. With respect to all the potential cases that never reach court,
it might be better to say that the relevant distribution of rights and
privileges has never been made. In any case, it appears impossible
to come to any conclusion about the efficiency of the substantive
rules of nuisance law. 'Thou shalt not pollute unreasonably" is too
imprecise an injunction to be subjected to economic analysis.
V. THE I EFICNcES OF WATER LAW
A. The Bias Against "Conservative Uses"
Although it is impossible to analyze the efficiency of the substan-
tive decisions reached by the courts in cases where those decisions
573. Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 475, 78 N.E.2d 752, 759
(1947). The court continued: "The law of private nuisance is a law of de-
gree; it generally turns on the factual question whether the use to which the
property is put is a reasonable use under the circumstances. . Id. at 476,
48 N.E.2d at 759.
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are couched in terms of reasonableness, that does not mean that it
is impossible to analyze the efficiency of all substantive rules of
nuisance relating to water pollution. For example, from the time
at least of Justice Story, the law has not recognized that one has
"property" in water but rather that one is only entitled to its "use"
as it goes flowing by.574
When one examines the "uses" of water which our law protects,
it becomes apparent that the preservation of the natural quality of
a body of water is afforded little or no protection. The law of nui-
sance (or of riparian rights or of appropriation rights) may
afford some protection to one manufacturer against pollution by
another when the pollution unreasonably interferes with the first
manufacturer's production. It affords much less protection to that
diffuse interest which we all have-the public interest575-in the
natural quality of our waters.
There appear to be two general legal categorizations of the types
of uses which are made of waters. The earlier system, adopted in
the eastern states where water was plentiful in terms of the demands
imposed by the technology of the eighteenth century, distinguished
between natural and other uses, presumably unnatural, if not down-
right perverted.576
"Two potentially contradictory theories of property rights under-
lay eighteenth century legal doctrines for resolving conflicts over
uses of property. The first, an explicitly antidevelopmental theory,
limited property owners to what courts regarded as the 'natural'
uses of their land, and often 'natural' was equated with 'agrar-
ian.' 577  The natural uses included water for domestic consump-
tion, watering lawns and stock, and perhaps irrigation.578 This
categorization tended to protect the natural quality of a stream, at
least from the depredations of industrial users. But with the com-
ing of the nineteenth century and the religion of progress, the
machine entered the garden 79 and such antidevelopmental doctrines
574. See notes 449-52 supra and accompanying text.
575. I do not mean to imply that there is some sort of platonic entity called
"The Public Interest," or "The General Welfare" or some such thing. When I
use the term "public interest" I merely mean the interest which many people
have in a "public good" as that term is used by economists. See note 422
supra and accompanying text.
576. See, e.g., Evans v. Merriweather, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 492 (1842).
577. Horwitz, supra note 570, at 249.
578. See F. TRELEASE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 29 (1967).
579. For a study of the collision between industrialism and pastoral values,
see L. MARx, TAE MACHINE iN TBE GARDEN (1964).
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vanished along with the buffalo and clean waters. "In the process
of responding to the changing and often unstable utilitarian standard
of efficiency, the American conception of property was harnessed to
the paramount goal of economic development."580
In place of the protection of natural uses-and of nature as a
by-product-the pressures of industry and progress persuaded the
courts to substitute a new categorization of protected uses: those
uses which are "beneficial" in an economic sense. Nowhere has
this approach been more clearly stated than in the judgment of
Lord Justice James in 1874 when he said, as you will recall, "it
would never have been done because by the reign of Queen
Victoria both white and red roses would have ceased to bloom in
the Temple Gardens."58'
American courts have adopted the same philosophy 82 The
doctrine of "beneficial use" is most highly developed in the western
states where water is scarce. Every drop of water which escapes
to the sea is likely to be deemed waste and permitting its escape
will be deemed an unreasonable use.583 Often in the western states
To some extent, at least, the concern with environmental quality along with
the increasingly high value which our society assigns to nature, almost cer-
tainly is the consequence of a resurgence of pastoral values. See, e.g., Con-
servation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc. v. Volpe, 343 F. Supp. 761 (D. Vt. 1972);
cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (dissenting opinion of
Douglas, J.).
It is easy for hardheaded believers in rationality and the optimization of the
value of society's production to sneer, their feet firmly grounded on a Pareto
optimal equilibrium, at such a romantic and old-fashioned philosophy. To the
extent, however, that people do value nature highly, nature is valued highly.
If some sort of pastoral society were to become our summum bonum, then
that is the good which should be maximized according to the axioms of welfare
economics, no matter how distasteful it may be to the scientific and value-
neutral apostles of profit maximization.
580. Horwitz, supra note 570, at 290.
581. See Salvin v. North Brancepeth Coal Co., L.R. 9 Ch. 705 (Ch. App.
1874), quoted in full in text accompanying note 566 supr'a.
582. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453
(1886), discussed at note 150 supra.
583. "The state has a definite interest in seeing that none of the valuable
water from any of the streams of the state should go to waste." Rancho Santa
Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 560, 81 P.2d 533, 563 (1938).
Rancho Santa Margarita involved a dispute between two riparian owners in
a state which recognizes both riparian and appropriation doctrines; it is, how-
ever, one of the best expressions that I have seen of the goal of total con-
sumption, which underlies the appropriation doctrine. The case appears to
have been an epic and perhaps, to a romantic, tragic battle between the life
of the old Spanish West and the efficiency of the modem agri-business. The
plaintiff was the owner of a tract of land situated in San Diego County orig-
inating in a single Mexican grant known as the Santa Margarita y Las Flores
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there is a statutory hierarchy of beneficial uses; typically the highest
priorities go to domestic and industrial uses, while the lowest are
assigned in true puritan fashion to recreation and pleasure.584 But
if the doctrine of beneficial uses is most highly developed in the
West, the eastern courts today tend to assign the same meaning to
the phrase "reasonable use."5 5 As Professor Kinyon described the
workings of the Eastern, reasonable-use doctrine in 1937: "No pro-
prietor has a right to have the mere natural integrity of the stream
maintained."588
It would seem that, to the extent the courts refuse to protect
the public interest in the natural quality of our waters, the law of
nuisance could not afford that interest as much protection as it
would receive had we an efficient market in which everyone who
shares that interest could purchase his private portion of a natural
stream. This does not mean, however, that nuisance law affords no
protection to water in its natural state. A "beneficial" user down-
stream may want unpolluted water for his use and he might prevail
upon a court to protect his interest. In such a case, the public in-
terest in an unpolluted stream will receive some protection-at least
until the water in question is used "beneficially" by the successful
plaintiff. One cannot, however, expect that such protection will be
significant since the cost of purifying polluted water for industrial
use is often inexpensive. 587
Rancho, containing 133,440 acres. The defendants were upstream riparian own-
ers who in 1923 increased their diversions from the Tomecula-Santa Margarita
River so that the river "was caused thereby to disappear as a surface stream on
the Santa Margarita ranch some 6 miles further upstream than had theretofore
occurred." Id. at 517, P.2d at 541.
The "waste" which the court alluded to was that some of the river, at least
before the diversion, actually got to the Pacific.
584. See, e.g., TEx. WATER CODE ANNmr. § 5.024 (West 1972).
585. Although the terms "reasonable use" and "beueficial use" are syn-
onymous, each is usually associated with a different system of water
law..... The question as to whether a given usage is reasonable
usually does not arise until there are competing users with regard to a
given source. The "reasonable use" requirement of the riparian rights
system and the "beneficial use" or application called for by the prior
appropriation system are parallel terms, given a source of water inade-
quate to meet the desires of all potential users. Comparing the "rea-
sonableness" of two competing uses necessitates a determination of
the use with the higher value.
Levi, Highest and Best Use: An Economic Goal for Water Law, 34 Mo. L. Rzv.
165, 168 (1969).
586. Kinyon, What Can a Riparian Proprietor Do?, 21 Mnr. L. REv. 512,
524 (1937) (emphasis added).
587. See notes 553-54 supra and accompanying text. If the downstream
"beneficial use" is agricultural, the downstream user may have a stronger case
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There is a third categorization of the uses of water which courts
sometimes advert to, although the categories involve hydrological
rather than legal concepts. Uses are divided into those which are
"consumptive" and those which are "nonconsumptive"-into uses
which eventually return water to its original source, and those which
do not. This system of categorization is extremely useful when one
is considering problems involving the quantity of water available
but is not too useful when one is concerned with water quality. Non-
consumptive uses almost inevitably change the quality of the water
in some respect. A municipal sewage plant may consume no water
and yet greatly lower its quality. Little water may be consumed
in cooling a power plant, but the quality of the water, especially
its temperature, may change drastically, if only temporarily. And
temporary changes in temperature may have drastic consequences
upon aquatic life and upon oxygen levels in the water. Even a
hydroelectric plant which merely passes water through a turbine
may disrupt the ecological system of a stream. s8
The sad fact is that there apparently is no term to describe uses
which do not consume the quality of a water course.589 I propose
that we label such uses "conservative
-and be willing to spend more money to prove his point-because it is not so
easy to remove contaminants from irrigation waters.
It should be recognized that irrigation itself leads to low water quality in
several ways. It increases the amount of evaporation and thus concentrates
the pollutants in the remaining water. It causes siltation of streams. If it is
used in conjunction with fertilizers-as is usually the case-it leads to an in-
crease of nutrients in the remaining waters. Finally, it tends to leach out
salts which in strong concentrations make the water unusable for any purpose,
except perhaps as a laxative. Agriculture in the West has so corrupted the
Colorado River that Mexico has persuaded the United States to attempt to
desalt that stream-at the taxpayers' expense-before it reaches Mexico. See 43
U.S.C. § 1571 (1970).
Unfortunately, the FWPCA, for all its ambitious "goals," does not apply to
most agricultural pollution since the FWPCA's regulations for the most part
are concerned only with "point sources," 40 C.F.R. § 401 (1974), which does
not seem to include any agricultural source other than "concentrated animal
feeding operations." 40 C.F.R. § 412 (1974).
588. See, e.g., Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
589. There is, admittedly, good reason for the absence of such a term. Nor-
mally, the only way to preserve the quality of a stream or lake is not to use
it at all. It may strike some people odd that a nonuse should be described as
a use. But why should it not be if the usage is useful? We are familiar with
nonfeasance being treated as malfeasance, inaction as an act. Even economists,
who are decidedly mathematical these days, are used to considering zero as
a number and a straight line as a circle with an infinite radius. In any case,
such "nonuses" are clearly goods in the economic sense if people desire them.
To retain the negative label is likely to add nothing but confusion.
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Conservative uses include: impounding waters during times of
surplus for later use during the dry season, limiting withdrawals
from an aquifer so as to prevent the intrusion of salt water, aug-
menting the flow of a stream in order to dilute sewage or other
pollutants in the stream, preserving a trout stream for the benefit of
fishermen and hikers, and flood control projects. One striking char-
acteristic of these uses is that they are almost invariably 90 public,
both in the sense that they produce public goods and in the related
sense that they are normally undertaken by public agencies rather
than private property owners.59'
Conservative uses obviously tend to preserve water quality in
streams and lakes. In fact, preservation of water quality is in itself
a conservative use of water and an economic good. Once one rec-
ognizes this fact a great deal becomes clear about both water pollu-
tion and the legal and economic relations into which it enters. Part
of the value in having streams and lakes of decent quality is that
they will still be available to us in the future when we may need
them even more.5 92 Value also lies in the fact that decent water
590. Some relatively minor conservative uses of water are undertaken by
private persons: a rancher may construct his own reservoir to supply water to
his stock during the dry season, a hunting and fishing club may preserve a reach
of a trout stream (see, e.g., J. DAIEs, PorLunoN, PRoPERTY & PRCEs 68-70
(1968)), a farmer may construct an earth fill across a gully to reduce erosion
on his land. It should be apparent, however, that each of these private uses
does have external effects. The rancher reduces the amount of water available
to those downstream and the fishing club benefits downstream owners with
better water quality than they would have otherwise received. It may at first
glance be less clear how the farmer's blocking erosion has significant external
effects, yet those effects are so serious that Congress has provided subsidies for
farmers who undertake erosion control projects. 16 U.S.C. § 590h (b) (1970).
Conserving productive land benefits not only the landowner but also the public;
the dustbowl of the thirties damaged not only the farmers who were dusted
out, but also the entire economy of the nation. There is surely a moral here
for those who consider the conservation of water and water quality as being
of relatively little importance to the nation.
591. Of course there is almost certainly a causal connection between the
two meanings of the word "public." Only public agencies can afford to pro-
duce or conserve public goods in the amount that the public, the aggregation
of the individual members of the public, desires. See note 422 supra and
accompanying text.
592. The fact that goods or factors of production owned in common cannot
be saved in this fashion by the individual owners of the commons leads to the
over consumption of the commons. See notes 410, 419-21 supra and accom-
panying text. More important, perhaps, is the fact that the interests of future
generations cannot be fully protected by the workings of the most efficient
market. See notes 112-19 supra and accompanying text.
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quality is usable as a factor of production when the output is rec-
reation, tourism, and aesthetic pleasure. There is also value in the
-fact that decent water quality is an insurance against the risk which
we run of making that ecological system which we call the earth
unsuitable for human life. And there is value for fisheries.5 93 But
most important of all, perhaps, is the most intangible of all these
values: streams and lakes and seas seem to be essential to human
happiness, and were we to replace them all by open sewers we
would perhaps have so diminished ourselves that nothing that re-
mained would be of any value.
Yet the courts in litigation between private parties have been
reluctant to recognize that conservative uses are "beneficial" or
worthy of protection. Consider, for example, the holding in Empire
Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co.,594 a case in which the
complainant, a privately owned resort developed about a waterfall,
sought to enjoin the diversion of the water which fed the falls. In
denying the injunction the court said:
The laws of Colorado are designed to prevent waste of a
most valuable but limited natural resource, and to confine
the use to needs. By rejecting the common law rule they
deny the right of the landowner to have the stream run in
its natural way without diminution. He cannot hold to all
the water for the scant vegetation which lines the banks but
must make the most efficient use by applying it to his
land.... The case before us is exceptional, but we think
complainant is not entitled to a continuance of the falls
solely for their scenic beauty. The state laws proceed upon
593. It is easy to underestimate the potential economic values of fisheries.
It is true that compared to the other values described in the text, the value
of fisheries may be insignificant, but commercial fisheries are one of the few
values inherent in good water quality which can be measured in the market.
For example, it has been alleged that the destruction of the Lake E rie fisheries
through water pollution has entailed a dramatic loss of production. See
B. CommoNRm, THE CLosING Cmcra 96 (1971). It should also be noted that
the value of the production of commercial fisheries tends to be underestimated
in the market since fisheries are a classic example of a "common pool." See
Gorden, The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery,
62 J. PoL. ECON. 124 (1954).
594. 205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).
595. Id. at 129. It should be noticed that the complainant was a private
company. It intended to make a profit by constructing a resort in the vicinity
of the fails, and it had made extensive investments in hotels, cottages, roads,
and trails. Clearly the idea of "beneficial use," of "utility, liberally and not




more material lines.... If nature accomplishes a result
which is recognized and utilized, a change of process by
man would seem unnecessary. But the trial court based its
decision of this branch of the case largely upon the artistic
value of the falls, and made no inquiry into the effective-
ness of the use of the water in the way adopted as com-
pared with the customary methods of irrigation.... It may
be that if the attention of the lawmakers had been directed
to such natural objects of great beauty they would have
sought to preserve them, but we think the dominant idea
was utility, liberally and not narrowly regarded, and we
are constrained to follow it595
Or consider Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake View Duck Club,5 96 a
case which reached an equally unhappy conclusion on far more
preposterous grounds:
The vital question.., is, can an appropriation of water
be made under the laws of this state for the irrigation of
unsurveyed, uninclosed, unoccupied public domain of the
United States for the sole production of food for wild water
fowl, which, when propagated and raised, must, of necessity
be as accessible to capture, destruction, and appropriation
to use, by any other person who may see fit to hunt upon
the land, as to the person who went through the form of
making an appropriation. To our minds it is utterly incon-
ceivable that a valid appropriation of water can be made
under the laws of this state, when the beneficial use of
which, after the appropriation is made, will belong equally
to every human being who seeks to enjoy it. It would be
little short of an anomaly in any system of jurisprudence
that would authorize the restraining of a person from di-
verting water used solely for the propagation of ducks, and
then deny injunctive, or any, relief against the same person
if he should enter upon the land irrigated, shoot the ducks
ad libitum, and appropriate them to his own use. If the
beneficial use for which the appropriation is made cannot,
in the nature of things, belong to the appropriator, of what
validity is the appropriation? The very purpose and mean-
ing of an appropriation is to take that which was before
public property and reduce it to private ownership....
We have searched in vain for any authority in support
of appellant's claim of a valid appropriation of the water
in controversy. The beneficial use stated in the application
is not in question. We are not disposed to hold that any
use of water tending to supply man or domestic animals
596. 50 Utah 76, 166 P. 309 (1917).
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with food is not beneficial. But for the purpose of effecting
a valid appropriation of water under the statutes of this
state we are decidedly of the opinion that the beneficial use
contemplated in making the appropriation must be one that
inures to the exclusive benefit of the appropriator and sub-
ject to his complete dominion and control. As the use in
this case is not of that character, we are forced to the con-
clusion that plaintiff's attempted appropriation is in-
valid .... 57
Thus Empire holds that the profitable preservation of natural
beauty is not beneficial, while Lake Shore holds that, though wild
ducks are beneficial, using water for the cultivation of such ducks
is not because ducks are public goods 598
Admittedly, these two cases arose in western states where water
is scarce and water rights are subject to appropriation.599 Both
cases are perhaps extreme examples even for such states. But
Empire and Lake Shore do illustrate a judicial attitude of hostility
to conservative uses of water and indicate the reluctance of the
courts to protect, without legislative sanction, the public interest
in public goods.
To the extent that someone is willing to invest in a public good
like wild ducks or water quality even though he will not reap all
597. 50 Utah at 80-82, 166 P. at 310-11.
598. It may make Lake Shore Duck Club more palatable if one notices that
the litigation was between two private duck clubs. It would appear, however,
that the court held that water cannot be appropriated for the purpose of
producing public goods, even though the appropriator obtained so much private
benefit from the public goods that it was willing to pay the full costs of appro-
priating the water. The winning duck club won a most pyrrhic victory since,
under the court's holding, the water which it uses for the production of wild
ducks can be taken away by any person whose use of the water does not benefit
the public. Cf. Ex parte Elam, 6 Cal. App. 233, 91 P. 811 (2d App. Dist.
1907); In re Maas, 219 Cal. 422, 27 P.2d 373 (1933) (holding that under-
ground water could not be used to create duck ponds because such use is not
beneficial to land).
599. For a discussion of the appropriation doctrine, see notes 523-31 supra
and accompanying text. It has been claimed that the concept of "reasonable
use" in states following the riparian doctrine, and that of "beneficial use" in
states following the appropriation doctrine, "have been merged into a new
rule-that a particular use must not only be embraced within the general class
of uses held to be beneficial, or must not only be of benefit to the appro-
priator, but it must also be a reasonable and economic use of the water in view
of other present and future demands upon the source of supply." Trelease,
The Concept of Reasonable Beneficial Use in the Law of Surface Streams, 12
Wyo. L.J. 1, 16 (1957). This suggests that there is little functional distinction




the benefits of his investment, such public goods would receive some
protection under even an imperfect market system in which there
are public goods. Lake Shore indicates that the courts will supply
even less protection than such an imperfect market would. The
conclusion seems inevitable that nuisance law and the law of private
water rights permit-and perhaps mandate-water of lower quality
than would exist if there were an inefficient market in water qual-
ity, to say nothing of an efficient one.
A. Structural Biases
1. The Hohfeldian Structure of the World
In describing the biases which are inherent in our legal system
as it applies to water quality, it is helpful to have a terminology
that allows one to make the necessary distinctions. If economists
build models, so, on occasion, do jurists. At least one juridical
model, that of Hohfeld, 00 offers an important insight into legal
relations that tends to be ignored, perhaps willfully, 01 by econ-
omists: there is a difference between a plaintiff and a defendant.
For our purposes it is not necessary to consider the entire Hoh-
feldian structure. It is enough to notice Hohfeld's distinction be-
tween "rights" and "privileges." A "right" is a legally "enforceable
claim to performance (action or forbearance) by another. It is
the legal relation of A to B when society commands action or for-
bearance by B and will at the instance of A in some manner
penalize disobedience." 02  On the other hand, a "privilege" is
"[t]he legal relation of A to B when A (with respect to B) is free
or at liberty to conduct himself in a certain matter as he pleases;
when his conduct is not regulated for the benefit of B by the com-
mand of society; and when he is not threatened with any penalty
600. See Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 1, in FUNDAMENTAL
LEGAL CONCE'rxO1s 36-38 (W. Cook ed. 1923). For an example of a use
of Hohfeldian terminology to describe the rights and privileges of riparian
owners, see Kinyon, What Can A Riparian Proprietor Do?, 21 MiNN. L. REv.
512 (1937).
601. See, e.g., Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & ECON. 1
(1960).
602. Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163, 167 (1919)
(emphasis added). Corbin's explanation of Hohfeld's terminology is more
concise than Hohfeld's formulations. Corbin goes on to say "A, knowing that
he has a particular right, can answer this question, 'What must another do
for me?' (The court will aid me by using compulsion if he does not do it.)"
Id. See also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 1 (1936).
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for disobedience, for the reason that society has made no com-
mand."
6 03
There is no magic in this terminology; it merely helps one to
distinguish between the right (which Hohfeld calls a "right") to
have a court compel someone else to do something and the right
(which Hohfeld calls a "privilege") to do something without ju-
dicial interference. 0 4 This distinction is merely
[A]n algebra that will enable us to describe some precise
and repeated situations, the actual judgment of courts, in
such a way that any judgment can fall into the scheme.
It will be of some service in the larger task either of collect-
ing, memorizing, or teaching these judgments, but not in
the much more vitally important task of forecasting them.605
I would add, however, that the distinction between rights and pri-
vileges can be of a great deal of service in forecasting (or at least
in explaining) the economic consequences of varying legal regimes.
The economic importance of the right-privilege distinction lies
in the fact that the transaction costs (which are inherent in the
use of the judicial system) are imposed upon polluters and their
victims in an asymmetric manner. The only way to exercise a right
against one who denies it is to invoke, at considerable expense,
the aid of a court. On the other hand, one asserts a privilege sim-
603. Corbin, supra note 602, at 167. See also RESTATEMENT OF PRoPEiRTY
§ 2 (1936).
604. Cf. Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HArV. L. REv. 1141 (1938).
Hohfeld mistakenly insisted that . . . [a] privilege is not to be
called a "right" at all. This unfortunately contradicts so fully estab-
lished a usage both in law and literature, that it is idle to suppose
that any terminological reform will overcome it. So clearly are tese
"privileges" rights, that they are usually the first thing that are thought
of as rights whenthe word occurs in speech. This sense is found in
such phrases as "a man's right to do what he likes with his own";
and in so capital an instance as the expression "bill of rights", as well
as in "fundamental rights", and other expressions like them, most of
the "rights" involved are privileges.
Id. at 1149. Radin's solution is to call Hohfeldian rights "demand-rights" and
Hohfeldian privileges "privilege-rights." Unfortunately, this suggestion has not
been generally adopted.
605. Id. at 1147. Cf. Letter from Sir Frederick Pollock to Mr. Justice
Holmes, Jan. 24, 1921, in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETrEns (M. Howe ed. 1941).
Pollock wrote: "I do not doubt that the late Prof. Hohfeld was a learned and
ingenious man, and be seems to have had at least the merit of, not inventing
new words. But it is strange how many rational beings believe the ultimate
truths of the universe to be reducible to patterns on a blackboard. Our geom-
etry is not ultimate, we know now, Deo gratias." Id. at 63.
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ply by doing whatever it is that one claims one is privileged to
do.606 A polluter asserts his alleged privilege of polluting by the
very act of polluting. The polluter's victim, on the other hand,
can only assert his alleged right to a decent environment by hiring
a lawyer and going into court. In a legal system where each party
pays his own legal fees, a "rational" plaintiff, even one with the
law clearly on his side, will not bring suit unless the anticipated
value of a judgment in his favor is greater than the legal costs in-
volved. Since the interest in water of good quality is normally di-
vided among many different individuals, it is conceivable that, even
though the aggregate value of all these interests is large, no single
individual would be willing to bring suit. If, on the other hand,
some of the potential plaintiffs do suffer damages sufficient to justify
bringing suit, the polluter may find it advisable to buy off those
plaintiffs. If the privilege of polluting is valuable to the polluter,
it may be cheaper for it to settle with a few plaintiffs at twice the
amount of their damages, while leaving the mass of potential plain-
tiffs without recompense. Furthermore, rather than settle with the
plaintiffs who do actually sue, the polluter may decide to make the
litigation as costly as possible so as to discourage further suits.
In any of these cases some or all of those who are injured by the
pollution will not receive any compensation and thus the costs of
the pollution, from the polluter's point of view, will be less than
the total costs to society. In such circumstances a rational pol-
luter will produce more pollution than he would have produced
if there were an efficient market in water quality rights.607
606. There is always the possibility of a declaratory judgment action brought
by the polluter. However, the burden of persuading the court to stop the
pollution or to assess damage will always rest on the victim of the pollution.
But cf. Auger & Simon Silk Dyeing Co. v. East Jersey Water Co., 88 N.J.L.
273, 96 Ad. 60 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915) which was an action by a would-be
polluter to enjoin diversion of a stream in which it wished to discharge its
wastes; the holding that the plaintiff has no right to have the stream remain
in situ does not, of course, mean that the plaintiff had no privilege to pollute
the stream. The possession of a Hohfeldian right does not necessarily imply
the possession of a Hohfeld privilege. See Radin, supra note 604, at 1150-52.
607. According to the Coase theorem, it would ceteris parabus make no dif-
ference in the efficient market whether the law allowed polluters to pollute or
forbade pollution without the consent of their victims. See note 394 supra.
In the first case the victims would pay the polluter to decrease pollution, in
the second case the polluter would pay the victims for their permission to
pollute. In either case there would be the same amount of pollution as deter-
mined by bargains reached in the market. In either case there would be less
pollution in the world with an efficient market than there is in the actual world
with its dependence upon private litigation.
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In the case where there are many polluters the problem is ag-
gravated, for no single polluter may do enough damage to justify
suing him, although in the aggregate the damage caused by the
polluters may far exceed the benefits which they receive from their
activities. In such a case, even if there is only a single victim, the
victim, if he is rational, will not sue if the costs of a multitude of
suits will exceed the value to him of the expected judgments. On
the other hand, in the never-never land of the efficient market,
the victim and the polluters would bargain for lesser amount of
pollution than obtains in our world.
This bias against those who claim "rights" and in favor of those
who assert "privileges" seems to be inherent in any system of pri-
vately enforced antipollution law. It may be possible to offset it
but, if we assume (contrafactually) that all other aspects of the
law duplicate the results of the efficient market, then the distrib-
ution of the costs of litigation will lead to more pollution under a
regime of privately initiated legal controls than would occur in the
efficient market. I can imagine no case in which the differing status
of privilege-holders and right-holders would tend to be biased
against pollution. This imperfection in our legal system leads to
more pollution than would occur under an efficient market. If our
goal is the pursuit of whatever Pareto optimum happens to be on
our horizon, it appears that we should take some action to correct
the imperfection-unless there are other biases in our legal system
which tend to cause too little pollution.608 As will be seen, there
appear to be no such countervailing biases.
In fact, I have understated the advantages that the polluters
receive from the asymmetry between privileges and rights. I have
argued that a victim of pollution will not sue if the potential judg-
ment is worth less to him than his litigation costs. Economic theory
suggests, however, that in many cases the victim will not sue even
though the value of the judgment may exceed the cost of litigation.
A major reason-perhaps the most important reason-why a market
608. "Too little pollution" is, of course, a shorthand phrase for "too little
production of goods which are associated with the pollution in question."
Throughout this comparison of the workings of our system of privately en-
forced water law with the model of the efficient market, I shall, in the grand
tradition of the genre, ignore the problem of the second best. If I did not, I
would have to say that if there is any other imperfection anywhere in the
system, there is no sure way of telling whether we have more than an efficient




in water quality has not, will not, and cannot be developed is that
water quality is a public good and that rational economic men will
deliberately understate the value that they assign to such goods in
the hope of getting a free ride on someone else's investment. 0 9
The same logic indicates that each rational potential plaintiff will
sit back and wait for somebody else to bring suit. Furthermore,
from the point of view of a consumer of water quality (i.e., a
polluter), water quality is a commons, and rational economic men
do not invest money in improving the quality of a commons.6 10
Some of the most likely candidates for plaintiff in a suit over water
quality are the polluters themselves. 61' Polluters want clean water
at their intake pipes, after all, and polluters who actually use the
water are among the limited number of potential plaintiffs who
have standing to bring an antipollution suit. Some polluters might
even want to clean up their operations but cannot afford to unless
the other polluters also reform.
Thus, the very "imperfections" in the market system which
lead to overpollution also tend to keep privately initiated litigation
from functioning as an efficient surrogate for the market.
There may be ways to overcome these problems. The most
obvious solution is the adoption of some legislation like the FVVPCA
under which the government assumes the responsibility of pro-
tecting and developing the public good of decent water, just as it
assumes the responsibility for such other public goods as the
national defense and interstate highways.612 Another possibility
would be for the government to subsidize the plaintiffs in private
antipollution cases. Such a blatant type of socialism for the rich
might be attractive to certain segments of the bar but I cannot
see it as having a broad political appeal.
609. See notes 422-23 supra and accompanying text.
610. See notes 409-21 supra and accompanying text.
611. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Standard Bag & Paper Co., 72 Ohio St.
324, 327-30, 74 N.E. 206, 207 (1905); Silver Springs Bleaching & Dyeing Co.
v. Wanskuck Co., 13 R.I. 611 (1882).
612. I am not taking a position in this article as to how the cleanup man-
dated by the FWPCA should be financed. It should be noted, however, that
if the costs attributable to current water pollution are not initially borne by
the polluters (even though these costs may later be passed on to the pur-
chasers of the polluters' goods), there will be an inefficient and excessive
amount of pollution to be cleaned up. On the other hand, the costs attribut-
able to pollution in the past should not, if one's only goal is economic efficiency,
be placed on the polluters, because that would lead to underproduction of the
goods associated with water pollution.
1976]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Another possible approach endorsed by a leading economic
lawyer, Professor Posner,613 is the use of class actions. Such a
solution does little, however, except reduce the legal costs per
plaintiff614 and thus is likely to do no more than encourage a few
"marginal" antipollution suits. More suits would be encouraged
if the damages were treated as a fund available for attorneys' fees.
Professor Posner's cost-benefit analysis of this is, "[it] places the
lawyer in the position of an entrepreneur rather than an agent,
which is good although contrary to tradition but it also relieves him
of accountability, which is bad, because his private incentive di-
verges from the social goal of obtaining a judgment equal to the
social costs of the violation." 615 There is a growing tendency on
the part of the courts to award attorneys' fees out of the "fund"
created by a class action 616 and this development-which cannot
easily be reconciled with the normal rules of restitution 6 17 -may
tend to offset the bias inherent in the right-privilege dichotomy.
But a provision for private citizen suits and the award of attorneys'
fees can be and has been made a part of a regulatory statute like
the FWPCA. 618 Furthermore, although awards of attorneys' fees
may be increasing, the Supreme Court has shown a definite tendency
613. See R. PosNRa, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW, 157, 349-51, 377 (1973).
614. I do not know of any empirical data which establishes that even this
assumed advantage exists. Are there economies of scale in litigation? Even
if there are, do they extend to extremely large class actions?
615. Id. at 350 (emphasis added). 0 ye gods of champerty and mainte-
nancel Professor Posner points out that "[t]he lawyer for the class will be
tempted to offer to settle with the defendant for a small judgment and a large
legal fee, and such an offer will be attractive to the defendant." Id. Need I
add that the same lawyer will be tempted to abscond with the funds of his
more conventional clients.
This seems to be an example of the fact that too much attention to economic
analysis leads one to ignore values that are difficult to quantify-in this case
the values inherent in the honor of Professor Posner's (and my) profession.
The only thing that Posner seems to find wrong with the hypothetical lawyer's
conduct is that his private incentives deviate from the social goal of having
the judgment equal to the social costs of the violation. I admit that many
such lawyers exist, but is their existence not a strong argument for putting
temptation out of their way?
As a matter of fact, once the violation has happened it does not increase
economic efficiency to obtain a judgment equal to the social costs anymore than
it increases efficiency to charge polluters the cost of cleaning up past pollu-
ion. See note 612 supra and accompanying text.
616. See Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from
Funds, 87 HARV. 1597, 1601-12 (1974).
617. Id. at 1643.




to limit the availability 6 19 and practicability 620 of class actions
under the Federal Rules and the state courts are likely to follow
the Supreme Court's lead.
Still another possibility which might encourage more antipol-
lution suits would be to adopt the English and Continental rule
that the losing party must pay the winner's counsel and witness
fees. This would, however, probably be counterproductive since
the potential plaintiff is not going to be sure that he will win621
and thus the English rule may actually increase his expected liti-
gation costs. If the polluter is wealthier than the plaintiff, the
polluter can afford to run up extensive litigation costs in the hopes
of driving the plaintiff out of the game. Poor men should never
play poker; rich men should do nothing else.622
Thus, it appears that, since the substantive law of nuisance
protects only "uses" of our waters, an efficient market that takes
into account the interests of those who wish to conserve our streams
would produce water of higher quality than can be obtained under
a regime of nuisance law. The first inefficiency we have observed
in nuisance law is biased against good water.
2. Standing
It is a peculiarity of our law that not everyone who is damaged
has a judicially cognizable cause of action. As one author has
stated:
Private litigation in denying relief despite injury and un-
lawful conduct entails the use of rules that deal with the
same elements of a claim as common law standing. Such
rules are among the laws governing claims and, because
they are not subsumed under the rubric of standing, clearly
express the kind of substantive reasons for which relief
is denied: that defendant owes no "duty" to the plaintiff,
that the defendant's conduct is not the "legal" cause of
plaintiff's injuries, or that the plaintiff's interest is not one
which the law protects.623
619. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
620. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, motion of petitioner to
assess costs denied, 419 U.S. 815 (1974).
621. See R. PosNr, supra note 613, at 351; Dawson, supra note 616, at
1598-99.
622. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (Supp. IV, 1974) for a provision permitting
the court to award attorney's fees.
623. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate
Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YAra L.J. 425, 438-39 (1974).
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In fact, however, the rubric of standing is often used to explain
the substantive rules governing causes of action based on pollution,
especially if the action sounds in public nuisance. 624
When I speak of "standing" barriers which deny a day in court
to many of pollution's victims, I do not mean to raise the spectre
of the federal law of standing to review administrative action, that
"complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction" which has spawned
so much work for teachers of environmental law and so many
environmental cases with resounding nicknames like Storm King,6m
Mineral King,626 and SCRAP.6 27  I merely mean that the courts
will hold that many potential plaintiffs have not stated, and cannot
state, a valid claim for relief even though they have unquestion-
ably been damaged.628
In general, plaintiffs aggrieved by water pollution have three
arguably different causes of action: (1) public nuisance; (2) pri-
vate nuisance; and (3) interference with water rights. Historically,
of course, all three actions are merely variants of an action on the
case for nuisance. Since there are two different systems of water
rights in the United States, the last variant divides into interference
With riparian rights 6 29 and interference with appropriative rights. 63
Each of these causes of action has stringent standing rules that
deny any remedy to most victims of pollution.
One requirement is common to all these nuisance actions and
is indeed a necessary element of any action on the case: the plain-
tiff must allege and prove actual legally cognizable damages as part
624. See, e.g., RESTATEmENT (SEcoIN) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes
§ 821c(2) (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971), where it is said: "In order to maintain
a proceeding to enjoin or abate a public nuisance, one must . .. (C) have
standing to sue as a representative of the general public, or as a citizen in a
citizen's action, or as a member of a class in a class action."
625. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).
626. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
627. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
628. Cf. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inade-
quate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 438-39 (1974).
Professor Albert takes the refreshing and convincing position that the diffi-
culties of standing to review administrative action become tractable if they are
analyzed in terms of "claim for relief" and "cause of action." Unfortunately,
the history of the federal law of "standing" and the "case or controversy' re-
quirement of Article HI will undoubtedly keep that area of the law from ever
being completely free of analytical confusion.
629. See notes 477-522 supra and accompanying text.
630. See notes 523-31 supra and accompanying text.
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of his cause of action. Unlike actions for trespass, damages will
not be assumed. 63' Injury to one's aesthetic and moral senses
will not, as a rule, support an action on the case; one must show
actual physical or economic damages to one's person or property
before one can state a valid claim.632  This requirement excludes
631. See RESTATE mT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, § 821D, comment e at 43
(Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970). "A trespass was remediable at common law
by an action of trespass; the private nuisance was remediable by an action on
the case.... For an intentional trespass, there is liability without harm; for
a private nuisance, there is no liability without substantial harm." Id. It
should be noted, however, that the damages which are sufficient as a matter
of law to constitute a cause of action for nuisance may result at trial in only
nominal damages. This point is well illustrated by Smith v. McConathy, 11
Mo. 331 (1848), a case involving water pollution caused by a distillery, where
the court said:
In an action for a private nuisance, it is not necessary to allege or
prove any special damage...
It is very true that there cannot be a private nuisance unless it
be attended with some damage or inconvenience to the party injured,
and this idea enters into the very definition of a nuisance. Hence
the books speak of the necessity of proving the injury sustained by the
nuisance, as well as the continuance or erection of the nuisance. But
it is very material to the plaintiff that the distinction between the
nature and amount of damage which will constitute a nuisance and the
extent of injury which has actually resulted to the plaintiff from the
nuisance, be preserved. What constitutes a nuisance is a question of
law for the determination of the court.... [If the facts avowed do
constitute a nuisance, it is suffcient for the plaintiff to prove them,
and it is not necessary that he should also prove that he has been
specially injured by such nuisance....
S. . [W]hilst cases might be imagined and stated, in which the
amount of inconvenience or injury might be important in determining
whether the acts charged constituted a nuisance or not, this is cer-
tainly not one of them....
When we look at the nature of most of the private nuisances
spoken of in the books, we cannot fail to perceive the propriety of
owing a recovery upon the mere proof of the existence of a nuisance.
Take the case of a smith's forge, and privy, or a lime-kiln (all of
which are frequently spoken of as nuisances), erected so near a dwell-
ing house as to render it unfit for habitation. How could the plaintiff
establish any special damage resulting to himself from the erection of
such nuisances? If a pecuniary loss be the criterion of special dam-
age, the most intolerable nuisances would be without redress ...
In fact, damages are not usually the object of such suits. The rin-
cipal object is to establish the fact of nuisance, so that a .second suit
may recover more substantial damages, if the nuisance be continued,
or the verdict and judgment in the first suit may be the foundation of
proceedings to abate the nuisance.
Id. at 334-35. The implication, of course, is that the damage remedy may
be inadequate even when the nuisance causes enough damage to the plaintiff
to afford him standing.
632. See, e.g., Mathewson v. Primeau, 64 Wash. 2d 929, 938, 395 P.2d 183,
189 (1964), where the court in accordance with this view said: "That a thing
is unsightly or offends the aesthetic sense of a neighbor, does not ordinarily
make it a nuisance or afford ground for injunctive relief."
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many who are disturbed by the destruction we are working on
our waters and yet cannot point to any physical or economic loss
that they themselves have suffered. Even though I would be
willing to pay either higher taxes or higher costs for manufactured
goods to abate pollution,633 I have no standing to sue any of the
polluters who afflict me with their effluvia. 63 4
Of the various causes of action available to the victims of water
pollution, public nuisance presents the most stringent, and ap-
parently anomalous, 635 standing requirements. The traditional rule
requires that "[i]n order to recover damages in an individual action
for public nuisance, one must have suffered harm of a kind dif-
ferent from that suffered by other members of the public exercising
the right common to the general public which was the subject of
the interference." 63 6
The question as to what constitutes "harm of a kind different
from that suffered by other members of the public" invites meta-
Until recently, the courts have been unwilling even to uphold police power
regulations where the grounds for the regulations are purely aesthetic. See,
e.g., Vermont Salvage Corp. v. Village of St. Johnsbury, 113 Vt. 341, 34 A.2d
188 (1943), where the court quotes with approval an earlier statement: "The
law will not declare a thing a nuisance because it is unsightly and disfigured,
• . . nor because it is unpleasant to the eye, and a violation of the rules of
propriety and good taste, nor because the property of another is rendered less
valuable. No fanciful notions are recognized. The law does not cater to
men's tastes, nor consult their convenience merely .. " Id. at 351, 34 A.2d
at 195, quoting Woodstock Burying Ground Ass'n v. Hager, 68 Vt. 488, 489,
35 A. 431, 432 (1869). But cf. Searles, Aesthetics in the Law, 22 RECORD OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 607 (1967); Note, Aesthetic Nuisance: An Emerging Cause of
Action, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1075, 1082-84 (1970).
633. The problems associated with public goods and commons keep me
from even considering market transactions as a means of obtaining the water
quality I desire.
634. That is, I have no standing at common law. One of the blessings of the
FWPCA is that it may have conferred standing upon me to seek abatement
of water pollution, if not the recovery of my damages. See FWPCA § 3, 33
U.S.C.A. § 1365 (Supp. 1976).
635. Historically, the anomaly lies in the fact that some private parties do
have a cause of action for public nuisance, not in the limitations on the
availability of the action to private parties. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TAauEs 0216-21.
636. RESTATEMENT (SEcoN'm) OF TORTS § 821(c) (Tent. Draft No. 16,
1970). This requirement of damages differing in kind goes back at least to
Blackstone. 3 W BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAIES 0219. The draft of the
Restatement suggests that this standing requirement may be relaxed if the
relief sought is an injunction rather than damages, but a close reading re-
veals that the Restaters have only told us that we have standing to bring a
suit to enjoin a public nuisance if we suffer damages "of a kind different" or
if we "otherwise have standing."
[Vol. 27:3
WATER POLLUTION
physical speculation 637 of a type which I am constitutionally incap-
able of pursuing. To the best of my knowledge the only private
plaintiffs who have been granted standing to bring public nuisance
actions against polluters of our waters are landowners (who pre-
sumably could bring a private nuisance action) 63 and commercial
fisherman. 639 Blackstone's example of a private action for a public
637. See Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887), where
the court notes: "A barren cow is substantially a different creature than Esici
a breeding one." Id. at 577, 33 N.W. at 923.
638. There may be a chance, however, that the private nuisance action is
barred by that time while the public one is still viable. See notes 813-16 infra
8nd accompanying text. The availability of privately maintained public
nuisance actions appears to be significant in the context of water pollution
only in so far as such actions are not susceptible to the defense of prescription.
639. See, e.g., Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 223 N.C. 535, 27 S.E.
2d 538 (1943). Why and how commercial fisherman suffer damages differing
from those suffered by the other victims of pollution, particularly amateur
fishermen and nature lovers, is not wholly clear. This point appears to have
bothered at least one federal judge:
As it is the biggest fish that always breaks the hook or bites the
line in two, so, now, the huge sum of thirty thousand dollars is asked
as compensation for fish that were never caught. I can remember
when that sum would buy a lot of fish. I have seen six-pound roe
shad retail for five cents apiece and cured herrings sell for two dollars
a thousand-one hundred and twenty pounds of shad for one dollar
and five herrings for one cent.
And this large sum is now asked for whose fish? Certainly not
the plaintiff's, because he never owned them. I repeat the question,
whose fish? The answer is plain: they belonged to the Public.
it is well settled that in actions by private individuals, based upon
the creation of maintenance of a public nuisance, there can be no
recovery, even of nominal damages, upon the mere establishment of
the wrongful act. In such cases it is essential to the plaintiff's cause
of action that he show appreciable injury....
As previously stated, in actions in tort, the damages recoverable,
whether direct or consequential must flow naturally and reasonably
from the wrongful act alleged. I am of the opinion that the attempt
to so estimate and segregate the damages in this case would involve
a misty maze of conjecture and speculation as unprofitable as calcu-
lating the mechanical value of a cubic mile of pea-soup fog off the
Grand Banks of Newfoundland.
While these considerations seem to point unerringly to the solution
of the question considered, I am not disposed to rest my decision
upon this weakness in the plaintiff's case. For there is, I think, an
even more patent and fundamental defect. It is uniformly held in
North Carolina, and generally elsewhere, that, in order for a private
citizen to sustain an action predicated upon a public nuisance, he
must establish an injury, which is not only appreciable, but special
and peculiar to himself, differing not only in degree, but in kind
from that common to the public. ...
Stated concisely, the alleged injury consists in the diminution of
annual revenue from the plaintiff's business and property; the alleged
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nuisance involves a ditch dug across a highway, which he says is
a public nuisance, abatable by the public authorities. Though it
entails your having to go the long way home, that gives you no
cause of action. However, says Blackstone, if you ride your horse
into the ditch and he breaks his leg, then you have a cause of
action.640  I suppose if you rode your horse into the Cuyahoga
River, and he dissolved, then you would meet Blackstone's test.
The more liberal cases do recognize that there is something
unsatisfactory about the mechanical application of the standing
rules in public nuisance cases. As stated by the Supreme Court of
North Carolina: 641
wrong in defendant's diversion or destruction of fish in the Roanoke
River, through the daily discharge into that stream of poisonous and
deleterious matter.... It is true that the plaintiff had the right
to fish in the River, and to appropriate to his own use the fish so
taken therefrom. But the plaintiff had not reclaimed the fish in
question. Moreover, his right of fishery was neither several nor ex-
clusive. Nor was it incidental to his riparian ownership, but a
right held in common with the public ...
If, therefore, the plaintiff has sustained an injury, then so has
every citizen of the State. If the plaintiff may maintain this action,
every citizen of the state may maintain a like action for the same
wrong.
Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 49 F. Supp. 625, 627-31 (E.D.N.C.
1943) (Meekins, J.), rev'd on peculiar grounds, 139 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1944).
As I suppose you have gathered, the last paragraph that I quoted was intended
as a reductio ad absurdum, not as a judicial solution to our environmental
problems. Judge Meekins was reversed by the Court of Appeals on the basis
of the opinion of the North Carolina Supreme Court in Hampton v. North
Carolina Pulp Co., 223 N.C. 535, 27 S.E.2d 538 (1943), a case involving the
same parties and what appears to be, for all intents and purposes, the same
cause of action as was before Judge Meekins (the only difference that I can
perceive-not having seen the record-is that the relief requested in the second
case was for damages not to exceed $3,000, the then applicable jurisdictional
amount in diversity cases; the first complaint asked for $30,000 and was re-
moved to the federal court!) The amended complaint in the state case was
apparently filed after the entry of judgment in the federal case. So much for
res judicata.
At least we can be sure that Judge Meekins was not upset by the reversal.
For as he said in his opinion:
Oh, well, now, yes, of course, the Circuit Court gives me a lot of
trouble. But "it ain't as bad as it mought be." If I am not reversed
in more than nine cases out of ten, I feel from fair to middling. And
if I draw ten straight, that does not send me to bed as even one re-
versal does some of the gentlemen of the bench, State and Federal, so
I have heard.
49 F. Supp. at 628.
640. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 635, at 219.




The real reason on which the rule denying recovery of
damages is based-and the only one on which the policy
it reflects is justified-is that a purely public right is of
such a nature that ordinarily an interference with it
produces no appreciable or substantial damages-or at
most, an inconvenience of no serious nature. To deny
private redress, the incidence of infraction must be as
uniformly public as the right which is exclusively com-
mitted to public protection ...[W]here by reason of a
nuisance, however, public, substantial injury is inflicted on
the health, life, limb or property of the individual it will
be found that another sort of right-more intimate, per-
sonal and important-has been invaded, for which the
sterile satisfaction of public indictment, or abatement of
the nuisance will not afford compensation; neither did the
law so intend.642
Such courts are not unaware of the economic consequences of
externalities like pollution: "[Ilt is not amiss to say that a state
which deals with its resources on the principle attributed to Louis
XIV---'apres moi, le deluge'-is headed for economic ruin."6 3 But
for all this apparent liberality, the courts cannot do much to ex-
tend the availability of public nuisance, because some 'legally pro-
tected interest" must still suffer injury. If one is a landowner one
may assert riparian (or appropriative) rights. If one is a fisher-
man one may assert the right of the public to fish in navigable
waters 44 (as did the plaintiff in the case just quoted.645) If one is a
sailor one may assert the right of the public to navigate on naviga-
ble rivers.6 46 And these are all the legally protected rights in water
which come in mind. Even in liberal jurisdictions, no one else is
likely to be accorded standing, and it is not common for sailors or
their ships to bring actions for public nuisance. The interests of
those who would eat the fish,647 if we had some fish, are not going
642. Id. at 544, 27 S.E.2d at 544.
643. Id. at 550, 27 S.E.2d at 547.
644. Cf. Sax, Standing to Sue: A Critical Review of the Mineral King
Decion, 13 NATURAL REsoUncEs J. 76 (1973).
645. The personal right involved here is the security of an established
business .... The necessities of a person whose business is taking
fish from a common fishery and one who, by reason of his riparian
ownership and ownership of the bed of the river, has a several and
exclusive fishery are precisely the same, and the same principle of law
must apply.
223 N.C. at 547, 27 S.E.2d at 545-46.
646. Cf. the Refuse Act provisions of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,
ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152 (codified at 33 U.S.C. 407 (1970)).
647. Considered solely as a food product, fish have unlimited possibili-
ties-quantitative and qualitative. We are told that a few little fishes
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to be protected, nor are the interests of those who would protect
our streams and lakes and their inhabitants for their own sakes.
Even the most liberal jurisdictions accord standing in public nuisance
actions to those with economic influence rather than human needs.
At the very most they accord standing to those who have sufficient
economic interest to bargain for a market solution. The great mass
of victims who individually suffer only small damage from each
individual act of pollution still have no locus standi in courts.6 48
To bring a private nuisance action, one must have, besides
damages, some interest in real property, and this is also true even
though one clothes one's complaint with allegations that the de-
fendant is interfering with "property" rights in water, for such
rights are at once "real property" and, almost without exception,
appurtenant to land.649 As you may recall, a private nuisance is
normally defined as a nontrespassory (and unreasonable) inter-
ference with the use and enjoyment of land.65 0
But ownership of land, though necessary, is not sufficient to
give one standing in private actions for water pollution. If I bring
polluted water to my land without any right or privilege to do so,
and seven loaves, five loaves and two fishes, according to St. Luke,
were more than sufficient to feed a hungry multitude of four thousand
men, together with the women and children present, and of the frag-
ments there were seven baskets full of fish. Quantitative.
Professor Agassiz, the eminent Harvard scientist, said: "Fish is a
good brain food." One wrote to know "in what quantities should it
e taken?" The great scientist wrote back: "In your case, a whale a
day for thiity days." Qualitative.
Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 49 F. Supp. 625, 626 (E.D.N.C. 1943),
rev'd, 139 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1944) (citations omitted).
Perhaps I should resist further quotations from Judge Meekis, but I recom-
mend him to you most warmly.
648. When each individual's damage is slight, even though the damage in
the aggregate is massive, the transaction costs (the cost of invoking a market
solution) discourage the victims from seeking market solutions, even though
the aggregate amount of damages may exceed the costs of abating the nui-
sance. The administrative costs of justice (which the Magna Charta says the
King shall not sell, leaving us in exclusive possession of a lucrative market)
have the same discouraging effect. The standing rules relating to nuisance
actions go further unfortunately, for one who is willing to pay the price of
justice, even though his own monetary damage is slight, will not get through
the door. For a first-rate description of nuisance costs, prevention costs, and
administrative costs, see Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance
Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 681, 687-91
(1973).
649. C. MEYERS & R. Posran, MARKET TRANSFERS oF WATER RIcHrS:
TowARD AN IMPROvED MAmT IN WATE REsOURCES (1971).
650. See notes 463-74 supra and accompanying text.
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then I am, at law, the cause of my own injuries. 651 The only way
one can acquire an interest in water is by being either a riparian
owner or an appropriator. 52 When one categorizes the rights and
duties and the privileges and nonrights with respect to water pol-
lution under our present legal system, one finds that they are al-
located under Holbfeld's scheme in the following manner:
Polluter v. Pollutee
1. Not a riparian landowner or
appropriator.
Has absolute privilege to pol-
lute.
2. Not a riparian landowner or
appropriator.
Has absolute duty not to pol-
lute.
3. Riparian landowner or ap-
propriator.
Has privilege to pollute rea-
sonably and duty not to pol-
lute unreasonably.
4. Riparian landowner or ap-
propriator.
Has absolute privilege to pol-
lute.
Not a riparian landowner or ap-
propriator or commercial fish-
erman.
Has no right to legal remedy.
Riparian landowner or appro-
priator or commercial fisherman.
Has legally enforceable right to
clean water.
Riparian landowner or appro-
priator or commercial fisherman.
Has legally enforceable right to
reasonably clean water and no
legally enforceable right to un-
reasonably clean water.
Not a riparian landowner or ap-
propriator or commercial fish-
erman.
Has no right to legal remedy.
651. The stink of a polluted stream may well be a nuisance to landowners
who have no legally protected interest in the waters. Perhaps I am a bit
arbitrary in my classification, but I would place such a case in the category
of air pollution.
I am concerned in this article with streams and lakes, not with surface
waters which may actually carry pollutants onto someone else's land. See,
e.g., Vian v. Sheffield Bldg. & Dev. Co., 85 Ohio App. 191, 40 Ohio Op. 144,
88 N.E.2d 410 (1948). Pollution of surface water is analogous to air pollu-
tion in that the standing problems are less difficult. One must still own land,
but the only additional requirement for standing, if not for an ultimate victory,
is that the polluted air or water actually flows over one's land.
652. In some jurisdictions one might also acquire an interest in water by
assignment from a riparian owner or appropriator. See, e.g., Hard v. Boise
City Irr. & Land Co., 9 Idaho 589, 76 P. 331 (1904). But such assignees
can, for our purposes at this point, be considered as standing in the shoes
of their assignors. In any case, it appears that in most jurisdictions it is not
possible, or at least not feasible, to separate interests in water from the land
riparian to it or from the land for which it was initially appropriated. See
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What this means, of course, is that there are a large number
of people who suffer from water pollution who have no recourse
to the courts. On the other hand, there may be polluters who have
no legal interest in the waters and yet who can pollute them with
impunity because their real victims lack standing while those with
standing suffer no damages.653 In the world with the perfect market
not one victim would be excluded from the market nor could any
polluter get such a free ride.654 Thus, it is clear that there will be
more pollution under a regime of privately enforced nuisance laws
than there would be, ceteris paribus, in a world with a perfectly
efficient market.
VI. SUGGESTED MEANS OF APPROXI ATING EFcIEaNCY
IN AN IMPERFECr WORLD
The goal of welfare economics is to get as close as possible to
the Pareto optimum optimorum, and my goal is-in this portion of
this article-to do no more than demonstrate that our present sub-
optimal state is suboptimal because we have too much pollution,
not too little. The fact remains, however, that I am buzzing around
in an economist's cloud-cuckoo land. It might seem more reason-
able for me to compare what we have with the best of all possible
worlds rather than with an impossible one. The problem is that
I do not know how to define the best of all possible worlds and
the masters of the arcana that I am criticizing normally do not
bother to deal with the possible.
There is, however, a proposal of Professor Calabresi's, which is
based in turn on the analysis of Professor Coase, that should per-
haps be mentioned.
generally Gapay, Liquidity Problem: Far West's Shortage of Water May
Block Many Energy Schemes, The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 16, 1974, at 1,
col. 6 (Midwest ed.).
653. For example, a steel mill located on nonriparian land may dump its
effluvia into a ravine which flows into a river on which the lower riparian
owners are also steel mills. Those concerned with environmental quality
have injuries, but no standing, while the other steel mills have standing but
little or no injury. Even if the other mills suffered some injury from the
pollution, they would probably assume a "dog doesn't eat dog" attitude,
especially since a law suit initiated by them would expose their own crimes
against nature.
654. Even if the perfect market existed in a world where polluters "owned"
the privilege of polluting, a polluter could not pollute without costs: the
opportunity costs of foregoing "bribes" from his victims. Where there is no




This is Calabresi's position:
(1) that economic efficiency standing alone would dictate
that set of entitlements which favors knowledgeable choices
between social benefits and the social costs of obtaining
them, and between social costs and the social costs of
avoiding them; (2) that this implies, in the absence of
certainty as to whether a benefit is worth its costs to society,
that the cost should be put on the party or activity best
located to make such a cost-benefit analysis; (3) that in
particular contexts like accidents or pollution this suggests
putting costs on the party or activity which can most
cheaply avoid them; (4) that in the absence of certainty
as to who that party or activity is, the costs should be
put on the party or activity which can with the lowest
transaction costs act in the market to correct an error in
entitlements by inducing the party who can avoid social
costs most cheaply to do so .... 65
655. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HAIv. L. Rzv. 1089, 1096-97 (1972) (em-
phasis added). Calabresi was well aware that "Distributional Goals" and
"Other Justice considerations" as well as economic efficiency must be con-
sidered in any setting of "entitlements."
It cannot, however, be overemphasized that "[f]rom a fairness standpoint
the results of a cheapest-cost-avoider analysis can be simply horrendous."
Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 165, 190
(1974).
I confess that I find these Calabresian commandments puzzling and un-
satisfactory for the same reasons that I object to other normative systems based
on the goal of "economic efficiency" or "Pareto optimality." The fact that
Calabresi and Melamed recognize the objections to such a partial analysis of
major problems (e.g., "Pareto optimality is optimal given a distribution of
wealth, but different distributions of wealth imply their own Pareto optimal
allocation of resources." Calabresi & Melamed, supra, at 1096) is disarming,
but candor is not always a sufficient justification. Considering that they recog-
nize that "[t]here should be no implication that a Pareto optimal solution
is in some sense better than a non-Pareto optimal solution which results
in a different wealth distribution," id. at 1096 n.15, I fail to understand
how they can argue that legal entitlements should ever be distributed so as to
achieve economic efficiency, i.e., Pareto optimality. The distribution of legal
entitlements is, after all, the distribution of wealth.
I am not, by the way, criticizing Calabresi and Melamed for advocating
"property rules" rather than "liability rules" or for favoring the alienability of
property in many cases. Once wealth entitlements are distributed, I see little
harm in the pursuit of efficiency. My criticism of the effort to distribute en-
titlements on the basis of economic efficiency is a logical objection even more
than it is an ethical one.
It should be noted that in many cases the party who can most cheaply
avoid the cost of pollution will be that party who must bear the cost. If
the owners of a polluting factory must bear the costs of its pollution, then
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These rules are designed to be applied in the real world where
uncertainty prevails and transaction costs and the problems of "pub-
lic goods" and the "commons" impede or prevent a market from
functioning.
It should be noted that the "standing" problems associated with
nuisance actions tend to allocate the burdens of water pollution in
a manner dramatically opposed to the recommendations of Professor
Calabresi. The party best located to do a cost-benefit analysis
of pollution will normally be the polluter since he is in the best
position to know who is polluting and to what extent. He will
also know the benefits which accrue to him from pollution though
his victims will have the best idea of the costs to them. Yet the
standing rules appear to be skewed in favor of the polluter. The
significant polluters will tend to be fairly sizeable concerns, either
manufacturers or municipalities, who will not suffer so much from
the transaction costs that are faced by their multitudinous victims.
A factory or a city can clean up its effluent if it is compelled to
do so to survive, while the problems of public goods and the com-
mons make it almost impossible for the victims to take any con-
certed actions in the market. Yet it is the victims whose individual
damage is small, though the aggregate damage may be large, who
are most likely to be denied standing.656
It appears that, even if we compare the workings of the stand-
ing rules with proposals more practicable than the creation of an
the factory may be worth so little that its owners can avoid the costs very
cheaply-by abandoning their now-worthless plant. On the other hand, if the
victims must bear these costs they may be able to avoid them very cheaply
by abandoning their now-worthless homes. If the transaction costs (the bar-
riers against bargains between polluters and pollutees) are too high, whoever
gets stuck with the costs of pollution is likely, in his new found poverty, to
be the one who can most cheaply avoid them. This is just a variation on the
fact that, if no trades are possible, any state of affairs is Pareto optimal. It is
true that this criticism has more force in some circumstances than in others.
656. If the best solution were for the factory to purchase the privilege of
polluting from the victims, the numbers of the victims might make it is
difficult for the factory to reach an arrangement with them as it would be for
the victims to buy off the factory. In such circumstances, the best rule
(though none are very good from the point of view of efficiency when com-
pared with the ideal market) might be one allowing the victims damages, but
no injunction. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 655, at 1115-21. Or
the victims could be allowed to enjoin the factory if they would pay the
factory's damages resulting from the injunction. Id.; cf. Spur Indus., Inc. v.
Del. E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972) (the court en-
joined a feed lot at the behest of the plaintiff real estate developer who had
built a retirement community near the pre-existing feed lot, but the court
also required the plaintiff to pay damages to the defendant feed-lot owner.)
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efficient market in pollution, the standing rules still seem to be
biased in favor of pollution.
I do not believe, however, that the standing rules can, or should,
be relaxed to any appreciable degree. A multitude of individual
damage suits would not be a very efficient allocation of judicial
resources. And the fact that there would probably not be such
a multitude of suits is not an argument for relaxed standing rules,
but rather evidence that the burden of paying for justice bears
more heavily on the pollutees than the polluters.6 57
The possibility of avoiding the standing problem by allowing
individual claims to be aggregated in class actions or by permitting
suits for injunctions to be brought by "representative" plaintiffs
might have some advantages in a system depending solely on pri-
vate nuisance laws. The class, however, is the public and the
most legitimate representative of the public is the government. One
may have one's doubts about legislatures and administrative
agencies but surely they would do a better job of regulating pol-
lution than would the courts. I even wonder whether the doctrine
of separation of powers would not preclude the courts from under-
taking the legislative and administrative responsibilities entailed
by such solutions.
The problem of standing arises because water quality is a
public good. We can hardly expect private litigation to correct
market imperfections when the imperfections-analytically the
same imperfections-apply to the allocation of justice. Even the
most ardent adherents of laissez faire will admit that some govern-
mental action is necessary to offset the misallocations resulting from
the existence of public goods. None but the most obdurately
wrongheaded could believe that privately initiated and financed
lawsuits conducted between random members of the public should
constitute that governmental action.
VII. THm BiAs oF Tmm
To say that one cannot determine whether court-made nuisance
law deviates from the results one would expect from an efficient
market because one cannot separate distributional questions from
allocational ones ignores an extremely important point. In my dis-
cussion of the substantive law, I have looked at the problem as
657. See note 607 supra and accompanying text.
1976]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
if the relevant time for the comparison between the workings of
nuisance law and the workings of an efficient market were the time
when the judge makes his decision. Considering the tendency of
both economists and lawyers to take the world as it exists today
as the starting point for their analyses, this may be the proper
way to analyze the cases where pollution has already occurred.
But what of the future? If there are any undefiled streams left in
the world, or any that could be made worse, it appears that nuisance
law is biased against clean waters in the future and will permit more
pollution than would occur in a world with an efficient market. It
also appears that the substantive law of nuisance has a distributional
bias in favor of polluters.
The latter point is, at first glance, irrelevant to an analysis
of the "efficiency" of nuisance law since there is an efficient alloca-
tion of resources for any distribution of wealth. 658 Nevertheless, in
seeking an answer to the question of how clean our waters should
be, we should not disregard institutional biases that affect water
quality simply because they cannot be said to be inefficient The
fundamental question to be decided, the question of what pro-
tection we should afford our waters, is one that smacks more of
the distribution of well-being than the allocation of resources.
Furthermore, it is not appropriate to ignore this particular distri-
butional bias when one is examining the efficiency of nuisance law,
because the bias results from allocative decisions. Whenever al-
locational choices determine the distribution of well-being in
society, something is happening that could not happen in the world
with an efficient market. The result may not be inefficient but it
certainly cannot be justified by welfare economic theory.
When one looks to the future, it may be clear that, given the
present distribution of wealth, it would be inefficient to con-
struct a facility that will cause significant water pollution. Once
the plant is built, on the other hand, it may be inefficient to stop
the pollution. If there is an efficient market, the facility will not
be built; under the regime of nuisance law it may very well come
into existence. Furthermore, if there is some water that is not
currently allocated to any use,65 9 the law of nuisance is likely
to allocate that water to a use that diminishes the water's quality,
658. See text accompanying notes 164-68 supra.
659. Of course, if the water is not being used, it can be described as being
put to a "conservative use," as I have defined that term. See notes 589-93
supra and accompanying text. Cf. note 599 supra and accompanying text.
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thus causing those who profit from pollution to be better off and
those who would prefer clean water to be worse off.
I shall discuss these tv~o biases of nuisance law separately.
A. Sunk Costs
"Sunk costs" are costs 660 that have already occurred. Econo-
mists wisely enjoin us to ignore them. There is, after all, no use
in crying over spilt milk.661 Writers in the field of law and econom-
ics tend to avoid the problems associated with sunk costs by writ-
ing about hypothetical problems that do not involve large outlays
of capital. They tend to discuss agrarian examples.662  If there
are no sunk costs, the time when an efficiency analysis is made is
probably unimportant; the efficient number of cows for a rancher
to maintain will often be independent of his past activities. The
cases actually decided by the courts, on the other hand, tend to
involve sources of pollution that represent large capital invest-
ments.663 Even when economists do discuss pollution from capital
intensive sources, they almost always begin their analyses from a
point where the factory is already built and polluting, that is, when
the capital investment associated with the harm has already been
"sunk."
For better reasons, the courts in nuisance cases also start their
analysis only when one party is engaged in an activity which
inflicts harm on the other. Were this not so, there might not be
a justiciable case or controversy. Furthermore, if the remedy sought
is damages, there can be no damages until harm has actually oc-
curred. Even if an injunction is sought, the courts are extremely
reluctant to act until the harm has actually occurred.66 4  More-
over, even if a remedy were available before the harm occurred,
660. For an explanation of the economic meaning of "sunk cost" see notes
250-52 supra and accompanying text.
661. See D. WiNcn, ANALYrcAL WELFARE ECONOMCS 106 (1971), where
the author states:
The historic-cost case, being purely ex post, is not a problem of
resource allocation, though it is of distributional interest. Once a
tunnel is dug it is available for use....
It is one thing to dismiss the historic cost of digging a tunnel ex
post, but quite another to dismiss it ex ante.
662. See, e.g., Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & EcoN. 1, 2-8
(1960).
663. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d
870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970); Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1,
101 N.E. 805 (1913).
664. See text accompanying note 743 infra.
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the victim would not likely bring suit, both because he is not likely
to know whether he will be victimized until the pollution occurs
and because he will be unwilling to assume the costs of litigation
until he has actually suffered injury.66
In a world with an efficient market, where there is perfect in-
formation and all goods and factors of production (including water
quality) have an owner, the question would be not whether the
harm should be allowed to continue, but whether it would occur
in the first place. Let me give you an example. Assume the fol-
lowing: In a world with an efficient market, both Able and Baker
own land on the Afton River. Baker is the downstream owner.
Each lot is worth $200,000. Able is contemplating building a
steel mill on his land that would cost $1,000,000 and that would
produce a stream of income to Able worth $1,300,000.666 The water
pollution from the steel mill would make Baker's land worthless
for any use.
Will Able build the mill? Of course not. Able's contemplated
net gain from the plant is $100,000. But Baker will pay him up
to $200,000 not to build the plant. 67 Thus Able can make up to
$100,000 by not building the plant. Of course, if Baker owns the
right to be free from pollution, the shoe would be on the other
foot. Able would have to pay Baker at least $200,000 to obtain
the privilege of operating the plant. In this case, Able would
lose $100,000 if he builds the plant. So no matter who owns the
legal rights to the water quality in the stream, the plant will not
be built.668
665. This is, of course, an example of the unavoidable bias that any legal
system must have against potential plaintiffs, against those who have Hoh-feldian
rights rather than privileges. See notes 606-08 supra and accompanying text.
666. The cost of the mill is $1,000,000 plus land worth $200,000. The
value of the mill is $1,300,000. The gain to Able, therefore, is the difference
between $1,300,000 and $1,200,000.
667. The cost of the mill in this case will be $1,400,000, $1,000,000 for
construction plus Able's land which is worth $200,000 and Baker's land
which is also worth $200,000. Able's loss is the difference between this total
cost of $1,400,000 and $1,300,000.
668. Notice, however, that when Able owns the privilege of polluting, he
can "extort" $200,000 from Baker. This is the same thing as saying that the
privilege to pollute (or the right to be free of pollution) is worth $200,000.
Obviously, the distribution of wealth differs, ceteris paribus, depending on
which rule of law is in force. See notes 128-35 supra and accompanying
text. Since the efficient allocation of resources depends on the distribution of
wealth, the example in the text does not make sense unless we also assume that
there is $200,000 that (i) Able has, if Baker has the right to be free from
pollution and (ii) Baker has (at least initially) if Able has the privilege to
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Now let us look at the same example with one change: the
steel mill has been constructed and is in operation. How this
could happen in a world with an efficient market is beyond me.
Either we have to assume that the plant was built before the
market became perfect"'0 or that there has been an "exogenous"
change somewhere, for example, in the technology of producing
steel.670  In any event, Able now owns a mill worth $1,300,000671
pollute. The changes in the distribution of the $200,000 keep the distribution
of wealth constant as the legal rules change. This is the $200,000 that Able
"extorts" from Baker. Notice that no matter what the rule of law is, Able
ends up with this "extra" $200,000. To make the Coase theorem work, even
in hypothetical problems, requires some juggling. See notes 106-11, 591-99
supra and accompanying text.
Another interesting feature of this example is that Able's land is always worth
$200,000. If the plant were the efficient use of the land, i.e., if it could have
been constructed at a profit, Able's land would have been worth more than
$200,000, and the entire problem would have been different. In any event, in
the model of an efficient market the ultimate conclusion is always determined
by the initial distributional assumptions. Perhaps one further explanation about
this example would be helpful. For the sake of simplicity the problem has
been treated as if the choice were between operating the plant with full
pollution or shutting it down. Such discontinuities are, however, ruled out
in most market models (if they are not ruled out, one is going to have to
work with the topology of sets or even more abstruse areas of mathematics
such as catastrophe theory. See note 338 supra.) It is, however, easy to
convert this particular example so that it is continuous. Just assume that,
with the available technology, to produce an income stream with a capitalized
value of one cent, the mill must produce pollution that will decrease the
value of Baker's land by two cents. Assume further that if any mill larger
than the one costing one million dollars is built, then for each additional unit
of capital investment there will be a decrease of more than one unit in the
capitalized value of the stream of income from the mill. Some requirement
like this last assumption is necessary not only to preserve continuity but also
to outlaw the impermissible situation where there are declining costs to scale.
See note 343 supra and accompanying text.
The fact remains, however, that discontinuities and decreasing cost indus-
tries do exist in the real world, which obdurately refuses to conform to the
limitations of our mathematics.
669. See Liebhafsky, The Problem of Social Cost-An Alternative Approach,
13 NATURAL REsotmrcs J. 616, 658 (1973).
670. In other words, the constraint represented by the "technological fron-
tier" has moved and the market is now aproaching a new Pareto optimum.
This raises the basic question: What earthly advantage is there in trying to
be "efficient" if the meaning of "efficiency" keeps changing?
671. The mill is worth no more and no less than the capitalized value of the
income that it produces. How much it cost to build the plant is-from an
economic point of view-irrelevant. The courts, on the other hand, often
act as if such "sunk" costs are relevant to the value of the plant. See, e.g.,
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 225, 257 N.E.2d 870, 873,
309 N.Y.S.2d 321, 316 (1970). The Boomer court viewed closing down the
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and Baker owns a valueless tract of land which would be worth
$200,000 if Able's mill were shut down. Obviously, in this case
the pollution will continue since the most Baker will offer as a
"bribe" to stop the pollution is $200,000. If, on the other hand,
as seems unlikely,672 Baker has the right to have the Afton flow
sweetly, he can extort $200,000 from Able, since Able will not be
willing to give up $1,300,000 if he can continue producing steel at
the cost of only $200,000. In fact, theoretically Baker can "ex-
tort" up to $1,300,000, and the mill will still continue to pollute. 73
There will be more pollution in a world regulated by nuisance
law than there would be in a world with an efficient market. This
is so since in the efficient market, unlike the imperfect system under
which nuisance law operates, the parties have perfect information
which will prevent the construction of an imperfect plant. Under
the law of nuisance, with its imperfect information system, the
chance is much greater that the plant will be built.
To see why that last statement is true, consider the original
example when Able is deciding whether or not to build the plant
and see what happens under our regime of nuisance law. Able
has a choice: he can build the plant or he can try to extort $200,000
from Baker. He is unlikely to succeed in this latter attempt in the
real world because of transaction costs and the problem of public
goods.674  If extortion is foreclosed, Able still has the choice be-
plant as a drastic remedy, reasoning that the respondent's investment in the
plant was in excess of 45 million dollars. Cf. 1 J. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION
OF PROPERTY (1937) where the author speaks of sunk costs and courts:
[Wihat we now have to note is the fact that the courts often accept
actual or original cost in proof of value, despite the fact that a hard-
headed businessman, in deciding the price for which he would either
buy or sell the property, would hardly turn his finger to discover the
amount of this cost.
Id. at 146.
672. It is implausible to assume that Able is a tortfeasor in a world with
an efficient market. Tortfeasors have to be ruled out or people would steal
rather than trade and the system would not approach either an equilibrium
or an optimum.
673. It turns out that it is not the steel mill that is worth $1,300,000; it is,
ceteris paribus, the privilege of polluting that is worth that amount. Of
course, for there to be the same Pareto optimum when Baker has the right to
clean water as there is when Able has the privilege of polluting, one must do
a bit of juggling with the figures. If Able has the privilege, Baker must have
an additional $1,300,000. If Baker has the right, then Able must have the
extra $1,300,000-he needs it to bribe Baker. Notice that Able always ends
up with a steel mill (or a privilege to pollute) worth $1,300,000 and Baker
always ends up with that amount in cash.
674. See note 435 supra and accompanying text. If Baker is the only
downstream owner, Able might be able to get away with the "extortion" even
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tween keeping his land worth $200,000 or investing that land, plus
an additional $1,000,000, in a steel mill ultimately worth $1,300,000.
Will Able decide to put up the plant? He is confronted with the
problem that he does not know what will happen when and if
Baker sues him. If the court enjoins the plant at Baker's request,
Able will lose his entire investment. If the court awards Baker
his $200,000 damages, Able loses $100,000. If the court denies
any relief to Baker, Able has come out $100,000 ahead.675
Assume that the court believes in the doctrines of welfare
economics. It is clear that they will not enjoin the operation of
the mill because that would be an inefficient result since the mill
has been built already. Will they award Baker his $200,000 in
damages? This is a purely distributional problem since the mill
will continue to operate and to pollute whether or not the damages
are awarded.676 It might seem reasonable to a court, particularly
one misled by the Coase theorem, 677 to assume that since the ef-
ficient allocation of resources is for the steel mill to continue pol-
luting, the pollution is not a nuisance and therefore damages should
not be awarded. After all, a nuisance is a wrong and if the pol-
lution is socially desirable, it cannot be a wrong. So the court
may conclude that the pollution is not a nuisance, that it is "rea-
sonable."
If Able believes that the court will react in this fashion he will
construct the steel mill, even if he is sure that Baker will sue
in the real world. This would have the effect of leaving the stream un-
polluted, just as would happen in a more efficient world.
Able could, of course, sell his land for $200,000, but that would leave the
new owner faced with the same pair of choices.
675. And Baker will be worse off to the tune of $200,000. Thus, if Able
and Baker are the only two persons affected by the mill, society will have lost
$100,000 if the mill is constructed. Since the real world is probably not at
a Pareto optimum, this $100,000 of loss to society is a rather meaningless
figure. See notes 290-313 supra and accompanying text. However, if we
ignore the problem of the "second best," it is clear that it is inefficient to
build the mill and that society will be worse off (to some extent) even though
Able is better off.
676. This is so because Able's payment to Baker of $200,000 and his re-
sultant $100,000 loss is no reason for Able to close down a steel mill worth
$1,300,000. It should be noted that a court of law would not award Baker
the $200,000 as lump-sum damages. He will be forced to bring a series of
separate actions. See notes 843-45 infra and accompanying text. This fact
may discourage Baker from suing for all of his damages and thus increase
Able's chances of winning if he gambles on putting up the plant.
677. See notes 142-57 supra and accompanying text.
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him6 7 8 Even if Able is not certain how the court will decide the
distributional question of whether to grant damages to Baker, Able
may still decide to build the mill. He may be willing to gamble
the chance of a $100,000 loss against that of a $100,000 gain.679
There is always the chance that the court will want to encourage
the steel industry and will deny damages on that ground.6 0
Although this may seem like a serious bias in favor of pol-
lution in the real world, there are countervailing considerations. The
question of whether or not to award damages is not purely distrib-
utive. The award of damages will not keep the water quality of
the Afton from being destroyed, but a court might award damages
on allocative grounds pour encourager les autres. Able's mill will
continue to pollute, but the award of damages may discourage
others from making the socially undesirable decision to build a
steel mill in similar circumstances.68'
When one looks only at the substantive law, one might con-
clude that the time when a court acts is not as important as it first
678. Remember the biases that exist in the law that may prevent Baker
from suing.
679. It should also be remembered that Able does not have perfect informa-
tion. He does not know, in fact, that his profit on the steel mill will be worth
exactly $100,000 or that the injury to Baker's land will be exactly $200,000.
Thus, it is likely that Able is overstating his chances of profiting from the
mill. I suspect that only optimists invest in new steel plants while pes-
simists save their money in their mattresses. If Able is a pessimist, he will sell
the land to an optimist, and that optimist will build the mill.
If my suspicion is correct, the mere fact that the law of nuisance is un-
certain will encourage pollution, since those who make the relevant invest-
ments will believe that they can "luck out." If it were absolutely certain
that the mill would result in a loss of $100,000, not even an optimist would
make the investment.
It may be possible to construct a model of an efficient market in which
perfect information about the future is not assumed, provided that everyone
has perfect information about the probability of every future event happening.
Cf. J. VON NEUMANN & 0. MORGENSTERN, THEORY oF GAMEs AND ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR 19 (2d ed. 1947). In such a model, people with different risk
preferences would be able to trade risks until a Pareto optimal point was
reached. Unfortunately, it would seem that this optimum would be very
unstable; every time something happened a gamble would be converted into a
sure win or a sure loss, with a corresponding change in the distribution of
wealth and in the Pareto optimum.
680. Cf. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886),
discussed in note 797 infra and accompanying text.
681. When Able and others like him in 1976 consider whether a court will
award damages to their victims in 1978, they should keep in mind that the
court might award such damages for the sole purpose of discouraging Able
and his friends from making their investments in 1976.
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appears. Still there is obviously some bias towards pollution be-
cause the courts cannot act until after the investment is made.
B. Coming to the Nuisance
Another bias that becomes apparent when one looks at the
workings of nuisance law at a time before the nuisance occurs is
a consequence of the "doctrine" of "coming to the nuisance." This
is a distributional bias that favors polluters over those who would
seek to apply waters to "conservative use" 6 2 and favors intensive
pollution over less harmful activities.
Once again consider the two tracts on the Afton river owned
by Able and Baker. Assume that Able, who owns the upstream
tract, wishes to build a steel mill there, while Baker wishes to build
an expensive dwelling on his tract. We do not know how the
efficient market would allocate the water quality in the Afton but
as the market allocation is based on the distribution of wealth
with one dollar counting as one vote,683 it is safe to assume that
the allocation will depend partially on the distribution of wealth
between Able and Baker. Let us further assume that if Baker
owns the right to clean water, he will not sell out to Able at
any price Able could afford to pay, while if Able owns the pri-
vilege to pollute, Baker will not be able to meet his price. Thus,
depending upon the distribution between Able and Baker of that
portion of society's wealth that is represented by the water quality
of the Afton, either pollution from a steel mill or no such pol-
lution will be the optimal allocation of that water quality. With
neither Able's mill nor Baker's mansion in existence it seems safe
to say that the wealth represented by the water quality is un-
distributed, for neither the courts nor the legislature have specified
the rights and privileges of the two parties.684 If we are, however,
in a jurisdiction that adheres to the doctrine of "coming to the
nuisance," we can make an educated guess as to how a court
will decide the distributional issue.
If Able gets his steel mill constructed and in operation before
Baker gets his mansion built, the court will probably say that Baker
came to the nuisance and decree that Able is privileged to pollute.
On the other hand, if Baker gets his mansion built first, the pol-
682. See notes 589-93 supra and accompanying text.
683. See note 227 supra and accompanying text. For a full discussion of
one dollar, one vote, see notes 204-42 supra and accompanying text.
684. See text accompanying notes 542-50 supra.
1976]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
lution is more likely to be declared a nuisance. Thus the wealth
represented by the water quality of the Afton is going to be dis-
tributed on a first-come, first-served basis, which does not seem to
be a satisfactory solution. 68 The result is paradoxical since the
courts end up making a distributional decision on the basis of the
existing allocation of water quality. The allocation ends up specify-
ing rights, rather than rights specifying the allocation.681 6
The doctrine of "coming to the nuisance" has had a long, but
spotty, history. Blackstone approved of it: "If my neighbor makes
a tan-yard, so as to annoy and render less salubrious the air of
my house or garden, the law will furnish me with a remedy; but
if he is first in possession of the air, and I fix my habitation near
him, the nuisance is of my own seeking, and may continue." 687
On the other hand, it was asserted in 1947 that:
It has been established virtually beyond question that if
a condition, business, or occupation is so operated or
maintained as to actually constitute a public nuisance or
a private nuisance as to those people living in the neigh-
borhood, the fact that the complainant or others purchased
or occupied their property in the vicinity after the estab-
lishment of the condition constituting a nuisance will not
constitute a defense or alone conclude an individual
complainant or public authorities in an action for relief.688
Although there are cases in which the doctrine of "coming to
the nuisance" has been allowed as a defense,689 the majority of
jurisdictions agree: "It is well settled that the mere fact that one
voluntarily 'comes to a nuisance will not preclude him from
complaining of and obtaining relief against it ... A contrary doc-
trine would be so unreasonable and oppressive as to work its own
condemnation." 690
Thus, it might seem that "coming to the nuisance" is not an
important doctrine. It is probably better to say, however, that
it is simply misleading. It is true that few courts would say that
"coming to a nuisance" deprives the victim of his cause of action,
685. Cf. 1 N. WnLIAms, AmmucAN PLn~o LAw, LAND USE AND THE
PoacE PowER 4 (1974).
686. See text accompanying note 161 supra.
687. 2 W. BLACESTONE, COMMENTAUES *402-03.
688. Annot., 167 A.L.R. 1364, 1366 (1947).
689. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Church, 53 F. 422 (C.C.R.I. 1892); Steele v. Rail
& River Coal Co., 42 Ohio App. 228, 182 N.E. 552 (1927).
690. United States v. Luce, 141 F. 385, 410 (C.C. Del. 1905).
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but most, if not all, will hold on occasion that something is not
a nuisance because it was there when the plaintiff arrived on the
scene. Thus, it might be better to phrase the doctrine as follows:
"If you come to an annoyance, that is your own fault, and the
courts will not treat the annoyance as a nuisance." The applicable
maxim is "volenti non fit injuria." Coming to the annoyance is
normally not treated as a defense, but rather as something that
"may... be considered as a factor in the determination of whether
the defendant's use of his property is . . . unreasonable, . . . or as
some courts have expressed it, to determine the 'equities' of the
case." 691
One is reminded of Justice Sutherland's famous aphorism: "A
nuisance may be merely a right thing in a wrong place-like a
pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." 692 The question is,
what determines whether a particular locality is a parlor or a
barnyard? The answer, of course, tends to be that the first use is
determinative. It is not surprising that the Washington Supreme
Court refused to enjoin the emission of cement dust in the town
of Cement at the request of one who came to the nuisance, when
the town of Cement would never have existed except as a by-
product of the dusty cement plant.693
The doctrine of "coming to the annoyance" has defeated plain-
tiffs in nuisance actions even though the plaintiffs arrived on the
scene before the polluters. Witness the decision of the New York
Appellate Division in Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp.: 694
It is true that the appellant was a resident of this
locality for several years before the defendant came on
the scene of action, and that, when the plaintiff built her
house, the land on which these coke ovens now stand was
a hickory grove. But in a growing community changes
are inevitable. This region was never fitted for a residen-
tial district; for years it has been peculiarly adapted for
factory sites. This was apparent when plaintiff bought
her lots and when she built her house. The land is low
and lies adjacent to the Buffalo river, a navigable stream
connecting with Lake Erie. Seven different railroads run
through this area. Freight tracks and yards can be seen
691. Annot., 167 A.L.R. 1364, 1382 (1947).
692. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
693. Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, Inc., 15 Wash. 2d 14, 129 P.2d
536 (1942).
694. 236 App. Div. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 229, motion for leave to appeal denied,
236 App. Div. 775, 258 N.Y.S. 1075 (1932).
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in every direction. Railroads naturally follow the low
levels in passing through a city. Cheap transportation is
an attraction which always draws factories and industrial
plants to a locality. It is common knowledge that a
combination of rail and water terminal facilities will stamp
a section as a site suitable for industries of the heavier
type, rather than for residential purposes. In 1910 there
were at least eight industrial plants, with a total assessed
valuation of over a million dollars, within a radius of a
mile from plaintiff's house.
With all the dirt, smoke and gas which necessarily
come from factory chimneys, trains and boats, and with
full knowledge that this region was especially adapted
for industrial rather than residential purposes, and that
factories would increase in the future, plaintiff selected
this locality as the site of her future home. She volun-
tarily moved into this district, fully aware of the fact that
the atmosphere would constantly be contaminated by
dirt, gas and foul odors; and that she could not hope to
find in this locality the pure air of a strictly residential
zone. She evidently saw certain advantages in living in
this congested center. This is not the case of an industry,
with its attendant noise and dirt, invading a quiet, resi-
dential district. It is just the opposite. Here a residence
is built in an area naturally adapted for industrial pur-
poses and already dedicated to that use. Plaintiff can
hardly be heard to complain at this late date that her
peace and comfort have been disturbed by a situation
which existed, to some extent at least, at the very time
she bought her property, and which condition she must
have known would grow worse rather than better as the
years went by ...
I think that the trial court was amply justified in re-
fusing to interfere with the operation of the defendant's
coke ovens. No consideration of public policy or private
rights demands any such sacrifice of this industry.695
This passage may merely reflect a late blossoming of the nine-
teenth century passion for industrial progress. Today, with in-
creased environmental concern, the courts might be expected to
lean the other way.696 Thus, one could conclude that the biases
695. Id. at 41-43, 258 N.Y.S. at 233-35.
696. Cf. Spur Indus. Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494
P.2d 700 (1972). In Spur a cattle-feeding lot was enjoined when the victims
came to live in the neighborhood. Notice, however, that the plaintiff-developer
who induced the victims to move to its retirement community next to the
nuisance was compelled to pay the cost of relocating the "nuisance." Thus
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inherent in the doctrine of coming to the nuisance cancel out, and
it all depends on who gets there first.
The matter, however, is not so simple. Consider once again
the quotation from Lord Justice James:
If some picturesque haven opens its arms to invite the
commerce of the world, it is not for this Court to forbid
the embrace, although the fruit of it should be the sights
and sounds and smells of a common seaport and ship-
building town, which would drive the Dryads and their
masters from their loved solitudes. 6 7
and the sad fate of Mill Brook:
[W]ith a considerable city ... upon either bank, and the
adjacent lands descending rapidly towards its bed, [that
may] cease to preserve its water from impurity, and
become valueless for any purpose except that of drainage
and the creation of power by its head and fall. 6"08
Consider the declared helplessness of the court in Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Co. in the face of pollution that they felt should
not be permitted.6 90 These cases give me the impression that
something like Gresham's law is at work: bad uses drive out good.
To be absolutely certain that such a bias exists when courts decide
whether pollution is a nuisance would require empirical studies.
One might reasonably suspect, however, that it is easier to turn
a parlor into a barnyard than a barnyard into a parlor. Further-
more, if my arguments that other aspects of nuisance law favor
pollution are correct, then we will have an excessive amount of
pollution that will be protected by the doctrine of "coming to the
nuisance." If all the world is a barnyard or a sewer, we will come
to the nuisance by the very act of being born-volenti non fit in-
juria indeedl
It is also true that the almost universal existence of zoning
laws suggests that our political representatives, when it comes to
Spur can be read as a case that adopted the rule that he who comes to a
nuisance loses. The unusual result is a normal application of the doctrine that
he who seeks equity must do equity. Were it not for the interests of the
innocent victims of the plaintiff, the development company, it seems clear that
the court would neither have enjoined the nuisance nor awarded damages.
697. Salvin v. North Brancepeth Coal Co., L.R. 9 C.H. 705, 710 (Ch. App.
1874).
698. Merrifield v. City of Worcester, 110 Mass. 216, 220 (1872).
699. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970), discussed
infra at notes 810-15.
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questions of land use (as opposed to water quality),700 have not been
satisfied with the results reached by the unregulated market in land,
constrained only by the courts' sporadic decisions in nuisance
cases.701 If one looks at a microeconomic model that is sophisti-
cated enough to incorporate the fact that all tracts of land are
not identical, one will find a "zoning" effect in the model itself,
since each tract of land will be allocated to its "highest and best
use." 702 If I am correct in my suspicion that nuisance law tends
in the long run to allocate all land (and all waters) to their
filthiest uses, then it is clear that the body of law has at least
distributional bias in favor of pollution. One might even conclude
that it also has an allocational bias; one might conclude that the
regime of nuisance law results in more water pollution, and other
types of pollution, than would occur under the regime of an effi-
cient market.
At least one bias in favor of pollution clearly must exist as a
result of the doctrine of "coming to the nuisance." If the law
protects the first user it will, almost always, protect some pollu-
tion. In my example at the beginning of this section, Able's steel
mill will cause more pollution than will Baker's mansion but the
mansion itself will almost certainly cause some pollution. It is
very unlikely that "conservative uses" will be protected by nui-
sance law.70 3 Remember that "conservative uses" are not really
uses at all. Until a stream is polluted by someone, it is allocated
to a conservative use; it is not used at all, and it is very unlikely
that any use of the water, no matter how polluting, will be held
to be an unreasonable interference with this non-use.70' The doe-
700. Since water flows downhill, it is harder to zone water than land.
Such zoning was mandated, however, by the FWPCA before the 1972 amend-
ments and still plays an important (although apparently secondary) role in
the act as amended. See FWPCA § 3, 33 U.S.C. § 1252 (Supp. IV, 1974),
amending 33 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970).
701. It should have been noted that land may effectively be "zoned" by
private covenants. Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HAnv.
L. REv. 1645, 1669 (1971). But see B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WrrnouT ZONIN
77-84 (1972).
702. It should be noted that in the area of land (as opposed to water) use,
even those who prefer market solutions to zoning recognize that other interests
than those of individual property owners must be protected. See Costonis,
Fair Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking
Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 CoLum. L. REv. 1021, 1030 (1975).
703. See notes 589-99 supra and accompanying text.
704. There are some jurisdictions in which a riparian owner who does not
use the water might be allowed to get nominal damages for a violation of his
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trine of "first-come, first-served" will induce "rational" men-the
types who inhabit economic models-to race to see who can
first grab the wealth represented by water quality. There is no
way for someone who affirmatively desires not to use the water,
who desires to conserve water quality, to enter the race. Perhaps
Able will win, perhaps Baker. To some extent, however, water
quality must always lose. And, once again, there is a bias in
nuisance law that impairs water quality to a greater extent than
would occur under the regime of an efficient market.
C. Prescriptive Rights and Related Doctrines
There is another possible bias in the law of nuisance that is
related to the time when the analysis is made. The existence of
this bias suggests that there will be more pollution under a regime
of nuisance law than under the regime of an efficient market. The
bias becomes apparent if one considers the workings of nuisance
doctrines, not at the time when a court determines whether or
not a particular condition is a nuisance, but at a later date when
circumstances have changed. It is also apparent in cases in which
a court has not been called upon to determine whether a condition
is a nuisance before there has been a change in the efficient alloca-
tion of resources.
You will recall that welfare economic theory of the Paretian
kind is based on a very static type of model. Given a fixed distribu-
tion of wealth, fixed technology, and a fixed set of individual
preferences, the model tells us that if there is also a perfect market,
the ultimate result will be a Pareto optimum. 705 The model does
not exclude the possibility of changes in wealth or technology or
tastes. It merely assumes that such changes are "exogenous" in
relation to the model. When one of these exogenous changes
occurs, the model goes right on grinding out the primrose path to
a Pareto optimum-only it is a different path and a different opti-
mum than those which "existed" before the change. And when one
compares the workings of an efficient market with the workings
of nuisance law after the time such an exogenous change occurs,
it again appears that the law of nuisance will produce more pollu-
tion than would an efficient market.
riparian rights on the theory that otherwise the polluter might obtain a pre-
scriptive right to pollute. See note 730 infra and accompanying text.
705. See notes 337-50 supra and accompanying text.
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It is hardly surprising that there is a deviation between the real
world with a regime of nuisance and the unreal world with a
perfectly efficient market. As you will recall, trades in the perfect
market can be made without any transaction costs, 706 while in the
real world the "friction" of such costs may cause an inefficient allo-
cation to endure. As one commentator has suggested sarcastically,
if we had an efficient market, "titles to property and rights in land
would then become functions of long-run market prices, possessing
the same degree of certainty as do economic and weather fore-
casts." 707 In the real world, of course, titles to property and rights
in land do not fluctuate in this fashion, although there will be a
tendency for the owners of the titles or the rights to apply them
to what the owners believe, lacking perfect information, to be
their highest and best use.708 On the other hand, if the courts make
their determinations in nuisance cases on the basis of economic
efficiency, 709 then the allocation of the privilege of polluting would
seem to be a function of what the courts deem to be the relevant
"market prices," as determined by the courts, and therefore the
allocations should be much more changeable than are titles to
property. There are, however, at least three ways in which one,
in theory, could obtain a privilege to pollute that would not be
dependent upon "market prices" that react to each exogenous
change in wealth, technology, or tastes or upon a court's determina-
tion of the efficient allocation after such a change. Once a court has
determined that A's pollution is or is not a nuisance as to B, that
decision is not likely to be overturned merely because of some
exogenous change. In a state with an appropriation system, an
appropriator who applies his appropriated water to "beneficial"
and polluting uses is not likely to lose his appropriative rights
simply because there has been a change in the costs his pollution
imposes on others. In all states it would seem possible that a
polluter-merely by continuing his "wrongful" pollution for a long
706. See note 346 supra and accompanying text.
707. Liebhafsky, The Problem of Social Cost-An Alternative Approach, 13
NATURAL RFsouRcEs J. 615, 652 (1973).
708. This use, of course, may not be the one that brings the highest mone-
tary return. If the owner applies his rights to a "lower" use, in terms of
monetary income, then the owner is wealthier than one would assume if one
merely considered the market value of his rights. This is merely one more
example of the fact that it does make a difference to whom property rights
are assigned. See notes 155-68 supra and accompanying text.
709. See, e.g., notes 553-54 supra and accompanying text.
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enough period-may obtain a "prescriptive right" to continue pol-
luting without any liability in nuisance, even though his pollution
is unreasonable.710
Since it is practically impossible to transfer rights to water
quality,711 and since rights and privileges obtained by prescription
do not permit any change in the nature of the use that is subject
to the right or privilege, it would appear that water quality that
has been subjected to prescription will not be reallocated even
though that allocation of water quality is no longer efficient.
1. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis
The first type of prescription, that of res judicata (or "issue
preclusion") and stare decisis, is so completely accepted that it is
unlikely that a pollution case will be relitigated between the same
parties once the initial litigation has been lost and won. Further-
more, even if the litigation is not brought as a class action, it will
undoubtedly be considered as the controlling law in any subse-
quent cases by other persons affected by the pollution. If the
court holds that the effluent of a steel mill is not a nuisance as to
riparian A, it will almost certainly hold that it is not a nuisance as to
A's riparian neighbor B. If the court holds that A is entitled to
damages, it will almost certainly hold that neighbor B is also en-
titled to damages and the only issue that might be litigated is the
quantum of the damages.712 If A is granted an injunction, neighbor
B will receive its benefits without further litigation.713
Even though res judicata as traditionally defined applies only
to the original parties to the litigation,714 it has been extended to
710. In fact, he will obtain this "right" only because his pollution is un-
reasonable. See note 728 infra and accompanying text.
711. See C. MEYERS & R. PosNER, MAKEr TANSFERs OF WATER RIGRTS:
TowmD AN IMPROVYED MARKET IN WATER REsouRcEs 8-15 (1971).
712. If liability is clear, the parties will often be able to negotiate a settle-
ment. Even if a court is called upon to fix the damages, the only issue is
likely to be one of fact and thus one would not expect a reported opinion.
713. See text accompanying notes 783-93 infra.
It is possible in theory that A will release his injunction for a consideration.
In such a case B will have to sue, but the court will almost certainly grant
the injunction to B on the grounds of stare decisis (or perhaps res judicata,
if the court is not overly concerned with privity). See, e.g., Zdanok v.
Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
It is the fact that B can obtain another injunction that prevents the polluter
from purchasing A's release of his injunction. See notes 422-33 supra and
accompanying text.
714. See Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 710, 713 (1957), where it is said:
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bind those in privity with them and, in some rare cases, others
who can hardly be called privies 15 Successive owners of the same
parcel of land will probably be deemed to be in privity for the
purposes of res judicata.716 Technically, however, even if the parties
are the same, an allegation that certain pollution is a nuisance in
1976 would not be precluded by a decision that the same quantum
of pollution was not a nuisance in 1936 .717 What was reasonable
yesterday may not be reasonable today.718 Nevertheless, a court
probably would not be enthusiastic about abandoning its earlier
decisions when all that has changed is our tastes. The fact remains,
whatever the theory may be,
[T]hat when an action has been brought for the disturb-
ance of a certain right, and a verdict obtained for the plain-
tiff under the general issue, and another action for the dis-
turbance of the same right is commenced between the
same parties ... the first recovery is strong, though not
conclusive evidence for the plaintiff in the second action to
sustain his right.719
And if the plaintiff should lose in the first action it would be
equally strong evidence against him in the second.
The definition often cited is that where a valid final judgment has
been rendered on the merits by a court having proper jurisdiction,
such judgment is conclusive, in a subsequent action between the
same parties and brought before a court of like or concurrent juris-
diction, of rights, questions, and facts in issue.
Basically, it has been said, the doctrine rests upon the ground that
the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity,
has litigated, or had an opportunity to litigate, the same matter in a
former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be
permitted to litigate it again to the harassment and vexation of his
opponent.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
715. See, e.g., Kinney v. State, 191 Misc. 128, 75 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Ct CL
1947).
716. See Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion, V PERSONAL INJuRY ANNUAL
121-23 (1969).
717. "Every continuance of a nuisance is held to be a fresh one, and there-
fore a fresh action will lie .. " Miles v. Wingate, 6 Ind. 458, 459 (1855);
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAMES 0220; cf. A. Tum-ms, TAE Do"riM
OF BFs JuDICATA 177 (2d ed. 1969). As one author noted on this point:
"A decision the foundation of which was a finding that it had not been
proved that respondent was a gipsy was held to be no bar to the litiga-
tion in subsequent proceedings of the different question whether he was a
gipsy on a later date." Id., quoting Mills v. Cooper, [1967] 2 All E.R. 100
(Q.B.).
718. Cf. Heck v. Beryllium Corp., 58 Berks County L.J. 12 (Pa. C.P. 1965),
rev'd on other grounds, 424 Pa. 140, 226 A.2d 87 (1967).
719. Miles v. Wingate, 6 Ind. 458, 459 (1855). But cf. J. WELLS, REs
ADJUDICATA AND STARE DEcisis 281-82 (1878).
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The fact that the courts and lawyers have a tendency not to
relitigate nuisance cases does not by itself suggest any bias for
or against clean water. If we assume that the court made the
original determination on efficiency grounds and that there has
since been an exogenous change that makes the court's initial
allocation inefficient, we cannot tell whether the inefficiency consists
of too little or too much pollution. Two recent developments
suggest, however, that an efficient level of pollution in 1900 would
today constitute an inefficient surplus of pollution. Each of these
changes results in an increase in the value 720 of water of good
quality. In the first place, the supply of clean waters has been
decreasing as population and industrialization have increased.721
The second change is more clearly exogenous and thus could not
have influenced the allocations of the efficient market in 1900; the
demand for waters of good quality has increased because of
changes in our tastes since the latter part of the 1960's. Admit-
tedly, one would be hard put to supply hard data for this last con-
tention, but considering the sudden emergence of the environ-
mental movement, the amounts of energy-and money-that have
been expended on behalf of the environment, and the political
demand that has resulted in the FWPCA and the NEPA and all the
other recent environmental legislation, it would be even harder to
conclude that no shift in demand has occurred.722
720. Le., an increase in the marginal price of water of good quality in a
hypothetical, efficient market.
721. See B. CommioNE, THE CLosnqG CmcLE 134 (1971).
It is possible that in the efficient market this increasing scarcity would have
been taken into account when allocations were made in 1900. Since water
quality is a "commons," however, the prices in 1900 would not have reflected
this future value. See notes 409-21 supra and accompanying text. Further-
more, even in an efficient market, values which will be realized only after
most members of the community are dead are not likely to 'be reflected in
the market. See notes 112-15 supra and accompanying text.
722. It might be argued that the demand was always there but was
unarticulated. Such an argument is, of course, an indictment of the regimes
of the existing market and nuisance law which were incapable of recognizing
this inarticulate demand. It seems more likely, however, that much of the
current demand for a decent environment, including decent waters, is new.
This demand is probably a result of our increased ability (whether real or
only apparent) to do something about environmental degradation, an ability
that was revealed by the decisions in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference
v. Federal Power Commn, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 941 (1966), and its progeny and by the very passage of such acts as the
NEPA and the FWPCA. Thus, the increase in our demand for a liveable en-
vironment is the result of an increase in the supply of legal remedies with the
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If either of these shifts has taken place, the law of supply and
demand must lead to the conclusion that the price of good water-
and therefore the cost of pollution-set by the workings of an
efficient market, has increased during the last decade. If this is
so, any allocation of water quality that was efficient before 1966
will be inefficient today, and the inefficiency will consist of too
much pollution rather than too little.
2. Appropriation
A clearer example of prescriptions that must lead to a sub-
optimal amount of good water quality exists in the more western
states where water is subject to appropriation. Although ordinary
nuisance cases turn on a court's determination of what is "reason-
able" and therefore permit consideration of economic efficiency,
there is no requirement that appropriation of water rights be
reasonable. Appropriation rights are not in practice marketable 723
and may be lost if the appropriated water is applied to different
uses or to different land. As you will recall, in some states water
cannot be appropriated for conservative uses, including the preser-
vation of water quality.724 All of these facts make it almost incon-
ceivable that the quality of water subject to appropriation will be
reallocated to reflect the increased value of clean water.
3. Prescriptive Rights
Prescription in its ordinary meaning will also freeze allocations
of water quality that were once efficient but are no longer so.
The defense that the polluter has acquired a "prescriptive
right" to pollute, the claim that the polluter's activity, although
originally tortious, has become privileged with the passage of
time, was successful, as you will remember, in that old horror
story Standard Bag & Paper C0 .72 The exact nature of a prescrip-
environmental revolution becoming a revolution of rising expectations. To
phrase the point in a way that would not seem alien to economists, there has
been a shift in the technological frontier, but in this case the "technology" is
that of law and politics rather than mechanical engineering.
723. See generally C. MEYERs & R. POSNER, Mua"ET TRNisFEas OF WATm
RIGHTS: TOWARD AN IMPROVED MARCET IN WATER REsouncEs 8-15 (1971).
For an example of the difficulty of transferring appropriative rights, see
Spencer v. Bliss, 60 N.M. 16, 287 P.2d 221 (1955). See, e.g., Salt River
Valley Water Users Ass'n v. Kovacovich, 3 Ariz. App. 28, 411 P.2d 201 (1966).
724. See notes 583-99 supra and accompanying text.
725. See text accompanying notes 40-43 supra.
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tive right 726 is hard to define, if only because the theory underlying
such rights has changed over the years. In general, modem Ameri-
can courts hold that adverse use of real property, continued for
the period of the statute of limitations for the recovery of real
property, gives rise to a prescriptive right or easement just as ad-
verse possession gives rise to a prescriptive title.72 7 Where this
theory prevails, pollution which was once a nuisance becomes a
"property right" of the polluter when the period of the statute of
limitations is past. There is no corresponding chance for a pollutee
to obtain a prescriptive right to clean water,7 28 since the victim of
a wrong is never the beneficiary of the statute of limitations.
Under other theories of prescriptive rights, such as the fiction
of a lost grant,729 which merely protects a long established course of
conduct without regard to whether that conduct is actionable, a
pollutee might technically be able to obtain a prescriptive right
to clean water. But this could happen only if he has in some way
actually been using the water for a long period of time. Thus,
even in those few jurisdictions which might recognize the possi-
bility of a prescriptive right to clean water, there is no protection
for a water course that is still in its natural state and subject only
to conservative uses. Prescription will preserve inefficient alloca-
tions that result in too much pollution, but it cannot protect those
where there is too little; the conclusion is inescapable that applica-
tions of the doctrine of prescription must result in more pollution
than would occur under the regime of an efficient market.
Admittedly, there are few cases dealing with prescriptive rights
to pollute.730 This may result from the fact that there are so many
726. See generally Stoebuck, The Fiction of the Presumed Grant, 15 U. KAN.
L. REv. 17 (1966).
727. "(A] use to create a prescriptive right must, like the possession which
is protected by the statutes of limitation, be adverse, continuous, and uninter-
rupted." 2 AmmECAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.52 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
"For practical purposes the terms 'prescriptive user' and 'adverse user' are the
same. Courts commonly equate the elements of adverse user with those of
adverse possession, except of course that 'user' is substituted for 'possession'."
Stoebuck, supra note 726, at 23.
728. "Siiice in most cases a downstream use causes no harm to an upstream
riparian, a long-continued downstream non-riparian use does not create a
prescriptive right that can receive protection against a new upstream use
that causes harm to it. In the West this rule has become epitomized as
'prescription does not run upstream.'" F. TRELEASE, WA-mi LAw 345 (2d.
ed. 1974) (citations omitted).
729. See generally Stoebuck, supra note 726.
730. In numerous cases the defense of a prescriptive right to pollute
has been interposed, but the single English decision of Baxendale v.
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other legal and economic obstacles in the way of successful pollu-
tion suits. Proving that one has a prescriptive right to pollute
can be difficult if one must prove not only that one has polluted
for the applicable period, but also that the pollution was unreason-
able and that it constituted an actionable nuisance throughout the
entire period.731 In such cases it might be simpler for the polluter
to assert that his actions are reasonable than to prove that they
have been unreasonable for fifteen or twenty years. Long con-
tinued pollution without objection by those downstream will ap-
pear to be reasonable to most judges, particularly if the complaint
is brought by someone who "came to the nuisance." 732 It also seems
improbable that anyone would bother to sue a polluter who has
been carrying on the same activities for the last twenty or thirty
years. The doctrine of prescriptive rights is more likely to be a
discouragement to litigation than a basis for deciding litigated
nuisance cases. If an activity has been conducted long enough,
most lawyers will believe that the activity may be rightfully con-
tinued. If this is true, then prescriptive rights to pollute come
close to being the type of well-defined property rights which are
respected by others without any necessity for litigation.
Despite the paucity of reported decisions applying the doctrine
of prescriptive rights in water pollution cases, and despite the
numerous cases in which prescription will not be an effective de-
fense, it is clear that the doctrine has been of fundamental impor-
tance in establishing the present allocation of rights and privileges
McMurray [1867] L.R. 2 Ch. (Eng.) 79, ... seems to be about
the only direct authority in which a bill against a private person
or corporation for polluting a stream has been successfully defended
squarely on this ground. . . . It has been generally recognized,
however, that, so far as the particular pollution constitutes a purely
private nuisance, the defendant might in a proper case be permitted
to establish a prescriptive right ...
Annot., 46 A.L.R. 8, 69 (1927).
Courts have held however that there can be prescriptive rights to maintain
a nuisance. See, e.g., Alabama Consol. Coal & Iron Co. v. Turner, 145 Ala.
639, 39 So. 603 (1906) (on appeal from the sustaining of a demurrer to a
defense of prescription). See also Cleveland v. Standard Bag & Paper Co.,
72 Ohio St. 324, 74 N.E. 206 (1905).
731. See, e.g., McCallum v. Germantown Water Co., 54 Pa. 40 (1867),
where the court found: 'If... an upper riparian proprietor claims the right
to pollute the stream by prescription or a user of twenty-one years . . . he
cannot pollute the water to any greater extent than it was polluted at the
commencement of the twenty-one years." Id. at 48.
732. See notes 682-90 supra and accompanying text.
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relating to the use of waters. Consider the following description
of the effects of prescription in California:
If the doctrine of the riparian right had been strictly
enforced in all cases by the abutting land owners, it is ob-
vious that it would have prevented all use of the waters
of streams passing through lands in private ownership,
on any non-riparian land. The rightful use of such waters
on non-riparian land would have been impossible, for
such landowners could not lawfully take out the water
without infringing upon the right of every riparian owner
along the stream to have the water flow as it was ac-
customed to flow...
Notwithstanding the existence of these vested rights,
there has been a very general use of water on non-riparian
land. This has been made possible by several causes.
The most important and effective cause of a legal nature
is the common law rule . . . that a title by prescription,
good against all owners of private property, may be
acquired by adverse occupancy for the period of five
years continuously .... The large diversions, almost with-
out exception, have been made near the point of emer-
gence of the streams from the mountains, where land
had little value for any purpose, and where the diversion
would have little effect on the land near by and were
so far from the land seriously affected thereby that they
provoked no immediate opposition. In these ways and
for these reasons, innumerable prescriptive rights to the
use of the water of streams have been acquired from the
riparian owners of private land, either without objec-
tion, or by successful litigation. As a net result the ir-
rigated land in the state is almost all non-riparian, and
the existence of the riparian right has not prevented the
beneficial use of the greater part of the waters of the
streams.7
3
It is not necessary to explicate all the possible variations of,
and exceptions to, the doctrine of prescription. It suffices to point
out that the doctrine is biased against good water quality in the
same way, though to a lesser extent, as a legal regime which
assigned to all potential polluters the absolute privilege of pol-
luting and granted to no one the legally enforceable right to clean
water. Even though in a perfect market such an allocation could
be a Pareto optimum, it is unlikely that it would remain optimal as
good waters grew scarce and the demand for such waters increased.
733. Shaw, The Development of the Law of Waters in the West, 10 CAI.w.
L. REv. 443, 455-56 (1922).
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4. Laches
Prescriptive rights generally result, at least by analogy to adverse
possession,734 from the running of the period of the statute of
limitations. Something like a prescriptive right can also be ob-
tained by the defense of laches. The fact that laches applies only
to equitable actions does not mean that it is unimportant. Injunc-
tions, the most potent weapon against pollution, and permanent
damages (which historically is an equitable remedy) both may be
barred by the doctrine of laches.
It is impossible to ascertain the exact moment when laches
can successfully be invoked as a defense. It is addressed to the
discretion of the court and its application normally turns on the
peculiar facts of each case. Clifton Iron Co. v. Dye735 may serve
to give one a feel of the type of case in which the defense
prevails. The Alabama Supreme Court in that case emphasized
the fact that "[t]he only asserted use made of the water of the
creek by appellee, prior to the erection of the washers [that caused
the pollution at issue], was for fishing, bathing, and watering a
few horses, cattle and hogs." 73 6 And then the court judicially (if
not perhaps, to gentle ears, judiciously) took
notice of the fact that in the development of the mineral
interests of this state, recently made, very large sums
of money have been invested. The utilization of these
ores, which must be washed before using, necessitates,
in some measure, the placing of sediment where it may
flow into streams which constitute the natural drainage
of the section where the ore banks are situated. This
must cause a deposit of sediment on the lands below;
and while this invasion of the rights of the lower riparian
owner may produce injury, entitling him to redress, the
great public interests and benefits to flow from the con-
version of these ores into pig metal should not be lost
sight of.737
734. Each day that a nuisance continues results, in theory, in a new cause
of action. Therefore, the right to sue to abate a continuing nuisance cannot
be barred by the expiration of the period of limitations relating to nuisance
actions. Since, however, prescriptive rights are usually analogized to adverse
possession, the right to sue will be barred after the period of the statute of
limitations for the recovery of real property has expired.
735. 87 Ala. 468, 6 So. 192 (1889).
736. Id. at 470, 6 So. at 193.
737. Id. at 471, 6 So. at 193.
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In view of these facts the court said: "[W]e think the chancellor
should have declined to make the injunction perpetual, and have
remitted the plaintiff to a court of law for the recovery of such
damages as he may be able to show he has sustained." 73 8  Al-
though the court thought the injunction should be denied in view
of the competing equities, an alternative holding was based on
laches:
The bill in this case was filed . .. more than three years
after the first washer was erected. Complainant saw the
effect of it on the stream, and made no objection thereto.
The company then erected the second washer . . . and
nearly two years elapsed before relief was sought. Clearly
it was the duty of complainant to give the company some
intimation of his objection, and not to stand by with full
knowledge, and permit it to make large outlays on these
washers, and then seek the aid of a court of equity to
arrest their operations. Reasonable diligence in the as-
sertion of his rights was the measure of complainant's
duty in this case; and failing in this, he must now seek
relief in a court of law ... 79
The doctrine of laches can only bias our world toward pollu-
tion. One can assume that the very existence of the doctrine,
particularly when it is compounded with the arcane mysteries of
standing, prescriptive rights, and all the other pitfalls which the
law of nuisance has placed in the way of victims of pollution, must
discourage potential plaintiffs in water pollution cases. Laches
occurs when a plaintiff seeking equitable relief "sleeps on his
rights"-something that would not happen in the world with an
efficient market"4 --and is for that reason denied his remedy. As
is the case with the related defense of prescriptive rights, the
doctrine of laches can only benefit polluters; it cannot be invoked
against them.
There is one other feature of the doctrine of laches which
deserves attention. If one who would assert a right to clean water
acts too soon, he loses. But if he waits too long to bring his suit he
may be barred by laches. There is obviously a risk that the inter-
738. Id.
739. Id. at 471-72, 6 So. at 193.
740. To be more exact, someone may sleep on his rights in the world
with an efficient market, but he will only do so by his own choice. If he
chooses to. sleep on his rights, he will still, by definition, maximize his utility,
since by the rules of logic he cannot choose not to maximize his utility.
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section of these two doctrines may result in denying any chance
of a day in court to the potential plaintiff in a nuisance case.
The courts are, of course, aware of this danger; the cases are
filled with assurances that they will never let a plaintiff be caught
in such a predicament:
Plaintiffs say that the present action is not premature
because they "believe" that if they await the construc-
tion and operation of the refinery, which they contend will
create a nuisance, they will be met in any action thereafter
instituted by a defense of laches or unclean hands. I can
see no merit to this contention. Plaintiffs are not presently
subjected to any nuisance or deprivation of water. If
and when they might be, in the future, so subjected, any
prompt action taken by them could hardly be met by an
assertion of laches. Nor is the fear of being charged
with unclean hands a realism. Disposition of their claims
on the present motion would certainly render such a de-
fense inappropriate.741
Notice, however, that the premature plaintiffs must be "prompt"
after their cause of action arises if they are to avoid the defense
of laches. Notice, too, the court's suggestion that the disposi-
tion of their premature action would protect them from the charge
of unclean hands, a position pregnant with the possibility that
the plaintiffs might have found themselves barred by unclean
hands or laches if they had not brought the premature action.
If the conclusion to be drawn from the quoted passage is that
one will not be trapped between the doctrines of prematurity
and of laches provided that one brings an action before the pollu-
tion starts and then another action after the pollution has begun,
then the court is putting a doubly expensive burden on the victims
of pollution who wish to avoid the trap. Even if the courts have
succeeded in protecting the right of the pollutees to have their
day in court, the fact remains that the pollutees have only a
short period in which they may prevail. Furthermore, there is no
assurance that, once the polluting facility is constructed, a court
would be willing to enjoin it. Laches or no laches, it would be
inefficient to close down a refinery or a steel mill once it is con-
structed.
As always, the dice are loaded against one who would assert
a right to clean water. In the case of prescriptive rights and




laches, any change (whether exogenous or not) that would lead
to better waters in a world with an efficient market is likely to be
frustrated in our world. No corresponding inhibitions in our world
stand in the way of worsening conditions. Under the impact of
random exogenous changes, the value (as measured at the appro-
priate point of Pareto optimality) of clean water may go up and
down; in our world, however, the quality of the water can only go
down. We seem almost to have adopted the entropy law as one
of the underlying rules of the common law.
VIII. REaNMDms
A. In General
Once a court determines that a polluter's conduct is unreason-
able or once some other basis of liability is established, then the
court is confronted with the problem of applying a suitable remedy.
Although the allocations of water quality resulting from the appli-
cation of the various liability rules adopted in nuisance actions
cannot be compared with the allocations which would result from
an efficient market,74 it is possible to draw some conclusions about
the effects on water quality of available judicial remedies. Basic-
ally there are two such remedies: injunctions and damages. Neither
seems very satisfactory. An efficient market is finely tuned and
results in the Pareto-efficient amount of water pollution that is
consonant with a given distribution of wealth. Injunctions and
damages, on the other hand, are very crude instruments for regu-
lating pollution (or any other consequence of economic activity).
The economists dream of the market weighing out exactly the
optimum amount of pollution as if with laboratory scales; the courts,
on the other hand, must make their divisions with the cleaver of
injunctions or the blunt instrument of damages.
B. Injunctions
Although damages are the traditional common law remedy for
nuisances,743 injunctive relief would appear to be the remedy
742. The impossibility of the comparison results not only from the fact that
we do not know the allocation that would be produced by the efficient market
given a certain distribution, but also because the application of nuisance rules
changes the distribution. See text accompanying notes 539-40 supra.
743. Blackstone, for example, although he supplies an excellent and still
usable description of the law of nuisance, never mentions the possibility of
injunctive relief. On the other hand, the assize of nuisance and the action
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most likely to allow a court to simulate the workings of an efficient
market. So let us start our consideration of the economic conse-
quences of the remedies available in nuisance cases with an analysis
of injunctions.
Th- arguments in this section on remedies, unless otherwise
limited, are based on the initial assumptions (i) that there has
been a determination by a court that the water pollution at issue
is a nuisance, (ii) that the determination is. the equivalent of a
determination that there is more pollution than would exist under
the regime of an efficient market, and (iii) that the second determi-
nation is correct.7 44 It will be seen, however, that the court's de-
in the nature of a writ of right entitled "quod permittat prosternere," which
were both already historical oddities in Blackstone's day, did in theory provide
for the abatement of a nuisance as well as damages. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COM-
mmNAm ] l 216-22. The courts of equity had, however, taken jurisdiction over
actions to enjoin continuing wrongs before Blackstone's time. See, e.g.,
Hoigges v. Harry, 1 Calendar of the Proceedings in Ch. XXIV (reign of
Henry VI), reprinted in Z. CHAFME, JR. & R. POUND, CASES ON EQUrrABLE
RELIEF AGAINST TORTS, INCLuDING DEFAMATION AND INJURIES TO PasoN-
ALrrY 3 (1933), where the authors speak of the historical development of
equitable relief from nuisances:
Equitable relief against nuisances was perhaps a natural conse-
quence of the existence of several forms of specific relief in the early
law courts. The first reported case in Chancery seems to be Osburne
v. Barter [1583]. The defendant had erected a new mill and was
turning the water-course from serving the plaintiff's mill; but be-
cause the plaintiff, after filing his bill, had brought an assize of
nuisance at law, Bromley, C., dismissed the bill unless cause was
shown. [One opinion], written before 1650, recognizes the equitable
jurisdiction as settled: "Where an action upon the case for a Nusans
and damages only are to be recovered, the party may have help
here to remove or restore the thing itself."
Bush v. Western, [1720], before the Lords Commissioners Tracy,
Pratt and Montagu, is the first reported case to grant relief. The
defendant claimed the land through which a water-course ran, by
virtue of a forfeited mortgage for one hundred years, which he had
obtained a decree to foreclose. The bill was for a perpetual in-
jUnction to quiet the plaintiff's possession of the water-course, which
defendant had totally diverted. The plaintiff's title was fully
proved. Though it was objected that the title should first be estab-
lished at law, the court "decreed for the plaintiff, and a~reed it usual
to have such bills in the first instance in this court.' Hardwicke
mentioned the jurisdiction over nuisances in connection with tres-
passes, Coulson v. White, [1743], and the obstruction of light,
Fishmongers' Co. v. East India Co., [1752]. Temporary mandatory
injunctions against interferences with water-courses were granted by
Thurlow, Robinson v. Byron, [17851, and by Eldon, Lane v. Newdi-
gate, [1804]; but .. . these Chancellors were reluctant to grant
equitable relief in less extreme cases.
Id. at 55 (citations omitted).
744. Perhaps the third assumption should be weakened to read: "(iii) that
that determination (that there is more pollution being produced in the case
before the court than would be produced under the regime of an efficient
[Vol. 27:3
WATER POLLUTION
termination of whether or not there is a nuisance may well be in-
fluenced by the nature of the remedies available to the court. The
fear of having to grant injunctive relief, for example, may induce a
court to find that certain pollution is not a nuisance even though the
court correctly believes that there is more pollution than would
exist under the regime of an efficient market. Thus, the initial
determination of liability vel non may not be independent of the
remedies available, and the deviations 745 caused by the absence
of appropriate remedies may appear (or be hidden) in the court's
discussion of the substantive issues. It cannot be stressed enough
that the biases inherent in the law of remedies come into play only
after the victim of water pollution overcomes the many biases (for
example, the standing rules) that tend to keep him out of court
and the biases that would deny him any remedy even though the
pollution is "inefficient." It should also be kept in mind that any
biases that exist in the law of remedies will be reflected in the
victim's original decision to sue or not to sue.7 46
Injunctive relief typically presents more problems for the courts
than does legal damages, but, in one case at least, the economic
consequences of injunctions are easy to describe. This is the case
when, either by the use of antipollution devices or by process
changes, the polluter can decrease the amount of pollution to the
level that would prevail in a world with a perfect market without
going out of business and without raising the price of the goods
above the price that would prevail in the "optimal" world.747 In
market) cannot be demonstrated to be incorrect." See note 742 supra and
accompanying text.
745. In general, the words "deviations" and "biases" are used in this article
to describe the deviations from, or biases against, the result of an efficient
market. The deviations or biases are considered as existing in the "real
world" or in the 'legal system," although logically they should perhaps be
treated as being located in the space of the legal system in which the com-
parison between the real world and the efficient market is made. But where
is that space? Is it Euclidean? Is it empty? Such problems inevitably arise
when one considers contrafactual states of affairs (e.g., the workings of an
efficient market). To the extent that these problems appear insurmountable,
all comparisons between the real world and the contrafactual model of the
efficient market situation degenerate into nonsense. This suggests that any
application of welfare economic theory to the real world is nonsense. Please
remember that I consider welfare economic theory to be nonsensical and am
making the arguments in the second part of this article only for the benefit
of those who disagree with me.
746. As well as in the victimizer's decision to defend or not to defend.
747. It should be noted that in our imperfect world the polluter may not
have to raise his prices. He may have been making, at the expense of the
pollutee, a profit that would not be available in an efficient market.
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such cases the court can, by use of the injunctive remedy, decree
an allocation of water quality that will be a good approximation,
ceterie paribus, of that which would exist under the regime of a
perfect market. Any decree entered will probably have distribu-
tiona 748 consequences-consequences we are enjoined to ignore
by the Coase theorem.749 Moreover, the court can also decree that
compensation be paid to offset any undesired distributional ef-
fects.7 -0 In such cases the court can simply order that the pollution
be reduced to the efficient level.
It should be obvious that the real world is never likely-even when one
considers only one polluter and one victim-to be an exact model of the
efficient market. I am assuming that the pollution can be reduced to a point
where it and the price of the goods affected by the reduction are, "in the
ballpark."
748. Redistributional consequences also arise if the decree results in a dis-
tribution of wealth that differs from one that was established by previously
defined property rights. Since rights in water quality are not well-defined,
this is not likely to be a problem. See notes 868-89 infra and accompanying
text.
749. See note 547 supra. Since we are concerned in the second part of
this paper only with deviations in the allocation of resources, we can legiti-
mately ignore distributional effects for the limited purposes of this part of the
paper except to the extent that they determine the allocation. But they do
determine the allocation. See note 745 supra.
750. It can, but in some cases it probably will not, if the injunction leaves
the plaintiff poorer than the court deems to be desirable (we need not
speculate about the basis, or the authority for the court's decision). The court
can also order the defendant polluter to pay compensatory damages for the
remaining pollution, exactly as the court would do in those cases in which
it decides to deny an injunction and grant damages. If these additional
damages are awarded as a lump sum, they will have no allocational effects-
so long as the defendant polluter can afford to pay the damages and still
remain in business (i.e., so long as the capitalized value of the polluting
activity subject to the partial injunction exceeds the lump-sum payment).
See notes 802-41 infra and accompanying text. If the damages exceed the
value of the activity subject to the injunction, the activity will cease and
this would seem to be a drastic allocational affect-but ex hypothesi this cannot
happen because it would entail the conclusion that the polluting activity as
reduced by the injunction is not the optimal allocation of resources given the
desired distribution of wealth. Furthermore, given that distribution, if the
polluting activity ceases that will be the optimal allocation.
In the case where the partial injunction leaves the polluter too poor in
the court's estimation, the court could, on the theory that "he who seeks equity
must do equity," decree that the plaintiff must pay lump-sum damages to the
defendant as a condition of obtaining the injunction. Once again, the lump-
sum payment will not have any allocational consequences and cannot,
ex hypothesi, cause the plaintiff to forego the benefits of the injunction.
However, the class of cases reaching this result contains, at the most, only
on. member. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178,
494 P.2d 700 (1972). This suggests that the courts will not require damages
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The cases in which the plaintiff can avoid the ill effects of pol-
lution at a reasonable expense but the defendant cannot reduce
the pollution except at a prohibitive cost are slightly more difficult
for the court. In such cases, the optimal allocation will be reached
by denying the injunction and leaving it to the plaintiff to avoid
the pollution. The court may, of course, award compensation in
such cases to adjust for any undesired distributional results from
the pollution. The courts, however, may feel constrained to grant
the injunction if they award damages.751 If injunctions are granted
in such cases, we have discovered that rare discrepancy; a bias in
our legal system that favors clean water. But it should be noted
that the cases in which this bias may exist will typically involve a
plaintiff who wants to use the water himself, for example, in a
chemical plant The cases with which we are primarily concerned
do not fall into this category since it normally is impossible to
clean up the waters of a living stream at small expense. 752
The interesting cases are those in which the physical realities
do not correspond to the assumptions of the model of the efficient
market. In the real world the relevant functions are often not
continuous, to say nothing of not being differentiable or con-
vex.75 3 In particular, an industrial plant may be constrained so that
it must either produce a fixed amount of pollution or shut down.75 4
to be paid in such a case. This, in turn, suggests that there may be a bias
against clean water in our legal system because the courts may feel that
they should deny the partial injunction on distributional grounds, rather
than grant it while making the plaintiff pay damages. See text accompanying
note 755 infra.
751. See notes 783-93 infra and accompanying text.
752. See notes 295-98 supra and accompanying text.
753. See note 338 supra.
754. This is what one would expect in an operation that must produce
its product in batches; a paint factory is an example. If the pollution
unavoidably associated with a batch is sufficient to annihilate the ecological
system of a receiving stream, one must either give up all production from
the factory or give up the entire ecological system. In such a case there
is a lack of continuity which makes it impossible for an economist to perform
a marginal analysis for there will be no margin. The problem does not exist
only in theory, for the cases supply many examples where a court was
stuck with the choice of either closing down the polluting facility or com-
pletely denying injunctive relief. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,
26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970) (where the
injunction was denied); Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1,
101 N.E. 805 (1913) (where the injunction was granted). Although the
decree in Whalen enjoined the pollution from a pulp mill and not the
operation of the mill, the pulp mill was, in fact, forced to close its doors.
See Driscoll v. American Hide & Leather Co., 102 Misc. 612, 614, 170
N.Y.S. 121, 122, aff'd mem. 184 App. Div. 916, 170 N.Y.S. 1076 (1918).
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In addition it may be that any appreciable amount of pollution will
destroy the value of the receiving stream while the polluting facility
cannot operate without some pollution. In these cases the choice
is reduced: either the pollution should be allowed to continue
unabated or it should be totally enjoined even though this entails
closing down a plant.755 In such cases, the granting of the injunction
will tend to result in less pollution than would exist in a world
with an efficient market in water quality,756 whereas the denial of
the injunction will tend to result in more pollution. These are,
however, only tendencies.
By hypothesis, 57 the court will find that there is a nuisance if
and only if the pollution exceeds the amount that would exist under
the regime of an efficient market If one accepts this hypothesis,
one might well assume " that the damages that will be fixed by the
court equal the costs that the polluter would have had to pay in an
efficient market for the privilege of polluting. If these damages
exceed the value of the polluter's production, the polluter will shut
down his plant.75 9 In such a case the granting of the injunction
755. The fact that few courts will have the stomach to close down a
facility like a municipal sewer system suggests a strong bias in our legal
system against water of good quality. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Standard
Bag & Paper Co., 72 Ohio St. 324, 74 N.E. 206 (1905). I shall, however,
limit my argument to industrial polluters. One should perhaps take note
of Professor Coase's suggestion that governmental activities (or activities
sponsored by governments) may actually lead to more legalized externalities
than would occur if the activities were undertaken by private parties. See
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & ECoN. 1 (1960). This may
be a valid argument against governments, but it does not seem to be an
argument against governmental regulation of water pollution. Cf. Costonis,
"Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking
Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 CoLuM. L. REv. 1021, 1031-32 (1975).
756. Remember, all this is subject to the ceteris paribus assumption.
757. See text accompanying note 744 supra.
758. The basis of both assumptions is that we have no way of knowing
the exact results obtainable if there were an efficient market. Thus, in
order to have some basis for discussion, we might as well assume that the
court's result is correct.
759. In the long run the polluter will shut down if his fixed costs, his
variable costs, and the damages exceed the value of his production. In the
short run, however, the polluter will shut down only if his variable costs
and the damages exceed the value of the production. I trust that you will
forgive me for ignoring this complication which could not arise in an efficient
market in which, by definition, the polluter would have perfect information
about his costs and could transfer the factors of production that he owns to
other uses without incurring any transaction costs.
It is significant, however, that "sunk" costs will have no influence on the
polluter's decision as to whether or not to shut down. See notes 660-75
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presents no problem since the pollution would stop in any event.
Either damages or an injunction will serve to achieve the same
result that would occur under the regime of an efficient market.
There is, however, a serious discrepancy that may arise in the
ease in which the polluter "owns" the privilege of polluting. In
this case the court will find that there is a nuisance if there is
more pollution than there would be under the regime of an effi-
cient market. The polluter in the efficient market would be offered
a "bribe" by his victim to cease polluting. If the amount of the
bribe exceeded the value of the polluter's production, the polluter
would sell the right to be free of pollution to the pollutee and the
efficient allocation would result in no pollution. The only way a
court can reach this same result would be to enjoin the pollution
and compel the pollutee to pay damages to the polluter. But this
is something that the courts are not inclined to do-if only because
they have not thought of the possibility.760 Of course, we are con-
cerned only with the efficient allocation and the court could achieve
that allocation simply by granting the injunction without awarding
damages against the plaintiff. There may not be much of a prob-
lem here since in our world-a world without an efficient market-
normally one cannot "own" the water quality.7 '61 But what if a
court believes that the polluter does, or should, own the privilege
of polluting?7 6 2 Is not there a serious danger in such a case that
the court will deny the injunction on distributive grounds either
because it cannot say that the polluter has done something wrong
or because the court is not prepared to award the polluter compen-
sation? If the court denies the injunction, there will be more
pollution in our world than would occur in a world with an effi-
cient market.
The most difficult problems arise, however, in cases where the
efficient level of pollution is unobtainable in the real world. This
situation arises whenever we are confronted with a plant that pro-
duces goods of sufficient value to justify some damages but that
supra and accompanying text. See also notes 903-07 infra and accompanying
text.
760. Only one court has reached such a result. See Spur Indus., Inc. v.
Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972). It was not
until 1972 that Calabresi and Melamed brought the possibility to the attention
of the academic community. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 89 HAlv. L. lEv. 1089
(1972).
761. See notes 447-52 supra and accompanying text.
762. Perhaps the polluter has a prescriptive or an appropriative right.
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cannot reduce pollution except by shutting down. Consider a
chemical plant that produces each month a batch of a certain chem-
ical that sells for ten dollars a quart. Assume that the chemical
can only be manufactured in batches of 1,000 quarts and that it
costs $10,00076a to make one batch,764 without including any dam-
ages caused by pollution. Also assume that the damage done to
water quality by each batch is exactly $100. Two further assump-
tions are necessary: every plant producing this particular chemical
is confronted with the same costs (including pollution costs) 7 5
and no one will buy any of the chemical unless they are assured
that they may obtain another batch next month.766
In an action brought by the victims of such a chemical plant's
pollution, a judge who believes that he should try to duplicate the
workings of an efficient market will be confronted with numerous
difficulties. It is clear that the present production of the plant is
inefficient since it costs $10,100 to produce chemicals worth only
$10,000. At first glance it would seem that the operation of the
plant should be enjoined. This probably is as close as one can
get767 to the "efficient" result. Our judge, however, is sophisticated
enough to know that such a plant could not exist in the traditional
models of an efficient market. A plant faced with such costs in an
efficient market would simply reduce its production until its mar-
ginal costs equal its marginal revenue.768 Let us assume that the
judge finds 769 that if the plant 770 reduces the number of quarts
763. Including a return on investment of $10.00 per batch.
764. The "cost" given in the text includes a reasonable return on investment
to the owners of the chemical company.
765. This is, of course, unlikely in the real world unless the plant in ques-
tion is in a monopoly position. However, the workings of the model of the
efficient market lead to this result in the long run; every plant in a given
industry will be of the same size and compelled to pay the same costs for the
factors that it consumes.
766. This is not an unreasonable assumption. Perhaps the purchasers of
the chemical must buy expensive equipment to use such a substance. Will you
buy an automobile if you know that there will be no gasoline in 1977?
767. Ceteris paribus.
768. The marginal revenue equals the price at which a marginal unit of
the chemical sells.
769. On the basis of expert economic testimony?
770. If there is more than one plant, the judge may be able to get out of
the trap that he is in by enjoining some plants and allowing others to operate.
But what would this do to the idea of equal justice under law? It is not
the function of courts to treat like cases differently. See generally Dworkin,
Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 YALE L.J. 855 (1972). Could the judge
order that compensation be paid to the owners of the plants that are shut
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in a batch by one quart, the price that will be offered for the
remaining production will be raised by one cent. Thus, if a batch
is reduced to 999 quarts the total revenue received for its sale will
be $9,999.99, and if a batch is reduced to 998 quarts the total
revenue received from its sale will be $9,999.96.771 Of course, there
is no way under our assumptions that the plant can produce less than
1,000 quarts, but let us ignore that for a moment as our judge
tries to figure out what would happen if there were an efficient
market He knows that the marginal price is $10 plus an additional
penny for each quart by which the batch is less than 1,000 quarts.
Since the judge wants to reach the point at which the marginal
price equals the marginal cost, he now must find the marginal cost.
The trouble is, of course, that the marginal-cost curve is not contin-
uous. The cost of producing one quart (or one millionth of a quart)
is the same as that of producing 1,000. Thus, the marginal cost of
the first quart is $10,000. But the marginal cost (i.e., the additional
cost) of producing the second quart is $0.00, as is the marginal cost
of the third quart and all others through the 1000th quart. Then for
the 1001st quart the marginal cost jumps to $10,000, and then it
drops to zero again for the next 999 quarts. It would seem that
the judge is not going to be able to find a point where the marginal
cost equals the price. But he may not think that this means that
he should enjoin the production of the chemical. After all, any
time the price of a good exceeds marginal cost, economic theory
tells us that we can make the community better off by producing
more of the good, and the marginal price does exceed the marginal
cost 999 times out of 1,000. Since one cannot have a marginal-
down? Who should pay? These questions suggest that there may be legis-
lative solutions to the problem facing the judge, but that there are no solutions
available to a court. Suitable juggling with the facts will close even this
escape hatch.
771. 998 X 10.02 = 9,999.96. If a batch is reduced to 500 quarts, the total
revenue will be 500 x 15.00 = $7,500; if it is reduced to one quart, the total
revenue will be 1 x 19.9 = 19.99. The formula that will give the total rev-
enue R (in dollars) resulting from the sale of X quarts is: R = PX, where
P = the price per quart. Since the price P = 10 -. 01 (1003 - X) = 20 -
.01X, R = 20X -. 01X2. If we relax the assumption that X 1,000 it can be
seen that for any value of X> 2,000, total revenue will be negative (a result
that cannot happen in an efficient market, courtesy of the pig principle) and
that the maximum total revenue will occur when X = 1,000 and R = $10,000.
Such problems actually do occur when one tries to adapt the real world to the
model of an efficient market by setting marginal cost equal to marginal revenue.
See R. MUseRAVE & P. MUSGRAvE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
679-82 (1973).
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cost curve that is not continuous in an efficient market, the judge
will have to find what the marginal cost would be in an efficient
market.
There is one way that the judge might find the marginal cost
in an efficient market. Mieroeconomic theory tells us that in an
efficient market at equilibrium, marginal cost equals average cost
as well as price.772 The judge knows that the average cost of
producing a quart of the chemical is $10.10; 77" therefore, he might
find that the marginal cost should be $10.10.774 In a world with
an efficient market, the chemical plants would cut their production
back to the point where the price is $10.10. In view of the judge's
earlier finding about how prices behave, he might find that in the
efficient market, the efficient, optimal level of production would be
a batch of 990 quarts.775 The judge has discovered the level of
production that would exist in an efficient market. He has not,
however, solved his problem. In the first place, he still has not
calculated the amount of pollution that would exist in the efficient
market. Perhaps, carried along by the persuasiveness of his find-
ings, he will conclude that, since the efficient level of production
equals 99 percent of the actual level, the efficient level of pollution
would be 99 percent of the actual level.77 6 Thus, the pollution
should be reduced until it causes only $99 damage.777
The judge finally arrives at the key question: should he issue
an injunction? If the judge orders the pollution reduced to the $99
level, the chemical companies will cease production since they can-
not, in the real world, produce any of the chemical without causing
at least $100 in pollution damages. The $99 pollution level is un-
reachable by hypothesis. At this point it would appear that the
judge should not grant the injunction.
772. See R. ScoTT, THE PRICING SYSTEM 177-82 (1973).
773. 10,100/1,000 = 10.10.
774. This does not make sense unless the judge assumes that everything
except for the one chemical plant is at an equilibrium cur Pareto optimum.
But this unrealistic assumption underlies any attempt to apply welfare eco-
nomics to something less than the entire economy.
775. Since P = 20-.01X and P (as found by the judge) should equal
$10.10, 10.10 = 20-.01X and, solving that equation for X, X =-990. See note
771 supra.
776. There is no reason to believe that either the amount of pollution or
the damages caused by it bears a one-to-one relation with the amount of pro-
duction. This is, however, no more unreasonable an assumption than the
initial assumption that the marginal price equals $10.10, which the judge
knows is not true.
777. How the judge calculated that the actual damage caused by the pol-
lution is $100 is a matter about which I am disinclined to conjecture.
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Should he grant damages? Assuming the judge believes that
the victims have the right to be afflicted with no more than a
Pareto optimal amount of pollution, it would seem that at least
$1.00 in damages should be decreed. 78 In the world with an
efficient market, however, the chemical company would cease pro-
duction rather than pay an extra dollar. It made no profit before
it was required to pay the extra dollar, so it can only produce at
a loss.779 This suggests that by granting an injunction the court
in a more direct approach will achieve the same end result as if
damages had been awarded. The plant would cease operations
in the model if the victims have the right to damages and, if the
chemical company owned the privilege of polluting, the plant would
not continue operations in the efficient market because it could
sell this privilege to its victims at $100 and go into another line of
business. Clearly, therefore, the injunction should be granted
against any pollution whatsoever.7 80 But this contradicts the judge's
earlier conclusion.
The simple fact is that there is no way the judge can duplicate
the workings of the efficient market. In this case I am sure no
judge would be willing to run through such a silly exercise. But
it does show that, even when the facts are grossly simplified, there is
no way in which the remedies available to a judge can conform the
real world to the conditions that would exist in an efficient market.
In general, if the functions that describe the behavior of the real
778. If the judge finds that the distribution of wealth is such that the
victims "own" the right to clean water, the damages will be $100.
779. In the real world this would not happen because the chemical com-
panies could not switch their resources, without any cost, into another indus-
try. In the real world, the extra dollar would dearly be taken out of the fair
return which the investors were getting on their investment. If there were
an efficient market, however, the chemical companies would be able to change
to some other product.
780. There is another problem that the judge might notice. If the plant
were to produce only 990 quarts (throwing away the other 10?), its average
cost per quart in the real world would be 10,100/990 =$10.20. This sug-
gests that the marginal cost in the efficient market would actually be $10.20
and that the price should be $10.20 per quart. The number of quarts X is
1010
therefore given by the formula P = 20- .01X or 99 = 20-.01X. Then
10,100
X = 979.798. But in this case the average cost is increased to979.798
about $10.30. Therefore, the price should be increased by that amount. Then
X again becomes a smaller number. It thus appears to be impossible to set
the price equal to the marginal cost. In fact, after about fifteen iterations of
this logic (or illogic) the efficient number of quarts X. would be less than
zero.
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world are not convex, it simply does not make sense to try to bend
our world to the efficient mold.
Even when the mathematical functions which describe the
behavior of the real world do not violate the conditions imposed
on the functions that comprise a model of the efficient market,
the law of remedies is likely to deviate from the precepts of eco-
nomic "rationality." Consider the case where a manufacturer
produces an excess amount of goods and therefore an inefficient
excess of water pollution but is able to reduce his production to
the efficient level. If one of the manufacturer's victims sues for
an injunction against the pollution, a court will have a difficult
job tailoring its remedies to force the manufacturer to reduce his
production of pollution and goods to their efficient levels. Under
the reasonable use doctrine the courts will allow some pollution
to occur without any liability to-or cost internalization by-the
polluter. Damages are not granted unless the court finds that
the defendant's pollution is unreasonable. But once a court finds
that the pollution is unreasonable then it has also determined that
the defendant is at fault: that he is a tortfeasor. Logically, the
plaintiff is then entitled to an injunction since the defendant is
guilty of a continuing tort affecting the plaintiff's real property.
Since the cases we are concerned with all involve continuing pol-
lution,781 legal logic seems to lead to one of two extremes: either
the defendant's conduct is "reasonable" and thus his costs are not
internalized, or it is unreasonable and he is therefore subject to an
injunction. There appears to be no possible alternative for the
case where the plaintiffs activities impose severe downstream costs
on the defendant but the value of the plaintiff's production exceeds
the costs borne by the defendant.782 Efficiency analysis would
781. We are concerned only with pollution that is intentional in the sense
that it can be foreseen. Pollution as the result of accidents cannot occur
with an efficient market and therefore does not seem amenable to an efficiency
analysis. But see G. CAL"ABBi, THE Costs oF AccmENrs (1970).
782. Of course, a court could in such a case issue an injunction mandating
a reduction of pollution to the efficient level and no further. My impression is,
however, that the courts tend to take an all-or-nothing approach to injunctive
relief. See, e.g., Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E.
805 (1913). Unless the manufacturer has a monopoly, he cannot set the price
for his goods. Thus, if efficiency is not defined in terms of the cost functions
of the particular plant in question, a reduction in the level of production may
afflict the manufacturer with marginal costs above the price he can charge.




suggest that in such a case the defendant should be allowed to
continue his conduct subject to payment of damages. However,
some courts have been persuaded by legal logic to grant an in-
junction whenever the plaintiff has established that he is a victim
of a continuing nuisance.
The most famous of such cases is probably Whalen v. Union
Bag & Paper Co.,783 in which the court enjoined a pulp mill, rep-
resenting an investment of more than one million dollars and em-
ploying four to five hundred employees, at the suit of a riparian
owner whose farm suffered damages of about $100 per year because
of pollution from the pulp mill. The court in Whalen reasoned:
Although the damage to the plaintiff may be slight com-
pared with the defendant's expense of abating the condi-
tion, that is not a good reason for refusing an injunction.
Neither courts of equity nor law can be guided by such
a rule, for if followed to its logical conclusion it would
deprive the poor litigant of his little property by giving
it to those already rich. It is always to be remembered
in such cases that 'denying the injunction puts the hard-
ship on the party in whose favor the legal right exists,
instead of on the wrong doer.'78 4
This example of judicial reasoning must appear preposterous
to an economist. Even though lawyers are familiar with such
arguments, it should still seem clear to them that the reasoning
is either circular or depends upon an unnecessary dichotomy. The
Whalen court argued that a failure to grant the injunction would
deprive "the poor litigant of his little property" and failed to
notice that it is only the decision to award damages and an in-
junction that created the "little property." 85
If new fangled concepts borrowed from Roman Law, especially
the concepts of "property" (proprietas) and "ownership" (domi-
num) had not snuck into our language over the last five hundred
years, the court in Whalen would not have been so naive. "In
order to avoid conundra... it is necessary to... talk of English
783. 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913). The pulp mill involved in Whalen
did close down. See Driscoll v. American Hide & Leather Co., 102 Misc. 612,
170 N.Y.S. 122, aff'd mem., 184 App. Div. 916, 170 N.Y.S. 1076 (1918).
784. 208 NY. at 4, 101 N.E. at 806.
785. Id. I have no objection to creating a little property for the poor liti-
gant, but I do think that the court was a mite disingenuous with its circular
reasoning. For examples of similar distributive logic, see notes 557-64 supra
and accompanying text.
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Law in English terms.... [T]he first point which must be grasped
is this-in a real action what is recovered is not the ownership of
land . . .but the seisin of land." 786 Mr. Whalen was not seised;
he could not be seised of rights to water quality, at least not in
the same literal sense that he was of the farm.787  One can con-
clude-as an economist would presumably wish to do--that the
pulp mill should pay damages for the injury which it did to Mr.
Whalen's use and enjoyment of his farm, without having to con-
clude that a court of equity should also enjoin the pulp mill from
mucking up the waters. Such a conclusion is possible, however,
only so long as one does not think that Mr. Whalen's rights were
property rights. Once Mr. Whalen's loss is denominated as a
loss of property, it becomes hard to see how the court can properly
refuse him an injunction. One can, however, use the term "prop-
erty" and still avoid the problem, so long as one does not say
that Mr. Whalen had any property right in the water (as opposed
to the farm). If one takes this approach, it does not seem contra-
dictory to assert that the pulp mill's activities were unreasonable
enough to justify damages, but reasonable enough to avoid an in-
junction.788
Another means of avoiding the problem is to avoid using the
terminology of "fault." The typical polluter is after all not moti-
vated by mens rea. There is nothing inherently immoral in operat-
ing an industry, or a municipality, or a farm.789 In fact, these
are usually considered to be socially desirable activities. The
economists and their models and the Calvinists and their ethics
have persuaded us that there is a virtue in making profits. On
the other hand, even breathing contributes to pollution. Would
it not be more sensible to avoid labeling the polluter a "wrong-
doer" and simply try to place the burdens where they lead to
786. A. SnvAsoN, AN IvTroDuCMON TO THE HSoRY oF THE LAND LAW
35 (1961).
787. Rights to water quality lie in grant, not in seisin. Id. at 100. "Both
Bracton and Britton include in the class of servitudes those natural rights of a
property owner which arise through the partial acceptance in the law of the
maxim sic utere tuo ut alieno non laedas.... Interference with such 'servi-
tudes' was remediable from Bracton's time onwards by the assize of nui-
sance...." Id. at 100-01.
788. See, e.g., text accompanying note 850 infra.
789. In fact, industrial decisionmakers are usually employees of a corpora-
tion with the legal duty of maximizing profits for their stockholders. Decision-
makers in municipal governments have similar responsibilities to their voters.
See notes 228-31 supra.
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the most socially desirable consequences? It seems to be com-
pounding the injury for courts, which have been unable to create
well-defined property rights in water quality, to argue that they
must grant an injunction against a polluter because they have
determined that the plaintiff has a "property right" to damages,
or to clean water, vis-a-vis the defendant, and that the polluter is
therefore a wrongdoer.
But the fact that there are certain defects in the logic of the
opinion in the Whalen case does not mean that the holding in the
case was necessarily incorrect. The decision in Whalen does protect
the environment. Even though economists may object to the logic
of the court in Whalen, they might well agree that an injunction
should have been granted in that particular case. As Professors
Morris and Keaton have said on this point:
That the plaintiff would not have been willing to sell his
injunction at a price which would have permitted the
operation of the defendant's plant is hard to believe. But
suppose that the defendant had bought off the plaintiff.
He would then have to buy off any lower riparian owner
who demanded tribute. The cost of placating all lower
riparian owners was probably too great for the defendant
to bear. So the plaintiff was actually a representative of
a class. Fortunately the court did not withhold the in-
junction on the ground of the comparatively small injury
to the plaintiff. Since the continuance of the defendant's
business probably was not justifiable in light of the un-
reasonable damage which he was doing to a large class
of persons of which the plaintiff was a representative, an
injunction was proper and the defendant was, in fact,
put out of business.790
In short, the cost of the pollution probably exceeded the benefits
of the defendant's production. Still, as an economist would be
quick to point out, it is not at all certain that was the case. Even
if the benefits of the production far exceeded the costs to the
downstream riparians, once the right to an injunction was estab-
lished the owners of the pulp mill would have had an impossible
task if they had tried to negotiate a release from each of the
potential owners. The cost of negotiation could easily exceed the
difference between the polluter's benefits and the pollution's cost.
If the courts always followed the rule apparently adopted in Whalen
790. Keeton & Morris, Notes on "Balancing the Equities," 18 TEx. L. REv.
412, 418-19 (1940).
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"that a nuisance which results in substantial continuing damage to
neighbors must be enjoined,"791 then in many cases the economists
would object that society as a whole would be paying more in lost
production for the injunction than the benefits were worth. As was
pointed out over thirty years ago:
[T]he interests of the parties are not the only interests
to be taken into account in arriving at just results. If
the defendant is conducting an enterprise of social value
exceeding the social value of the plaintiff's interests, the
common weal may be best served by permitting the
defendant's plant to remain undisturbed, requiring him
to compensate the plaintiff for his financial losses, and
punishing him sufficiently for mislocating his plant to dis-
courage similar future wrongdoing. After all, we do not
condemn to death the child conceived illicitly, nor is it
always wise to destroy the factory which should not have
been built. Perhaps in a community which has too many
factories, destruction of a few may work a social benefit
rather than a social harm. But if industrial birth control
is needed, injunction for nuisance can hardly be counted
on to do the job.792
Still, even if the rule that an injunction should be granted
whenever a court is willing to grant damages for a continuing
nuisance cannot always be justified on economic grounds, it might
work a certain rough justice: we have already seen that damages
are not granted for pollution resulting from "reasonable" activities,
a rule that presumably prevents some pollution costs from being
internalized, thereby leading to overproduction of both goods and
pollution. The potential anti-pollution bias of injunctive relief
791. The Whalen rule has been picked up by later courts; see Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 229, 257 N.E.2d 870, 875, 309 N.Y.S.2d
312, 320 (1970) (Jasen, J. dissenting, relying, inter alia, on Whalen).
792. Keeton & Morris, supra note 790, at 425.
Cases in which courts have refused an injunction solely on the
ground that the injunction would do the defendant harm dispropor-
tionate to its value are difficult to find. In many cases the injunc-
tion has been refused even though the defendant intentionally en-
tered into an activity which he knew would unreasonably interfere
with the plaintiff. But the only case which we have found in which
some factor unfavorable to the plaintiff was not used as an additional
ground for the decision is Bentley v. Empire Portland Cement Co.,
48 Misc. 457, 96 N.Y. Supp. 831 (Sup. Ct. 1889).
Id. at 424 n.28.
For a discussion of the problem of "the factory which should not have been
built," see notes 898-909 infra and accompanying text.
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may tend to offset this pro-pollution bias. Although the costs
and benefits of a legal regime that enjoined some efficient plants
and allowed other inefficient plants to pollute without penalty
would be somewhat arbitrarily distributed, if the opposing biases
of the two rules do cancel out, we might end up with approximately
the same amount of production and pollution as we would have
under an efficient market system of allocating rights in water
quality. The anti-pollution bias can also be justified by the high
cost of litigation which may make it undesirable to try to ap-
proach the results obtainable in an efficient market. Furthermore,
since many members of the general public who do not have stand-
ing to bring a damage action may be hurt by the pollution, an
injunction may be justified even when the value of all of the
legally obtainable damages is less than the value of the polluter's
production.
Whatever the economic merits of granting automatically an in-
junction whenever there is a continuing nuisance, it appears that
even this rule does not lead to a decent level of water quality.
The experience in states which claim to grant injunctions auto-
matically shows that they have not solved the problem of water
pollution. For example, Indiana subscribes to the rule that in-
junctions against polluting industries must be granted whenever
there are damages, 793 and yet, as early as 1912, that court declared:
"[T]he streams of pure and limpid water, which formerly traversed
the State, have become cesspools of filth and breeders of disease,
and are polluted to nausea. . .. ."794 This is hardly a surprising
result considering all the other biases which our legal system has
against good waters.
793. Indiana has not only adhered to the rule calling for injunctions when-
ever there is a local injury resulting from water pollution, but also has tended
to cast its decisions in terms of the natural flow theory of riparian law. See,
e.g., Weston Paper Co. v. Pope, 155 Ind. 394, 57 N.E. 719 (1900), where the
court said: "[E]very riparian proprietor is entitled to have the waters of the
stream that washes his land come to it without obstruction, diversion, or cor-
ruption, subject only to the reasonable use of water, by those similarly en-
titled, for such domestic purposes as are inseparable from, and necessary for,
the free use of their land .. " Id. at 401, 57 N.E. at 721. But cf. Northern
Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Vesey, 210 Ind. 338, 200 NE. 620 (1936). Note,
however, that Indiana has followed the exception carved out in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886). See also Bernard v.
Sherley, 135 Ind. 547, 34 N.E. 600 (1893). But of. Niagara Oil Co. v. Ogle,
177 Ind. 292,98 N.E. 60 (1912).
794. Penn American Plate Glass Co. v. Schwinn, 177 Ind. 645, 658, 98
N.E. 715,720 (1912).
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A rule mandating an injunction whenever pollution is unreason-
able may actually lead to more pollution than would occur were
the courts less rigid. If any substantial award of damages-even
an amount as small as $100 a year as was the case in Whalen-
necessarily entitles the plaintiff to an injunction, the courts may
be reluctant to find that there is any actionable wrong at all.
In the leading and infamous case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Sanderson,795 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied damages
to Mrs. Sanderson although a mountain stream flowing through
her land was being grossly polluted by a coal mine because: "[If
the right to damages in such cases is admitted, equity may, and
under the decisions of this Court undoubtedly would, at the suit
of any riparian owner, take jurisdiction, and upon the ground
of a continuous and irreparable injury, enjoin the operation of the
mine altogether." 796
The decision in Sanderson also emphasized the importance of
coal mining to the economy of Pennsylvania 7 7 and the "higher
795. 113 Pa. 126,6 A. 453 (1886).
796. Id. at 144, 6 A. at 455. This is, of course, another example of circular
judicial reasoning. Cf. note 785 supra. The opinion of Mr. Justice Clark
continues:
Whatever rights Mrs. Sanderson may have to the use of this water,
and whatever remedy she may have in this case, or in any other forum,
in law or in equity, is the right and remedy of every other riparian
owner, along Meadow Brook, and whatever may he the rights and
remedies of the owners on Meadow Brook, are, of course, the rights
and remedies of all other riparian owners throughout the Common-
wealth. It may be that Mrs. Sanderson adopted a more extensive
arrangement for the use of this water than any other person, and is
consequently more inconvenienced on that account; but the law is the
same in her case as in all other cases; if she may recover damages
in a large amount, others similarly but less affected, may recover in
a less sum. Besides, these riparian owners are not limited to their
present modes of enjoyment; it is impossible to foresee what other
modes of enjoyment they, or their successors in title, may adopt; or
to estimate the extent of damages to which the continued pollution
of the stream might proceed; hence, if the responsibility of the opera-
tor of a mine is extended to injuries of the character complained of,
the consequence must be that mining cannot be conducted, except
by the general consent of all parties affected.
133 Pa. 126, 144-45, 6 A. 453, 455 (1886).
The last argument is, of course, a recognition of the problem, of public
goods. See notes 422-23 supra and accompanying text.
797. "It has been stated that 30,000,000 of tons of anthracite and 70,000,000
of bituminous coal are annually produced in Pennsylvania .. " Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 144, 6 A. 453, 455 (1886).
The plaintiff's grievance is for a mere personal inconvenience, and we
are of the opinion that mere private personal inconveniences, arising
in this way and under such circumstances, must yield to the neces-
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law" doctrine that coal mining is a "natural use" of land and, there-
fore, cannot be a nuisance.798 Sanderson may also be analyzed as
a case demonstrating the advantage which political and economic
power, good lawye~ring, and inhuman persistence can give to a
corporate polluter. The Sanderson case was before the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court four times. Mrs. Sanderson won the first
three decisions,799 twice800 on holdings directly opposed to the
fourth and final decision with which we have been concerned.801
sities of a great public industry, which, although in the hands of a
private corporation, subserves a great public interest. To encourage
the development of the great natural resources of a country, trifling
inconveniences to particular persons must sometimes give way to
the necessities of a great community.
Id. at 149, 6 A. at 459. Remember that this was an action for damages, not
an injunction.
798. Id. at 145-46, 6 A. at 45-58. The "natural-use" theory, despite its
apparent theological underpinnings, is not necessarily objectionable from the
point of view of an economic analyst. As it is applied in Ohio, for example,
pollution from extractive industries will not be enjoined, but (unlike Sander-
son) the polluter is liable for damages. See notes 846-50 infra and accompany-
ing text.
The "natural-use" exemption does not apply to industrial uses-only to uses
which directly exploit the land. Cf. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 395,
412 (1915). The theory seems to be that although you can put your factory
anywhere, you can put a coal mine only where there is the particular coal that
you are going to mine. I suppose that an economist might see some sense in
this legal rule: the opportunity cost that society pays when a coal mine is
enjoined is the full value of the coal which would otherwise be produced,
whereas the opportunity cost of enjoining a factory is not necessarily the full
production of thb factory, since other factories can make up the difference in
production. This does not, of course, mean that there is no opportunity cost
to society when a factory is closed.
Note that Sanderson demonstrates the use of "formalistic" arguments (e.g.,
"natural use") in a case that is clearly motivated by purely instrumental con-
siderations. See Scheiber, Instrumentalism and Property Rights: A Reconsid-
eration of American "Styles of Judicial Reasoning" in the 19th Century, 1975
Wis. L. Brav. 1.
799. The decisions are reported at 86 Pa. 401 (1878); 94 Pa. 302 (1880);
102 Pa. 370 (1883) (appeal by Mrs. Sanderson from jury instruction on dam-
ages).
800. 86 Pa. 401 (1878) (reversing the holding of the trial court that the
damage was damnun absque injuria because there was "no negligence or
malice, and the discharge of the mine-water [is] necessary in mining ...... Id.
at 402, 94 Pa.' 302 (1880) (affirming the verdict for Mrs. Sanderson on the
basis of the earlier decision in 86 Pa. 401 (1878)).
801. In fact, the first opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Sander-
son concluded:
Relaxation of legal liabilities and remission of legal duties to meet the
current needs of great business organizations, in one direction, would
logically be followed by the same relaxation and remission, on the
same grounds, in all other directions. One invasion of individual
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This history suggests still another bias against clean water, one
that I cannot document, but which I am sure exists. Many pol-
luters have sufficient power to run roughshod over the interests of
those who, in theory, are entitled to the protection both of law and
of economic theory. The relevant distribution may be neither that
of wealth nor that of one man, one vote. Perhaps what deter-
mines "efficiency" is the distribution of naked power and well-clad
influence.
Although there are few, if any, other decisions on the point
which are as outspoken as the court in Sanderson, it is hard to
believe that the necessity of granting an injunction against a con-
tinuing nuisance does not in many cases lead to a finding that
there is no nuisance. Thus, the unsatisfactory character of the
remedies available in private pollution suits may lead to ,a bias
against clean water in the substantive law of nuisance.
C. Permanent Damages
In general, law courts are not empowered to grant permanent
damages 80 2 for continuing nuisances. For example, in Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Co.,803 the trial court felt itself bound to award
only the damages that had actually accrued, "only the loss of
rental value or loss of usable value sustained." 04 In nuisance cases
where it is determined that permanent damages will result from
the continuation of the nuisance, damages may be awarded to the
plaintiffs on one of two theories: either the party maintaining the
nuisance has the power of eminent domain, in which case the
nuisance is treated as a "taking" and the damages as just compensa-
right would follow another, and it might be only a question of time
when, under the operations of even a single colliery, a whole country
side would be depopulated.
86 Pa. 401, 409 (1878).
802. "Permanent damages" is perhaps a misnomer. If a nuisance has
resulted in permanent damage, for example, if water pollution that constitutes
a nuisance as to you has killed all of your cows, you probably can obtain the
full value of the cows as damages for your permanent loss. This example is
not an example of the "permanent damages" referred to in the text. The
distinction I wish to make is between (i) "permanent damages" that include
losses that will occur in the future and (ii) "past damages" that are recover-
able only after they have accrued.
803. 55 Misc. 2d 1023, 287 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1967), aff'd, 30 App. Div.
2d 480, 294 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1968), reed, 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
804. 55 Misc. 2d at 1025, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 114 (1967).
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tion in an "inverse condemnation" suit80 5 or the permanent damages
are granted as an equitable remedy.
The first basis for permanent damages is hardly germane to
this article for we are examining only the allocative effects of the
law of nuisance to see if they are "efficient" The compensation
paid when the power of eminent domain is exercised has only dis-
tributional consequences. The decision to reallocate the resources
"condemned" is not made by the courts but by the condemnor and
by the legislature.30
805. Cf. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
806. Whether the reallocation made by the condemner is efficient is beyond
the scope of this article. Whether the fact that compensation is paid is suffi-
cient to justify the exercise of the power from the point of view of a Paretian
analysis is a difficult question (see note 144 supra) that is not relevant to the
matters discussed in this section.
It should be noted, however, that the normal measure of damages in a
condemnation case is the "fair market value" of the property taken. United
States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943). To the extent that value does not
reflect other values held by actual persons other than the landowners, the
condemner may be able to acquire the property at less than its actual value
to members of the community who will not be made whole by the payment
of compensation. This is particularly likely to happen in the case of public
and unmarketable goods like water quality. When it does happen, the reallo-
cation may be "inefficient" if one takes the distribution of well-being that
existed before the condemnation as the starting point for one's analysis.
It should also be noted that the federal government is not constitutionally
required to pay compensation for the taking of interests in navigable waters,
including presumably taking the privilege to pollute such waters. See generally
Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the
Rule of No Compensation, 3 NATURAL REsouRcEs J. 1 (1963). What excep-
tions there are to the rule that the federal government need not pay compen-
sation for the taking of interests in navigable waters are purely matters of
legislative grace. See e.g., River and Harbor Act, 33 U.S.C. § 595a (1970)
(applies only when real estate is taken for improvements to rivers, harbors,
canals, or waterways and would not seem to call for compensation for pollu-
tion). But cf. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950)
(compensation payable under terms of the Reclamation Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 371
et seq. (1970)); United States v. 967,905 Acres of Land, 447 F.2d 764, 771
(8th Cr. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974 (1972). Some states have
similar constitutional rules. See, e.g., State ex rel. Squire v. City of Cleveland,
150 Ohio St. 303, 82 N.E.2d 709 (1948) (compensation not required for
takings of land under Lake Erie to be used as a highway; this result was
reached on the basis of the "public trust" in which waters are held for the
purposes of commerce). Where compensation is not required for the taking
of interests in water, governmental action is more likely to degrade water than
would either the workings of an efficient market or the workings of the law
of nuisance. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & EcoN. 1
(1960). The FWPCA applies its provisions to governmental actions, however,
and some protection may be given by the NEPA. See, e.g., Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 348 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1972), aft'd, 477
F.2d 1033 (8th Cir. 1973).
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Grave doubts may be entertained as to whether the imposition
of permanent damages as an equitable remedy will have any ap-
preciable allocative effects. A quick look into the historical devel-
opment of remedies in this area of the law reveals that the major
basis for equitable jurisdiction over cases of continuing nuisance
was to relieve the plaintiff of the burden of bringing multiple
suits.807 The remedy in such equity proceedings was an injunction.
Most courts of equity, unlike the New York Court of Appeals in
Whaen,s80 did not feel compelled to grant an injunction in every
nuisance case and would remit the plaintiff to his remedy at law if
they did not feel that the injunction was desirable.809 Thus courts
of law would balance the competing interests to determine whether
the pollution constituted a nuisance. If the finding was that a
nuisance existed, the courts of equity would "balance the equities"
to decide whether an injunction should issue. If the court denied
an injunction, the plaintiff could only recover his legal damages,
i.e., the damages already caused by the nuisance. Some courts of
equity, however, have adopted the technique of denying an injunc-
tion but awarding permanent damages in lieu thereof.
Perhaps the most famous case of this sort is the decision of the
New York Court of Appeals in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.810
Although Boomer was concerned with air rather than water pollu-
tion, it is of particular interest because it, in effect, overrules
Whalen. This suggests that the courts are not prepared to adhere
to the one rule that might be biased in favor of a clean environment.
In Boomer the plaintiffs sought an injunction against the opera-
tion of a cement plant that caused severe air pollution in a rural
area. The offending plant represented an investment of more than
$45,000,000 and supplied over 300 jobs.8 The plaintiffs, who
apparently were prosperous farmers, had suffered permanent dam-
ages to the order of $185,000.812 Unlike the situation in Whalen,
it is probable that the plaintiffs in the seven actions consolidated
in Boomer represented all or a large majority of those who had
standing to complain of the nuisance. The New York Court of
Appeals declined to follow Whalen for the following reasons:
807. See note 845 infra and accompanying text. But ef. note 743 supra.
808. Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913).
809. See Keeton & Morris, supra note 790. Compare Straight v. Hover, 79
Ohio St. 263, 87 N.E. 174 (1909) with Salem Iron Co. v. Hyland, 74 Ohio
St. 160, 77 N.E. 751 (1906).
810. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
811. Id. at 225, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
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It seems apparent that the amelioration of air pollu-
tion will depend on technical research in great depth; on a
carefully balanced consideration of the economic impact of
close regulation; and of the actual effect on public health.
It is likely to require massive public expenditure and to
demand more than any local community can accom-
plish and to depend on regional and interstate controls.
A court should not try to do this on its own as a by-
product of private litigation and it seems manifest that
the judicial establishment is neither equipped in the lim-
ited nature of any judgment it can pronounce nor prepared
to lay down and implement an effective policy for the
elimination of air pollution. This is an area beyond the
circumference of one private lawsuit. It is a direct re-
sponsibility for government and should not thus be
undertaken as an incident to solving a dispute between
property owners and a single cement plant-one of many-
in the Hudson River valley. 13
Having abandoned any attempt to solve the problems of air
pollution in this private litigation, the court then proceeded to point
out that: "[t]he ground for the denial of injunction, notwithstanding
the finding both that there is a nuisance and that plaintiffs have been
damaged substantially, is the large disparity in economic con-
sequences of the nuisance and of the injunction." 8 14 One might
wonder why the court should deny its competence to deal with
the social problems inherent in air pollution and then turn around
and overrule Whalen8 15 because of the supposed economic dis-
812. The estimate of $185,000 was made by the trial court in the hopes of
encouraging a settlement; it did not amount to a binding finding. Id. at 224,
257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 316. On retrial two of the three plaintiffs
settled their claims while another four plaintiffs had settled earlier. The
remaining plaintiff (who claimed the most damages) was awarded $175,000
for the "servitude" that the cement company had "taken." Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co., 72 Misc. 2d 834, 839, 340 N.Y.S.2d 97, 102 (1972), aff'd sub
nom. Kinley v. Atlantic Cement Co., 42 App. Div. 2d 496, 349 N.Y.S.2d 199
(1973).
813. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 223, 257 N.E.2d 870, 871, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314-15
(1970).
814. Id. at 223, 257 N.E.2d at 871, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
815. It could be argued that the court in Boomer did not overrule Whalen.
In Boomer an injunction was technically granted-but only if the cement com-
pany did not pay permanent damages. This distinction seems slightly spurious,
but the majority opinion in Boomer never expressly states that Whalen is over-
ruled. The dissenters, however, clearly believed the rule in Whalen "that a
nuisance which results in substantial continuing damage to neighbors must
be enjoined" had been changed. Id. at 229, 257 N.E.2d at 875, 309 N.Y.S.2d
at 320. The appellate division has also concluded that "the Court of Appeals
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parity between the interests of the plaintiffs and the defendant
cement company. If the court felt that it could not determine the
socially desirable result, why did it feel compelled to change a
well-settled rule of law? On the other hand, did the court not
reach, despite its modest disclaimers, the result that welfare eco-
nomic theory calls for? Since the plant's output was undoubtedly
worth more than the losses suffered by the plaintiffs, did the court
not reach the "efficient" result?
The answer to these questions is implicit in the court's ex-
planation of the result. It is quite clear that the court did not find
that air pollution from cement plants is efficient. The court was
acutely aware that it was dealing with only a small part of a problem
involving public goods and public bads, and it simply assumed
the obvious fact that I am attempting to prove: private litiga-
tion in pollution cases is not capable of bringing the world to
a socially acceptable level of cleanliness. If one translates the
overruled the doctrine that where a nuisance has been found and where there
has been any substantial damage shown by the party complaining, an injunc-
tion will be granted." Kinley v. Atlantic Cement Co., 42 App. Div. 2d 496,
497, 349 N.Y.S.2d 199, 200 (1973).
Perhaps Boomer can be distinguished from Whalen on the ground that the
latter involved riparian rights (and perhaps even the theory that a riparian
owner has a right to have a stream flow by in its "natural" quantity and
quality) while Boomer was a pure nuisance case involving air pollution. Un-
fortunately for any proponent of this distinction, the court in Boomer cited
other cases as supporting the rule in Whalen and these cases applied the rule
consistently in both riparian and other types of nuisance cases. Kennedy v.
Moog Servocontrols, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 966, 237 N.E.2d 356, 290 N.Y.S.2d 193
(1968) (discharge of sewage into ditch on plaintiff's property enjoined; cited
in the dissenting opinion in Boomer); McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549 (1907) (air pollution case decided on "nuisance"
theory; the defendant's plant was not enjoined, only the burning of soft coal
therein). See also Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164 N.Y. 303, 58 N.E. 142
(1900), a riparian rights case decided on the theory that each riparian owner
may make reasonable use of the stream:
When the diversion, or pollution, which is treated as a form of diver-
sion, is caused by a new and extraordinary method of using the water,
hitherto unknown in the state, and such method not only permanently
diverts a large quantity of water from the stream, but also renders
the rest so salt, at times, that cattle will not drink it unless forced
to by necessity, fish are destroyed in great numbers, vegetation is
killed and machinery rusted, such use as a matter of law is unreason-
able and entitles the lower riparian owner to relief.
Id. at 321, 58 N.E. at 147; Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568 (1876) (air
pollution case resulting from brick burning decided on "nuisance" theory).
Thus New York, at least when confronted with the question of remedies,
does not distinguish between "riparian" cases and other types of nuisance
resulting from pollution. See note 473 supra.
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court's argument into economic terminology,- the court is saying:
(i) the problem of air pollution from cement plants, involving
as it does public goods, externalities, and unpriced costs, will only
be solved by governmental action; (ii) the court cannot force
the entire cement industry into adopting the optimal level of
pollution by putting pressure on the one defendant before the
court; (iii) the court does not know what the optimal level of pollu-.
tion is for the cement industry; (iv) the, court does, however,
know that the optimal level of pollution from the one plant sub-
ject to its jurisdiction-if that plant is considered in isolation81
from the entire system comprising the cement industry (or the
economy of the United States )-would be close to that which actu-
ally exists; (v) therefore, the best solution available to the court is to
allow the pollution to continue, even though this is clearly not
the optimal result. If one reads the opinion of the court in this
fashion, it would appear to be a judicial declaration of my thesis
that private litigation will result in a sub-optimal excess of pollution.
The courts argument, as paraphrased, does not sound very
persuasive from the viewpoint of welfare economics. If the pol-
lution from the cement plant exceeds the amount of pollution that
would exist in an efficient market, should not the court have
ordered an abatement of the pollution, or at least of the excess
pollution? Perhaps not, since the the court had no way of guess-
ing what the "second best" 8 17 solution would be. But how can
an inability to guess at the correct result justify a drastic change
in the law? 18
The problem is that my paraphrase is incomplete. The Boomer
court did not reach its results on any allocative ground. Having
determined that it could not enforce "economic efficiency," it simply
ignored efficiency considerations and decided the case on distributive
grounds.
The distributional bases of the decision can be seen most clearly
in the fact that, unlike my paraphrase, the court in Boomer did
not advert to the value of the plant's production; it was only
concerned with the defendant's investment in the plant and the
816. It is a truism of systems theory that optimizing the various intercon-
nected subsystems that comprise a larger system will not, as a general rule,
optimize the larger system.
817. See notes 375-90 supra and accompanying text.
818. Is there nothing to be said for stare decisis? Will not the new rule
adopted in Boomer encourage (at least relative to the effects of the rule in
Whalen) suboptimal polluters to build suboptimal plants?
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more than 300 jobs that depended on the plant's remaining in oper-
ation.819 Clearly the majority thought that it would be unfair and
socially undesirable to deprive the capitalist of his investment or
the workmen of their hire while other cement plants could cheer-
fully and freely continue to belch forth their noxious dust. On
the other hand, Judge Jasen in his dissent argued:
In permitting the injunction to become inoperative upon
the payment of permanent damages, the majority is, in
effect, licensing a continuing wrong. It is the same as say-
ing to the cement company, you may continue to do
harm to your neighbors so long as you pay a fee for it....
Nor is it constitutionally permissible to impose servi-
tude on land, without consent of the owner, by
payment of permanent damages where the continuing
impairment of the land is for a private use.820
Although my sympathies are with Judge Jasen, his opinion is
a classic exercise in begging the question. His conclusion is based
in part on the assumption that the plaintiffs had the legal property
right to be free from pollution. This assumption was not unreason-
able, however, since the judges who heard the case agreed that
the pollution constituted a nuisance. Furthermore, the rule in
Whalen did appear to treat the right to be free from pollution
as a property right that entitled the plaintiffs to the full panoply
of remedies that are available to other owners of real property.
Even the majority stated, in effect, that they were allowing the
cement company to take the property of the plaintiffs:
The theory of damage is the 'servitude on land,' of plain-
tiffs imposed by defendant's nuisance ...
The judgment, by allowance of permanent damages
imposing a servitude on land, which is the basis of the
actions, would preclude future recovery by plaintiffs or
their grantees ...
This should be placed beyond debate by a provision
of the judgment that the payment by defendant and the
acceptance by plaintiffs of permanent damages found by
819. The investment in the plant is a "sunk" cost that would have, in an
efficient market, no effect whatsoever on the optimal level of production of
either goods or pollution. Jobs also represent a cost; the labor of the job-
holders is a factor of production consumed by the plant; it is not a good in
economic theory.




the court shall be in compensation for a servitude on the
land.821
The majority opinion is a bold one, for the judges made it clear
that they were authorizing a taldng of the plaintiff's property.
They did not avoid this issue, as did the Pennsylvania court in
Sanderson, by declaring that the pollution was not a nuisance at
all.822 Rather, they proceeded to "undefine" a property right, sub-
stituting (in Calabresian terminology) a liability rule for a prop-
erty rule,823 and, in effect, took the unusual82 4 step of conferring
the power of eminent domain upon a private manufacturer.825 They
presented no authority other than the disparity in the "economic"
interests of the two parties. All of this was accomplished in the
face of the argument that the "new 'economic utility doctrine' ...
will leave in jeopardy the rights of small property owners through-
out the State of New York." 826 Thus, it appears that Boomer and
similar cases granting permanent damages are indistinguishable 827
821. Id. at 228, 257 N.E.2d at 875, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 319. The majority made
it absolutely clear that they considered the case as one where the plaintiffs'
property was taken by citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946),
the case in which Justice Douglas invented the "taking" doctrine that is the
federal counterpart of state "inverse condemnation" proceedings.
822. It is true that this brave stance was perhaps forced upon the majority.
The New York Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to review the facts
as found by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate division. N.Y. Crv.
PnAc. LAw § 5501(b) (McKinney 1963). It would thus have been difficult
for the court to deny the fact that there was indeed a nuisance.
823. See note 445 supra.
824. Keeton & Morris, supra note 790, at 424 n. 28.
825. The case upon which the majority relied most heavily was Northern
Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Vesey, 210 Ind. 338, 200 N.E. 620 (1936), where an
injunction was denied against the operation of an artificial gas plant serving the
city of Fort Wayne and permanent damages were granted as an "equitable
principle that equity will give full relief in one action and prevent a multiplicity
of suits." Id. at 354, 200 N.E. at 627. But Vesey differs from Boomer in one
important respect. Public service companies have the power to condemn land
(although nothing was made of this express power in Vesey) and the trial court
specifically found "that the continued operation of the defendant's gas plant is
necessary in the public interest." Id. at 349, 200 N.E. at 625 (emphasis
added). No such finding was made-or could have been made-in Boomer.
The trial court in Boomer did, however, find that an injunction "would pro-
duce great public hardship." 55 Misc. 2d at 1025, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 114 (1967).
826. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 220, 257 N.E.2d 870,
309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970) (points of counsel for Boomer).
827. Indistinguishable, that is, except for the fact that it is the courts rather
than the legislature that vest the power to take in the polluter. It would
hardly be fair of me to claim that I ignore the allocative effects of a judicial
decision on the grounds that the legislature might have reached the same
results.
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from cases involving the power of eminent domain. Despite the
New York Court of Appeals' concern with distributional considera-
tions in Boomer, the ultimate issue in the case was allocative:
Should the air have been used as a dumping ground for the
wastes of a cement plant or should it have been used for more
human, and bucolic, purposes? The holdings, however, seem to
have been that the air should not have been used as a refuse
dump but that it would have been unfair to impose this allocative
decision on one cement plant. Thus the decision appears to permit
more pollution than would have existed under the regime of an
efficient market.828
If this correctly states the court's holding, I cannot greatly
fault it even though the result is both inefficient and dirty. To
consider pollution solely from the point of view of a market analysis
is one-sided. Although I believe that court-made law necessarily
permits too much pollution, that is not a ground for singling out
individual polluters for unevenly harsh treatment. The investors
in the Atlantic Cement Co. have a legitimate claim to equal treat-
ment before the law and the company employees have some right
not to have their jobs wiped out by a court's unfeeling and random
digression in the direction of the public good.8 29 Even those who
do not like such distributional arguments and object to "fairness"
as an unmarketable and arbitrary concept might agree that, even
though the plant's costs may have exceeded its benefits, shutting it
down without making the corresponding adjustments throughout
the rest of the economy could have caused economic distortions and
828. This conclusion is based on my continuing assumption (see note 744
supra and accompanying text) that the courts' decisions as to "reasonableness"
are correct determinations of "efficiency."
829. "If . .. the whole industry has not found a technical solution a court
would be hard put to close down this one cement plant if due regard be given
to equitable principles." 26 N.Y.2d at 226, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d
at 317.
Contrary to the assumptions built into the model of the efficient market,
factors of production cannot be switched from one productive process to
another instantly and without cost. This is especially true of the factor known
as "labor," which might be more properly described as human livelihoods. The
trial court in Boomer also seemed concerned with the effect on local taxes.
55 Misc. 2d at 1025,287 N.Y.S.2d at 114 (1967).
Legislative solutions to the problem of pollution can ameliorate, if not avoid,
the crueler consequences of such dislocations. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1367(e)
(Supp. 1976). See generally Picker, Adjustment Assistance for Employees:




created social costs even greater than those entailed by the con-
tinuation of the pollution.
If the plant in Boomer is looked at in isolation from the rest
of the economy, it could be argued that the result reached by the
court was in fact the efficient allocation.830 It would appear prob-
able that the value of the cement plant's production exceeded its
costs, including the damages awarded to the unhappy plaintiffs.83l
A closer examination of the remedy granted in Boomer reveals,
however, that the result reached will inevitably be biased in favor
of an inefficient excess of pollution, even though allowing the plant
to operate may be more efficient than shutting it down.
Although Atlantic Cement Co. had installed the best available
pollution control devices, the court seemed to agree that better
controls would be developed if the entire industry were given
sufficient incentive.8s The majority in Boomer argued: "It
seems reasonable to think that the risk of being required to pay
permanent damages to injured property owners by cement plant
owners would itself be a reasonable [sic] effective spur to research
for improved techniques to minimize nuisance." 833
830. One could even feel sorry for poor old Atlantic Cement Co. that was
forced to buy a "servitude" that may become or will become unusuable when
and if the mandate of the 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act are taken
seriously. As the majority said in a clear admission that the result reached
may be socially inefficient:
The nuisance complained of by these plaintiffs ipay have other
public or private consequences, but these particular parties are the
only ones who have sought remedies. . . . The limitation of relief
granted is a limitation only within the four comers of these actions
and does not foreclose public health or other public agencies from
seeking proper relief in a proper court.
26 N.Y.2d at 226, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
831. In fact, considering the amount that was ultimately awarded as dam-
ages, it is quite possible that the plaintiffs were not all that unhappy. See
note 931 infra and accompanying text.
832. The dissenter appeared to think that Atlantic Cement Co. could solve
the problem by itself:
It is not my intention to cause the removal of the cement plant
from the Albany area, but to recognize the urgency of the problem
stemming from this stationary source of air pollution, and to allow the
company a specified period of time to develop a means to alleviatethis nuisance ....
* I believe it is incumbent upon the defendant to develop such
devices....
26 N.Y.2d at 231, 257 N.E.2d at 877, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 322 (dissenting opin-
ion).
833. Id. at 226, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 317. The threat of in-
junctions would be an even better spur. I cannot help but think that the
result in Boomer must strike the cement industry more like a salve for its
bleeding flesh.
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Whatever truth this claim may hold for the cement industry
as a whole, it cannot be true of the particular plant in question
for "once . . .permanent damages are assessed and paid, the
incentive to alleviate the wrong would be eliminated, thereby
continuing air pollution of an area without abatement." 83 4 As one
of our leading lawconomists has pointed out in the context of noise
pollution:
A problem with the eminent domain [i.e. payment
of permanent damages in return for a "servitude"] approach
is that once the airline, having found that the costs of noise-
abatement procedures are greater than the benefits to it
in reduced liability to the subjacent owners, acquires ease-
ments from them that authorize it to maintain a high level
of noise, it has no incentive to reconsider the adoption of
such procedures in the future, when and if their cost falls
or their effectiveness increases: the benefit of a lower
noise level would inure entirely to the subjacent owners.83 5
In fact, any grant of permanent damages is inherently in-
efficient. As you will recall, the economic explanation of excess
pollution lies in the fact that pollutants represent an "external"
cost, a cost that is not considered by the polluter when he chooses
his level or his means of production or consumption. 36 The
economic solution is to "internalize" such costs, to force them back
onto the polluter and into his decision-making process. An award
834. Id. at 230, 257 N.E.2d at 876, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 321 (dissenting
opinion).
835. R. PosNEn, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 27 (1972).
836. See notes 396-402 supra and accompanying text.
The relationship between external costs and pollution levels is simple in
theory but complex in practice. Apparently the large majority of economic
studies to date assume that if the cost of pollution is internalized the producer
will reduce his output of goods. It is also possible, however, for the producer
to install antipollution devices so as to reduce his output of bads (pollutants)
without a corresponding reduction in the output of goods. In extreme cases,
the polluter (or his victims) may relocate, thus obviating the necessity of
reducing production. In this article I have followed the common practice of
assuming that pollution levels are proportional to production levels. The
facts of the Boomer case indicate that this is not necessarily true. For the
only discussion I have found concerning optimal levels of pollution as op-
posed to production, see Mishan, What is the Optimal Level of Pollution?,
82 J. PoL. EcoN. 1287 (1974), in which the various means of reducing pollution
are analyzed. This article should not be confused with W. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR
PENGUINS, THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION (1974), which is a tract for




of permanent damages has no such effect, except in the extreme
case where the polluter decides to close down his operation rather
than "buy" the right to pollute in the future.83 7  Except possibly
for the period when litigation is actually pending, the award of
permanent damages today can have no effect on past levels of
pollution; effects do not ordinarily occur before their causes. 38
Once the award is paid, it will not provide any incentive to reduce
pollution in the future because any act taken in the future cannot
affect the amount of damages paid today. There may even be
a tendency for awards of permanent damages to increase pollu-
tion since any additional pollution will be without additional cost
to the polluter.8 3 9  Perhaps the polluter will decide to increase
his production to pay for the loss incurred on payment of the
permanent damages.
Thus the major effect of an award of permanent damages is
distributional. The basic allocative decision, the decision to allow
the pollution to continue, is a consequence of the denial of an
injunction, not of the award of permanent damages. It is possible
for the denial of the injunction to be relatively efficient while the
award of permanent damages will be inefficient.8 40  The threat of
837. In such a case, permanent damages are the equivalent of an injunc-
tion, but such cases will be rare if most polluting facilities have a value in
excess of the permanent damages that they impose upon those who have legal
standing. Such an excess of benefit over cost does not, however, imply that
the pollution from the facility is at an optimal level.
838. The risk of having permanent damages awarded against a plant may,
on the other hand, act as a restraint on pollution, but presumably not as much
of a restraint as would the risk of an injunction. This possibility does not
belie the claim made in the text. A risk that something may happen in the
future is a very different type of "entity" from the happening itself. I shall
discuss the risks of remedies hereafter. Cf. notes 911-12 infra and accom-
panying text.
839. It is unlikely that a polluter would go so far as to remove whatever
pollution control devices he used before the damages were awarded. Such
an act would invite an injunction, at least one requiring the reinstallation of
the devices. Whether he would keep the devices in good working order is
another question.
840. For example, a plant might produce goods worth a million dollars and,
impose external pollution costs of $100,000. The optimal level of production
and pollution might be $950,000 of goods and $50,000 of pollution costs.
This might represent a reduction in production greater than 5%.' As production
goes down, prices will increase, provided that the decrease in production is
not offset by production elsewhere. Cf. Mishan, supra note 836. In such a
case, it would be inefficient to close down the plant, but it would also be
inefficient not to encourage a reduction in the production both- of goods and
pollution.
1976]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
issuing an injunction could encourage a reduction in the produc-
tion of goods and pollution, but once payment has been made,
there is little incentive to achieve an optimal level of production
and pollution. Since permanent damages probably will not result
in such a reduction of either goods or pollution, the remedy is
inherently inefficient and, as usual,841 the inefficiency consists of too
much pollution.
D. Past Damages
Although permanent damages awarded against a single polluter
have a purely distributional effect, the award of past damages
coupled with the assurance they will be awarded in the future
whenever necessary must have allocational consequences. In fact,
the award of past damages seems to be the only tool in the courts'
kit that is capable of "internalizing" the costs of pollution.84
841. Of course, if the injunction were granted and permanent damages were
awarded to the polluter; the inefficiency would consist of too little pollution
(and too little production). Since the courts do not as a general rule award
such a combination of remedies, the asymmetry in the law tends inevitably to
produce, in terms of Pareto efficiency, too much pollution rather than too little.
842. Injunctions, though they may be effective in the pursuit of the optimal
level of pollution, do not internalize pollution costs. For a cost to be inter-
nalized, it must be fed in to the decision-making process of the polluter. If
pollution is enjoined, a law-abiding would-be polluter will find that his de-
cision has been made for him-he can no longer make the rational (or irra-
tional) choice to pollute (or not to pollute). A polluter who is not law-
abiding by nature will still have to take some costs into account in making
his decision, but these costs are the costs associated with contempt of court,
not those associated with pollution: a potential jail sentence is not the same
as the cost of pollution. Injunctions act very much in the same way as gov-
ernmental regulations like the FWPCA. The difference is that they cannot do
the job as well. An injunction in a private nuisance action runs only against
an individually insignificant pollution source that is unlikely to be able to make
the adjustments (including changes in the price of products) that would be
made if an entire industry-or all polluters-were subject to the restriction.
It should be noted that in the case where an injunction leads to too much
clean water and too little pollution ("too much" and "too little" being defined
in terms of economic efficiency), past damages assessed against the plaintiff
for the harm done to the defendant-polluter would supply a countervailing
push toward a more efficient and dirtier result.
As Calabresi and Melamed have pointed out, there is no theoretical reason
why the court in such circumstances could not enjoin the pollution and order
the pollutee to pay the damages which the polluter will suffer because of the
injunction. If that were done, the legislature would have "distributed" the
privilege to the polluter and then the judge would have reallocated it to the
pollutee, and in theory the world would be closer to the Pareto optimum
determined by that distribution of wealth under which the polluters are
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Past damages are the traditional remedy in nuisance cases be-
cause nuisance has traditionally been a subdivision of an action
on the case.8 43  Such a remedy, however, is insufficient to make
the plaintiff whole;844 equitable remedies are granted in nuisance
cases for this very reason. As one case explains this development:
Prior to Lord Eldon's time, injunctions were rarely
issued by courts of equity. . . It was formerly rarely
issued in the case of a nuisance until the plaintiff's right had
been established at law ... But now a suit at law is no
longer a necessary preliminary, and the right to an in-
junction, in a proper case, ... is just as fixed and certain
as the right to any other provisional remedy. The writ
can rightfully be demanded to prevent irreparable injury,
interminable litigation and a multiplicity of suits ...
Here the injunction also prevents a multiplicity of suits.
The injury is a recurring one, and every time the poisonous
breath from defendant's brick-kiln sweeps over plaintiffs'
land they have a cause of action. Unless the nuisance
be restrained the litigation would be interminable. The
policy of the law favors, and the peace and good order
privileged. Unfortunately the courts are authorized to enter injunctions only
when the party enjoined has done something "wrong," and the legislature has
declared that water pollution is not a wrong. See Calabresi & Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1118-20 (1972). In such a case it is the cost of clean
water that is being internalized. The beneficiaries of the injunction, however,
would presumably release the polluter from its burden if they could find a
cheaper means of obtaining water of the quality they desire.
843. See note 743 supra. The assize of nuisance and the writ of quod
permittat prosternere apparently could result in the abatement of the nuisance,
but they fell out of favor along with the other common law actions. No later
action at law was ever developed to compel the abatement of a.nuisance in
the way that ejectment compels the discontinuance of a permanent (as opposed
to a sporadic but continuing) trespass.
844. This is not a fact that would trouble most welfare economists and
certainly would not trouble typical lawconomists who have abandoned the
Paretian underpinning of their moral prescriptions. They simply do not care
whether or not the plaintiff is made worse off by the pollution; all they desire
is that the cost of the pollution be internalized, be taken into account by the
polluter. If it is, they assume that the result will be efficient even though the
plaintiff is not compensated. The loss to the plaintiff is (they assume.) a
purely distributional consequence of their scientific detachment from the
sufferings of others. Need I remind you that a failure to compensate in such
cases deprives welfare economics of any normative basis? Or that the pay-
ment of compensation may (in all but the most inconceivable cases) change
the optimal level of pollution? See note 144 supra and accompanying text.
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of society are best promoted by the termination of such
litigation by a single suit.845
Although an efficiency analysis of the effect of private litiga-
tion on levels of water pollution may disregard such matters as
"the peace and good order" of society, the courts may not do so.
There is a push upon the courts to grant remedies that are not so
"efficient" as past damages. In the discussion of remedies, I have
already adverted to the fact that a court that considers an ac-
tionable nuisance to be a "wrong," will find itself confronted with
the dilemma that (i) if it awards damages it should grant an in-
junction against the wrong (as did the court in Whalen) or (ii)
if it is not willing to grant an injunction it must deny that there
is any wrong and refuse to award damages (as was the case in
Sanderson). This suggests that past damages will often not be
the chosen remedy and that the costs of pollution usually will
not be internalized because the courts are not willing to issue an
injunction.
There are, however, some courts that are willing to ignore the
dilemma. In 1906 in Salem Iron Co. v. Hyland,846 the Supreme
Court of Ohio held that an injunction should not be granted against
water pollution resulting from the operation of an oil well for
the following reasons:
This is not an action for damages. The defendants are
conducting a lawful business with care. They are con-
ducting it at the only place where it can be conduted.847
Such injury as is done to the plaintiff is unavoidable. No
injury to the health of the public or the employees of the
plainfiff resdlts. If the conduct of the defendants is with-
out right, and a more hppropriate rule of damages should
not be suggested in an action *at law, the recovery of a
sum of money sufficient to .pay the expense of obtaining
845. Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 582 (1876). As we have seen,
permanent damages as well as injunctions are eqiptable remedies, although
permanent damages are as rare today as injunctions were in the days before
Lord Eldon. In Boomer, for example, the trial court awarded only past
damages, explaining: "In awarding damages to the time of trial I am bound
by precedent to grant only the loss of rental value or loss of usable value
sustained." 55 Misc. 2d at 1025, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 114. The trial court went
on to calculate permanent damages, but only as a basis for the voluntary
settlement to avoid future litigation. Id. at 1026, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 115-16.
846. 74 Ohio St. 160, 77 N.E. 751 (1906).




water from another source would fully indemnify the
plaintiff and relieve it of further injury without additional
litigation. Cases which take no account of considerations
such as these are not in harmony with the beneficent
purposes for which the system of equity was established.848
In Straight v. Hover,849 a case decided three years later, the
same court actually permitted the recovery of damages in a factual
situation almost identical with that in Hyland, except that the
plaintiff sought damages rather than an injunction. The Straight
court concluded:
This case considered in connection with ... Hyland...,
places us in the position of holding, that in cases of this
character where the invasion of the rights of the lower
proprietor does not amount to an appropriation of his
property, but merely constitutes a nuisance, an injunction
will not be allowed to prevent the development of the
resources of the lands of the upper owner, but that an
action will lie for the recovery of such substantial damages
as the lower proprietor may sustain by reason of such
operations. With that position we are content since it
seems to regard all the principles which the rights of the
parties require us to recognize.850
"Ah!" crieth the lawconomist, "A Daniel come to judgment" It
does seem, at first glance, that we have at least come upon a rule
848. 74 Ohio St. at 167, 77 N.E. at 752. Notice that the remedy sug-
gested by the court supplies no protection whatsoever to the interests of all
those members of the public, besides the plaintiff, who may desire clean water
or clean streams. It should also be noted that the plaintiff wanted the water
for highly consumptive uses: in the manufacture of pig iron it consumed
200,000 gallons of water daily for the production of steam. Id. at 164, 77
N.E. at 751. This supports my conclusion that private litigation over water
pollution often will have no tendency to protect the quality of water in situ.
The dispute in Hyland was over who would get the profit from killing a
living stream. Plaintiff, the lower riparian owner, was a nonpolluter, but his
use of the stream was to create steam which he could not do because the
defendant's oil wells put salt into the stream.
Hyland is also of interest in that the court was able to cut through the
most knotty legal problem in Boomer: How can a court deny an injunction in
such a case and not be guilty of taking private property for public use in
violation of due process? In Hyland the court simply said: "That an injury
to a property right of this character cannot be legalized by the legislature
does not affect the form of relief which should be awarded on account of an
invasion of the right." Id. at 166, 77 N.E. at 752. When impaled by a
dilemma, just hit it hard between the eyes!
849. 79 Ohio St. 263, 87 N.E. 174 (1909).
850. Id. at 278, 87 N.E. at 176.
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that should get us about as close as possible to the optimal state
in water pollution cases. If we translate the court's use of the
word "property" as meaning "a marketable interest," 5 1 the rule
appears to be that the taking of marketable interests will be en-
joined, but the taking of interests that are not marketable will
be protected only by damages. An economist will conclude that
the market in "property" will lead to an efficient allocation of
property;s5 the unmarketable (e.g., water quality) will lead to
an efficient allocation by the fact that any external costs affecting
it will be internalized by means of past damages.
To some extent this conclusion is true. If we look only at the
plaintiff and defendant in a given case, this Ohio rule will reach an
efficient result provided that the court has been able to fix the
damages at the amount of the actual cost of the pollution. There
are, however, the interests of others, including you and me and
those yet to be born, which are not the interests of the plaintiffs.
These interests, which would be weighed by the allocative processes
of an efficient market, are disregarded by the Ohio rule. Since
a few of us who are disregarded desire good water, it appears
that the Ohio rule does not overcome many biases against clean
water that exist (dehors the law of remedies) in the body of
private law relating to water pollution.
Even if we look only at the interests of the plaintiff and defen-
dant, it is apparent that the Ohio rule will not be sufficient to
achieve an optimal level of pollution. In the first place, the costs
will be internalized only if the plaintiff suffers substantial damages.
But when we consider all the water pollution in the world, it may
well be that the aggregate of all the insubstantial damages is far
greater than that of all the substantial damages. In the efficient
market where transactions are cost free, the "insubstantial" costs
would be accounted for. In the second place, a single polluter
cannot respond to cost internalizations in the same fashion that a
polluter would respond under the regime of an efficient market.s5
851. If "property" in the quoted passage means "something protected by a
property rule," i.e., "an interest protected by injunctive relief," the court's
argument would be so circular that even a law student in his first week would
be ashamed to make it.
852. If marketable interests are not protected by property rules, by injunc-
tions, they will cease to be marketable. We all know in our bones that this
is true, for surely our oldest maxim is that "nobody wants to buy a law suit."
Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 842.
853. Or under a nationwide system of prohibitions such as the FWPCA.
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Under the Ohio rule, the polluter must judge whether the value
to him854 of his production exceeds the cost of paying damages.
Normally it will.P55 If it does not he will cease production alto-
gether or (in some cases) 856 reduce his pollution until the sum of
his other variable costs and the damages resulting from the pollu-
tion are less than the amount by which his income from the reduced
production exceeds the damages that he must pay. Under an ef-
ficient regime, al polluters would behave in the same fashion but the
results of their actions would be different. In an efficient market
the polluters could reduce their production and thereby cause the
price of their product to rise until a new equilibrium is reached.
Under the Ohio rule, however, the polluter can reduce his produc-
tion but he cannot change the price of his production unless he is
a monopolist. Thus, the Ohio rule will often fail to reach the same
optimal level of pollution as would occur under the regime of an
efficient market.857 There is one remaining bias that will keep the
Ohio rule from reaching the efficient allocation. In the efficient
market there are no transaction costs whereas in the real world, liti-
gation is expensive. Is there not something paradoxical about a rule
of law that reaches an efficient allocation of water quality by an in-
efficient allocation of legal resources? The simple fact is that, in
many cases, the Ohio rule will not lead to the internalization of the
cost of pollution because the plaintiff will not be able to afford
to bring repeated court actions. In Whalen the damages for a
year were only $100.s18 If the plaintiff in that case had been sub-
jected to the Ohio rule, it seems unlikely that he could have
854. There may be external benefits to production; to the extent that they
exist, it is possible that we will get an inefficient result because there is too
little production (and pollution). This type of countervailing inefficiency
cannot be blamed on the law of nuisance. Has anyone ever attempted to
make an efficiency analysis of the law of restitution?
855. This is so because a rational polluter will disregard many other costs,
all those costs that he "sunk" in times past. See notes 250-52 supra and accom-
panying text, cf. notes 898-909 infra and accompanying text.
856. The polluter will reduce his pollution in those cases where the mar-
ginal costs of pollution increase as the amount of pollution increases.
857. This conclusion shows a bias in favor of too little pollution when we
look only at the efficiency of the Ohio rule as it affects the parties to the liti-
gation. The danger is that some plants will close rather than reduce pollution.
This bias tends to disappear when we consider the larger world, however, for
other polluters not before the court (and perhaps not even in Ohio) will be
able to take up most of the slack.
858. In Straight, the damages for an unspecified period were only $102.25.
79 Ohio St. at 264, 87 N.E. at 174.
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afforded to sue for his annuity year after year. Thus, even the
remedial rule most likely to result in an efficient allocation con-
tains a serious bias against clean water s59
IX. THE DISTRIBUTION OF RIGHTS TO WATER QUALITY
There are two further reasons why any private remedy may not
result in a socially optimal allocation. Consider the following argu-
ment by Kneese and Bower:
[E]ven if a clear right is given to either the dischargers
or the parties damaged by waste discharges and if com-
pensations reflecting the value of the property right can
be arranged, longer-term adjustments in the economy will
not tend toward optimality. This is because assignment
of a property right is made by virtue of participation in a
particular kind of economic activity. The right cannot
be held independently of the activity; it automatically
accrues when the activity is undertaken. That is, the
right to the services of water would not be a general
one that could be exchanged among all interested parties
in a market that would place a price on it and thus tend
to make the services available to the most productive
user. If waste dischargers must compensate for damages,
a party can collect only if he engages in an activity likely
to be damaged. If a reduction in waste discharge is to be
induced by a damaged party, the payments are made only
if a potentially waste discharging activity is undertaken.8 60
859. If the plaintiff sues repeatedly there may be a bias against the polluter
because the defendant would be confronted not only with the necessity of
paying damages but also with the cost of litigation. In such a case, however,
one would expect the polluter to buy servitude and thus convert the cost of
pollution into a "sunk" cost that will no longer be internalized. If that hap-
pens, past damages will be converted into permanent damages.
Some courts have suggested that if repeated actions are necessary, the plain-
tiff should be awarded punitive damages. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 144, 6 A. 453, 455 (1886). Such a rule would
overcome the bias against clean water inherent in the Ohio rule but it is
dearly opposed to the reasoning of the rule which is justified by the argument
that the polluter is not really a wrongdoer. In any case, the courts do not
appear to be very inclined to award punitive damages in pollution cases.
When repeated punitive damages are awarded, they will-if they become large
enough-have the same effect as the granting of an injunction, which is in-
consistent with the Ohio rule. Cf. id. Thus the bias of the Ohio rule is not
and cannot be offset by any recourse to punitive damages.
860. A. KNEESE & B. Bown, MANAGING WATERn QuALrry: EcoNozmcs,
TECHNOLOGY, INsTrrunoNs 87 (1968). The quoted passage is the last of
six "major deficiencies of legal remedies." Id. at 84-88.
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While I do not wish to abandon any argument that might support
my position, this one is suspect since it amounts to a denial of the
Coase theorem. If the "clear right" is given to either party, the
result, even in the long run, can be efficient, but the efficient results
will differ depending on which of the two parties is given the clear
right. "If waste dischargers must compensate for damage," they
will have to pay some damages, whether or not their victims are
undertaking any use of the polluted waters, since damages are
normally calculated on the basis of the reduction in rental value
of the victims' land."61 If there are uses that the victims can make
that would be profitable if there were no pollution, then they will
presumably go ahead and make those uses and collect their damages.
At this point the polluter will either shut down, if he cannot af-
ford the damages, or pay the damages and continue to pollute.
Either of these results would seem to result in an efficient alloca-
tion of the water quality in question. The same type of objection
can be made to the Kneese and Bower argument when the "clear
right" is assigned to the polluter.8 62
It may be, however, that Kneese and Bower are disturbed by
the fact that different assignments of rights lead to differing optima.
It seems unlikely that one would consider both optima to be equally
desirable. Therefore longer run adjustments will, in some cases,
not tend toward the optimal optimum, the optimum optimorum.
It may also be that they are concerned with the law's inability to
protect conservative uses.8 63  Their explanation of the argument
is as follows:
861. See, e.g., Pan American Petroleum Co. v. Byars, 228 Ala. 372, 153 So.
616 (1934).
If the damages are slight, there is the possibility that a court will not find a
nuisance and thus deny any damages, an action that would be contrary to
the assumption that there is a "dear right."
862. The party with the privilege of polluting does not actually have to
pollute to get his victims to pay bribes to him; he only has to threaten to pol-
lute. Of course, to make his threats credible, he may have to build a pollut-
ing facility, but that would presumably be wasteful and not an optimal allo-
cation of the resources used in the facility. If, however, the optimal allocation
of the water quality, given the existing distribution of wealth, is that it not be
polluted, that optimum will come to pass as soon as the victim pays up. On
the other hand, if pollution is optimal, then that optimum will prevail.
863. See notes 594-99 supra and accompanying text.
This explanation seems improbable; there is nothing in theory that would
prevent the creation of property rights demanding that a stream not be
polluted. It may be, however, that Kneese and Bower are so used to the way
that our law operates that they cannot conceive of any basis for the assign-
ment of water rights other than by use.
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Much of the literature concerning externalities ... has
asserted that the assignment of property rights with re-
spect to externalities is unimportant so long as they are
clearly defined and enforceable. If, however, the right to
the use of an asset (or resource) is made contingent upon
engaging in a particular activity, and the right to the use
of the asset is given free to parties engaging in the activity,
excessive activity in that line will be generated. Clearly,
long run efficiency requires that a price be placed on the
asset reflecting its value in alternative uses.8s
This does seem rather persuasive and perhaps the Coase the-
orem that it does not make any difference how legal rights are
assigned is incorrect even in a perfect market even where one is
concerned only with allocational questions. The problem, how-
ever, turns on the phrase "excessive activity." The apparent dis-
agreement between Kneese and Bower, on the one hand, and
Coase, on the other, appears to vanish if one asks: "Excessive in
terms of what?" "Excessive" clearly means "excessive in com-
parison with the efficient level of that activity," but that in turn
raises the question: "What distribution of rights or wealth deter-
mines the efficient level?" If the distribution that determines ef-
ficiency includes the assignment of rights that result from the
activity in question, then (unless Coase is wrong) there will be
no excessive activity. 65 If, on the other hand, the initial distribu-
tion does not include the assignment of the rights in question, one
may well conclude, without violating the Coase theorem, that it
would be inefficient to assign the rights without charging for them.
For example, if society assigns the privileges to pollute only to
would-be polluters, the resulting level of pollution will exceed that
which would exist if the privileges to pollute, and the corresponding
right not to be polluted, were divided among all members of so-
ciety, including would-be conservationists. If we take as our
initial distribution the one in which only polluters are assigned
the privileges, then the resulting level of pollution will be efficient
If we take as our initial distribution the one in which all members
864. A. KNEESE & B. BowEn, supra note 860, at 87.
Compare the last sentence quoted in the text with the .argument that "a
factor of production that is valued at nothing in the business calculations of its
users will yield nothing in income.' See text accompanying note 421 supra.
865. But one will be confronted with the paradox of the allocation of




of society share in the privileges and rights, then the assignment
of the rights to polluters would result in an inefficiently excessive
amount of pollution. This problem would be aggravated in the
real world, where transaction costs would prevent the conservation-
ists from bribing the polluters not to pollute. Even in a perfect
market, the conservationists-having been deprived of some of
their wealth-could not afford to bribe their way back to the
efficient allocation that would have existed if the original assign-
ment still obtained.
If this is the Kneese and Bower argument, it raises two critical
objections to ordinary efficiency analyses. Both objections relate
to the initial distribution that is taken as the starting point for the
analysis. For the most part I have been taking as the initial dis-
tribution that distribution which existed at the time of the analysis.
This has caused some problems because the rights and privileges
with respect to water quality are not distributed to particular
members of society; there is, in fact, no initial distribution. No one
"owns" water quality; no one even "owns" the water in natural water-
courses. s16 If it is true that "everybody's property is nobody's
property," 67 then it would seem reasonable to claim that goods.
and resources, such as water quality, that belong to no one should
be considered as belonging to everyone in common. If this is true,
then all the examples presented earlier where the parties are treated
as owning the water quality in a stream are misleading. The only
basis on which a Paretian analysis of the allocation of water
quality should be done is on the assumption that all members of
society own the water quality in common. This is the first objec-
tion that is suggested by the Kneese and Bower argument.
The second objection to ordinary efficiency analyses is even more
telling. It relates to the time when the analysis should be made.
The normal practice is to analyze the optimality of water pollu-
tion after it has commenced. The question that should be asked,
however, is whether we should allow our waters to become defiled.
As Kneese and Bower suggest, a rule of law that allows the pollu-
tion to commence before the efficiency analysis is undertaken and
any remedies can be imposed, will allow an "excessive" amount of
pollution to occur.8 68
866. See notes 447-52 supra and accompanying text.
867. See note 421 supra and accompanying text.
868. Here, excessive is defined in terms of that optimal allocation of water
pollution that existed before the pollution commenced. This objection is
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The second part of this article shall be concluded by a' demon-
stration that these two objections strongly suggest that-when we
make the only appropriate assumptions about the initial distribu-
tion of wealth-- there inevitably will be more pollution in a real
world protected only by nuisance law than there would-be under
the regime of an efficient market.
A. The Efficient Allocation When Rights to Water
Quality Are Not Distributed
Rights and privileges with respect to water quality are not dis-
tributed among individual members of society in the same fashion
as are rights and privileges with respect to parcels of. land or the
other innumerable subjects of property. Our governments have
the power to regulate the use of water8 69 without any duty to pay
compensation and may actually change or destroy preexisting pri-
vate "rights" with respect to water without violating either the
taking or due process clauses.870 Thus, in any particular case one
cannot say how the relevant rights .and privileges to water quality
are distributed until a court has spoken. Our goal, however, is
to determine whether the decisions of the courts in cases involving
water quality result in efficient allocations. Quite obviously we
cannot accomplish our goal if our determination cannot be.made
until after the courts have reached their decisions. Thus, to do
the job properly we need to be able to specify the efficient allo-
cation of water quality, the allocation that would obtain under the
valid only in the real world where resources cannot be allocated to other
uses without cost. Since we are trying to determine whether the law of
nuisance can make the real world-where the objection is valid-conform to
the model of the efficient market-where the objection is not compatible
with the model's contrafactual assumptions-the objection is valid as to our
undertaking.
869. They also have the power-though perhaps to a lesser extent-to regu-
late the use of land and chattels. As to land, see, e.g., Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Even in the case of land, much
of its value can be ascribed to governmental rather than market activities
and this value can properly be thought of as belonging to the public. See
Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for
the Taking Impasse In Land Use Controversies, 75 CoLuM. L. Rev. 1021,
1032-33 (1975). But cf. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922); F. BOSSELMAN, THE TmaNG IssuE (1973).
870. See generally Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navi-
gation Power and the Rule of No Compensation, 3 NATURAL RFsouRcEs




regime of an efficient market, without reference to court decisions.
Since the distribution of rights determines the specification of ef-
ficiency,87 ' we need to know the distribution of rights.
The fact that the relevant rights and privileges are not dis-
tributed among individual members of society obviously makes it
difficult to accomplish the task we have undertaken. One might
argue that any distribution will constitute a Pareto improvement
because the distributees will be better off, while the nonbeneficia-
ries of the distribution will be no worse off than they were before.872
I find it hard to believe, however, that the nonbeneficiaries will
agree that they are no worse off. Any disiribution that leads to a
change in the status quo that existed before the distribution will
make those who preferred that status quo feel that they are worse
off. If they feel they are worse off, then they are, by definition, 73
worse off, and the distribution cannot be justified as a Paretian im-
provement. And if this is true, then the only distribution that can
be justified by Paretian arguments87 4 is one that will not change
the preexisting allocation of water quality. This seems to lead us
to the trivial and damning conclusion that no change in the present
allocation of water quality can be efficient
There is one way to avoid this particular8 75 argument that the
status quo is a Pareto optimum. One can plausibly assert that
there is at the present time a distribution of water quality, not a
distribution among the members of society, but a distribution to
all of them in common. The highest legal authority, the Supreme
Court of the United States, has supported the proposition that the
properties of a water course are held in common.8 76 Furthermore,
871. See note 161 supra and accompanying text.
872. One could argue that, if there is no distribution, there can be no
Pareto optimum, and that our undertaking in the second part of this article
is theoretically impossible. One cannot compare the real world with the
model of the efficient market insofar as water quality is concerned.
873. See notes 99-102 supra and accompanying text.
874. I know it is unusual to justify distributions with Paretian arguments;
but to distribute rights in water quality in a manner that causes an allo-
cational change that is not Pareto optimal (in view of the distribution of
other rights that preexisted) can result only in the new distribution being
described-correctly-as not being optimal.
875. In practice, however, I do not believe that it is possible to make any
significant change in the allocation of natural resources-including water quality
-without making someone worse off.
876. Head .v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885) (holding that the
potential energy in a stream belongs to all those who own land near the
stream and that a legislature may, on the analogy of the Statute of Anne,
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at least in the case of navigable, waters, the federal government,
which in democratic theory includes all of the people of the United
States, "owns"87 ' the rights and privileges relating to such waters: 878
something called the "navigational servitude." Also, all of the land
(including the waters) in the original states was held either by or
for the Crown and thereafter the states acquired the rights and
powers of the Crown.879 In fact, did not the Crown, and do not
the states now, hold all lands under navigable water in trust for the
public?8 0 , Is it not generally accepted that property rights are
the creatures of the state and the legal system it has created?8 '
provide for the partition of this "co-tenancy.") See also Ohio Oil Co. v.
Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1899) (justifying regulation of "waste" from oil and
gas wells on similar grounds).
877. I get a bit queasy when confronted with a confusion between govern-
mental powers and rights of ownership, but, for the purposes of economic
analysis, I can see no harm in treating a governmental body as being nothing
more (or less) than a medium through which we exercise some of the jural
relations that are the subject of analysis. Cf. W. HommLD, FurNrniErAx
LEGAL" CONCEPTIONS AS AsPPLm IN" JUDicIAL RI-soNmG 150-51 (1923).
In fact, it would seem that such an analysis could be made without referring
to a government. Consider the case of feudal England where there was ,no
distinction between governmental powers and ordinary questions of meum
and tuum, or the case of a communist society after the state has withered
away. Of course, those who believe that there really is something called
the "sovereign" will not agree with this argument, but even they might
agree with my conclusion, if only because it seems improbable that the
outcome of an economic analysis, even a normative one, should vary depending
upon whether the analyst is a "realist" or a "nominalist."
878. See Morreale, note 870 supra. But cf. United States v. Gerlach Live
Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 736-39 (1950) (suggesting that the "navigation serv-
itude" may be exercised only for the purposes of navigation).
879. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 198 N.Y. 287,
91 N.E. 846 (1910) (holding that the English sovereign, prior to the
Revolutionary War, could make no grant in derogation of the common right
of passage over navigable waters in this country); see Illinois Central R.R. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435-37 (1892).
880. See Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 163 U.S. 142 (1896); Sax, The
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Interven-
tion, 68 Mxca. L. RMv. 471 (1970).
Of course, this rather peculiar trust, despite the creative history of
Professor Sax, may be limited solely to the purposes of navigation. I suspect
that the only intelligible way one can formulate the "public trust" doctrine
as it relates to navigable waters is to abandon the word "trust" and merely
say that the right to regulate navigable waters is a governmental power that,
like most governmental powers, cannot effectively be conveyed away by a
legislature. If this analysis is correct, the legislature would not have the
power to make an irrevocable distribution to individuals of the rights and
privileges relating to navigable waters (or to their qualities).
881. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalien-
ability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Hanv. L. REv. 1089, 1090-91 (1972).
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If there is something, like water quality, as to which no property
rights have been created, then does not the state have the power to
create such rights? And are we not the state and therefore the pos-
sessors of that power and of the not-yet existent rights?
There is another way to reach the same conclusion. The po-
litical philosophy of Locke had great influence upon the founders
of our Republic.8 8 2 An integral feature of Locke's contractarian
theory is that, in the state of nature, everything was owned in
common and remained so until appropriated.88 3 Since it is hard
to conceive of a Lockean appropriation of water quality in a flow-
ing stream,88 4 it would appear that most water quality remains the
property of all of us. And Locke's theory of appropriation appears
to allow "private property" to be recaptured when there is not
enough to go around.8 5 Thus, we have retained under his theory
a "power of termination" with respect to that water that can be
said to be privately owned.8 6 Regardless of theoretical underpin-
nings, the brute fact is that the government possesses the power
(and perhaps the duty) to regulate the use that is made of land in
private ownership. 887 A fortiori, the government has the power to
regulate the use (i.e., the determinants of the quality) of water that
is subject to imperfect private ownership. 888 To have this power is,
in economic terms, to "ovn" the water quality.8 8 9  Thus, we all
882. Stoebuek, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WAsH. L. Rv.
553, 566-67 (1972).
883. J. LocKE, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of
Civil Government, in THE SECOND TBEATISE OF Covyr NmEN 17-18 (J. Cough
ed. 1946).
884. Under the "appropriation" theory it might be said that water, if not
its quality, can be appropriated, but we still have the higher federal law
that holds that ownership of water in a great stream is "inconceivable." See
note 448 supra and accompanying text.
885. J. LoCKE, supra note 883, at 18-20; cf., R. NozicK, ANARcHY, STATE,
Am UToPzA 175-76 (1974).
886. Though an adamant contractarian might reject Locke's point, even
the most adamant-one who would cheerfully let you contract yourself into
slavery-admits that the present distribution of wealth cannot be justified on
contractarian, laissez-faire principles and must be rectified before one can
justify inequalities resulting from contractarian principles. See R. Nozrcy,
supra note 885.
887. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926); Mansfield & Swett, Inc. v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145,
198 A. 225 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
888. To the extent that the "taking" clause limits government regulation
of land use, the governmental power to regulate the use of water is greater
than its power to regulate the use of land.
889. See note 877 supra.
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"own" the water quality of our land-at least we own it as cestui
que trust-and presumably we each have equal shares on the prin-
ciple of one-man, one-vote. The fact is that water quality belongs
to all of us in common.
This brings to mind the various problems that are presented
by the existence of commons and the fact that a resource "owned'
as a. commons will be excessively consumed. 890  Some economists
have suggested that the solution to these problems is for the state
to sell privileges to pollute to private parties.891 In a perfect
market, where transactions are cost-free, common ownership pre-
sents no problem, at least in the initial distribution. Under the
regime of such a market, if the efficient allocation of the water
quality of the Cuyahoga River is to serve as a sink for industry, in-
dustrialists must purchase the appropriate privileges to pollute.
On the other hand, if that water should be preserved pristine, the
concerned conservationists must purchase the appropriate rights 892
to clean water.
When one attempts to compare the allocations reached under
the law of nuisance with those that would be reached under the
regime of the perfect market, all the problems of common owner-
ship tend to result in an inefficient excess of pollution in the real
world. Furthermore, all the arguments I have made relating to
biases against the plaintiff,893 to "standing" rules,894 and to the law's
bias against "conservative uses" 895 take on added importance when
each of us is the distributee of a share in the nation's water qual-
ity. Since the law of nuisance 898 does not protect that portion of
890. See notes 409-21 supra and accompanying text.
891. See, e.g., J. DAEs, PoLLurioxr, PRoPERTY & PiCES (1968).
892. These "rights" are, of course, merely the obverse of exclusive "privi-
leges" to pollute.
893. See notes 606-11 supra and accompanying text.
894. See notes 628-35 supra and accompanying text. Note that under
the existing market economy, the defendant-polluter will, to a goodly extent,
represent the interests of those who consume his products (except, of course,
for the pollution he produces). Therefore, the interests of those who profit
from the pollution (or, more properly, that portion of our interests that is
advanced by the pollution) will be defended in the litigation. The past and
future sales of products to us generate a fund that can be and will be used
to defray the costs of defending the pollution suit. On the other hand, the
plaintiff-victim-if there even is a plaintiff with standing-is not likely to
represent the interests of all those who desire pristine waters.
895. See notes 589-93 supra and accompanying text.
896. This applies to public nuisance as well as private nuisance actions
because of the requirement that the plaintiff have an "injury differing in kind"
before he has standing to bring a public nuisance action. See notes 636-40
supra and accompanying text.
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our common wealth that, under the regime of an efficient market,
would be dedicated to the conservation of our waters, 97 one can
only conclude that nuisance law permits more than the Pareto op-
timal level of pollution.
B. Water Over the Dam
The quotation from Bower and Kneese suggests another defect
inherent in our law of nuisance. The decision as to whether a
certain beach should be polluted should be made before the pol-
lution takes place. Yet to rely on nuisance law is the equivalent
of relying on a policy of locking the barn after the horse is stolen.
Strangely enough,8 98 most economic analyses of pollution take
the same restrictive viewpoint; they focus on the efficiency of pol-
lution only after the pollution has occurred. 9 9  In the extreme
case, where the pollution has destroyed the quality of a body of
water beyond any hope of restoration, 00 it clearly would be inef-
ficient to deny the polluter the privilege of continuing to pollute if
such additional pollution will impose no additional costs on any-
one.901 To the extent, however, that we have waters that are un-
897. That portion of our commonwealth that would be "voted" in favor of
pollution is, at least in part, represented by the polluters. See note 894 supra
and accompanying text. In fact, since the polluter can often simply "grab"
(i.e., appropriate) the water quality for his nasty purposes, the interests favor-
ing pollution are dearly over-represented.
898. If one believes that lawconomists and other adherents of welfare
economics have prostituted themselves, or been co-opted by those powers that
profit from the dirty way things are, then this may not be so strange. I, how-
ever, do not believe that a whole profession could be so corrupt. The strange-
ness is probably the consequence of doing only partial analyses: analyzing only
one problem at a time and not attempting to resolve problems before they arise.
Although I am writing this article in defense of legislation like the FWPCA,
I consider the look-before-you-leap doctrine that underlies the National En-
vironmental Policy Act to be the best type of medicine for our environmental
ills-preventive medicine. See Durchslag & Junger, HUD and the Human
Environment: A Preliminary Analysis of the Impact of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 Upon the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment, 58 IowA L. 1Ev. 805 (1973).
899. See text accompanying note 664 supra.
900. One hopes such cases are extremely rare. Barry Commoner has, how-
ever, suggested that phosphate pollution of Lake Erie may have reached the
point where that lake is irredeemably doomed. B. CoMMoNr, TM CLosMnG
Cucrm= 104 (1971). A clearer case of irreversible pollution may be salt water
intrusion into aquifers.
901. The Ohio Supreme Court in its final remarks in Cleveland v. Standard
Bag & Paper Co., 72 Ohio St. 324, 74 N.E. 206 (1905), quoted in note 42
supra, may have been claiming that this was the case with Kingsbury Run.
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corrupted, the question is whether it is efficient to corrupt them;
whether they would be corrupted under the regime of an efficient
market, not whether, once they are befouled, it is efficient to let
them continue to be defiled.
In the model of a perfect market the time of the analysis
should make no difference; there, resources can be transferred
without cost from one use to another and the past can be undone.902
We, however, do not have such god-like powers.9 3 Once re-
sources are allocated to a particular use in the real world, it is
sometimes impossible and often exceedingly costly to reallocate
them. Thus, an allocation that is inefficient when viewed pros-
pectively will often become efficient when viewed retrospectively.
But that is not an argument for making the allocation.
For example, recall the hypothetical situation where Able, who
owned land worth two hundred thousand dollars, was considering
whether to build a steel mill at a cost of one million dollars. When
completed, the mill would be worth one million three hundred
thousand dollars but would decrease the value of Baker's land
from two hundred thousand dollars to nothing.90 4  Obviously, it
is inefficient to build the mill since the net loss to Able and Baker,
and thus to society, will be one hundred thousand dollars. Assume,
however, that Able builds the plant. Assume further that if the
steel mill cannot be used as a steel mill, it will be worth only five
hundred thousand dollars.905 Would it be efficient to enjoin the
use of the mill? The answer is clearly no. The net loss from en-
joining the use of the mill will be six hundred thousand dollars.906
At least that will be the case if we look-as the courts tend to-
only to the interests of Able and Baker.90 7
902. See text accompanying note 345 supra.
903. Justice Johnson argued that even the Deity Himself lacks such powers.
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 143 (1810).
904. This hypothetical begins in text at note 666 supra.
905. That is a generous value for a useless steel mill. Perhaps we should
assume that it can be used without destroying the value of Baker's land, but
only at the cost of installing eight hundred thousand dollars of pollution con-
trol equipment.
906. Baker would lose $800,000 and Able would gain (back again) only
$200,000.
907. If the interests of all members of society are considered, as I have
just argued they should be, then it might not be inefficient to enjoin the use
of the steel mill: Able's loss of $800,000 will include some-but admittedly not
all-of the loss suffered by those who would consume Able's production, while
Baker's $200,000 gain will not include the benefits received by those, other
than Baker, who desire clean water. This does not mean, however, that it
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We have been assuming that the courts succeed in guessing
whether or not it is "efficient" to allow particular pollution to con-
tinue. We have also assumed that, if they conclude that it is
efficient, they would classify the pollution as "reasonable" and
hold that it is not a nuisance. Since the courts refuse to enjoin
the construction of a plant that may become a nuisance 908 and
since there is no basis for granting damages until the plant ac-
tually does become a nuisance, the courts are unlikely to consider
whether pollution is a nuisance until the pollution has caused some
damage. If the source of the pollution is a capital intensive fa-
cility909 like Able's steel mill, it will appear, more likely than not,
to be efficient to allow the plant to continue, even though it was
inefficient to allow the capital that was invested in the plant to
be "sunk" in the first place. Thus, if our assumption is correct,
in the majority of cases the courts will hold that water pollution
is not a nuisance, even though it was inefficient to construct the
source of the pollution. The consequences of such judicial be-
havior are easy to predict.
To return to our example of Able and Baker, Able will be able
to construct his plant with confidence that he will make $100,000.910
would be efficient to enjoin the use of the steel mill. It just means that it
might be efficient.
The loss of $800,000 is not the total loss to society because those who
formerly purchased steel from Able may now have to pay, for example,
$1,900,000 for the same amount of steel that formerly cost only $1,800,000.
(For simplicity's sake I am assuming that the demand for Able's production
of steel is perfectly inelastic). There would then be a total loss to society of
$800,000, suffered by Baker, and $100,000, suffered by his customers. The
extra $100,000 is the so-called "consumer's surplus" attributable to Able's
production. I am assuming that all of these figures are the present values of
the various payments or receipts over whatever period of time is appropriate.
If Baker is also a manufacturer, the gross gain to society as a whole may
be more than the $200,000 benefit that Baker's customers will receive from the
injunction, since Baker's customers may also receive the benefit of a consumer's
surplus. This surplus to Baker's customers does not, however, include the
increased utility of each conservationist who is pleased that water quality
has improved.
908. See text accompanying note 741 supra.
909. Municipal sewage plants are also capital intensive facilities. Unfor-
tunately, the FWPCA contains federal subsidies for capital investments in
such municipal plants thereby increasing the problem of sunk costs. See 33
U.S.C. § 1281 (Supp. IV, 1974). Barry Commoner has argued that the plants
mandated by the FWPCA will aggravate the pollution problem. See B. Com-
MoN , THE CLosING CmcrE 110 (1971).
910. Of course, Able could extort up to $200,000 from Baker, provided
that both parties have perfect information, and that the law would permit
such extortion. It would seem, however, that such extortion would be a
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He will not be held to have caused a nuisance, his pollution will
not be enjoined and he will not be required to pay damages.
Under such circumstances we can expect more water pollution in
the real world than there would be under the regime of the ef-
ficient market.
One might object at this point that I have arrived at this last
conclusion only by pulling myself up by my own bootstraps. I
have, after all, reached the conclusion only on the basis of my
own assumption that courts decide nuisance cases on efficiency
grounds. This objection is well-taken. What is important, how-
ever, is not my assumption but the assumptions of Able and other
potential polluters. If Able believes that the courts will be per-
suaded to reach their decision on efficiency grounds, he will con-
struct the steel mill. Once the plant is up it is unlikely that any
remedy--other than the unlikely award of injunctive relief-will
cause the pollution to be abated. It is safe to say that most hard-
headed businessmen will assume that once they have made a large
investment in a plant, no one will dare shut them down or even
assess damages against them.911 Those who are deterred by such
risks would probably invest in more conservative projects.912 Fur-
thermore, the current thrust of much legal literature is that the
risky, and perhaps even a criminal act. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970) (defi-
nition of extortion requiring use of threat of force, violence, or fear under
color of state law). Cf. Nozick, supra note 885, at 84-86. The $100,000
profit on constructing the plant would be a sure thing. Since the world is
not populated by homines oeconomiei, it is quite probable that Able would
not even think of extortion as a possibility. Able is a respectable steel manu-
facturer, not a blackmailer. This is so even though welfare economic theory
insists that society would be better off if Able were a crook.
911. For an example of this phenomenon see the history of the so-called
"Reserve Mining" case, United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp.
11 (D. Minn.) (company operations enjoined), modified, 498 F.2d 1073 (8th
Cir.) (temporary injunction stayed pending steps to abate nuisance), applica-
tion for order to vacate stay denied sub nom. Minnesota v. Reserve Mining
Co., 418 U.S. 911 (1974). The district court on remand rejected the com-
pany's plan to abate the pollution and recommended against any further stay
pending litigation. 380 F. Supp. 11, 71 (D. Minn. 1974). In an unreported
decision, the court of appeals after a hearing upheld the stay pending appeal.
Relief from the stay was again denied by the Supreme Court, 419 U.S. 802
(1974). Finally, the district court's decision was modified and remanded.
Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir.), renewed application to
vacate stay denied, 420 U.S. 1000 (1975). All this indicates that the hard-
headed businessmen are probably right. Cf. R. CARO, THE POWER BROKER 22
(1974) quoting the dictum of Robert Moses that "[o]nce you sink that first
stake... they'll never make you pull it up."
912. Until recently, something nice and safe like New York City's securities.
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courts should, and do,913 base their decisions in nuisance cases on
grounds of economic efficiency. It seems reasonable to assume,
therefore, that Able and others like him will assume that they can
get away with their dirty and inefficient projects. 9 14
But assume that the courts either do not make an efficiency
analysis at all and simply declare that any extensive water pollu-
tion is a nuisance, or that they make the analysis as of some time,
nun pro tuno before the polluting facility is built. If potential
polluters know that their activity may be held to be a nuisance, it
would seem that they would not invest their money in inefficient
plants. This, however, is not necessarily so.915 The potential pol-
luters may lack sufficient information to realize the damages that
they are going to cause. They also may feel that they can afford
to pay some damages, especially considering that the burdens placed
on potential plaintiffs will tend to result in understated damages.916
The only threat that may seriously worry a potential polluter is
the possibility of being enjoined.917 Once again, however, the de-
cision whether to grant an injunction will only be made after the
investment has been "sunk" in the polluting facility. As we have
seen, the courts are extremely reluctant to grant injunctions when
913. See, e.g., R. PosuN-R, EcoNo~ic ANALYSiS OF LAw 37-38 (1972).
914. In an extreme case, such as my example of Able and Baker, it may
be that even a hard-headed businessman-or his hard-headed legal advisor-
would predict that a court would not let Baker's land be rendered totally
valueless. Real world examples are not likely to be so extreme. If Baker's
land were worth $1,200,000 until Able started to pollute, and if the value
then dropped to $1,000,000, it is much more likely that a court would leave
Baker without a remedy. The additional $1,000,000 in value does not, how-
ever, change the efficiency analysis. If "Baker" were a class of 200 people,
each of whose land was worth $6,000 before the pollution and only $5,000
afterwards, it is even more likely that the class of victims would obtain no
remedy. Considering the cost that the class would have to pay in
attorney's fees and the fees of expert witnesses, I am afraid in the latter
case that Able would win his gamble. Even if some members of the class
sue, one would expect that they could be bought off for considerably less
than $200,000.
915. The existence of cases like Boomer and Whalen appears to be proof
positive that polluters do in fact build plants that result in amounts of pollu-
tion that the courts consider to be undesirable.
916. See note 914 supra.
917. Punitive damages might also be a worry, as might be the possibility of
a very large permanent damages award. The latter possibility is suggested
by the subsequent proceedings in Boomer, although those proceedings can
also be read as suggesting that the courts' calculations of past damages are
grossly insufficient. See note 931 infra and accompanying text.
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the damage to the defendant resulting from the injunction exceeds
the benefit to the plaintiff. Thus, even if the courts will hold that
the pollution is a nuisance, a potential polluter may well think that
the odds are worth the gamble. The paradoxical fact is that such
an inefficient result appears to be mandated by efficiency argu-
ments.
It might be noted that a polluter who calculates that he will
not be enjoined may fairly safely discount the threat of other
nuisance remedies, even though he may be held liable for com-
mitting a nuisance. Furthermore, if he does not cause large dam-
ages to one victim, but only small damages to many victims, he
can expect to be able to structure his case so that no injunction
will be granted.
Assuming that the court finds a nuisance, but denies an injunc-
tion, it is very unlikely that permanent damages will be awarded.
Boomer is famous because it is unique among pollution cases.918
The normal remedy in such a case would be past damages-the
only damage remedy that will encourage future efficiency and not
reward inefficiency.919 It would seem, however, that the possi-
bility of having to pay past damages will not be a serious threat
to a potential polluter.
In the first place, the normal rule for calculating past damages
does not include all of the injuries, including the external costs, that
will be borne by the polluter's victims. The normal measure of
damages in nuisance cases, as already noted, is the fair rental value
of the victim's land without the nuisance, less the fair rental value
of the same land for the same period with the nuisance.9 20 This
rental loss will not include any appreciable portion of the value
inherent in the victim's land resulting from purely public goods.
921
The fact that the quality of the water flowing by the victim's
land is a good that many enjoy besides the particular victim who
brings the nuisance action will not be reflected in the loss of rental
value of that victim's land; by the definition of public goods, the
owner of the land will not be able to collect rent from the other
beneficiaries of the public good. Furthermore, "fair rental value"
918. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 228, 257 N.E.2d
870, 875, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 319 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
919. See notes 836-42 supra and accompanying text.
920. See, e.g., Cumberland Torpedo Co. v. Gaines, 201 Ky. 88, 255 S.W.
1046 (1923).
921. See notes 422-23 supra and accompanying text.
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is calculated on the basis of the market 922 value excluding any
particular value that the land might have to its particular owner-
such as the fact that it is his home. It may be that there is no
price that the polluter could pay that would induce his victim to
part with his right to have the stream flowing by his garden remain
inviolate even though the decrease in rental value might well rep-
resent a sum easily within the polluter's means. In such a case
the optimal allocation would be for the stream to remain unpol-
luted, although it might be profitable for the polluter (as opposed
to society) to corrupt the stream and pay damages to the victim. 923
Moreover, the damages, as calculated by the courts, might be so
small that it would not profit the victim to sue repeatedly for his
small "rent"
A consideration of the remedies granted in WhaZen9 24 and
Boomer925 illustrates the fact that past damages, the only remedy.
that can be expected to increase efficiency in the future, are not
likely to deter even the most inefficient polluter. In Whalen, the
damages suffered by the plaintiff were only one hundred dollars
a year.926 It seems improbable that such a small sum, even if the
plaintiff had bothered to sue for it every year or so, would have
had any influence on the behavior of the polluter, the Union Bag
Company. Even in 1913 such a sum would seem trivial in com-
parison with the return on an investment of one million dollars.
Although it has been argued that the result of the injunction that
was granted in Whalen was to increase efficiency, 927 it may be that
the actual consequence of the injunction was that the waters were
restored to an inefficiently high level of cleanliness. But it seems
certain that if the injunction had been denied and only past dam-
ages had been awarded, there would have been an inefficient ex-
cess of pollution.
922. This is true only when the damages are temporary, as opposed to
permanent damages which are based upon the change in market value plus
incidentals. Pan American Petroleum v. Byars, 228 Ala. 372, 153 So. 616
(1934).
923. The conclusion that it is inefficient for the pollution to occur assumes
that the distribution of wealth is such that the victim initially has the "right"
not to be polluted or that he is independently wealthy.
924. See note 842 supra.
925. See note 837 supra.
926. 208 N.Y. 1, 3, 101 N.E. 805, 806 (1913).
927. See Keeton & Morris, Notes on "Balancing the Equities," 18 TEx. L.
REv. 412, 418-19 (1940).
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This point is even more clearly illustrated by Boomer. There
the trial court originally felt itself bound to award damages equal
to "only the loss of rental value or loss of usable value sustained;"9 28
the court felt itself bound to grant only past damages. For one
parcel, the "Kinley parcel," the court calculated that the loss of
"usable value" resulting from the pollution was $150 per month
($1,800 a year); while at the same time it calculated that the
permanent damage to the Kinley parcel was $70,000, or nearly 39
times the annual loss of "usable value." 929 It seems that, at least
in this case, the polluter would have been far better off paying a
series of past damage awards rather than one lump-sum award for
"permanent" damages. The award of past damages would tend
to be far less of an incentive for potential plaintiffs than a rule
allowing permanent damages.
The lesson to be learned from Boomer does not end with the
first trial. After the decision of the court of appeals, 930 the trial
court again calculated the permanent damages suffered by impos-
ing the "servitude" which permitted pollution upon the Kinley
parcel. This time the permanent damages were found to be $175,-
000,931 more than 97 times the annual damages that were estab-
lished at the first trial. This difference in the amount of damages
may in part be attributable to rising land values and to such purely
random factors as the fact that there were different jtwges at the
two trials. It may also have been influenced by the fact that the
second trial was only concerned with valuing the servitude, while
the first trial was directed primarily to the question of whether an in-
junction should have been issued. Thus, the second trial was not
concerned with pollution damages, because the evaluation of the
servitude depended upon the reduction in land values which would
result from the spreading of dust across the plaintiff's lands. The
change in value would obviously be a function not of past injuries
but of the maximum permissible future injuries. Remember, per-
manent damages are, if paid, an encouragement to further inef-
ficient pollution.
It is clear that the courts in Boomer and their progeny made
no allowance for the possibility that the pollution would be re-
928. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 55 Misc. 2d 1023, 1025, 287 N.Y.S.2d
112, 114 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
929. Id. at 1026, 207 N.Y.S.2d at 115.
930. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
931. 72 Misc. 2d 834, 844, 340 N.Y.S.2d 97, 108 (1972), aff'd sub nora.
Kinley v. Atlantic Cement Co., 42 App. Div. 2d 496, 349 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1973).
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duced in the future. Moreover, at the second trial, the court was
struggling to find a measure of damages more generous to the
victim than one calculated on the basis of market values. Since
the Atlantic Cement Company did not possess the power of emi-
nent domain, it seemed unsuitable to fix damages on the basis of
the market price that would be reached between a willing buyer
and a willing seller of the servitude if only because that is the
traditional measure of "Just compensation" when there is a lawful
taking under the power of eminent domain.932 The ultimate award
of permanent damages in an amount nearly one hundred times
the annual past damages was based in part on a formula that
includes elements that would be recognized in an efficient market
but are not recognized under normal damage rules.933
Whether the results in Boomer are typical is a question that
cannot be answered. There are few, if any, other cases in which
the courts have determined both past damages and lump-sum
"permanent damages," since the two remedies are mutually exclu-
sive. Past damages are calculated with the common law's notori-
ous reluctance to restore the victims to their previous estates, while
permanent damages, like injunctions, are designed to make the
victims whole. One can conclude that the dichotomy between the
two remedies that is illustrated in Boomer proves that the threat of
being subjected to past damages will seldom be sufficient to dis-
suade a rational profit maximizer from investing in a plant that will
result in excessive water pollution and an inefficient reduction in
water quality.
The courts are stuck with a paradox if they seek to find reme-
dies in nuisance cases that will lead to efficient levels of pollution.
In most cases an injunction will not appear warranted because the
value of the enjoined activity will, once the pollution has com-
menced, exceed the benefit of clean water. On the other hand, the
threat of an injunction, if it is reasonably certain, will discourage
some inefficient (and perhaps some efficient) investment in plants
that would cause water pollution. The threat of permanent dam-
ages, although less fearsome than that of an injunction since it is
unlikely to result in a total loss of the polluter's investment, will
also discourage investment in polluting facilities. In all but the
932. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
933. 72 Misc. 2d at 844, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 108.
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most extreme cases,934 however, the grant of permanent damages
will tend to increase the amount of pollution caused by the plant
in question. While the grant of past damages may increase ef-
ficiency by discouraging future pollution from the plant in ques-
tion, it will have little if any discouraging effect on others who are
contemplating the construction of facilities that will result in inef-
ficient levels of water pollution. The law of nuisance thus seems
doomed to result in inefficiently high levels of pollution and ex-
cessively dirty water.
C. The Possibility of Restructuring Rights to Water
Quality So As to Reach an Efficient Result
The last question that comes to mind is whether nuisance law
could be restructured to lead to efficient results. A comparison of
nuisance law with the law of trespass to land might supply an
instructive contrast. After all, no one argues that the law of tres-
pass to land is as inefficient as nuisance law.
The acts that constitute an actionable trespass are well-defined:
one must break another's close vi et armis, contra pacem, etc. In
other words, one must intentionally go upon another's land to be
guilty of a trespass. Thus, one can know with a high measure of
certainty whether or not one is committing a trespass. 935 Consider
the example of Able constructing a steel mill upon his own land
that will result in pollution that will destroy the value of Baker's
land. If the example were to be restructured as a case in trespass,
we would have to assume that Able constructs his steel mill upon
Baker's land. In such a case, Able would either be acting under
a mistake or would know (if he is sane) that he is committing a
tort.
Assume, however, that Able builds a mill on Baker's land. As-
sume further that Able, who is influenced by the argument of
934. In rare cases, the permanent damages are greater than the value of
the polluting facility. Such permanent damages will have the same effect as
an injunction. The plant will close and the damages will not be paid (ex-
cept for past damages to the date of the court's decree). In fact, since per-
manent damages are an equitable remedy, granted in lieu of an injunction,
if the polluter elects not to pay the damages, the injunction will issue. Note,
however, that the permanent damages were paid in Boomer and undoubtedly
would have been paid in Whalen if the polluter had been given the option.
Even if the Whalen court had found that the permanent damages equaled
100 times the annual damages of $100, the total cost to the polluter of
keeping its million dollar plant in operation would have been only $10,000.
935. RzSTATEmENT (SFcOND) oF ToRTs § 166 (1965).
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some lawconomist whom he has retained unwisely as his counsel,
determines that it would be inefficient to order that the mill be
dismantled. What remedy is available in such a case?
The court could decree in the action of Able v. Baker that
Baker now owns a steel mill on the basis of the doctrine that
what is attached to the land is part of the land. Then the court
could award Baker $200,000 damages for the value of his land.
On our original figures, 936 Baker would come out of the litigation
ahead by $1,300,000 in terms of market values.937  Such a result,
however, will seldom be observed. 938 Since the normal property
936. See text accompanying note 904 supra.
937. This does not necessarily mean that Baker is better off than he was
before the plant was built, for Baker might not have been willing to convert
his pastoral Eden into a steel mill for such small change. Baker's refusal is
consistent with the assumptions of the model of the efficient market, providing
that there is some price at which Baker would sell, for example, ten million
dollars.
938. The possibility of such a result in the case of pollution is not even
mentioned by Professor Calabresi and Mr. Melamed in their famous article.
Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability. Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HI-atv. L. REv. 1089 (1972). It is easy to
see why even legal writers as astute as Calabresi and Melamed have ignored
such a rule in the context of pollution cases. It is only of use if (i) the
pollution increased the value of the pollutee's land or (ii) a court were
willing to hold that the act of pollution transferred title of the polluter's
(former) land to the pollutee. In the first case, there is an external benefit
rather than an external cost and this hardly can be classified as involving
pollution. For an example of such a case, see Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co.,
146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558 (1948), holding that natural gas injected
under land of the plaintiff was not a trespass because the plaintiff had the
right to capture it and thereby acquire title to it by occupancy.
The second case seems almost inconceivable because there is no legal
doctrine that would justify such an expropriation of the polluter's property
for the benefit of his victim. It is unjustifiable, and probably unconstitutional,
on distributional grounds. See Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U:S. 97 (1877).
The fact remains, however, that a rule that transfers a polluter's property
to his pollutee (with or without the polluter also being required to pay
damages) would be in many cases (were there only one pollutee) the
simplest way of obtaining both economic efficiency, now that the polluting
facility has come into being, and an effective assurance that any plant that
would result in inefficient pollution would not be built in the future. It is
also true that entitlements to land are protected by such a "transcendent
property" rule, as well as by Calabresian property and liability rules.
Calabresi and Melamed perhaps were induced to ignore the possibility of
such a transcendent property rule by their desire to approach "Property and
Torts ... from a unified perspective." Calabresi & Melamed, supra, at
1089. To protect an entitlement by a transcendent property rule, one simply
would skip the tort and keep the property. The legal theory that comes to
mind bears the label "restitution" rather than "tort." For those who delight
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rule is that Baker owns everything affixed to his land, Able will
not wittingly build a factory on Baker's land. If such an unusual
event should accidentally happen, I am sure that any court with
its heart in the right place would struggle mightiy to prevent such
a forfeiture. For example, in Hardy v. Burroughs 9 39 the court was
in symmetry, a transcendental property rule may be disturbing because it
adds an unwieldly fifth dimension to the four-fold analysis of Calabresi and
Melamed who describe the following rules as covering all possible entitle-
ments with respect to pollution:
First, Taney may not pollute unless his neighbor .... Marshall,
allows it (Marshall may enjoin Taney's nuisance). Second, Taney
may pollute but must compensate Marshall for damages caused
(nuisance is found but the remedy is limited to damages). Third,
Taney may pollute at will and can only be stopped by Marshall if
Marshall pays him off (Taney's pollution is not held to be a nuisance
to Marshall)...
... [Fourth,] Marshall may stop Taney from polluting, but if
he does he must compensate Taney.
Id. at 1115-16 (footnotes omitted).
It should be noted that Calabresi and Melamed also ignore the distinction
between past and permanent damages, both of which are subsumed, without
distinction, under the third rule. Those who prefer symmetry can similarly
consider transcendent property rules as being merely one special type of
property rule. Or perhaps they can treat transcendent property rules as
"alienability" rules, supplying a symmetrical and logical balance to Calabresi
and Melamed's discussion of "inalienability" rules. See id. at 1111-15.
In any event, it is worth noting that Calabresi and Melamed's example of
a case that would be appropriate for application of their fourth rule would
also be properly handled by the application of a transcendental property rule.
They "[alssume a factory which, by using cheap coal, pollutes a very wealthy
section of town and employs many low-income workers to produce a product
purchased primarily by the poor; [and they] assume also a distributional goal
that favors equality of wealth." Id. at 1121. They then conclude: "Rule
Four-payment of damages to the factory after allowing the homeowners to
compel it to use better coal, and assessment of the cost of these damages to
the homeowners-would be the only one which would accomplish both the
distributional and efficiency goals." Id. If we add the assumption that the
homeowners became the owners of the factory, a transcendental property rule,
coupled with a rule that the new factory owners may not raise their prices
above what they would be if cheap coal were used, would do the best job
of accomplishing both goals. I fail to see, however, how a court could feel
justified in indulging in either of these approaches to accomplish a piece-meal
redistribution of wealth. Such an approach is one for the legislature, not for
the courts. Cf. Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 YALE L.J. 855,
857-68 (1972). A legislature that tried such games might-and I think
should-have difficulties with the equal protection, taking without compen-
sation, and due process clauses of the Constitution. There are fairer, less
random, less ad hoc means of redistributing wealth. The better solution
would have been to construct the plant elsewhere. Calabresi and Melamed
analyze the problem of pollution at too late a time; they too are merely
trying to lock the barn after the horse is stolen.
939. 251 Mich. 578, 232 N.W. 200 (1930).
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confronted by a bill in equity alleging that the plaintiffs had built
a house by mistake upon the defendants' land and that the defend-
ants had moved in. There was no allegation that the defendants
were estopped to deny their ownership. The Michigan Supreme
Court held that if the plaintiffs proved their case, they would be
entitled to a decree requiring the defendants, at their option, to
either buy the improvements from the plaintiffs or sell the land
in question to the plaintiffs at the respective fair values as deter-
mined by the court. The court in Hardy recognized, however,
that such an equitable result ran counter to the majority of cases
and that the creation of a new basis for equitable jurisdiction was
required. Today, in the majority of jurisdictions, the bona fide
improver of another's property probably will receive some relief,
either by statute or judicial creativity. The important point is that
in almost all jurisdictions there is no relief for mala fide improvers. 940
Furthermore, in most jurisdictions, the improving trespasser is still
not empowered to bring an action. He may only use defensively
whatever rights he has.941
Baker will have other remedies besides the right to keep the
steel mill. He may sue in ejectment and, if he does so, he will be
entitled to relief, although the sheriff may have some trouble eject-
ing a steel mill. As a combination of remedies, Baker might simply
have Able ejected and keep the mill; that should not present any
trouble for the sheriff.942 Or Baker might simply get an injunction
either enjoining Able from using what is now Baker's mill or re-
quiring Able to tear the mill down. If he pursues such a remedy,
Baker may be confronted with the defense that he who seeks equity
must do equity, which may defeat the claim for injunctive relief
if Able is not a deliberate wrongdoer.943 But the defense is un-
940. See Merryman, Improving the Lot of the Trespassing Improver, 11
STAN. L. REv. 456,465-67 (1959).
941. See id. at 467. In Hardy, the plaintiffs would by statute have been
entitled to compensation for their improvements if the defendants had sued
the plaintiffs in ejectment, rather than simply moving in. 251 Mich. at 579,
232 N.W. at 200. If the actual defendants in Hardy had sought equitable
relief, they would undoubtedly have been met with the affirmative defense
that he who seeks equity must do equity.
942. But Able might be entitled to some compensation for his improve-
ments.
943. If Baker just sits back and watches Able constructing a steel mill on
Baker's land, Baker may, of course, also be confronted with the defense of
laches. See notes 734-41 supra and accompanying text. In such a case, Able
may even prevail, in some jurisdictions, in an affirmative action on the theory,
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likely to prevail since it is rather improbable that Able innocently
misplaced his steel mill.
Baker will more likely use the remedies of ejectment and injunc-
tion rather than rely on the fortuitous benefits of the rule I have
called a "transcendent property rule"944 if the mill merely en-
croaches on his land. Cases like that do happen and the courts
often 945 will issue an injunction requiring the removal of the en-
croachment, even though such an injunction will clearly work
inefficient results.946
The last statement suggests that the law of the trespass also
works inefficiently and should attract the attention of the law-
conomists who consider efficiency to be the summum bonum. If,
however, one is only concerned with the two immediate parties
to a trespass action, one can see that the law of trespass is as
efficient in Paretian terms as any rule of law can be. The key
difference between trespass and nuisance turns on the fact that in
the case of trespass the original distribution is well-defined. Thus
both Able and Baker know or should know that Baker owns Baker's
land. More particularly they know, with a high degree of cer-
tainty, what will happen if Able builds his steel mill on Baker's
land.947 The consequence is that, except by accident of the most
unusual sort; Able will not build on Baker's land. If the efficient
allocation of Baker's land is that it supports a steel mill, then, by
the definition of efficiency, someone can make himself better off
while making no one else worse off by acquiring title to the land
and building the mill there. Baker himself may build the mill or
Able (or someone else) may buy the land from Baker. If, how-
or absence of theory, that we call "estoppel." -But for either laches or estoppel
to apply, Able must be innocent and Baker must be knowledgeable.
944. See note 938 supra.
945. See, e.g., Pahl v. Ribero, 193 Cal. App. 2d 154, 14 Cal. Rptr. 174
(1961) (where the encroachment of a building upon the air space of an
adjoining piece of land constituted a nuisance abatable by mandatory injunc-
tion). See also Geragosian v. Union Realty Co., 289 Mass. 104, 193 N.E.
726 (1935).
946. See generally Keeton & Morris, Notes on "Balancing the Equities," 18
T-x. L. REv. 412 (1940).
947. The possibility that Baker will-by operation of law-end up owning
the steel mill, while Able can only hope that the courts will grant him some
relief on restitutional grounds, has the effect of reversing the bias against the
victim that is inherent in the structure of nuisance law. If Able builds a
steel' mill on Baker's land, Able may be the future plaintiff, who searches
desperately for some cause of action that may afford him relief from the
consequences of his own "wrongful" act.
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ever, Able will neither build the mill nor sell his land, then, by
definition, the efficient allocation is that the mill not be built.
There is some "friction" involved in transferring rights to land.
Because of transfer costs, even the market in parcels of land is in-
efficient. There are also information costs that may prevent the
efficient allocation from being reached.948 It is, however, hard to
conceive of any set of legal rules that is more conducive to ef-
ficiency than are the rules that protect Baker from Able's steel mill.
The only time grave inefficiencies may occur is when Able acci-
dentally encroaches on Baker's land.949 Then the courts may occa-
sionally enforce an inefficient injunction, pour encourager les autres;
but they can also allow the new efficient state, caused by the
accident, to persist without running any serious risk that they will
encourage the Ables of this world to build on Baker's land.
If we look beyond the interests of Able and Baker, however,
the results of trespass law may still be inefficient. If Able buys
the land and builds the mill, there will inevitably be external costs
imposed on others that will not be internalized by the law of tres-
pass. There may, for example, be water pollution that will impose
costs on all downstream riparian owners. Suddenly we are back
to nuisance law with all of its inefficiencies. There may be other
costs that will be paid only by future generations. These costs, of
course, are not in any way internalized by the law of nuisance.
The fact remains that resources subject to the rules of trespass are
far more efficiently allocated than are resources subject only to
nuisance rules or no legal rules at all.
The last question thus becomes whether we could restructure
the law of nuisance so that it, like the law of trespass, would lead
to efficient results. I believe that this can be done, though not by
the courts alone. The key differences between nuisance and tres-
pass lie in the facts that there are normally many victims to a
nuisance and only one to a trespass and, more importantly, that the
interests protected by nuisance rules are not well-defined. When
Able contemplates building a steel mill on his own land, he cannot
know with any certainty how a court will react to the damages he
will inevitably impose on those who are downstream. In such cir-
948. Cain may not know that such an ideal site as Bakers land exists;
yet he may be the only potential purchaser who would pay Baker's selling
price.
949. Accidental encroachments have little relevance to the problems dis-
cussed in this article since I have not been discussing accidental pollution. See
note 781 supra.
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cumstances no bargain can be struck; both Able and his potential
victims are confronted with risks that would not exist under the
regime of an efficient market. The solution is simple enough. All
we need is a body of law that will define Able's rights and privi-
leges with respect to those downstream. All we need to do is draw
a line as well-defined as Baker's boundary line and say-under the
threat of painful sanctions-you may pollute thus far and no fur-
ther. Were we to do that, we would come far closer to Pareto
efficiency950 than we can ever get relying on ex post facto and
ad hoc judicial determination of "reasonableness." We could even
protect the interests of the future that are ignored both by trespass
and by nuisance law.
We can do that and perhaps we already have, for that is ex-
actly the potential of the FWPCA. If you like efficiency, you
should love the FWPCA.95*
And so I rest my case.
CONCLUSION
Now that I have rested, I must confess to a certain twinge of
guilt. As I look back at the monstrous article I have imposed
upon you, I fear that I may have been shooting at a mosquito with
an elephant gun. Still, when I started out on those uncharted
waters, the efficiency arguments of the lawconomists loomed as large
and fearsome as a Leviathan. If it now appears that those argu-
ments are as illusory as the clockwork that drives the celestial
spheres, that does not mean they are not dangerous. Few things
are more powerful than ideas, and the strength of an idea is less
950. To get to Pareto efficiency we would also need to create a market
in pollution rights and privileges corresponding to the market in land. Since
the privilege to pollute to the extent permitted will always be associated
(except perhaps for floating communities) with particular parcels of land,
the market in land will, to a large extent, serve as a market in pollution
rights and in rights to water quality.
Those who desire a market in pollution rights might consider the following
problem: There are certain uses of land where high elevation is desirable-for
example, microwave relay stations. Should there be a market in elevations
separate from the market in land?
951. Of course, the FWPCA may not lead to such neat results. The statute
is an abomination of ambiguities, and it may never work. Perhaps it was
never intended to work. Something like the FWPCA, an instrument defining
legal standards relating to water pollution, is, however, a precondition to
any hope of reaching an efficient, a Pareto optimal, level of water quality.
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an attribute of its truth than of its effect as a palliative against the
necessity of further thought
Though I have accomplished what I set out to do, I have failed
you in at least two respects. It will be hard to make any practical
use of this article and, though I have trampled down the apparatus
of law and economics, I have not erected an alternative set of
monkey bars on,which we law professors can display our intellectual
gymnastics.
The first failure is the more troublesome. I submit, however,
that an understanding of the triviality of efficiency analyses can be
of use to the practitioner -confronted with the argument that the
application of the FWGCA or similar regulations will be too costly.
An awareness of the problem of the second best should suffice to
cast doubt on any efficiency analysis. 952 Exposure of the ethical as-
sumptions underlying welfare economics should reveal that that
"science" has no relevance to any legal issue.953 On the other hand,
a cost-benefit analysis that abandons the Paretian criteria and substi-
tutes the goal of maximizing national income can be shown to be
both ambiguous954 and without ethical foundations. 55 In short, this
article may be of assistance in preparing expert witnesses and in
conducting cross-examination. The true expert can be compelled
to so qualify testimony based on welfare edonomic theorizing that
he is unlikely to be convincing. The problem that I cannot assist
you with is the pseudo-expert who testifies to efficiency as scienti-
fically accepted gospel but is too stupid-or too wise-to discuss
the premises from which that gospel is derived.
As a caveat, I should point out that in this article I have only
been attacking economic moralizing. There is nothing that I have
said that should be construed as an attack on economic descriptions
or predictions. Although such positive economic analyses can
easily be misused,956 they are not objectionable in their own right
952. See notes 375-90 supra and accompanying text.
953. If a proposed change will really make someone better off without
making anyone worse off, then there will be no one willing to litigate the
issue. If on the other hand, someone does object to the change, then that
person would, by definition, be made worse off if the change were imple-
mented. See notes 88-125 supra and accompanying text.
954. See notes 269-79 supra and accompanying text.
955. See notes 176-85 supra and accompanying text.
956. The dangers of misuse have been noted:
The conventional assessment [of the impact of pollution control]
in our opinion is incorrect in the sense that it considers such expen-
ditures in an economic void without regard to all their ramifications
throughout the economy; and does not consider any implications
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for they do not purport to beg the political or legal questions that
are at issue. They are merely evidence that may be highly relevant.
If one is concerned with distributional questions, as we lawyers
inevitably are, an economist's testimony about the distributional
consequences of a proposed action can be extremely useful. For
example, in a dispute over mandatory pollution control, testimony
to the effect that "government programs and expenditures support-
ing pollution control will have a beneficial impact on employment,
a particularly noteworthy consequence in view of current unem-
ployment levels"957 may be relevant to the ultimate political (or
judicial) decision. However, the value of such testimony does not
depend on the concept of Pareto efficiency or any of the other
moral speculations of normative economics.958 Such economic testi-
mony is simply a small part of the factual data on which any po-
litical decision relating to pollution control should be based. The
ultimate question of which state of affairs we should choose, clean
water or dirty water, low employment or high employment, the
rich getting richer or the poor getting poorer, is beyond the com-
petency of economic theorizing. Such questions are purely political
and should be left to the constitutionally responsible authorities.
To the extent that economics informs, it is the queen of the social
sciences; to the extent that it exhorts, it is the whore of selfish
interests.
My second failure hardly weighs on my conscience. There are
those who believe that it is better to have wrong answers than no
answers but I am not of their number. One of the dangers in-
herent in the current fad for law and economics is that it substi-
tutes "definitions for both normative and empirical propositions." 959
We do have problems, terrifying problems, and when we cry out
for answers we are given tautologies. When the tautologies are
based on the Paretian, the "neo-Panglossian," 90 definitions that the
beyond those of dollar costs. These expenditures might more prop-
erly be considered not only in terms of the economic impact on the
economy as a whole (capital allocation, economic growth, inflation,
etc.), but also in terms of noneconomic impacts (human resources
and employment, energy requirements, health implications) ....
K. LED=G & J. KLEIN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL INDUSTRY 18 (1975).
957. K. KEUNG & J. KLEIN, supra note 956, at 22.
958. Beneficial impacts on employment cannot even be considered in an
efficiency analysis, because efficiency is a microeconomic concept that treats
employment as a cost and not as a benefit.
959. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism,
60 VA. L. REv. 451, 459 (1974).
960. See id. at 455-56.
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good is what we choose, and that what we choose is what we do,
then we are in danger of attempting to solve our problems by
denying their existence. Yet our environmental problems, includ-
ing those of water quality, are real. They go to the very value of
our lives and perhaps to our very existence. They should not be
trivialized by tautological placebos.
Another danger inherent, in welfare economic theorizing is its
terminology which exhorts us -to, pursue "optima," to pursue the
very "optimum optimorum." It is dangerous to ignore the truism
that "the perfect can be the enemy of the good." .'16 For us to
refuse, for example, to implement the FWPCA because we lack
information as to the optimal level of pollution is the equivalent
of a starving man's refusing a bowl of soup on the ground that he
knows not whether steak or caviar is the optimal repast. Those
who take welfare economics and other theories of optimization too
seriously might be well advised to consider the fate of Buridan's
ass.
962-
A related risk in dealing with the easy answers of welfare
economics and the other vigorously mathematical tools designed to
enable us. to make any social decision "with automatic hand" is
the well-known syndrome: "If you can't count it, it doesn't exist."0' 63
The most frightening aspect of law and economics, of the academic
pursuit of the unrealizable and distasteful optimum, is not the easy
answers or the wrong answers but the hubris that allows so many
of us to take them seriously. At the same time that we define our
good in terms of the pig principle that more is better--alles ist nur
halb 90 4-we seem to believe that we can shape our world, and
ourselves, with a little help from the law, into some perfect state.
It would be comic, were it not true, that though we cannot shape
the world to our liking, we can perhaps today, for the first time,
destroy it and ourselves. We should not deceive ourselves, dare
not deceive ourselves, that we are the masters of our fates. We
are bound to the harness of the entropy law and forever doomed
961. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
962. Buridan's ass, which was very hungry, was placed equidistant between
two identically attractive bags of oats. "The ass, then, was unable to make
up its mind and though ravenous with hunger, failed to eat at all. In the
midst of plenty, it starved to death." Demos, Human Freedom-Positive and
Negative, in FREEDoM: ITS MEANING 590, 601 (R. Anshon ed. 1940).
963. See Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HAxv. L. REv. 1329 (1971).
964. "Everything is only half," the refrain of the glutton gorging himself
to death in Brecht and Weil's "Der Aufsteig und Fall der Stadt Mahagonny."
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to ignorance of the totality of the world. But if we aspire above
our station, if we pretend that we are the masters" of the whirlwind,
we are heading for a fall that may make the ruins of Babel look
like a sand castle washed by a, gentle tide. In the end we will
lose to the forces of disorder, but our technology is such that, if
we listen to the siren songs of efficiency, we may hasten the coming
of the [heat death] in our small corner of the universe. We cannot
create an optimum; we can destroy the sea.
And even if my alarms are ill-founded, I fail to see ,the attrac-
tion of the pig principle. Were the inhabitants of Circe's island
so content? If we can get all that we desire and more, will we
be content? If we could know all the answers, would we be
content? Would we be human still?
That we can never hope to carry out the welfare economists'
program of maximizing social welfare may seem regrettable. It
would, however, be tragic if that .program could be carried out.
At stake are not merely alterations in the "costs" and
"benefits" associated with implementing existing prefer-
ences and values but alterations in the very structures of
human thought and reality on which all value premises
and the choices that embody them-all the frames of
reference for the defining of one-thing as a "cost" and
another as a "benefit"-must ultimately be based. To con-
ceive of the choice as a selection in terms of a "given"
value framework thus begs the question. . . ."
If I have no answers, I may still make a few suggestions. One
has been implicit throughout this article: We should impose con-
straints upon ourselves, limiting the amount of havoc we wreck
upon the world and upon those who shall come after us. In par-
ticular, we should impose constraints that will preserve the purity
of the waters upon which our lives depend. If we cannot know
with any exactitude what we should do, that does not mean that
nothing should be done. We need not choose to destroy ourselves.
Nor dare we choose to do so, whatever lawconomists may claim.
I have spoken about the necessity of establishing constraints.
It may seem that I am advocating that we constrain our freedom
for the sake of clean waters. But if we were free to do every-
thing, if there were no rules, then our choices would be curtailed,
965. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the' Fourth Discontinuity: The
Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 So. CAL. L. REV. 617, 650 (1973).
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not expanded. Social beings need constraints for without them we
cannot exist. Few lawyers except those who have been gulled by
the theorists of legal positivism look upon the law as a restraint.
Rather, we have created it to facilitate our choices.9 66
We have then the task of choosing-to the extent that choice
is available-the constraints under which we shall pursue our hap-
piness or whatever we choose to pursue. The only way such con-
straints can be established is through the political process.
We have made a beginning with the passage of the FWPCA.
Now it must be implemented. It seems clear to me that the Ad-
ministrator of the Environmental Protection Agency will never
come up with an optimal implementation plan. I do not see why
he should bother to look for one. What is needed is a workable
and simple set of limitations which will allow us the freedom to
carry out our individual pursuits without miring each other down
in our muck and offal.
I have one other suggestion. If we are to search for answers
to our social and existential conundra, or even partial answers, we
need some science, or some wisdom, that, unlike welfare economics,
denies neither the ambivalence of our nature nor the complexity of
the world. Consider the following proposition:
Like Arjuna faltering on the Field of Righteousness, the
individual is forced to make imperfect choices based on
irreconcilable loyalties-between the "rights" and "duties"
of self and those of family, tribe, and other units of
selection, each of which evolves its own code of honor.
No wonder the human spirit is in constant turmoil. Arjuna
966. See, e.g., 1 F. HAYsx, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBrvTY 107 (1973):
The understanding that "good fences make good neighbors," that is,
that men can use their own knowledge in the pursuit of their own
ends without colliding with each other only if clear boundaries can
be drawn between their respective domains of free action, is the
basis on which all known civilization has grown.... Law, liberty,
and property are inseparable....
(Footnote omitted.) See also id. at 108-09: "The maximal certainty of ex-
pectations which can be achieved in a society in which individuals are allowed
to use their knowledge of constantly changing circumstances for their equally
changing purposes. is secured by rules which tell everyone which of these
circumstances must not be attended by others and which he himself must not
attend." Cf., Perry, Liberty in a Democratic State, in FREEDOM: ITS MEAnNG
265, 288 (R. Anshon ed. 1940): "The most serious hinderance to a man's
interest is the rival interest of his neighbor, and the remedy lies in the system-
atic delimitation of interests. There is a greater liberty to be enjoyed through
the acceptance of such delimitation than through the claim of limitlessness...."
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agonized, "Restless is the mind, 0 Krishna, turbulent,
forceful, and-stubborn; I think it no more easily controlled
than is the wind." And Krishna replied, 'For one who is
uncontrolled, I agree the Rule is hard to attain; but by
the obedient spirits who will strive for it, it may be won
by following the proper way." . . . I- [have] suggested
that a science of sociobiology, if coupled with neuro-
physiology, might transform the insights of ancient reli-
gions into a precise account of the evolutionary origin of
ethics and hence explain the reasons why we make cer-
tain moral choices instead of others at particular times.
Whether such understanding will then produce the Rule
remains to be seen. 67
Perhaps there can be an answer; perhaps there is a Rule. If
there be such it is not the sterile way of the Pareto optimality
that exhorts its followers to the most rigorous denial of the most
human of emotions-jealousy and altruism, love and envy. Even a
partial, temporary answer will depend not on the selfish certainties
of monadic robots jerking through the model of an efficient market
but on our human, social imaginations. Human good resides in
something other than the maximization of economic goods. Surely
the value of our lives lies in their living, not in the accumulations
of material goods that attach themselves to us from time to time.
If we truly seek an optimal world, we should seek one in which
we can lead good lives and guide ourselves to become better men.
One of the greatest and most mathematical of living economists
has concluded in his search for a theory by which society may
choose its constitutions, its fundamental structures:
One type of interpersonal comparison to be found in
the most ancient ethical writings has yet to receive sig-
nificant expression and formalization in political and eco-
nomic contexts. It is exemplified, in perhaps an extreme
form, by an inscription supposedly found in an English
graveyard.
Here lies Martin Engelbrodde,
Ha'e mercy on my soul, Lord God
As I would do were I Lord God,
And Thou wert Martin Engelbrodde.
The principle of extended sympathy as a basis for
interpersonal comparisons seems basic to many of the
welfare judgments made in ordinary practice. But it is
967. E. WusoN, SOCIOBIOLOGY, THE NEW SYNTHESIS 129 (1975).
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not easy to see how to construct a theory of social choice
from this principle.968
It may be difficult to take into account in a mathematical analysis
that "[n]o man is an fland, intire of itselfe," 96 9 but we know it to
be true. If we deny our natures in pursuit of a Pareto optimum,
we shall pay a grievous price. Everyone may even be worse off.
And as to the waters:
"By the rivers of Babylon there we sat down, yea, we
wept .. ."970
968. K. ARuow, THE PROBLEM OF SocALt CHOICE 114-15 (1962).
969. Donne, Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions XVII, quoted by Mr.
Justice Blackmun in the dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 760
n.2 (1972).
970. Psalms 137 (King James).
